

EDITED BY

JULIAN
LINDLEY-FRENCH

YVES
BOYER

The Oxford Handbook *of* WAR

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

WAR

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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

WAR

Edited by

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

and

YVES BOYER

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In Memoriam Olivier Debouzy and Antoine Lecerf

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Foreword

War is now regarded by 'civilized' societies as an exceptional, indeed a pathological condition, to be studied only in order to be prevented. But throughout most of human history war has been accepted as entirely *normal*: as normal as famine, poverty, and disease. Peace, when it has existed at all, was only a temporary and precarious interval between recovery from the last war and preparation for the next. Prolonged peace was made possible only by the existence of empires strong enough to impose their will internally and defend themselves externally over generations. When their capacity to do so disappeared, the *pax imperium* disappeared with them.

The creation and maintenance of peace demanded a far greater degree of political skill than did the waging of war. It still does. But since on the successful waging of war depended the prosperity and independence, if not the very survival, of political communities, those groups who proved most adept at it tended to dominate their societies. In order to wage war more effectively societies developed increasingly complex forms of political organization; in Europe evolving from tribal to feudal structures, from feudal to monarchical, and eventually from monarchical to the bureaucratic-national states that by the end of the nineteenth century divided Europe between them and today make up the global political system in which we live.

In Judaeo-Christian eschatology, 'perpetual peace' has always been seen as requiring divine intervention. The belief that it can be created as the result of purely human endeavour dates back no earlier than the 'Enlightenment' in eighteenth-century Europe. The Enlightenment was itself the consequence of a period of political stability and economic prosperity that resulted, exceptionally, not from imperial rule, but from the development of states whose elites shared a common culture, and the emergence within them of *philosophes* who questioned the necessity for war at all and attributed its existence to those who profited by waging it. As the basis for political consent broadened, so they believed, the necessity for war would evaporate, and peace would become ubiquitous and eternal. Like famine, disease, and poverty, war could be abolished by rational planning and endeavour.

The next two centuries did little to justify these assumptions. Famine, disease, and poverty were indeed slowly mastered in the more fortunate parts of the world. But war, so far from dying out, became infinitely more terrible—so terrible indeed that by the mid-twentieth century the development of nuclear weapons made it likely that, so far from ensuring the survival of political communities, war would result in their mutual and total destruction. This has led industrialized states to redouble their efforts to avoid internecine warfare, but their efforts cannot resolve all the global political and ideologi-

cal conflicts, international or domestic, that seem insoluble except by armed struggle. Indeed, in consequence of the political confusion into which the world has been thrown as the ideals of the Enlightenment have become global, dissolving traditional political loyalties and creating new communities demanding statehood, armed conflict in one form or another has become increasingly hard to avoid.

By slow degrees a global community may be coming into being whose members share the common culture and degree of rationality needed to resolve all their conflicts without recourse to armed force. Meanwhile, war in one form or another is likely to persist, if only between those who profit from a stable and peaceful world in spite of its imperfections, and those who do not. A 'Handbook to War' is thus needed, not so much by those responsible for waging or aspiring to abolish it, but for everyone interested in understanding the world into which they have been born and in which they hope to survive.

Professor Sir Michael Howard

Oxford University
September 2011

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The editors need to thank more people than can possibly be mentioned. Equally, there are people who must be conspicuously thanked for their unstinting support in the preparation of what has been an enormous effort on the part of many.

Professor Sir Michael Howard gave of his time to write the Foreword for an old Oxford student who listened in awe to his breadth of both knowledge and wisdom in his study in All Souls College, Oxford. The book is graced with his Foreword and the editors hope the book in some small way honours Sir Michael for his efforts over many years to squeeze sense out of academic stones.

Dominic Byatt, Elizabeth Suffling, and Sarah Parker at Oxford University Press have been a constant source of support, advice, and encouragement. It has been a real pleasure to work with such a professional team, who are now as much friends as colleagues.

Our respective wives, Corine and Isabelle, have tolerated and supported their rather mad husbands as they have used this book to explore the Anglo-French relationship to the full, albeit thankfully fortified with French liquid culture, rather than British. Whilst we both understand war somewhat better after the experience, we certainly better understand each other. Above all, we much appreciate two partners who believed in both the project and the pair of us from the outset and maintained that belief throughout the intellectual rambling that marked the long road to this book.

However, we must reserve special thanks for our forty-six senior and very busy authors all over the world who gave of their time so generously and made this book into a unique piece of literature that combines high-level insight, knowledge, and experience in a manner never before tried.

We thank you all.

Julian Lindley-French
Alphen, Netherlands

Yves Boyer
Blois, France

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INTRODUCTION

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH AND YVES BOYER

> Only the dead have seen the end of war.
>
> Plato
>
> All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.
>
> Edmund Burke
>
> Orator, philosopher, and politician (1729–97)

Introduction

Understanding change and continuity in the broad domain that is war is the mission of *The Oxford Handbook on War*. It is thus a study of a political, military, and social phenomenon that seems destined sadly to scar the twenty-first century, much as it did the twentieth. To consider war in the round, therefore, the book brings together some of the most respected senior academics, policy-makers, and practitioners to consider two simple questions that challenged the ancients, such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu—how to avoid war, but if war must be fought, how to end it quickly? The Handbook is indeed a book of global scope and ambition, spanning scholars and practitioners alike. As such the contrasting traditions of thought apparent in the work are also reflected in the different modes of expression that can be found herein. That is a key strength of the volume and we have therefore made every effort to adhere as closely as possible to the style of expression sought by each author.

Whilst systemic war is happily absent from today's world the scale of contemporary conflict suggests that Plato was indeed correct when he said (or was purported to have said) that only the dead have seen the end of war. Indeed, if there is a core message from this book it is the following: war cannot be wished away but nor is it inevitable. War is unpredictable.

War will continue to be prepared for, but few states will actively seek it. However, when war starts the only consequence that is inevitable is the unintended. Still, there remains a fatalistic quality to war, even in the twenty-first century. Be it human nature so critiqued by Hobbes or the flawed international system of flawed states so analysed by the likes of Carr, Morgenthau, and Waltz, war is deep in the human psyche. Indeed, born of a potent cocktail of partnership, aspiration, friction, need, instability, and conflict, for all the post-modern will to wish war away it is still so often the dangerously classical reality that is war which prevails as the most compelling change agent in human affairs.

Therefore, the need for war to be better understood, not just from one political, cultural, or technical angle, but from many, pertains and persists. Thus, *The Oxford Handbook on War* purposely seeks to bring together many different and differing perspectives and experiences to consider war. As the American theorist Graham T. Allison once famously said, 'Where one stands, depends on where one sits.'

The Handbook is divided into ten analyses of war: the fundamental causes of war; the moral and legal aspects of war; theories on the practice of war; the strategic conduct of war; non-Western ways of war; the military conduct of war; technology, economy, industry, and war; civil–military cooperation and war; war and society; and, finally, the future of war. Whilst contemporary war and its ugly sister conflict certainly inform the Handbook it deliberately takes a 'helicopter view' by seeking to identify durable and enduring fundamentals. As such, this is a reference work in which there is no central narrative, but rather a series of perspectives on key elements and aspects of war. Certainly, the Handbook is designed to be read as a book by those interested in the subject; but it can also simply be dipped into by the interested student as and when the need arises. The purpose of this Introduction is thus to offer the student informed vignettes of each chapter.

The Fundamental Causes of War

What causes war? The opening section of the Handbook explores the political, economic, and social drivers of war, as well as the ideological and systemic imperatives that create the conditions for war. The authors collectively consider how tensions become war, how power, threat, and interests are calculated, and the criteria for the launching of war. For Sir Lawrence Freedman wars of any length invariably lead to unintended consequences. Indeed, whilst war is on the one hand a purposive activity, geared to the demands of personal, group, and national identity and security, it also concerns the grim consequences of those purposes being followed to a destructive end. War has thus always been as much about conflict within states as between states. Moreover, there can be no war without acts of warfare. Hew Strachan reinforces the tenuous link between intention and consequence by suggesting that whilst the Age of Reason saw strategy more as science than art such ancient and often geometrical certainties contrast with a today in which science and art, strategy and tactics are often confused. Paradoxically and critically, strategy

(of which war should be a most-considered part) is ultimately more important for those in decline who must match ends and means. For Strachan there is a profound contrast between those who seek strategy and thus war as an agent of change and those who seek stability to defend a status quo.

George-Henri Soutou is to the point; war, history, and the objectives of war are intrinsically linked because an understanding of previous wars (well-grounded or not) plays a powerful role in preparing for the next crisis and indeed future conflict. As Soutou poignantly says, 'Wonderfully prepared for the last war' described France in 1940 but could equally apply to many other countries in different places and eras and may be no less eloquent today in explaining why states seem unable to adjust effectively to change. Christopher Coker, on the other hand, emphasizes what for him is a dangerous disconnect between a 'modern' past and a post-modern future. For Coker war has traditionally reflected a fundamental Hegelian principle: the idea that man could become free through his own efforts. However, what is post-modernity if not a response to the unfulfilled promises and thwarted hopes of the modern era and thus recognition that there can be no final resolution to the dilemmas of life? War may thus still be necessary, but it is no longer redeeming. Therefore, in the collision between the modern and post-modern worlds war has become a potentially futile effort at the risk management of a global disorder that has become the norm.

For Yves Boyer alliances are diverse: at their most simple providing supplementary forces to balance a hostile power, to offer 'a positive correlation of forces against the unknown', or a formal coalition against an opposing country or group of countries. Alliances also exist across both strategy and geography, having shape as well as function designed to achieve diplomatic gains or successful military outcomes. By their very nature alliances therefore range in both scope and role, from mere entanglements to the most compelling of formal agreements (e.g. NATO during the Cold War). Alliances are at their most efficient when political preconditions and modus operandi reflect positive political will unconstrained by 'any kind of unfriendly pressures'. Such 'plasticity of the concept of alliance' explains the duration of many pacts throughout history beyond the initial *casus belli*. However, the very efficiency of NATO has gradually led to the debatable notion that a shared belief in democratic institutions is as important to the Alliance as effective military organization. It is an evolution in the concept of alliance that is today proving increasingly and unexpectedly inconvenient to the allies.

Alfredo Valladão is the first author to take us beyond the concerns and concepts of the West and looks at war from the point of view of emerging powers. Such powers by and large lack the strategic culture that the heirs of Machiavelli take as read. For Valladão such powers are fundamentally defensive and essentially parochial, and only keen to make sure that international relations favour their national 'emergence'. Still uncertain in the exercise of 'influence', their strategy is concerned primarily with the need to prevent any impediment to their 'rise'. Instinctively conservative as international actors whilst the peaceful pursuit of power and wealth favours them, systemic war is seen by such powers as extremely dangerous.

The Moral and Legal Aspects of War

Is war ever justified or legal? The chapters on the moral and legal aspects of war consider the changing nature and perception of war. Can war indeed be just in the modern age and what is the state and nature of the moral debate on war? The section takes as its starting point the legal concept of war and the changing nature of legality and legitimacy in relation to war over time and in different states and cultures. Paul Schulte challenges the assumption that warfare is the most ruthlessly amoral of all human activities or a field of human endeavour in which, notoriously, everything is fair. Rather, he suggests that some ethically positive description of organized violence is fundamental to societies' ability to accept war as a legitimate collective activity.

For Serge Sur international law and the UN Charter are perpetually at risk when rules and mechanisms are not able to prevent or control the threat or use of armed force by states, and ill-suited to dealing with new and unforeseen forms of conflicts. In implicit agreement with Coker, Sur questions the utility of traditional instruments in a new age. Moreover, the classical *jus ad bellum*, or right of a state to use armed force beyond its own borders, has been strongly reduced, and strangely reduced with their consent. Consequently, wars have not vanished but rather new types of conflict have emerged with the power to overwhelm and circumvent traditional legal prohibitions. Consequently, there is today revived interest in the *jus in bello* and the fashioning of law applicable to all forms of war or armed conflicts. For that reason Sur questions the continued relevance of the UN Charter and focuses rather on efforts to strengthen international humanitarian law, which remains weak.

Theories on the Practice of War

How is war conceived and perceived? Is Clausewitz still relevant or does a post-modern alternative exist and if so to what extent is the theory of war evolving? Colonel Benoit Durieux asserts that theory is both descriptive and political. For Colonel Durieux, in the theory of war one can find both the very idea of war and the means for its prevention. Indeed, whatever form war takes it should only be thought of, prepared for, and anticipated precisely so that it can be shortened, and if possible avoided. It is precisely within that framework that Ambassador Alyson Bailes considers the strategic object of war. Specifically, she examines the extent to which both conceptually and practically Western powers are shifting their 'strategic attention' to 'asymmetric' threats that range from international terrorism to the illicit spread of mass destruction technologies, both of which she considers transnational phenomena par excellence and thus indicative of the current age in which the relationship between the size of an actor and its ability to inflict damage is changing. The result is a new doctrine which can loosely be described

as Western extended self-defence. However, for such a doctrine to be remotely credible given the nature of the threat, new priorities and linkages must be established at the level of defence doctrine and macro-planning. This in turn will require national security strategies that demonstrably and publicly re-establish the essential relationship between cause and effect and critically between strategy, policy, capability, and cost.

The late Olivier Debouzy offers a sobering, modernist analysis of contemporary dangers. For Debouzy conventional war is a terrible reality. However, it is terrible precisely because such war is in and of itself one of the surest routes to a nuclear war which is being rendered more likely by the steady pace of nuclear proliferation. For those that seek such power short of war itself, intimidation and blackmail, supported, explicitly or not, by military means, were repeatedly used during the twentieth century by states aiming to challenge the existing international order either as a substitute for war, or more often, as preparation for it. Given nuclear deterrence is now a global phenomenon it is likely that Western powers will have to reinvest in armed force in all its forms, even in an age of austerity, if a credible balance between deterrence and defence is to be re-established.

Christian Malis considers unconventional forms of warfare and establishes three criteria. First, the target is not the conventional armed forces of the enemy, but rather its population, will, and resources. Second, the legal status of the 'fighters' has become (and is becoming) complex and unclear, be they irregulars, pure civilians, or criminals (or a possible combination of all three). This makes the twin notions of 'enemy' and 'threat' a challenge in itself. Third, the willingness of such 'combatants' to use weapons capable of damaging or destroying non-military targets blurs the traditional boundaries between war, conflict, and violence. It is this hitherto vain search of the West to define such actors and thus appropriate and proportionate response that Ambassador Robert Hunter challenges. For Hunter the term 'terrorism' has become one of the most common, overworked, and least well-defined and understood in the lexicon of war. Indeed, the phenomenon of terrorism, or more precisely the many different phenomena that comprise terrorism, are for Hunter too often lumped together under an injudicious and inaccurate single term that makes harder the understanding of the many forms, aims, and styles such actors adopt. Terrorism at root is about the stimulation of fear, in particular intense fear, and however unpalatable terrorism within warfare is, it must be seen as an essentially political act in which the element of deliberation is crucial.

The Strategic Conduct of War

How is war led, organized, and managed? This section examines the role, utility, and organization of war as a strategic tool and thus the relationship between power and effect. As such it considers how war is seen at the supreme political level, the role it plays in the formulation of foreign and security policy, and the relationship between the conduct of war and national strategy. For Julian Lindley-French, state war still concerns the achievement of national political aims and the organization of all national means

to that end. Consequently, strategic leadership must remain above the fighting of war even if maintaining an essential distance is the hardest of political challenges for leaders unschooled in war. Too much interference in military strategy can result in disasters such as Gallipoli in which the military strategy underpinning 'grand strategy' was beyond the means and wit of the military. However, too little interference can also result in disasters, such as Verdun and the Somme, where the military gradually acts beyond the control and mandate of national strategy. Effective strategic leadership thus rests upon consistent and informed strategic judgements and a close and mutually reinforcing relationship between political leaders and their security and military practitioners.

As a former Chairman of British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Sir Paul Lever emphasizes the vital importance of sound actionable intelligence to the strategic conduct of war and the sound judgements that must necessarily inform such leadership. However seductive in their scope and reach, all sources of secret intelligence have their advantages and drawbacks and must be subject to constant and rigorous assessment. Ignoring intelligence indicators can be fatal for the conduct of war, but so too can reliance on intelligence alone. Moreover, the greater availability of intelligence in real time will pose increasing challenges for practitioners, as will the blurring of boundaries between war, conflict, and crime, which will itself promote the need for closer links between intelligence and knowledge.

For General Jean-Louis Georgelin, a former Chief of the French Defence Staff, it is precisely at the nexus between intelligence and knowledge where the vital shared vision must be established between political and military leaders. Military commanders must of course understand and support the political vision, but at the same time political leaders must understand the constraints of armed force. Indeed, in a communications age in which all conflict is apparently 'strategic' and at the same time intimate, the need for the operational level of war to be understood at the political level is all the greater. A former senior official at the British Ministry of Defence, William Hopkinson, takes this theme further when he considers the management of war. For Hopkinson future wars will probably not call for the management of all national means on the same scale as the great wars of the last century. However, major, complex, and successful modern war will require special and dedicated means to better assist political leaderships to arrive at appropriate, timely, and informed decisions, and to have those decisions implemented and consequences monitored, measured, and effectively reported.

Non-Western Ways of War

Are there different ways to fight wars? To avoid the Handbook marching in the linear(-ish) direction of Western forms of violent 'rationality' this section looks at non-Western ways of war. Whilst not in any way a scientific survey of the 'other' the section purposively seeks out different perspectives and this affords the reader a pause for thought. All the authors concerned emphasize the move away from a Europe-centric world into one in which Asian stability is the strategic hub around which much of global

security in the twenty-first century will rotate. Major war, if it is to start anywhere, could thus well start in the Asia-Pacific region.

For Isabelle Facon the Russians' belief in the fundamentally human nature of war leads them to reject the 'over-technologization' of war characteristic of Western thinking. Russian military specialists tend rather to emphasize their own national military experience in the post-Soviet era, which has been mainly that of counterinsurgency warfare and local conflicts in Russia's periphery (and beyond) and little resemble the high-tech ambitions of the US military, albeit ambitions which have been tempered by the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, Moscow's observation that other great military powers are also finding it difficult to deal effectively with asymmetric threats and irregular warfare despite their technological superiority seems to have 'relaxed' the Russian military leadership about their relative strength compared to that of the West. For Facon this could make it easier for sustained international cooperation to be established between Russia and the West, albeit cooperation that will always be both pragmatic and realistic given the underlying current of suspicion that remains in Russia about the motives and reliability of the West as a partner.

Chinese General Peng Guang Qian reminds the reader that whilst much of the West wallows in the semantics of post-modernism, much of the world beyond is decadently modern. He offers a survey of Chinese thinking about war both old and new. He also establishes the first principles of the Chinese way of war, which is to ensure the freedom of initiative in war. This goal is itself based on the belief that all wars must utilize China's many strong points to attack any potential enemy's weak points. Paradoxically, the Chinese way of war is thus essentially defensive and regional although military power can and must be used to further the aims of Chinese national strategy.

The contrast between General Peng Guang Qian and Japanese Vice-Admiral Fumio Ota's analysis is at times clear and sobering. Ota captures a Japan that is beginning to move beyond its post-1945 role, which emphasized regional self-defence, to consider Tokyo's wider role in the international community and alongside other democratic nations. Indeed, Ota skilfully captures the very essence of security globalization in this chapter as Japan firmly identifies its interests with those of other 'Western' states. Whilst Western countries (often involuntarily) have been expanding towards the east, into areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gulf of Aden, China, India, and Japan have been expanding their activities towards the west into the Arabian Sea, Iraq, and the Gulf of Aden. However, the Japanese military posture remains fundamentally defensive, with the use of armed forces beyond Japan's borders reliant on a UN mandate and a clear humanitarian mission.

The Military Conduct of War

How are wars fought? In 2010 US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the categories of warfare are blurring and can no longer be fitted into neat, tidy boxes. Gates argued that new tools and tactics of destruction are being employed simultaneously in

what he called hybrid forms of warfare. Consequently, both the nature of warfare today and its organization and conduct are by their very nature complex. It is this theme of difficult operations in complex places that underpins much of the debate in this section. For Lieutenant General Andrew Graham, the former Director-General of the United Kingdom Defence Academy, contemporary and future military operations on all but the most limited scale and at the lowest level of intensity will almost certainly be conducted on a joint basis (i.e. air, land, and sea forces) and by coalitions. Exploiting the potential for coalition action as the instrument of necessity in the future international security landscape demands that the requirement to generate international resolve and support and foster unity of purpose cannot simply be left to commanders in theatre. Echoing Lindley-French, Graham emphasizes the vital importance of resolute political leaders willing and able to develop and maintain all-important political relationships, build trust, and engage with partners. Critically, an understanding of the complex dynamics and nuances of working in partnership with other nations and militaries is therefore essential for the successful conduct of war as an instrument of national policy in the twenty-first-century world.

Within that context the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff General Peter Van Uhm and Dr Ben Schoenmaker reinforce the essential and enduring importance of good and effective leadership, albeit at the military-strategic level. Indeed, the relationship between the political and military dimensions of conflict is the fundamental prerequisite for success. Moreover, the most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership, which in this day and age must also be established on a strong ethical dimension, because the reason for engagement is as important as the method of engagement. To that end, the relationship between the leader and the led must be established on mutual trust and respect. In addition the authors argue that in today's (and tomorrow's) amorphous conflicts military leaders must have the versatility of mind to adapt quickly to the constantly changing circumstances in which they operate.

The British Chief of Defence Staff General Sir David Richards takes up this theme when he considers the complex relationship between contemporary leadership and field command. Today's field commander must deal with a range of actors—governments both at home and in theatre, international agencies, coalition partners, non-governmental organizations, and local people (to name but a few). The command task requires as much tact and diplomacy as classical command authority. Indeed, unable any longer to simply give orders in the manner of, say, an eighteenth-century aristocrat, today's field commander must influence, cajole, and coordinate, at the centre of an 'entrepreneurial' network in which he is more communicator than dictator. Influence is the critical element for a successful commander, with soldiers having to be prepared to play a political role outside their military mandate, particularly if no one else is prepared to perform such a role, and commanders willing to listen to the experience of the most simple of Privates.

Echoing Sir David's fusion of the classical and post-modern, Rob de Wijk suggests that so-called hybrid warfare is not as new as often suggested. Moreover, due to enduring asymmetries in strength between Western armed forces and their adversaries it will be the defining relationship in war and conflict for much of the twenty-first century.

So-called hybrid wars will thus likely remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Certainly, in the absence of an existential threat to the Western democracies most of them will seek to avoid using excessive force, placing much emphasis on issues of proportionality of response. This runs counter to much of the thinking of the ancients but does chime with the idea of 'just war'. This preference for minimum violence also creates a dilemma for leaders and commanders. Indeed, given the need to devolve authority to commanders in the field the democracies will constantly face a dilemma over the nature of force and its use, which will often be played out in domestic political debate.

Dealing with complexity is a fact of life for contemporary commanders but all military success is based on getting the right military capability to the right place at the right time. Indeed, even in the face of complex contingencies NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff, argues for the importance of seeking to maintain a balanced military capability. Equally, at a time when defence budgets are under enormous pressure, a truly balanced capability is a luxury few can afford. Therefore, hard choices will have to be made, placing a particular premium on identifying and planning for enduring trends, itself difficult in a 'kaleidoscope' of conventional and irregular warfare, with terrorism, insurgency, and criminal activity all part of dynamic hybrid conflict. This places a particular premium on new approaches and partnerships. Partnerships between civilians and military in a theatre of war is not new but of increased and increasing importance.

Colonel Gian P. Gentile of the US Army reinforces the challenge and hard choices faced by both political and military leaders over the future shape and nature of armed forces when discussing counterinsurgency operations. He rightly defines counterinsurgency as a campaign in which a foreign government occupies the land of another government with full or partial support from the host nation and attempts to rebuild or build a state. Indeed, modern counterinsurgency at its heart is state-building. However, whilst the United States believes the future will involve the likelihood of more Iraqs and Afghanistans, future war also holds the possibility for major state-on-state war and that must not be forgotten in the planning of the future force. Moreover, after the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan few allied governments have the political stomach for more enduring engagements with little possibility of a clear and successful outcome.

In support of the Shirreff thesis that effective military operations normally involve putting the right force in the right place at the right time and ensuring they have the means to succeed in their mission, Matthew Uttley and Christopher Kinsey place defence logistics at the heart of fighting power. Indeed, Second World War US General Omar Bradley once famously said that whilst amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics. Helpfully, Uttley and Kinsey define fighting power as determining what military force can and must be delivered to an operational theatre, the time it will take to deliver such force, the scale and scope of forces that can be supported once there, and the tempo of operations. However, today logisticians face an array of challenges in matching military means to military ambition, the most obvious of which is often the vagueness of the threat and the uncertainty about scope and duration of operations that inevitably dominate the logistician's environment, particularly in contemporary conflict.

Military force is itself made up of distinct land, sea, and air components even if attempts are made to create a seamless or joint force. The late French General Antoine Lecerf emphasizes the strategic significance of land warfare, which has proved the key factor in the history of conflicts for two reasons. Firstly, the use of land forces demonstrates the determination of a society or state to achieve a decisive political objective. Secondly, only land forces are capable of capturing, occupying, and holding a position, thus maintaining a presence on the ground for as long as necessary. For Lecerf enduring military success will require adherence to three critical principles: freedom of action; concentration of effort; and economy of means—all of which place land forces at the centre of military strategy. Supporting the Lecerf thesis Admiral Lord West, a former First Sea Lord of Britain's Royal Navy and a former Security Minister, contends that the purpose of maritime warfare is ultimately to affect outcomes on land. After all, the majority of human activity on the planet, economic and political, occurs within two hundred miles (320 km) inland from the coast because that is where most people live. Moreover, to seaward human maritime activity is generally confined to within two hundred miles of the coast. It is precisely this 400-mile corridor of land and sea where decisive outcomes in war will be achieved and must be planned for, in a zone that is increasingly characterized as the 'seam'.

Air Commodore Frans Osinga of the Royal Netherlands Air Force flies a slightly different course. For Osinga current air operations in places such as Afghanistan sound a warning for the future conduct of operations, demonstrating both the advantages and dangers of rapid technology development. Redolent of the De Wijk thesis, Osinga argues that the need to create proper political and military strategic preconditions for the use of modern armed forces will be critical, with air power as the cutting edge of such efforts. Indeed, given the technology imperative that has so seduced leaders and commanders alike, the need for such preconditions are of ever greater importance if the relationship between strategy, technology, and military effect is to be safely understood and, of course, successfully applied.

Colonel Ton De Munnik of the Royal Netherlands Army moves beyond strategy and hardware to consider so-called 'human software' and the critical importance of effective defence education. The uncertainty of missions in fragile or failed states and the requirement to educate officers with civilian counterparts is leading to the acceptance by commanders of the need for a scientifically-based academic approach to defence education that goes beyond mere training. Knowing and knowing how to know is thus a vital piece of military 'kit', and defence and military academies must be reformed to serve such an end.

Technology, Economy, Industry, and War

Can war be afforded? Central to the contemporary debate in most states is the affordability of war together with all its associated paraphernalia. The interaction between the economy, technology, and industry is, thus, carefully considered, with implications for wider society that go well beyond the needs of armed forces.

For Colonel Michel Goya of the French Army, technology demonstrates the paradox of Western military power in the contemporary world. With aging populations and failing economies it is technology that the West relies on to offset its relative weakness. One would expect such pressures, allied to the change in the nature of warfare, to lead to the reform and remodelling of Western military doctrine as it pertains to the use of technology. However, in spite of clear deficiencies there appears little appetite for such change, particularly in Europe, where the focus remains on success on the conventional battlefield. Urgent change is therefore needed to establish new military paradigms, and the first consideration should be the limits of technology in war.

Xavier Pasco takes that debate to a higher dimension when he considers the role of space technologies in war. For Pasco, throughout the recent history of space activity the link between space technologies and military activities has been based on the strategic needs at any given moment of the military end-user. Equally, since the end of the Cold War the military use of space has been constantly changing and under constant review, leading to new questions about the relationships between technology and legality and the very place and role of space in war.

In 'Affording War: The British Case', Chris Donnelly, Commander Simon Atkinson of the Royal Navy, and Julian Lindley-French confirm that the main linkage in affording war is the relationship between war and the economy, or rather the cost of war and the strategic investment in armed forces. It is a truism that has stood the test of time and yet is extremely hard to judge, particularly during times of relative peace when there are so many other claims on the national exchequer. Demonstrating the value of defence investment in peace—the mantra of Value for Money—is indeed akin to proving a negative—if war does not happen to what extent is it due to defence investment? Since time immemorial British governments have grappled with this question and just about managed to balance strategy and affordability. However, such is the severity of the financial crisis Britain faces that the strategic linkage could be broken for the first time in perhaps four hundred years. For Heinz Schulte this challenge is compounded by the relationship between industry and war which can be summarized thus: technological innovation is insufficient if it lacks a broad and robust industrial base; equally, a broad and robust industrial base is inadequate if it lacks technological innovation and inspirational input from non-military industry.

Former European Defence Agency chief Nick Witney deals with the critical issue of affordability head on. Governments need equipment, goods, and services for their armed forces—and generally aim, as in normal commercial procurement, to secure good quality, prompt delivery, and reasonable price. But procurement for war is bedevilled by the special circumstances of defence: secrecy, innate conservatism, vested interests (of politicians, industry, and the armed forces themselves), and introverted bureaucracies. The result is the litany of procurement fiascos and equipment deficiencies familiar in all the major military nations, which continue to occur despite repeated reviews and attempts at reform. Yet the effort to get better results through greater transparency, tighter discipline, and cultural change remains imperative; for the price of failure is ultimately paid on the battlefield.

Robert Bell, Special Representative of the US Secretary of Defense in Europe, looks at the procurement challenge from an American perspective and by and large agrees with Witney. Equally, for Bell there are positive developments: be it the traditional equipment manufacturing side of defence industries, or service and supply contractors, the cost overruns and bloated contracts that were funded by the taxpayer during the early 2000s are now a thing of the past. This is because governments on both sides of the Atlantic are demanding far more value for money as public finances face unprecedented pressures, which will likely lead in time to further consolidation and much needed competition.

Civil-Military Cooperation and War

Can civilians and soldiers fight wars and win peace together? A theme running throughout the Handbook concerns the changing and emerging relationship between civilians and soldiers on both the battlefield and beyond and the extent to which such civil-military cooperation is critical to success. Equally, the sheer complexity of moving the so-called civil-military relationship beyond the theoretical and rhetorical towards the practical and operational is also apparent. Paul Cornish suggests that civil-military cooperation goes beyond the merely pragmatic. The requirement for civilian control has its roots in the liberal democratic ideal that there should be a close and constraining relationship between the civil and the military. Traditionally the liberal model of civilian control has been based on three core propositions: a clear hierarchy; the effective organization of bespoke agencies and actors within the civil-military relationship; and exclusivity in the relationship between official civilians and the military. In the early twenty-first century, however, challenges to national security have become more complex and urgent and it has become progressively more difficult to define security narrowly, leading to the need for a more informal relationship between civilians and soldiers in war.

Julian Lindley-French, Paul Cornish, and Andrew Rathmell in a sense demonstrate the truism of the Cornish thesis in their analysis of civil-military operations. In essence, if such cooperation is to work (and the jury is still out) the efficient generation and use of required resources and political will is critical. Strategic patience will also be vital. However, such cooperation could well fail if essential relationships with 'unofficial' civilians are not matched by the necessary flexibility and aptitude to adapt to new ways of fighting wars and winning peace. US National Defense University's Hans Binnendijk and Jacqueline Carpenter look at civil-military cooperation from a novel civilian angle. The consensus in the US government and across the NATO Alliance is that most future conflicts will resemble those of the past decade, requiring close civil-military planning and cooperation. However, whilst the United States has established policies and doctrine to address the need for a civilian 'surge' in line with and supportive of the military effort,

Washington still struggles to turn these decisions into actionable operational concepts and genuine capabilities because there simply are not enough civilian specialists. This problem is even more acute for the European allies where the concept of a civilian surge is more theoretical than actual.

War and Society

Are modern societies able to fight wars? The climax of the Handbook is a discussion about the changing nature of war and the changing nature of society and the very changed relationship that is already apparent between society and war since 1945. If war is an act of elemental violence, as Clausewitz would have it, war is also an act of societal violence. The relationship between war and contemporary societies thus essentially concerns the extent to which war is understood by wider society, society's resiliency in the face of war, and the way that the story of war is told. Radha Kumar points out that whilst the impact of war on populations can be extreme, the impact of populations on war can be equally profound. The changing scale, nature, and needs of populations is such that managing systemic change will be vital if human need is not to drive conflict in human security and lead in time to systemic war. The fate of the individual and the state are thus ever more closely bound together.

NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General Jamie Shea, with long experience in NATO of managing the official narrative of war, pulls no punches when he says that even the most successful and justifiable of military campaigns requires more and more hard sell to an ever more sceptical society. Effective 'strategic' communications are thus vital. Indeed, no contemporary war effort is today complete without its Media Operations Centre, staffed by dozens of specialists working on the Events Grid, the Master Messages, Scripts, and Rebuttals. Making war is thus not just policy by other means, but today military campaigning looks ever more like political election campaigning. Indeed, no daily news cycle takes place without its crop of news briefings, backgrounders, or embedded press tours ably directed by spokesmen and 'spin doctors' often drawn from the advertising or PR industries when not from the media itself.

Caroline Wyatt, the BBC's Defence Correspondent, looks at the narrative of war from the journalist's viewpoint. She eloquently captures the relationship between narrative and identity, or rather between what 'we' do and say and who 'we' are. For Wyatt war tells stories about values, national identity, and the place of peoples in the world community. The conduct of war—and how it is reported—can define the very vision a people/nation has of itself, or undermine and destroy that vision. It is for those very powerful reasons that those who fight wars are so keen to keep the chroniclers of conflict and the public onside, whether by use of propaganda, public relations, or media operations. War is after all a drama in which strengths are reflected as are the many weaknesses and foibles to which all societies are subject.

Does War Have a Future?

Does war have a future? Director of the Royal United Services Institute Michael Clarke answers with a sad but inevitable yes. Defining and assessing modern war is certainly not straightforward. However, the intuitive concept of 'war' is alive and well in the contemporary international system and likely to remain so. As Clarke rather succinctly puts it, 'For the powerful, and their allies, therefore, war in the present era is not a declared state of belligerence but a level of organized violence in which they engage, or for which they plan. They do not generally anticipate fighting war, but they nevertheless engage in frequent military operations.'

Only the dead have indeed seen the end of war.

PART I

THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF WAR

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CHAPTER 1

DEFINING WAR

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

> I don't ask *why*, because it is mostly the same.
> Wars happen because the ones who start them
> think they can win.
>
> Margaret Atwood, 'The Loneliness
> of the Military Historian'

I

The etymology of war is intriguing. The Latin word for war, *bellum*, survives when we talk of people inclined to war as being bellicose or belligerent. The wordsmiths of the first millennium, however, considered *bellum* to be inappropriately close to the word for beauty, *bellus*, and so looked for alternatives. An old English word *Gewin*, meaning struggle or strife, was replaced by the German *werran*, which meant something similar, and is linked to *worse*. *Werran* became *weeorre* and then *warre* in English, and *guerre* in French. As originally used it seems to have referred to confusion or discord.

In its origins therefore war is about a miserable condition and that is how it is still commonly and understandably viewed. But it is a condition which is often knowingly entered because not doing so carries its own miseries and dangers. The alternative to war is normally described as 'peace', with positive connotations of harmony and tranquillity. But peace can also involve oppression and subjugation, an incessant fear of attack, inadequate resources for survival, or a lingering sense of dishonour.

This goes to the heart of the issue of war. On the one hand it is about a purposive activity, geared to the demands of personal, group, and national security. On the other it is about the grim consequences of conflict. War is a bad thing to happen but, at least on occasion, a good thing to do. States continue to prepare for war while professing to wish

to legislate it out of existence, promising only to fight for the most righteous of reasons, as a last resort, and in the most civilized manner. Yet when war occurs it often bursts out of the tenuous limits imagined and promised at times of peace. The original rationales for war can soon come to seem irrelevant, overtaken by events, overwhelmed by the unanticipated consequences.

As she explores the meaning of Homer's *Iliad*, 'the most celebrated and enduring of war stories ever told', Caroline Alexander emphasizes the futility, and the losses suffered by all, as the Greeks fought for a decade with the Trojans. The force of the *Iliad*, the story of the reluctant and fated Achilles, lies in the constant reminders of how war makes 'stark the tragedy of mortality'. The victors come to be reviled through their association with the merciless sacking of Troy. They return to a land that had suffered in their absence and after journeys as fraught as the war itself. This story, notes Alexander, 'commemorates a war that established no boundaries, won no territory, and furthered no cause' (Alexander, 2009: 225).

If this was always the case then war would be nothing but tragedy. Yet in practice, if not always as intended, wars have established boundaries, won territories, and furthered causes. It is not true that victory is never without reward, even if measured in terms of terrors avoided. A preference for peace is no defence against a predator who apparently relishes war and seeks malevolent gain. Wars fought well away from home, at a minimum cost, may be looked upon favourably, and the association with tragedy may be diminished. Some cultures may take a stoical attitude to war and accept its pain fatalistically as normal and pre-ordained (Keegan, 1994). Western culture, not at all uniquely, is infused with a keen sense of duality, of war as a terrible thing to happen but on occasion a noble and necessary thing to do.

II

The tension between war's purposes and war's tragedy is at the heart of the conduct—and study—of war. The tension is evident in the persistent efforts to acknowledge war's political function as the ultimate arbiter of disputes while containing it as a social institution and mitigating its harmful effects. The Christian Just War tradition, normally traced back to Augustine of Hippo (354–430), demands not only that a war have just cause, right a serious wrong, be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success and after exhausting peaceful alternatives, but must also be conducted in a just manner, not making matters worse, using force proportionate to the wrong to be righted and sparing non-combatants. Largely drawing on this tradition, there is now a considerable body of law, as well as moral presumption, surrounding war. This can claim some success in establishing normative barriers to casual resort to war and setting standards for its conduct. It leaves war hovering on the border between a crime and a potentially unruly dispute mechanism.

The reason why war is so difficult to contain when it is waged is that the focus has to be on beating the enemy rather than keeping the means proportionate to the desired ends.

This means that the amount of force required is measured against the amount available to the opponent. There are limits to the difference resulting from superior skill and commitment in the application of force. Furthermore, the effort and endurance required by the clash of arms may add to the sense of disproportion by generating intense passions and demands for retribution. To add to the difficulty, the political goals set at the start of a conflict will escalate as a result of events during its course.

This unease about war's character encourages attempts to disguise its presence by the use of euphemisms (campaigns, operations, emergencies, police actions, peace support, humanitarian interventions). Another reason for euphemism, especially in inter-state conflicts, is the issue of declaration. According to Article 1 of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which set down the rules of war, hostilities can 'not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war'. So war requires at least one party to say it is a war. Once war is declared the various obligations war creates come into force. Not declaring war makes it possible to ignore at least some of those obligations. Thus, writing about NATO's operations during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, General Wesley Clark, then the alliance's senior commander, observed that 'we were never allowed to call it a war. But it was, of course' (Clark, 2001: xxiii).

The obligations attendant on a declared war can be substantial. For example, when the British government considered the matter after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 1982 it was soon judged that a declaration, however justified, would be more trouble than it was worth. All Argentinians resident in or carrying on business in British territory could be subjected to a variety of restrictions, up to internment, and the process could lead to the effective abrogation of all contracts involving Argentine nationals, and turn any trading with Argentina into a criminal offence. With a formal state of war not only the states directly involved acquire a distinct legal status but so do those not at war. They become neutrals, a status with its own rights and duties.

A non-declaration of war has thus become more common than a declaration. The last time the United States declared war, for example, was the Second World War, though it had done so four times previously (the War of 1812, the Mexican–American War of 1848, the Spanish–American War of 1898, the First World War). This does not mean that non-declaration makes it possible to neglect the 'rules'. Normative pressures can be as strong as the strictly legal. Even when not declaring war states are still bound by the Geneva Conventions. When it comes to commercial contracts where states of war are relevant courts have learned to take a pragmatic, common-sense view about what constitutes a war. So despite the euphemisms employed by governments to avoid describing armed conflict as wars, when it has come to the Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, that is how they are normally described.

There is no binding legal definition of war, set down in a multilateral treaty, but there is a broad consensus concerning its key elements. According to Oppenheim's classical treatise:

> War is a contention between two or more States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases. (Oppenheim, 1906: 56)

The first part of this definition, on contention, is more straightforward than the second part, on purposes. Later definitions have tended to ignore this aspect, assuming that the violence is purposive rather than random and not requiring tests as to what these purposes might be. The first part of the definition suggests two tests: states are doing the contending and armed forces are being used.

War has always been as likely to be intra-state as inter-state. Recalling Weber's definition of states as monopolizing legitimate violence within their borders, then internally or externally generated challenges to this monopoly are two sides of the same coin (Weber, 2004). Even during the course of inter-state wars at least one party, and possibly both, will seek to stir up discontent and rebellion inside the enemy's territory. Given the range and the types of violence that can take place within states, wars of this sort are even harder to define and describe. This has encouraged the spread of the term to cover any violent conflict, for example between warlords, drug cartels, and even rival urban gangs. Use has spread even further, ignoring the test of violence, to take in conflicts which involve intense hostility but no violence, for example competitive sports. Phrases such as 'war of words' or 'war of nerves' refer to situations displaying all the features of a war except actual violence. Governments often adopt the rhetoric of war when seeking to mobilize public support behind collective action against scourges such as drugs, cancer, and poverty, even though military methods would be wholly inappropriate. This tendency caused great confusion when it came to President George W. Bush declaring a 'war on terror', a scourge which involved violence but could come in many forms and be undertaken for a variety of purposes (Freedman, 2008). This example suggests that a suitable enemy is another test for war. It was possible to fight a war against Al Qaeda but not against a category 'terrorism', whose meaning and boundaries were disputed. Common nouns, as Grenville Byford observed, cannot be defeated. Better to wage wars against proper nouns, 'for the good reason that proper nouns can surrender and promise not to do it again' (Byford, 2002).

Though 'war' will often be adopted as a metaphor whenever a conflict becomes angry or intense, the core meaning depends on the association with purposive violence. Simply put there can be no war without acts of warfare. It is not enough to break diplomatic relations, exert economic pressure, or threaten force without actually doing so (as in a 'cold war'). It is, as Dinstein argued, indispensable that some armed force be employed (Dinstein, 2005: 9–10). War involves organized, purposive violence, undertaken by one wilful group against another.

Without the element of violence the study of war loses all focus. It does not, however, need states. There is no reason why wars between gangs or other organized and semi-organized groups cannot be discussed in similar terms. After all, war pre-dates states and in its earlier forms probably took place as small communities competed over access to fertile land or proximity to water. For the violence to be purposive it must be to a degree strategic. It must be geared to an end other than whatever satisfactions are derived directly from the experience of violence. Street fights, random displays of hostility, or 'letting off steam' do not count. There have always been claims that war appeals to an innate aggression yearning for an outlet, so that claimed purposes may be no more

than pretexts. For some that may be true but if wars are simply viewed as acts of collective psychopathy then they become impossible to comprehend.

War may end up as a chaotic state of affairs but it starts for reasons. It happens because human groups believe that by resorting to armed force they can gain advantage, or at least prevent disadvantage. As conflicts resolved without violence do not count as wars, wars by definition always involve suffering and destruction.

III

The elements of war can be discerned in their most basic form through observations of chimpanzees. They share with humans something rare in the animal world: a readiness to kill other members of their species as part of a group activity. This is more than the expression of an aggressive instinct and quite different from fights between alpha males about the opportunity to mate with females. The character of chimpanzee wars was observed by Jane Goodall in Tanzania in the mid-1970s, when two colonies fought about access to food in a conflict that concluded with the extinction of one colony, and the acquisition of its territory and females (Goodall, 1986). Organization was evident in calls that communicated to individuals a need to come together for defensive purposes, patrolling the territory in contention, moving with stealth and caution, and then waiting patiently and in silence until a potential victim came into view when on the offensive. Goodall observed a readiness to retreat rapidly when faced with superior numbers, even in home territory, and to chase and attack when the odds were with them. The chimpanzees were not rash or heroic. The strategy made sense. With relatively small colonies the loss of an individual made a considerable difference to the local balance of power (Wrangham, 1999).

Purposive violence is about power. It is normal in international politics to talk about 'powers' with measurable economic and military resources. This can be seriously misleading. Superiority in these resources does not guarantee favourable outcomes in all encounters. The contrast between available assets and actual achievement, between putative and actual power, can be stark (Baldwin, 1979: 161–94). Power needs to be considered in two distinct but closely related ways. The first is as a *general capacity*. This is the pot of power, the 'political capital', the collection of resources and attributes drawn upon when seeking to shape events and exert influence. Whether it will be any use in any given encounter cannot be known for sure. So the second way to think of power is as the *specific application* of this general capacity, when the putative becomes actual depending on the skill and strategic insight with which resources are deployed. In the process the general capacity will be transformed. Resources expended may be hard to replenish. At the same time a hard victory may burnish a reputation for toughness and gain respect from others.

Wars can also end inconclusively with a negotiated settlement that gives neither side all it wants, or petering out as all parties retire exhausted. The temptation of war,

however, lies in the possibility of a decisive shift in the balance of power sufficient to affect all future transactions involving the belligerents, and also possibly a wider range of political relationships as others are obliged to acknowledge the strength of the victor. A victory, resulting in opponents being eliminated, subdued, or intimidated may achieve its original purpose and much else besides. This view of war as being about a contest for power might normally be described as realist, but that term has become appropriated by a particular, doctrinaire approach to the study of international relations. This approach can also be called 'strategic'. The term 'strategy' can be traced back to ancient Greece though it only began to gain currency in the late eighteenth century, referring to the sources of victory in war (Heuser, 2010).

A favourite title for those writing about what we would now call strategy was *The Art of War*, as used by Machiavelli in the sixteenth century, Raimondo Montecuccoli in the seventeenth, Maurice de Saxe in the eighteenth, and Baron de Jomini in the nineteenth. It was adopted by the translators of the works of the Chinese sage Sun Tzu, and one wonders whether Carl von Clausewitz might have followed the practice were it not for the fact that Jomini had got there first. Clausewitz's reflections appeared under the even simpler *On War*. Clausewitz is now given the credit for moving the study of war onto a new level, in part because he sought to place his advice about strategy in the context of a broad and systematic theory of war, but also because this theory was influenced by the experience of the Napoleonic Wars which he had observed at first hand. He insisted that war was a continuation of policy by violent means, confirming its purposive character, yet also described the passions and furies unleashed by war, and the friction which interfered with military practice, all of which could lead to chaos, confusion, and irrationality. Clausewitz was a cautious strategist, anxious for numerical superiority at each encounter, warning of the dangers of trying to do too much by clever manoeuvres, of getting distracted by easy but peripheral targets, of becoming over-extended as an apparently defeated enemy is chased into his own territory, of failing to turn battlefield victory into a lasting political gain (Clausewitz, 1976).

On War is never described as an anti-war tract, and the Prussian was certainly not squeamish when it came to accepting war's bloody nature, yet he was all too aware of the generals' tenuous control over the course of events. Opponents are more resourceful and resistant than expected, campaigns are let down by incompetence or miscalculation; stalemates develop with a draining attrition the only possibility of resolution, a race to see who can endure the pain the longest. In these circumstances the waste and wretchedness of war becomes ever more prominent.

IV

In any account of a long war the cloud of tragedy soon smothers the narrative. The link between cause and consequences becomes progressively attenuated. Whatever was intended at the start there is much to mourn and regret at the end. The reasons for war,

once so pressing and compelling, are forgotten or reshaped in an effort to keep up with the conflict's latest stage. Hatred of the enemy, and a fear of defeat, sustain the conflict, but the effort becomes progressively harder as the military machine needs to be fed with more bodies and resources. Morale must be sustained so the business of killing at the front while grieving at home goes on, as memories of peace and hopes of its return fade. The Great War of 1914–18 still evokes such thoughts and has become a prime exhibit in any discussion of the futility and pain of war (Fussell, 2000). Its origins can be discerned in the insecurities of great powers and the character of their alliances, and historians can follow with grim hindsight the diplomacy following the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. What remains most striking is the disjunction between what those statesmen thought they were doing and the world that appeared as the war concluded, with empires fragmented and revolution and recession in the air.

The next global confrontation rescued, to a point, war's reputation. It confirmed the presumption left over from 1918 that modern war meant violence on an industrial scale, and this would now extend to raids from the air as well as land and sea. The idea of 'total war' was embedded. This phrase spoke of war without obvious limits as all the resources of a state were committed in a desperate struggle for survival and victory. They also became total because few places could escape their effects. Professed neutrality would be no help for countries who found themselves on an invasion route or sat atop vital resources. Issues of religious, national, or ideological identity leapt borders. The construction of pre-war alliances, designed to hold enemies in check, meant that one apparently small conflict could spread rapidly as others were drawn in as a result of their stakes in the broader configuration of power.

For these reasons the Second World War was even more total than its predecessor, covering more of the globe, lasting longer, confirming cities as targets, and leading to far greater death and destruction. Still, at least the enemies justified their status. The more that was discovered about the Nazis' aims and methods the more of a relief victory appeared. The failure of pre-1914 diplomacy was seen in the failure to contain great power rivalry and arms races; the failure of pre-1939 diplomacy was seen in the determination to avoid war at all costs against a dictator who could not be appeased. Nonetheless, even in what is still considered to be a 'good' war the victors were still responsible for atrocities, largely unleashed from the air, culminating in the dropping of the first atomic bombs. Moreover Poland, the country whose invasion prompted the British and French ultimatum to Germany, was brutalized during the war and remained a victim, a part of the Soviet 'sphere of influence' at the end.

The arrival of nuclear weapons completed the logic of total war. Once all the major powers had their own arsenals any attempt to resolve their differences by force was likely to result in their elimination as modern industrial societies. This prospect came to be described as mutual assured destruction, a condition that made political leaders pause when they contemplated any step that could result in it coming to pass. The starkness of the prospect, of great cities evaporated, populations largely killed off with survivors coping in a radioactive wasteland and envying the dead, left no doubt about the risks of war. It effectively removed total war for the major powers as a rational act of policy.

This did not mean that a total war, including nuclear use, was impossible, only that any occurrence would arise in irrational circumstances. Something limited and apparently innocuous might escalate into a great conflagration.

In the face of mutual assured destruction, the only wars that could seriously be fought would have to be limited (Osgood, 1957). The war that began with the attack of Soviet-backed North Korea on the American-backed South in June 1950 was taken to demonstrate the possibility of limited war, without a slide into a superpower conflagration. On the other hand this required accepting a stalemate—the armistice line confirmed in 1954 remains in place, more or less back at the point where the war started. The forces of North and South remain on a war footing on either side of the divide. Much strategic debate during the 1950s was about limited war, perhaps using 'tactical' nuclear weapons, a concept that came to be viewed sceptically, or else by keeping the aims limited in the hope that this would also lead to restraint in methods. In practice awareness of the consequences of a loss of restraint in methods led to restraint in aims, and a readiness to accept an unsatisfactory conclusion rather than risk escalation (Freedman, 2003).

V

The alternative to protracted war and escalation is a quick victory. Late in the nineteenth century the military historian Hans Delbrück argued that all military strategy could be divided into two basic forms. The first, the strategy of annihilation, demanded a decisive battle to eliminate the enemy's army, while the second, the strategy of exhaustion, required whatever means could be found to bring the war to an eventual and moderately satisfactory end. Naturally governments prefer to win through annihilation rather than exhaustion (Delbrück, 1990). Not all wars last for years and end in stalemate. Some are over quickly and with decisive results.

Starting with the war against Austria in 1866 Count Otto von Bismarck successfully used war, along with astute diplomacy, to unify Germany under Prussian leadership. He then forced France to accept a new balance of power. Later Japan seized the initiative in its war against Russia by attacking the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904 (prior to a declaration of war), and held it, ending up with Korea and the Port once peace was eventually agreed. In the decades after 1945 in a succession of wars Israel secured its independence and reshaped its territory, Bangladesh split away from Pakistan, Britain forced Argentina out of the Falkland Islands after a surprise occupation, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was toppled by the United States. Iraq was defeated twice by a coalition led by the United States, the first in order to push it out of Kuwait in 1991 and the second to change a regime claimed to be in violation of UN resolutions. In all these cases the war if not the subsequent pacification was comparatively short. One side turned out to be materially stronger and/or strategically much more accomplished than the other. This record suggests a simple and almost banal lesson. Wars can serve political purposes and produce a definitive result, but by and large this is more likely to happen if they are over quickly. Long wars can have

their intended consequences but after a time they acquire issues and meanings that were absent at the start, and the unintended consequences can become as if not more important than the intended.

The answer to whether a war is long or short is often presented in terms of the quality of the military offensive. The presumption, especially among generals, at least from the start of the Napoleonic Wars to the Great War, was that battle should be decisive. The reasoning was straightforward. States depend for their security on their armies. If their armies have been so comprehensively defeated that they can no longer function then the government has no choice but to accede to the demands of the victor. If the battle can be concluded quickly and decisively then so will be the war. The simplest way to achieve this is with overwhelming force, crushing any resistance. But when the forces are more evenly matched then victory will require taking risks, being bold, relying on guile and ruses before direct assaults. It is a common theme among strategists, from Sun Tzu to Liddell Hart, that it makes more sense to outwit the enemy rather than outfight them (Liddell Hart, 1968; Sun Tzu, 2003). This is evident in war plans that start with surprise attacks, unexpected manoeuvres, and rapid offensives in the hope that the enemy will be caught off guard and soon be in disarray. Moves of this sort create a problem for the legally-minded, which require waiting for the enemy to take the initiative so any military action is clearly in self-defence. In some circumstances conceding the initiative would mean conceding defeat, or at least a long war of attrition. Catching the enemy by surprise might be the only way in which total objectives might be achieved without crippling the victor.

This logic was taken to its extremes in nuclear strategy, as the only reliable form of victory was recognized to be a 'first strike', effectively disarming the enemy by catching its nuclear weapons before they could be used. Such a strike would require exquisite timing and coordination, would be necessarily pre-emptive, and still leave the aggressor hoping that the enemy would not launch on warning of an incoming attack, against targets at sea as well as on ground, with anti-missile defences needed to pick up anything that was launched. However 'surgical' in conception and execution, the attack would still cause massive casualties. Not surprisingly the nuclear powers came to conclude that it was better to concentrate on having the capacity to absorb such an attack and then retaliate (a second strike) than attempt to develop a reliable first strike capability.

In less extreme forms the logic remains the same. If the enemy can regroup and start to fight back then a battle cannot be considered decisive. This is why Napoleon's victory at Borodino in 1812 and the subsequent occupation of Moscow did not turn into a political victory because the Russian army remained intact (Lieven, 2010). By the same token the comprehensive defeats of both the German and Japanese armies in 1945 made it possible to impose transformational settlements. Regrouping can, of course, take the form of resistance and insurgency, even following an occupation, as well as a reconstituted army. This is how the United States found itself stuck in both Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2000s. Lastly, it may not be enough to take one country out of a war if its allies are still fighting. German strategy in both world wars was to deal with the most vulnerable member of the opposing alliance first. It made more progress in

the Second World War than the First but in the end it still could not cope with the full weight of the alliance it faced.

Even when a military victory has been achieved and a political settlement imposed it may not last. After 1871 France was determined to regain the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine; after 1947 India and Pakistan continue to argue over Kashmir; after 1967 Israel failed to find ways to pacify the Palestinians or to allow them their own state; after 1982 Argentina was not reconciled to the loss of the Malvinas. In each case this raises interesting questions about whether the aftermath of each war took an inevitable course, to which the answer is invariably that the victors had choices and these choices determined whether the best use was made of military success.

This leads to an important point. Wars are part of a political process, an attempt to shift obstacles and reshape the prevailing balance of power. As a result of war much changes, but also much stays the same, in terms of culture, attitudes, and interests, albeit in a new context. Because war is about the use of armed force it can be considered concluded when one side has decided that it can no longer fight or sees no purpose in doing so, or both sides agree on a ceasefire. Whether or not the political aims are achieved depends on what happens next. The outcome may be seized land, but the benefit and durability of such a gain will depend on what is done by way of consolidation (which may include gaining the acquiescence of the local population). Alternatively the outcome may be an agreement to negotiate, in which case the eventual gains may depend on what the war has shown about the relative strengths and interests of the belligerents, but also on diplomatic skills and shrewd tactics. There is plenty of evidence for the cliché about winning wars yet losing peaces. To use another cliché, military victories do not solve political problems. They can, however, lead to a new state of affairs which make possible solutions that would not otherwise have been available.

VI

A belligerent will say that war is caused by the unreasonable behaviour of the enemy. There may be a particular 'trigger' without which war might have been avoided. Students of the 'causes of war' tend to look more at an environment which creates incentives and disincentives to war. At the most fundamental level they point to the anarchic nature of the international system, requiring states to look after their own security and not rely upon some higher authority. On the assumption that states value security above all else then they are bound to be concerned about any powerful state which could turn against it. Herz explained how a 'security dilemma' can arise between two units in such a system, 'deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear', compelling them 'to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort that proves self-defeating because complete security remains ultimately unobtainable' (Herz, 1951: 231).

In this way states which have no inherent reason to fear each other get caught up in arms races and even war, as one decides it must strike while it has a momentary

advantage. Using alliance to draw on the power of other states, an otherwise weak state might balance a stronger state. While alliance formation might stabilize a situation, and create a balance of power, encouraging caution all round, it might also be that some local instability in the system creates uncertainty and violent moves, thereby drawing alliance partners into a fight despite what they know to be their best interests. Another causal factor might be the distribution of natural resources so that states find themselves competing for access to waterways or fertile land. Lastly there are issues of identity, the perceived need to support those with a similar religion, ideology, or ethnicity in other states.

Attempts to find answers to the problem of war have inspired the academic study of international relations and the practice of international law. There was often a disposition to treat causation in terms of irrational factors, such as arms races and security dilemmas, more than deliberate state policy. The serious empirical study of war began with Quincy Wright's fourteen-year project to produce his monumental *Study of War*, published early in the Second World War (Wright, 1942). There is now a substantial body of academic work, much under the aegis of the 'correlates of war' project (Singer, 1979), which seeks to put the study of war onto a 'scientific' basis, seeking to identify virtual laws of international politics, by getting basic data on all wars (defined by at least 1,000 combatant deaths) in terms of participation, duration, casualties, alliances, geographical scope, and a variety of other economic, diplomatic, and military factors. The impulse has been to see if there are factors which make war more or less likely and so in principle might be manipulable by enlightened governments. One example, which turned out to be less than originally it seemed, was the notion that democracies do not fight each other (Levy, 1988). It is unsurprising that the scientific approach has not produced reliable conclusions because correlations are sought between factors and events which have been taken out of their historical context. It can be of interest to know that the presence of certain factors makes war more likely but whether a particular war occurs will still depend on the decisions of individuals, which may depend as much on factors of personality, cognition, and group dynamics as underlying 'causes'.

After a protracted period of warfare there is great pressure to address the 'root' causes to prevent another such catastrophe. The great powers of the day have come together to develop appropriate rules and institutions. This was the case with the Treaty of Westphalia following the Thirty Years War and the Congress of Vienna following the Napoleonic Wars. After the First World War the League of Nations was established, and then the United Nations after the Second World War. Less significant but reflecting a similar sentiment were the Paris Treaties which concluded the Cold War. These initiatives generally address both the immediate and structural causes of the conflict which has just concluded (Ikenberry, 2000). They address causes in terms of specific sources of instability in the state system, for example the large number of statelets that made up the area that eventually became Germany until the unified state acquired such a power that this was considered destabilizing.

Attempts to deal with the ideological causes of war can be traced back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which left the question of whether a state should be Catholic or Protestant to the sovereign, and so established the principle of non-interference in a

state's internal affairs. Following the wars triggered by the French Revolution, the major powers sought to suppress any radical or nationalistic urges among their populations. By the end of the nineteenth century the demands of self-determination were impossible to ignore. The complex interaction of such demands, attempts to establish stable regional and global balances of power, and the spread of ideologies which claimed universal validity, turned out during the twentieth century to be particularly combustible. The point is that war is a function of instabilities in the state system but the causes of these instabilities are far more complex than attempts by large powers to maximize their security. Nor are they reliably susceptible to scientific analysis.

The presumption that war is a disease of humanity has shaped the study of its causes. In earlier times it might be seen as an opportunity to express manly virtues or the only certain way to hold on to essential territory, rich in food and close to rivers. Just as social and economic progress required trust in order to make possible small-scale communities which involved mutual interdependence and vulnerability, so the agreed extension of trust and cooperation, marked by contracts and treaties, reduced the need to settle disputes by violence. But even in small communities miscreants saw opportunities in violence for short-term advantage or deciding disputes where there was no evident non-violent solution. The god worshipped, language spoken, values honoured, economies prospering all depended on war. The best assumption was that war was not a lapse from a peaceful prehistoric society, but a natural state which the forces of civilization must strain to manage. Political theorists saw as their greatest challenge forms of government and international society that could avoid the need to resort to war. In this respect the real challenge is to identify the causes of non-war rather than war.

The major cause of non-war is awareness of the cost and character of modern war, particularly total war. Another cause of non-war at a global level is how little there is, territorially, left to fight about. European states no longer contemplate the rest of the globe with an acquisitive, mercantilist, and proselytizing eye. Their empires have been dismantled. Instead of the original 50 states of the United Nations there are now 192. Within these states, especially those with feeble economies, deep social cleavages, and weak political institutions, there are often things to fight about, some resulting from the struggle for existence, and others from the ideological formulas that seek to explain why things are so bad and how they could be better. The erstwhile great powers still find it difficult to be indifferent to turmoil within such states, especially if close to their neighbourhoods. If they differ with each other about how to stabilize these situations then old animosities and rivalries might be aggravated. There are certain capabilities, notably nuclear weapons, which might give an otherwise weak state a way of becoming strong and great. So while there are compelling reasons for reassurance that the age of total war has passed, at a more micro level war remains persistent, and sometimes so embedded in particular social and political structures as to be depressingly durable—a *werran* of confusion and discord.

> But it's no use asking me for a final statement.
> As I say, I deal in tactics.
> Also statistics:

> for every year of peace there have been four hundred years of war.
>
> (Atwood, 1996)

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CHAPTER 2

STRATEGY AND WAR

HEW STRACHAN

Strategy is a word of much more recent coinage than its use by strategic commentators and, even, historians suggests. It is legitimate to ask whether a civilization without a word for a concept possesses the concept in the first place. To talk of the strategy of the Roman or Byzantine empires, as Edward Luttwak has done, is to impose a vocabulary on those societies which was unknown to them.[1] The word may be derived from classical Greek, but the latter applied its root in the words for general, army, or stratagem, not in an abstract noun denoting the use of force for the purposes of war or the use of war for the purposes of policy. The word's Greek origins do however provide us with one important reminder: they are unequivocally associated with military organizations and their conduct of war. Strategy, both as word and concept, is often used today in contexts that concern neither, as a synonym for policy or as an approach to business studies and the challenges of management. Both tendencies—the readiness to see strategy as a universal set of truths applicable across time, and the application of the word to endeavours that have no military applications—have generated confusion and ambiguity in its meanings today.

Strategic thought was often the product of the need to survive. Military vulnerability and even catastrophic defeat have proved to be remarkably effective prods to innovative thinking about war. Sun Tzu's *Art of War* was written in China during a period when small states constantly fought for survival (403–221 BC); the Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), analysed the use of war after the defeat of the Italian states at the hands of France in 1494; and the great spur to Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was the defeat of his homeland, Prussia, by Napoleon at Jena in 1806.

In the late eighteenth century, it was France itself, the most powerful state in Europe sixty years previously, which was more conscious of military decline. Particularly galling were the defeats inflicted in the Seven Years War by Prussia, a small and backward kingdom which produced an army disproportionate to its size. When the war ended in 1763 Prussia rested on its laurels, but the military writers of France did not. They laid the intellectual foundations for a military renaissance. Probably the most inspired and

forward-looking text of the period, by Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert (1743–90), anticipated the way in which political change could transform warfare, but it was still focused primarily on tactics, as its title, *Essai général de la tactique* ('A general essay on tactics') (1772), made clear. However, in 1777 another French aristocratic officer, Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–80), moved on from the study of tactics to the development of a theory of what he called strategy:

> Making war is a matter of reflection, combination of ideas, foresight, reasoning in depth and use of available means. Some of these means are direct, others indirect; these latter are so numerous that they comprise practically everything known to man. In order to formulate plans, strategy studies the relationships between time, positions, means and different interests, and takes every factor into account . . . [This] is the province of dialectics, that is to say, of reasoning, which is the highest faculty of the mind.[2]

Maizeroy was inspired to use the word strategy by his knowledge of the Byzantine text, *Strategicon*, written by the Emperor Maurice in the sixth century (and itself a response to the tactical challenges posed by the horsed archers of the steppe peoples of central Asia). Maizeroy was not so much escaping from the efforts of Maurice and most other military writers (himself included) to produce a 'perfect' system of tactics, as arguing that there was a role not only for rules in the conduct of war but also for rationality and logic.

Guibert and Maizeroy were eighteenth-century *philosophes*, anxious in war, as in so many other areas of life, to apply the power of reason to a phenomenon that too easily could be seen as chaotic. Strategy, as a concept and at least within Europe, was therefore a product of the Enlightenment. It gained currency thanks to the wars which France prosecuted on the back of this military thought, those of the French Revolution and Napoleon. Bonaparte himself used the word 'strategy' sparingly; for him, as for most of his contemporaries, the combination on the battlefield of the three arms—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—was a matter of *la grande tactique* ('major tactics'), and the use of war for the purposes of policy was just that, *la politique* ('policy'). But in 1799 a Prussian, Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (1757–1807), published a book, *Geist des neuren Kriegssystems* ('Spirit of the new system of war'), which defined tactics and strategy and drew a clear distinction between them. Bülow associated tactics solely with the battlefield, but strategy was 'the science of the movements in war of two armies, out of the virtual circle of each other; or, if better liked, out of cannon-reach'.[3]

Bülow's book was translated into French and English, and so popularized the word, if not its intellectual baggage. Moreover, he had turned thinking about war upside down. Although the bulk of his book was a discussion of tactics as practised by the army of Frederick the Great, he elevated the superiority of strategy, which he saw not as an art but as the science of planning and command, subject to the rules of geometry. The stunning victories achieved by the armies of Revolutionary France did not cause him to rethink. Instead, Napoleon's defeat of the Austrian army commanded by the hapless Mack at Ulm in 1805, the product of brilliant manoeuvre but achieved without fighting, provided him with his clinching argument.

Clausewitz was very rude about Bülow, but, as with others whom he named and shamed in his great text, *Vom Kriege* (1832–4; English title *On War*), he was also indebted to him. From Bülow Clausewitz derived the key concepts of book VI of *On War*: the strength of the defensive, the idea that an attack passes 'the culminating point of victory', and the power of a people in arms. More generally *On War* is a book about strategy, albeit of a much more sophisticated variety than that described by Bülow. Bülow saw strategy as determined by the choice of bases and lines of operations: in strategy the enemy 'was merely the aim and not the direct object', and so strategy was divorced from combat.[4] Clausewitz disagreed with Bülow on the place of battle in war, recognizing, in some of his most forceful and graphic writing, that it is the use of violence or the threat to use it which underpins everything else in war. He therefore defined strategy as the use of the battle for the purposes of the war. What happened in combat was the preliminary to the battle's exploitation, to the pursuit of a broken army so that the tactical outcome could be converted into a strategic victory. He also condemned Bülow's determination to find a system (not that he totally denied a similar desire in his own writings) because Bülow's systematizing failed to acknowledge the role of chance and uncertainty in war.

That was also what divided Clausewitz from the other butt of his writings, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869). But these two also shared some core concepts. Like Jomini, Clausewitz focused his strategic thinking on the general principles which underpinned the conduct of war (even if he was more ready than Jomini to recognize exceptions to every rule). Like Jomini, Clausewitz stressed manoeuvres designed to bring mass on the decisive point, and Clausewitz also spent much of his time discussing what Jomini called 'operations', even though this was a word which Clausewitz eschewed in *On War*. Both of them were reacting to the example of Napoleon and his conduct of land warfare. But, whereas Jomini sought in his earliest work to place Napoleon on a continuum which reached back to Frederick the Great, Clausewitz used history to recognize change.

The core of *On War* (books III–V) is a discussion of war as Clausewitz had experienced it in the age of Napoleon, particularly in the campaigns of 1812–15. But when he came to the writing of book VI, on defence, Clausewitz found that Napoleon, the invader of other people's domains, provided less evidence to support his analysis than did Frederick the Great, who had spent most of the Seven Years War engaged in an existential struggle for the survival of Prussia. Frederick also caused Clausewitz to confront more centrally a relationship over which he had so far skated, that between war and policy. How should a state respond once it had successfully repelled an invasion? Should it then proceed in its own turn to invade the country whose army it had just defeated? These questions carried political as well as strategic implications, and from then on Clausewitz realized that he needed a tripartite approach to war—one which focused not just on the relationship between tactics and strategy, but also that between strategy and policy.

This insight, and its subsequent formulation as a principle, that war is the continuation of policy by other means, has come to underpin definitions of strategy, especially since the end of the First World War. But for Clausewitz policy as often stood outside strategy as within it, however much each shaped the other. Conceptually each served different ends and was in the hands of different authors (statesmen or monarchs on the

one hand, generals on the other). In reality of course policy penetrated war, but it could demand of war that it do things at odds with its own nature, including show moderation when war's own instinct was to escalate its use of force.

Clausewitz's distinction between the nature of war and the character of war was his way of dealing with the historian's problem of continuity and change. War possesses certain features which are constant across time, and which are sufficiently universal to give war its theoretical unity. Many of these are expressed in what are now clichés—the role of chance, the effects of friction, the importance of moral courage. At its heart is a relationship: that between two (or more) enemies. One side may seek to master war for its own ends, but the other will do its level best to prevent that happening. War's nature therefore depends on reciprocity; it is above all 'a clash of wills', which can generate exponential effects with unpredictable consequences. Guiding it are the human qualities of passion, the play of probability, and logic or reason, although the balance between these three varies from war to war. This much is constant in war, but Clausewitz also knew, as he wrote at the conclusion to a résumé of the history of war in book VIII, chapter 3, of *On War*, that 'every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions'.[5]

Clausewitz was not a professional historian, but he wrote more military history than he did strategic theory, and he knew the latter had to be grounded in the realities provided by the former. Marc Bloch, who was a professional historian and a soldier only by dint of national necessity, averred in his eyewitness analysis of the causes of France's defeat in 1940 that

> History is, in its essentials, the science of change. . . . The lesson it teaches is not that what happened yesterday will necessarily happen tomorrow, or that the past will go on repeating itself. By examining how and why yesterday will differ from the day before, it can reach conclusions which will enable it to foresee how to-morrow will differ from yesterday.[6]

So Bloch railed against the teaching provided at the Ecole Militaire before the First World War, which used military history to stress continuities not change. By the same token Clausewitz, all too conscious that war was shaped by the circumstances of its own times, was wary about predicting war's future character. He lived in an era in which political and social change transformed war far more profoundly than did technological improvements; in this he was lucky, in that his analysis has dated less readily than if it were tactically and technologically dependent. Twentieth-century strategic analysts, much more conscious of the exponential rate of science-led innovation, have often been less cautious, and their radicalism has been able to justify itself because of the conservatism inherent in strategic thought. At least up until 1945 strategic thought's natural tendency, as Bloch observed, was to use experience as the best, and very often only available, compass by which to navigate a path through the confusions of the present and into the uncertainties of the future. Military thought flourished in Europe in the nineteenth century, and it did so against the background of profound technological change and the transformation of industrial output. Its response was to use strategic thought to emphasize continuity,

and to seek out unchanging principles of war. The natural function of strategic thought has been to assimilate the character of the current conflict, the shock of the new, into the patterns of the past. Very often it has been less adroit in its handling of the relationship between change and continuity than was Clausewitz.

The generals and staff colleges of the nineteenth century focused on strategy in the sense of military operations. Clausewitz's definition of strategy, that it was concerned with the use of the battle for the purposes of the war, that it was therefore about armies and how they were used, and that it was the business of generals rather than of politicians, was one with which they remained comfortable, as did most of the generals who fought in the First World War.

That definition changed in the twentieth century. It did so precisely because armed forces confronted events so epoch-making that they could no longer simply be assimilated in a narrative that stressed continuity (although some certainly tried). Generals in 1914 had seen manoeuvre less as a result of battle and more as a means to bring it about. Battle was deemed to be the decisive act in war. In the event it was not, or at least not in the First World War. Big battles, particularly on the western front, did not produce the outcomes that their scale portended. The search for the elusive decisive battle meant that tactics, themselves shaped by the technologies thrown up by industrialization, trumped strategy. Not even the series of successful engagements conducted by the allies in the last hundred days of the war was sufficient to explain its outcome. To do that, analysts had to bring in the role of economic warfare, the promotion of revolution within belligerent countries, the coordination of allies, and the mobilization of men's and women's minds. In 1918, a young German historian, Hans Rothfels, who had lost a leg serving at the front, completed his thesis at the university of Heidelberg. It was on Clausewitz and it was subtitled *Politik und Krieg* ('Policy and war'). The war prompted thoughtful Germans like Rothfels to reconsider Clausewitz's view of strategy, separating it from the operational framework into which it had been set by soldiers before 1914, and emphasizing the text's passages on the relationship between war and policy. For the Reichstag committee of enquiry set up in Germany after its defeat, this was the message to be derived from *On War*, the need both to use war for the purposes of policy and to shape war to the dictates of policy.

Nor was the Reichstag committee alone. Lenin read Clausewitz in exile in Switzerland and came to the same conclusion, with the result that after 1917 *On War* achieved a status within the Soviet Union that it had never enjoyed in Tsarist Russia. Rothfels himself, forced into exile in the United States as a result of his Jewish ancestry, wrote the chapter on Clausewitz for the founding document of post-1945 strategic studies in the United States, Edward Mead Earle's *Makers of Modern Strategy*, the result of seminars held at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton University and published in 1943. In Britain, in 1933 Basil Liddell Hart damned Clausewitz in terms that were more uncomprehending of the range and subtlety of Clausewitz's thought than the selective readings of his text adopted by pre-1914 staff officers. Paradoxically, however, Liddell Hart too embraced a definition of strategy which stressed its relationship to policy as clearly as did those of Rothfels and Lenin. Strategy, he opined in 1928, is 'the art of distributing and applying

military means to fulfil the ends of policy'.[7] In this his thinking was shaped by another British military theorist, Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, who in 1923 coined the term 'grand strategy', to stress the need to prepare for war in peacetime, and to recognize that the conduct of war itself could no longer be understood in purely military terms.

The tradition of European strategic thought shaped by Clausewitz, which traced its origins to the eighteenth century and was refined by the wars fought thereafter, was concerned overwhelmingly with the conduct of war on land. The Napoleonic Wars did not produce a comparable articulation of naval or maritime strategy. Not until the 1870s did British authors begin to address this deficiency, and they did so precisely because Britain's maritime supremacy was being called into question by the progressive and accelerating industrialization of its neighbours. As Edward Luttwak has wisely observed, abundance is a poor basis for strategy, since it does not force states to prioritize as part of the process of making hard choices.[8] By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, powers other than Britain sought colonies and developed navies. Britain's imperial and maritime interests needed to be shaped by rational thought if they were to be defended. The upshot was strategy, and a form of strategy which pointed more to its twentieth-century understanding than it did to Clausewitz's idea that it was the use of the battle for the purposes of the war.

Admittedly the first and best-known popularizer of naval strategy, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, stressed the centrality of fleet action in his book *The influence of sea power upon history, 1660–1783* (1890). But Mahan also embraced an understanding of strategy which rested on political economy and the realities of geopolitics. Maritime trade both produced a seafaring population and was vital to national prosperity, both of which in turn sustained naval capacities. In other words the foundations of naval strategy in war were laid in peace, and the capacity to sustain that naval strategy in war rested on the possession of bases around the world, as well as on the control of the 'choke points' on the globe's maritime trading routes. Sir Julian Corbett, whose *Some principles of maritime strategy* was published in 1911, went further in his articulation of what this meant for strategy, distinguishing between what he called 'major strategy' (in other words grand strategy *avant la lettre*) and minor strategy, which was more akin to Clausewitz's operational definition.

Corbett's strategic thinking took another idea which Clausewitz had recognized in a new direction. Clausewitz's frustration at the king of Prussia's compliant attitude to the French request for troops for the invasion of Russia in 1812 led him to pin his hopes not on his liege lord but on the German *Volk* or nation. Clausewitz was no democrat but he, like Bülow, was aware of the role of the people in war. They were the possessors of passion in his trinitarian definition of war's features. In the years after 1815, these democratic ideas smacked too much of revolution to be sensible vehicles for Clausewitz's career prospects, but he did stress that the 'nation in arms' might be the way of future warfare, and he also warned that a popular uprising would be not only passionate in war but also ready to use terror.

Corbett too saw the potential application of democratization to strategy, albeit in slightly different terms. He was less persuaded than Mahan of the centrality of fleet

action. Rather, he believed that the effects of sea power were to be felt on the land, and that therefore blockade directed against the enemy's civilian population would be an important instrument in the fragmentation of a state. If a population were starving, it would turn against its rulers in revolt. He and Mahan were the products of democratic states, Britain and the United States, and Corbett reckoned to use the principle of democracy to wage war against states rendered vulnerable by the fault lines between rulers and ruled. The belief that this was what had happened in Germany in 1918, embraced by many in Britain after the First World War (including Liddell Hart), and used by the German army to excuse itself for its own responsibility for Germany's defeat (the so-called 'stab in the back'), became the basis for strategies that assumed that a civilian population was vulnerable to external pressure, and was becoming more so as urbanization gained hold. The need for security would result in civilians being ready to ally themselves, at least indirectly, with their attackers. The strategic bombing offensive of the Second World War rested on the proposition that, if the German people were 'de-housed', they would turn on the Nazis. They did not, but a similar set of democratic assumptions, sustained by the apparent link between war and revolution, underpinned the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The use of democracy within war was intimately bound up with the rule of law. Targeting the non-combatant population through blockade, bombing, or sanctions infringes the principles of law within war—of *jus in bello*. Clausewitz was less concerned with this, not least because in his calculus the civilian population were not passive victims, but active combatants in a war of national liberation. Both blockade and strategic bombing reversed the sequence, making them the targets in order to incite them to participation. In 1856 the treaty of Paris set about bringing the conduct of war at sea under international control, by abolishing the practice of privateering and protecting the trading rights of neutrals. By providing a definition of contraband, the Paris agreement limited the power of a navy at war to prevent the free passage of goods to its enemies. In 1909, the protection of neutral rights was extended by the declaration of London, which distinguished between 'absolute' contraband, such as munitions of war, which a belligerent was perfectly entitled to prevent from reaching an enemy port, and 'conditional' contraband, which put the onus of proof on the blockading navy. Food destined for a hostile army could be deemed contraband, but food for the non-combatant population could not be. Corbett, himself a lawyer by training if a historian by adoption, was well aware that the law of war at sea, while it would undoubtedly favour British shipping if Britain were a neutral in a future war, would also deprive Britain of its most powerful weapon if it were a belligerent. In the event Britain decided not to ratify the declaration of London and, once the First World War began, blockaded Germany without distinction as to what was contraband and what was not and, increasingly, as to what was consigned to Germany and what to its neutral neighbours. After the war was over, Germans would claim, albeit tendentiously, that the allied blockade was responsible for killing up to one million German civilians through starvation—more than would be killed by strategic bombing in the Second World War.

Until 1945 the pressure of international law was felt within war, in its protection of not only non-combatants (whose status was increasingly hard to define in what came

to be called 'total war'), but also combatants themselves, for example in their right to surrender and to be treated as prisoners of war. In the first half of the twentieth century Corbett's sensitivities to the law's power to curtail the strategic options available to a state were in practice too often usurped by the argument of military necessity. The case for discrimination of effects in relation to bombing, advocated by the United States in the interwar years, did not prevent plans for bombing civilian targets or their justification on the grounds that they would make the war shorter, and so less costly in the long run, than the First World War had been. Once the Second World War had begun, these lines of argument prevailed in the democracies of the United Kingdom and the United States, despite the fact that they were the protectors of liberal values and despite their readiness to institute war crimes trials when the war was over.

After 1945, however, the emphasis in international law shifted, from crimes within war to the crime of initiating war in the first place, to *ius ad bellum*. Germany was accused of waging a war of aggression and the United Nations' charter reserved the right to use force, except in cases of national self-defence, to the United Nations itself.[9] The change made the impact of law within strategy even more explicit as strategy itself changed focus. If strategy was concerned with the use of the battle for the purposes of the war, then it took the necessity of the war as a given; but if strategy was concerned with the use of war for the purposes of policy, then it had something to say about the decision to go to war in the first place. A framework for international law predisposed against the use of war as the inherent right of a sovereign state created obstacles to the development of strategy, and compelled strategy to give greater consideration to its place within international relations than had seemed necessary to Clausewitz and his generation.

These pressures were not just legal. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan in 1945 created a 'revolution in strategy' in the eyes of at least two strategic commentators, Raoul Castex and Bernard Brodie. Both had developed their reputations in the area specifically of naval strategy. Air power advocates were more inclined to stress continuity rather than 'revolution', seeing the atomic bomb as the coping stone to the strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War. By the 1950s the distinction was fundamental—between those who argued that the utility of the nuclear weapon lay in its non-use rather than in its use and those anxious to treat it as one weapon within a wider arsenal. For the former strategy was now a peacetime activity, and its central propositions rested on the manipulation of threats more than the application of force. In 1961, the year in which John F. Kennedy became president of the United States, these views gained political as well as moral purchase. Kennedy was determined to free the United States from the 'doomsday' scenarios of the United States Air Force, and to create more limited options under the nuclear umbrella for the use of conventional force. Academics took possession of strategic thought, and the ideas of deterrence were consolidated within American foreign policy. In 1962 the Cuban missile crisis seemed to show the effectiveness of deterrence in its most basic form, and thereafter the Vietnam War became the test-bed for the idea of limited war.

The upshot was to divorce strategic thought from its roots in strategic practice. Those who spoke of the 'nuclear revolution' progressively discredited strategic theory's practice

of using history, since nuclear weapons seemed by the very scale of their destructive effects to gainsay any 'lessons' from history. Nuclear strategists rarely saw history as Clausewitz or Bloch had done; instead they elevated game theory and mathematical modelling as disciplines, creating what appeared to be a science but was in truth only theory. Moreover, as academic departments of strategic studies flourished, so the theory bore less and less grounding in reality. In becoming self-referential, it was not forced into any sort of dialogue with the events of the past and it also managed to avoid much of the present. The ideas of limited war, which had been developed on the back of the Korean War, a real war which had been waged by major powers but had been contained, were discredited by the failures of the Vietnam War.[10] As a result this war was no more integrated into mainstream strategic thought than were other wars fought within the timeframe of the Cold War, including the Falklands War for Britain or the war in Afghanistan for the Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War exposed the nakedness of strategic thought. For the best part of half a century grand strategy had shaped foreign policy, and foreign policy in turn was influenced disproportionately by strategic theory, as expressed in ideas like deterrence. Having used strategy to avoid war, states had lost both the habits of mind and the institutional frameworks that understood how to use strategy to fight wars. The wars that occurred between 1945 and 1990 had little impact on the evolution of strategic thought, which remained hooked to ideas of 'major war' derived from the experience of the Second World War. A concept like 'total war', itself a phrase which had acquired currency during the Second World War, was kept alive by the threat of all-out nuclear exchange which underpinned the Cold War.

After 1990 powers waged wars at much the same rate as they had done before 1990, with the specific exception of the years 1990–2, but they did so with a set of concepts which obscured the fact that they were at war. Much of the use of force by states in the 1990s, particularly in the Balkans, was explained as peacekeeping which had transmogrified into peace support or peace enforcement. Alternatively states embraced the ideas and practices of counterinsurgency but specifically separated these from major war, which remained the conceptual benchmark both for thinking about war and for the organization and equipment of armed forces. These trends were exacerbated by the fashionable but spurious notion that war was no longer an activity engaged in by states, an argument sustained by reference to insurgents, terrorists, and warlords, but which discounted the readiness of states, and particularly the United States, to use war in pursuit of their policies. Indeed the bifurcation was itself false, as states used force against non-state actors specifically to redeem 'failed' states and to punish 'rogue' ones.

The first task in addressing these challenges was to recognize the distinction between strategic theory and strategic practice. The latter is the source of confusion for minds which have been shaped by the former, especially when strategic theory has not been exposed with sufficient regularity to the test of strategic practice. Strategic theory looks for continuities and systems, but it rests on a profound flaw: it can too easily fail to acknowledge that there is no universal character to war. War may have its own nature, but each war has its own distinct characteristics, which is precisely why the study of

military history is so central to the study of strategy. We read military history in order to understand how each war differs, and so to appreciate better the relationship between cause and effect.

Moreover, the application of strategic theory in the context of foreign policy has persuaded many democrats that war is the continuation of policy by other means. In the first half of the twentieth century this was Clausewitz's appeal to totalitarian regimes, whether communist or fascist. But for early twenty-first-century liberal democracies, inherently predisposed to see war as an evil to be avoided, war is profoundly discontinuous. It represents the failure of policy. Moreover, war—and especially protracted war—becomes in practice the master of policy, not its servant, narrowing the options available to governments and forcing liberal democracies down paths that are neither liberal nor democratic.

Strategic thought may naturally seek continuities, and stress the nature of war and the enduring principles which underpin its conduct in order to manage and direct it. But politics generates change over very short lead-times, and often uses war in ways that defy predictability. Politicians are the de facto strategists, even if they do not read strategic theory. Of the European statesmen of the last two centuries who have successfully used war for the purposes of policy, one stands out. Between 1864 and 1871 Otto von Bismarck achieved both his international and his domestic political goals through war, unifying Germany and consolidating conservatism within the new state. But he had never read Clausewitz. National leaders fighting existential wars have been pragmatists, their decisions uncluttered by theory and shaped instead by real-time intelligence and political nous.[11]

This is strategy in practice. If strategy occupies the space between war and policy, its formulation requires the combined efforts of generals (who understand the nature of war) and politicians (who are in practice the masters of the context in which it is to be applied). Those who make strategy need to be aware not only of the distinction between strategic thought and strategy in practice, but also of the fact that they are not alternatives. Strategy in theory, which teaches an awareness of war's nature, has to inform strategy in practice. Frederick the Great's Prussia embodied these functions in one man, just as did Napoleon's France—even if the latter never fully grasped the constraints on strategy in practice. Twentieth-century democracies fighting national wars of survival recognized the same point when they created war cabinets to bring together military advice and political decision-making. In 1947 the United States responded by establishing the National Security Council, an institution which after 2002–3 increasingly became the subject of imitation among its allies as a result of the pressures generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Corbett put it in 1911:

> Conference is always necessary, and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression and common plane of thought. It is for this essential preparation that theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its practical value for all who aspire to the higher responsibilities of the Imperial service.[12]

Strategy pivots on the relationship between ends, ways, and means. The contribution of strategy in theory is not only to set this out but also to provide the discipline which keeps

the end clear and prevents the means usurping it. This is probably the most obvious strategic hazard even for those belligerents victorious in war: the outcome rarely bears much relationship to that intended at the outset of hostilities. The United States' invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had as its end the defeat of Al Qaeda and the elimination of terrorist sanctuaries, but used the establishment of good government in Afghanistan as the way of doing this. So in the minds of some that became the end, not the way to the end. The confusion was compounded as the means included the United States' allies, for some of whom the end was not the extirpation of terrorism but the bringing of liberal and democratic values to a backward country.

Cross-cutting these relationships are the levels within war itself. For Bülow these consisted solely of strategy and tactics. By the late twentieth century, what he and even Clausewitz had understood by strategy was more regularly associated with the operational level of war, which filled the gap between tactics and the broader, twentieth-century understanding of strategy. Unlike strategy, operations were seen to be an unequivocally professional matter—but by the same token operational necessities could, without a clear articulation of strategy, expand to fill the political space available to them and so trump strategy. In the two world wars the operational brilliance of the German army did not produce a satisfactory strategic outcome. In the war in Afghanistan the need to focus operations on counterinsurgency, even though designed to serve the end of counterterrorism, had the potential to make counterinsurgency an end in itself. The point is even starker at the tactical level. The coalition forces in Afghanistan might be coy about using the word 'victory' to give coherence to their operations, not least when a lasting peace probably depends on negotiation with the enemy (a point which is the logical reverse of the fact that war itself depends on a relationship between two adversaries). But for a section or company in a firefight with the Taliban, victory was both a valid and a necessary aim, and thus an end in itself.

Much of strategy is therefore no more than common sense: rigorous thinking tempered by reality. That is why Edward Luttwak feels justified in talking about the grand strategy of the Roman and Byzantine empires:

> All states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not. That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the *level* at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms, intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states, with their own 'grand strategies'.[13]

That, however, is not the same as saying, as Colin Gray has, that: 'There is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.'[14] Gray is persuaded of the importance of strategic culture in determining and even narrowing states' preferences in relation to war. Geographical position is the biggest and most continuous influence in shaping strategic culture. Just as both Bülow and Clausewitz devoted chapters to the challenges which mountains and rivers presented to land warfare, so states with access to the sea or even surrounded by it have developed in different ways, politically, economically, and socially, from those with exposed land frontiers. Those geopolitical conditions may have

created habits of mind which so shape the range of strategic options open to states that they can be called cultural.

Indeed, at the broadest level, it is striking that so much of the world's understanding of war (and of what has been written in this chapter) has been determined by the experience of the contiguous land mass that is Eurasia, a term valued if not coined by the founding father of geopolitics, Halford Mackinder (1861–1947). He and those whom he influenced, including the Nazi Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), argued that the power which controlled Eurasia would dominate the world. Mackinder believed that Russia would do so, and after the First World War—not least for that reason—Haushofer urged Germany to seek a lasting deal with the Soviet Union. But that was not the view of his Führer, Adolf Hitler, whose strategy in 1941 flew in the face of geopolitical arguments. Hitler and Germany were defeated in 1945, not least thanks to the Soviet Union, for reasons that could be defined in geopolitical terms, but the entry of the Red Army to Berlin did not in fact result in the fulfilment of Mackinder's prediction. The intervention of the United States, a continental power in its own right, in the affairs of Europe gave maritime power greater leverage than Mackinder had anticipated would apply in the age of industrialization and the railway. For strategy the insights of geopolitics, like those of strategic culture, are only departure points, not answers.

Neither strategic culture nor geopolitics deals with contingency and choice, let alone policy and politics. Strategic culture argues that because Britain is an island it flexes its strategic muscles through the use of sea power and amphibious operations. In both world wars it was indeed dependent on the sea both for vital imports and as the means by which it brought force, both maritime and land, to bear against the enemy. But Britain also created a mass army and put it on the continent of Europe, and during the Cold War it left it there. Discontinuity is as important in understanding strategy as continuity. Without it, Europe would still be in dread of a resurgent France led by the heirs of Napoleon and Germany would not have broken with the legacy of the Second and Third Reichs. Through its understanding of history, strategic thought has the capacity not only to interrogate strategy in practice but also to stimulate change as well as to recognize continuity. There can be few more vital functions.

Notes

1. A point Luttwak freely acknowledges (Luttwak, 2009: 409; see also p. 11).
2. Quoted by J.-P. Charnay, 'Strategy', in Corvisier and Childs, 1994: 769.
3. Bülow, 1825: 86–7.
4. Ibid. 89.
5. Clausewitz, 1976: 593.
6. Bloch, 1999: 117–18.
7. Liddell Hart, 1944: 229.
8. Edward Luttwak, 'Strategy: Fundamentals', in Chambers, 1999: 684.
9. Lowe et al., 2008: 2–10.
10. Osgood, 1957.

11. See the four case studies, Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion, in Cohen, 2002.
12. Corbett, 1911: 5.
13. Luttwak, 2009: 409.
14. Gray, 1999: 1 (the original is in italics).

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CHAPTER 3

HOW HISTORY SHAPES WAR

GEORGE-HENRI SOUTOU

> Peace is but a dream and not a nice one at that.
> Moltke the Elder

Our modern world has been shaped by a series of wars since the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the two World conflagrations, including the decolonization wars and the peripheral conflicts of the Cold War. The current international system, resting still today first of all upon a worldwide net of sovereign states, is basically the outcome of those wars. This entails a decidedly realist view about the role of war in history, against current exaggerations about the decisive role of 'soft power'. But there is a dialectic relationship between war history and its object, because the understanding of previous wars (well-grounded or not, that is immaterial here) does play a role in the decision-making process for the next crisis and the future conflict. 'Wonderfully prepared for the last war' is something which was said about France in 1940 but which applies in many other cases. Hence the study of war history (which encompasses all aspects of wars, including political, economic, and cultural factors, and reaches beyond the more specific military history) is not just an academic field, it is a matter of importance for strategists and civilian and military leaders—provided they realize that history does not supply 'lessons', but an intellectual framework for understanding the relationship between different categories of events, and the interplay between long-term, structural developments and short-term crisis, and also the fact that things are or have been different elsewhere and at other times. This runs contrary to the tendency of the human mind to generalize one's own experience; it is an important lesson in modesty for the strategist.

The Lessons of War Past for The Present

At the political level, apart from the true pacifists, defensive wars have been by and large accepted by the people concerned in modern European history: they have provided the opportunity to test the cohesion of the nation-states which emerged progressively in Europe. The strongest pacifist movement developed after the First World War, but was largely nullified by Hitler's wars of aggression and never recovered fully afterwards. But aggressive wars, or in the current vocabulary 'wars of choice', have been the object of much more discussion at the time and among historians. If many wars of choice have been successful, if costly (Bismarck and the three wars leading to the unification of Germany provide good examples), others have failed, and in a spectacular way those launched by Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler. Offensive wars were in the long run more successful in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth. Thus after 1919 and after 1945 war as a Clausewitzian tool prolonging politics by other means was largely considered to be both inexpedient and unacceptable both politically and morally. At the same time the end of the Cold War and of bipolarization, leading to a (short-lived) US leadership in the world, restored for a while the view that 'wars of choice' (1991 in Iraq, 1999 in Kosovo) could be usable tools of policy. But Iraq in 2003 and now Afghanistan puts that into question once again. History on balance would seem to justify, even from a realist standpoint, the growing idealist scepticism (and revulsion) about war which has grown dramatically in Western culture since 1914. War has been largely deprived of its legitimacy by the course of modern European history.

There has been an escalation of war since 1914, with total, all-encompassing wars (including morale, economics, and so on) pitting all national resources against an existential threat for much bigger stakes than before. This evolution has reached its ultimate stage with the advent of nuclear weapons. The traumatic experience of Hiroshima and the rise of strategies of nuclear deterrence have raised the question, are great wars still possible? Should one accept that only wars at the periphery of great powers, by proxies, or non-conventional conflicts, are now possible? Has the history of ever more severe conflicts since 1789 changed the nature of war, because it has become a less and less credible tool for political aims, and less and less acceptable on human terms?

In the former Western tradition, wars had to be a viable continuation of politics, and always allow a return to policy. But there has been an evolution: until 1914, and even during the Napoleonic wars, negotiations, including official diplomatic talks, never completely stopped, even during the conflict. After 1870, and even more after 1914, this was no longer the case. A perverted form of pseudo-Clausewitzian teaching saw war and diplomacy as two successive and separate sequences.[1] The high point of that evolution was reached with the 'unconditional surrender' of the Axis powers decided upon by the Allies at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

But what if there is a continuum, or a simultaneity, like the famous 'Fight and negotiate' of the Vietminh in Indochina, whereby negotiation must take place during

the fighting, and not after? It is another cultural approach. After all, it was also largely the European practice until the First World War. As we shall see, through the evolution of modern armaments, international relations, and democratic governance, and after the experience of the Cold War and many insurgencies and 'wars of liberation', we may be returning to that more complex political-military nexus after one century of warfare escalating to the extreme, at least potentially, and precluding any other kind of war termination than full victory while excluding intrawar diplomacy.[2]

At the more strictly military level, one must be very prudent. We know the dangers of so-called 'history's lessons' about warfare: 1939 was supposed by the French and the British high commands to be a remake of the fixed fronts and protracted warfare of 1915–17, supplemented by a blockade of the enemy. But others retained the right lessons: J. C. Fuller in Great Britain, de Gaulle in France, Guderian in Germany understood a new war would be highly mobile and motorized, as a development of what had began in 1918, during the final phase of the Great War. We distinguish today between the two great innovations of 1917–18: motorized warfare on one side, and decentralized infiltration tactics as practised by the Germans before Riga, then at Caporetto and later in France. Those new tactics are seen today by many commentators as more decisive at the time than motorization as such. Their merging later was the true secret of the blitzkrieg.[3] It so happened that those innovative views, minority views everywhere at first, where finally accepted at the highest level in Nazi Germany, and not in London or Paris.[4]

Or past 'small wars' insurgencies: they also deliver ambiguous lessons. The British victory over the communist uprising in Malaysia in the 1950s, and also the French experience in Algeria, where, on the surface, the security situation had become much better in the final stage of the war, have led, in the face of the present situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, to an over-optimistic emphasis on 'counterinsurgency' and an undervaluation of the pertinent local and international political factors.

There are still major methodological lessons to be drawn from the study of past wars: the first is that, alongside the factors historians usually evaluate, like strategic doctrines, tactics, force levels, and armaments, it is necessary to delve into a more technical topic, which often escapes the layman: the organization of armed forces. In 1939–40 German superiority over France rested certainly not on numbers (apart from the air force) and not so much on superior armaments, but on a much better organization of the army (not only the *Panzerdivisionen*, but all types of units, which were much more flexible and reactive than their cumbersome and slow French counterparts and had perfected a very modern command and control system).

The second lesson is that military history cannot remain contained in itself if it is to be fully effective: it must be related to other fields of history, as they have developed over several years, such as economic, social, cultural, or international history, where the strategic-diplomatic approach has yielded impressive results. Only a multidisciplinary approach to the history of war can account for the tremendous development of warfare, in extension and in scope. And this includes the insurrection-like 'smaller' wars, which might well be the most frequent mode of warfare in the years to come.

This multiple approach is the only way to account for such a phenomenon as the Cold War. In some ways, it throws us back to many characteristics of the Hundred Years War and the Thirty Years War: a protracted war interspersed with periods of truce involving all sorts of factors, including political and ideological ones, and also domestic controversies and oppositions in many participating countries. Apart from peripheral conflicts, often linked with the end of colonization, the Cold War was not a full-fledged armed conflict, but at the same time it lasted fifty years and extended to most parts of the world, at least by proxy.

A good measure of aggressive intent is the percentage of GNP devoted to defence: probably 40 per cent for the USSR, at times up to 15 per cent for the United States, Great Britain and France around 10 per cent during the first phase of the Cold War. One of the main characteristics of the Cold War was that the military establishment was kept on a quasi-war footing even in peacetime. This holds also for the scientific-industrial effort, which was huge (nuclear weapons, electronics of all kinds, and aerospace armaments played a huge role in science, technology, and industry and took a big slice of budget).

The same could be said for psychological warfare: of course the control of public opinion by the governments did not reach the level of the two world wars, but the East used propaganda and disinformation to the utmost, and even the West resorted to methods of psychological warfare developed during the Second World War, to which they added more and more sophisticated means to influence public opinion. It has been stated that the USA established a 'National Security State' limiting citizens' freedoms for the sake of defence against the Soviet threat. Even if this is an excessive view (particularly when one compares the record of East and West on these problems), it is true that matters of internal security reached a new level of importance in the West, starting in 1948, after the shock of the Prague Coup.

The Cold War developed features different from previous times, and which will probably remain present in the future: a state of permanent alert and high readiness, because of very reactive modern systems of command and control, and because of the less stable international system and the blurring of the traditional distinction between peacetime and wartime. Another feature was a throwback to the times before the two world wars: the fact that, at least from the onset of 'détente' after Stalin's death, military tensions and peripheral conflicts coexisted with a system of permanent East-West negotiations (among them the SALT). This double approach even became a basic characteristic of Western policies, because it was the only way to achieve a consensus among all Atlantic Alliance members and to retain the support of public opinion (as exemplified by the Harmel report in 1967 and the NATO 'double-track decision' of 1979 concerning intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe).

Another feature which is bound to survive the end of the Cold War is the organic conflation of traditional 'national interests' (geopolitics and economics) with immaterial motives, like ideology or religion; this was of course not absolutely new (1939–45 . . .), but reached a new level under the Cold War. Also the blurring of the traditional distinction between domestic policies and foreign policy: the myth of total national unity against a foreign foe, which was more or less relevant until 1945, no longer exists. Modern

democracy and population changes induced by globalization lead to fragmented national bodies, beyond the reach of former national consensus-building. Carl Schmitt's main thesis, that the existence of a common foe is the main factor for the formation of political entities, is less and less valid. Like at the time of the revolutionary wars, the dividing line did not run only between states, but also inside the society of many of the participating nations.

The Cold War was also a conflict with global reach.[5] The use of the periphery was an important feature, not unlike during the 1914–18 war, but more systematically, and with effects multiplied by decolonization and the worldview of Marxist ideology. This was also a symptom of rising globalization after 1945. The Cold War has changed and deepened our understanding of war, and many of the features which it developed (the blurring between war and peace, transnational divisions not stopping at national borders, global reach, etc.) are going to stay with us. It is probably more paradigmatic than many think.

The most important lesson of wars past for the present is the tendency for conflicts, besides an ever-rising level of actual or potential violence, to become more and more all-encompassing and at the same time more diffuse. Wars are no longer declared; sometimes they do not really stop: at the best they gradually peter out. The sharp division between state of war and state of peace which marked Europe from modern times down to 1945 is now less clear. This is a major, although uncomfortable lesson. And today potential wars cover the whole range of violence, from the 'Bomb to the Guerrilla', to use one of Raymond Aron's expressions. There also the Cold War has been a defining experience.

How the Historical Experience of War Shapes the Understanding of War Today

What does 'victory' mean? Many wars led to clear-cut victories; in the twentieth century it has been the case with both world wars (but the ultimate outcome was not necessarily a true peace: the aftermath of 1919 and the Cold War after 1945 remind us that peace is not just victory). In France the elation felt in 1918 had largely disappeared as soon as 1919, as it became clear that Paris would not achieve, and by far, its war aims, and not even true security for the future. And what is the meaning of victory after the bloodshed caused by modern warfare? A strong international pacifist movement after 1919 relentlessly made the point.

Victory as a national defining moment and an occasion for national gratification has been largely discarded after 1919, even if it was to be shortly revived in 1945. But the notion survived, to this day, under the Wilsonian motto of making 'the world safe for democracy'. That was the legitimating argument for war and the politically correct description of victory in 1919 and 1945; it was echoed at the end of the Cold War by President George H. Bush (for him, the defeat of Soviet communism heralded a 'new

world order'). It was used once again to justify war against Iraq in 2003: a democratic Iraq would be built after the war; after all, weren't Germany and Japan reconstructed after 1945? The democratic delusion went as far as repeatedly predicting, from 1919 to 1990, the end of history and the end of wars.

But we might be witnessing the end of victory as a concept. Alongside a series of supposedly 'good' wars, ending with clear-cut victories, the West experienced many indecisive and 'dirty' wars: Spain in 1808, the two Vietnam wars, Algeria, to quote past examples. Even in the Algerian case, where the French army did achieve results on the ground, the war was lost at the political level. In a slightly different context, we could add the Resistance movements during the Second World War: in many parts of occupied Europe the Reich did not really control the situation. One can think also of long-drawn-out conflicts, where force is unable to bring by itself a solution, like Ireland. Before the twentieth century people could be subjugated under the domination of states which were based not so much on nationality as on religion or dynasty. With the advent of the nation-state, it has become largely impossible, at least in the long term. 'National' wars cannot end with a victory of the foreign state, or at least the Western people are now convinced of that. We appear to have entered the era of wars without victory, at least for the morally, culturally, and politically self-constrained West.

Then, there is no longer any glorification of war in the Western part of the world (Russia is there still an exception): books, films, monuments, celebrations about the two world wars have changed vastly since about the 1960s. For the present but also in retrospect, in historical studies, the accent is no longer on 'victory', but on the conditions of war termination, post-war reconstruction, regime change (for instance after 1945). One would even tend to forget that in some cases, as with Nazi Germany (the 1914 crisis was quite another problem), resorting to force was the only solution. The priority nowadays is on war prevention (not only through deterrence and arms control, as under the Cold War, but by addressing the causes of imbalances and oppositions and resorting to 'constructive engagement' of the potential adversary, or enlarging a sphere of organic cooperation, as the European Union intends to do with its 'neighbourhood policy'). This development results from general trends in the democratic world but also from the comparative assessment of great Western countries' policies after 1919 and after 1945, which were in the second case much more successful, because they were better suited for reconciliation with the former enemies, through democratic 'regime change', economic restoration (Marshall Plan, IMF, etc.) and inclusive participation in the European and Atlantic political process.

Through the same evolution the legitimacy even of defensive wars is put more and more in question: one should treat the causes of war upstream, and war can no longer be justified as '*ultima ratio regum*', in the name of national sovereignty. In the more recent evolution of international law, war as such has been largely outlawed as a tool of politics. Already the Covenant of the League of Nations introduced in 1919 the concept of obligatory international arbitration and collective security. But until the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928, war, even an offensive one, was traditionally seen as permissible if previous negotiations had failed to solve the conflict. After 1928, only defensive wars (either for a single

state or in the framework of collective security) were acceptable in international law. This was evidently the consequence of the First World War; it should be noted here that in 1914 Germany was condemned, at least at the official level, not for taking the offensive against Russia and France, but because, by invading Belgium, it had violated the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. This is an instance where history, in the shape of the 1914–18 slaughter, has modified the place of wars in the international system.

But history went on: because the events of 1939 showed that the concept of aggression could be manipulated, the legal right to wage even a defensive war has been more and more restricted under the UN Charter and its application. At the same time the emergence of the UN as a more powerful body after 1990, thanks to the end of the Cold War, and a growing revulsion against brutal regimes (and at times the manipulation of that reaction) have led to a kind of relegitimation of war in the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, when the emergence of a situation dangerous for peace warrants a UN intervention and the use of force against a state on its own territory, despite its sovereign rights.

At the same time we have witnessed since 1914 growing legal constraints on war. The legal notion of war crimes appeared first during the First World War, even if the notion that civilians should be spared in wartime had emerged already in medieval Europe. But until 1914 damages against life, limb, and property of civilians (including rape), if morally condemned, were not subject to legal prosecution; they were seen as a sorry but inevitable by-product of war. This changed during the First World War: German war crimes in Belgium and Northern France were carefully recorded, and at Versailles Germany was obliged to render to the Allies more than eight hundred civilian and military leaders (the Emperor heading the list) accused of war crimes. (In the end that did not happen; it was actually the first clause of the Treaty to be discarded, and instead a German court tried some of the accused.) This notion was enlarged through the Nurnberg trials after 1945. In many Western countries, military or even civilian courts are more and more frequently passing judgment on their national military personnel accused of war crimes. At the international level, the creation of the International Criminal Court is the most recent development in the direction of civilian legal oversight of war actions. Constraining 'Rules of engagement', as they are now defined for international military operations, are the practical consequence of that evolution. It would seem that nowadays the only fully legitimate use of force is seen in international operations under UN mandate, aiming at peace enforcement or peace re-establishment.

And legitimacy necessitates, at least at political and public opinion level, that any military operations should also be aimed at reconstruction and aid to the civilians alongside the war. (This is not an absolutely new development: during the nineteenth century European navies frequently engaged in humanitarian intervention and civilian relief in the Mediterranean; but we witness now a quantum leap.) This strategy was attempted, albeit in a crude way, during the Algerian war. It was perfected in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo after 1999, and has been one of the most disputed issues in Iraq after 2003 and now in Afghanistan. The idea is that that kind of war in not winnable in the long term if the civilian population is not convinced it is in its own interest not to support

the insurgents and if structures of good governance are not established. Such operations have to be double-track military-civilian operations, which entails a huge and long-term investment and can succeed only if the insurgents do estrange themselves from the general population, which did happen in some instances (Malaysia) but not in others (Algeria, Vietnam).

But isn't the delegitimation and criticism of the 'classical' kind of war going too far? Does it not cloud our understanding of new kinds of threats in the post-national world (terrorism)? Aren't strategies aimed at positive war termination, reconstruction, positive engagement, and inclusive participation posited on the need for a modicum of common values? Does the case of Germany or Japan in 1945 apply to Iraq and Afghanistan today?

On the other side, the loss of focus upon war as such, the inflated, ambiguous or even illegitimate use of the word 'war' in many instances ('war against terror', 'war against drugs'…) may contribute to current opposition to the very concept of war. Do we not lose the necessary distinction between foreign wars and internal peacekeeping, as the blurring of that traditional distinction in the reorganization of many Western security services since 11 September 2001 is interpreted today by many commentators? Or, with the growing relativity of borders in a globalized world, is that distinction still meaningful? The study of history cannot answer those questions, but it can remind us of their urgency and importance.

How History Promotes and Constrains the Use of War as Policy

We must recognize the essential ambivalence of history's lessons about war: the West lives now with the two excessive and opposed myths, Munich and Vietnam (or for the French, Algeria). Munich in September 1938 was certainly a political defeat for France and Great Britain in the face of Nazi Germany and totalitarianism, and it actually allowed Hitler to embark on war in 1939 in better conditions, but the frequent call after 1945 of 'no more Munich!' served all too often as mindless justification for military operations or wars of dubious necessity, like the Suez operation by the French and the British in 1956 or the Vietnam War. On the other side the American quagmire in Vietnam after 1965 and the French one in Algeria after 1954 have given birth to the idea that expeditionary wars cannot be won nowadays and have no rational justification.

Certainly the Algerian case has been revisited recently in the wake of 'Enduring Freedom' in Iraq by specialists of counterinsurgency. They make the point that the French Army in Algeria did finally achieve results in terms of observable security, through new methods of counterinsurgency, 'psychological warfare', and programmes of development for the Arab population, but they underestimate the fact that as early as 1960 de Gaulle's decision to find a political solution to the problem, despite many uncertainties and crises to come, had changed the climate of the war. They also underestimate the fact

that the international situation (strong and active opposition by the Muslim world and the Soviet bloc, and lack of support from the West) was enough to condemn the French effort in Algeria anyway, whatever the methods used.

But those myths lead us to a difficult question: are wars still 'winnable' in the post-national world? For instance, can counterinsurgency, applied in countries absorbed by a civil war by foreign armies, succeed? And beyond: has war become unthinkable as a tool for policies? Have we entered an age where 'soft power' has become the only acceptable and usable kind of power at the international level? Is the military nowadays suitable only for peacekeeping operations, under UN mandate? This frequent view is certainly the sum total of the historical experiences of the First World War, the Cold War, and the decolonization wars. For a short time Kosovo brought us back to the positive 1945 views about the 'good wars' aiming at regime change, but events in Iraq and Afghanistan since then have once again raised strong doubts about whether such policies are possible and advisable. Certainly, on the whole, modern and recent history restricts the use of war by Western countries.

At the same time armed conflicts, albeit more decentralized and elusive than past ones, do multiply; tribal and ethnic conflicts have reappeared, in a measure which was believed to be impossible since Enlightenment. Are we going back to the more unstable world we knew before the Cold War and bipolarity, or even before 1815? That period of relative stability, first under the clear-cut distinction between war and peace which was one of the hallmarks of the international system established by the Vienna Congress, then under the umbrella of mutual nuclear deterrence, may have been an exception.

Then one must consider a type of war without a history but full of lessons: nuclear war. Nuclear weapons, by their tremendous effects, even at the lower end of the range of possible yields, escape the normal logic of military weapons. And apart from a first strike (and a limited one, because of the complexities of a multiple attack, the existence of fratricide effects, and the loss of command and control owing to the failure of transmission and radar systems disturbed by the electromagnetic pulse) it is impossible to plan and perform an all-out nuclear war in any meaningful way. That is at least the rational conclusion at which the historian, with access to more and more records and testimonies, arrives. What on the other end has been very effective is the role of nuclear weapons as deterrent: first to prevent conflict or conflict escalation (the Cold War gives us a whole set of instances for that, starting from the Korean war, where the USA practised a form of self-imposed limitation for many reasons, but evidently because of the success in 1949 of the first Soviet atomic test). But also, even if it is less frequently acknowledged, nuclear deterrence provided the USSR with a roof under which it could safely support wars by proxies against the West (Korea, Vietnam) and in the seventies, dodging the threshold of nuclear war, expand its reach into Africa and the Middle East. Nuclear proliferation, which was supposed to be in check since the Non Proliferation Treaty of 1968 but which proceeded nevertheless, is therefore self-explanatory: either to enjoy security against an adversary or rival, or to retain the capacity for an ambitious regional agenda despite the tendency of major powers to control strategic regions and important developments, the incentives to achieve nuclear status are great.

At the same time a close study of the best-researched crises of the Cold War (the Berlin crisis which started in 1958 and the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962) show us how close the world came to nuclear war.[6] History does not in that respect let us enjoy any complacency, despite the usual mantra about nuclear weapons making an all-out war impossible. Miscalculations and stress have been at times very evident in the course of Cold War crisis, and nuclear weapons, and the fact that they could be delivered across the oceans in one half-hour, imparted a measure of hysteria to some episodes of the Cold War.

That is why, ever since Hiroshima, the USA has tried to convince the rest of the world to adopt the principle of nuclear non-proliferation. But the Baruch Plan failed at the UN as early as 1946, because of Soviet opposition. In succession the USSR, Great Britain, France, and China became nuclear powers. Washington reacted with the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty of 1968: basically those treaties were meant to stop proliferation, particularly to try to slow down Chinese nuclear progress and to block any German atomic programme. Besides non-proliferation, Washington started with Moscow arms control negotiations, which are something quite different. Those negotiations led to the SALT I and II treaties of 1972 and 1979. The aim was to limit a destabilizing, costly, and self-defeating competition in numbers of warheads and launchers (although not the qualitative competition). Beyond that, at least in Washington, the aim was to 'educate' Moscow to a more rational and less ideological foreign policy. For the USSR the aim was to slow down a competition which was much too costly for the Soviet economy, and to solidify an overall strategic balance, achieved by Russia in the 1970s at high cost. Thus Moscow could then engage safely in a new wave of communist extension in the Third World in the second half of the 1970s.

The historian cannot but notice that non-proliferation did not work, and did not prevent Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea from achieving nuclear status. The lesson of history since 1945 is that, on the whole, if a country has permanent problems with powerful neighbours (and particularly if those own nuclear weapons) and is not sure of full support from a nuclear ally, it makes good sense to achieve a nuclear capability. The unravelling of the NPT does not allow another conclusion. And if a country wants to achieve a regional sphere of influence, the possession of a nuclear deterrent will keep other actors from interfering. Certainly some nuclear powers will consider preventing through sanctions or pre-emptive strikes would-be nuclear powers from achieving that status. It is evidently an uncertain and dangerous undertaking. Or nuclear countries could try to accommodate the objectives and fears of aspiring nuclear countries, in order to deprive them of incentives for what remains a costly and difficult effort. But this would lead in some parts of the world to important changes in situations and balances.

A more modest undertaking, arms control could be tried in order to engage constructively threshold or actual new nuclear countries. But even that implies a modicum of agreement upon converging interests and about the significance of nuclear weapons and their special logic (which was the case between Washington and Moscow after the Cuban crisis). Whether the present more fractured world will allow either non-proliferation or arms control to develop is highly uncertain, and actually not probable. One must

hope that the nuclear balance and stability of the Cold War era will be maintained in present circumstances, keeping in mind that the multiplication of nuclear actors may make it more difficult.

The Theory and Practice of War

Military history was certainly not seen during the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s as a dynamic field of history. But it has since experienced a remarkable rebirth, from Roman or early modern military history down to the twentieth century. And it has explored many new fields of research.[7] Particularly recent military history has insisted upon the usual discrepancy between an imagined future war and the actual war that took place (before and after 1914 is a good case). This is significant for understanding the link between the theory and practice of war, through an iterative process of trial, error, evaluation, theorization, and new application.

The major new themes of military history include a rebirth of the history of strategic thinking, retracing the path of Hans Delbrück and Raymond Aron in studying Clausewitz and reaffirming the true philosophy of Clausewitz, despite its obfuscation in Imperial and afterwards Nazi Germany, and the necessary primacy of political considerations over military ones in the treatment of conflicts.[8]

Another topic which has much attracted historians is the notion of a 'revolution in military affairs', meaning the simultaneous transformation of armaments, strategy, tactics, organization, and the political-military relationship. The argument is convincing for many historians for the modern transformation of war during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is much more disputed for the current trends, despite the advent of smart weapons and information technologies, because so much, besides modern technologies, throws us back to the past, like the multiplication of 'small' wars, ethnic or religious conflicts, and even the rampant privatization of warfare.

The convergence of military history, sociology, economics, and history of innovation has led to a new field of research: the art of war seen as another kind of production process, the production of security. In war, through an iterative process of trial and error, doctrines, armaments, organization are put to the test and modified and tested again. This considerable rejuvenation of historical analysis is also useful to assess the real impact of new armaments and technologies on warfare, the relationship between technological development and the evolution of the art of war being much more complex than assumed earlier.[9] Generally speaking, the immersion of war history in general history has considerably enlarged the scope of recent writings. The re-evaluation of the role of the German *Wehrmacht* in the Nazi system and the realization of the fact that it is impossible to separate in a clear-cut way the armed forces from the regime and to study military history in a political and ideological vacuum have yielded important findings.[10]

Events since 11 September 2001 have led to renewed interest in terrorism as a weapon of war, insurrections and 'irregular' wars, and generally speaking in asymmetrical

warfare.[11] The problem there might be a tendency to concentrate on the technicalities of counterinsurgency or 'small war', losing the overall view, which has to be principally political, at the local and international level. The same obsession with the technical aspects of warfare (regarding armaments and tactics) may have led to an undervaluation, in historical research, of the psychology of the fighters, the 'morale' of the troops, the human and social aspects of military authority and obeisance, the reactions of the populations at the rear, although the first stage of military history's rebirth in the 1970s paid much attention to those problems, particularly for the First World War.[12] The striking demilitarization of Western societies, even beyond the general repulsion against war, with the suppression of compulsory military service and the ongoing privatization of even military security, may have contributed to the widespread view, often even among the younger generation of military historians, that war is a matter of technique, and not a central human activity.

Conclusion

Probably the only real lesson of history, and especially of military history, is that one must be ready at any time to be surprised. For instance, the history of nuclear deterrence since 1945 does not provide us with much guidance for the present strategic situation, where the main opposition is not between equivalent nuclear states, or between nuclear, developed states and guerrillas, but between major developed nuclear states and underdeveloped countries mastering or on the verge of mastering nuclear weaponry. Raymond Aron used to say that modern total war covers the whole field of violence, 'from the Bomb to the Partisan'; one can include there terrorism, ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts. Major developed countries may see themselves soon in the situation of having to confront countries much less developed, but mastering the whole range of violence, from terrorism and guerrilla warfare to nuclear deterrence, and without the constraints of a free political system and of public opinion. The notion of asymmetry would acquire here a new meaning, some countries not hesitating to use 'irregular' means to promote their agenda but being able to deter through an even modest nuclear armament the international community trying to restore order.

The traditional, Clausewitzian, European type of war, with declaration of war, orderly surrender or armistice, and afterwards peace treaty, with its insistence on *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, is no longer the rule, but rather the exception, if that. We have left an era of clear-cut difference between time of war and time of peace, and we have reached a state of continuous, diffuse violence. For the historian, this recalls pre-revolutionary Europe. At the same time it would seem, from a steady evolution of international law and political thinking and public opinion since 1919 (if not earlier) that for Western-type societies the use of sustainable force cannot be contemplated without an accompanying political process aimed at war termination, without a major effort directed to the civilian population, and without an international mandate.

Notes

1. Aron, 1983; Heuser, 2010.
2. Luttwak, 2009.
3. Keegan, 1997; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1990–.
4. For the difficult percolation of the new tactics in Germany, see Lemay, 2006 and Müller, 2008.
5. Westad, 2005.
6. Fursenko and Naftali, 1997; Uhl, 2006.
7. A useful exchange can be found in *Historically Speaking, The Bulletin of the Historical Society*, November 2009, X/5, 'A Forum on the State of Military History'.
8. Delbrück, 1975–80; Aron, 1983; Malis, 2005.
9. Goya, 2004.
10. Hartmann, Hürter, and Jureit, 2005; Aly, 2007.
11. An important issue of the journal *Stratégique*, 93–4/95–6, Paris, 2009, is devoted to the problem of the 'Stratégies irrégulières' ('Irregular strategies') in history.
12. Winter, 1988.

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CHAPTER 4

THE COLLISION OF MODERN AND POST-MODERN WAR

CHRISTOPHER COKER

The 'modern' is not something that the security community has found very important. By contrast, the world of literary criticism has traded in several variants of the term to identify the arts of the time: 'the modern movement', 'the modern tradition', 'the modern age', 'the modern century', 'the modern temper', 'modernism', or just simply 'the modern'. Political scientists too have been preoccupied for some time with marking out the parameters of the modern world. When it comes to the oldest word of all, the *modern*, the fact that we have to define it may be a sign that it is finally over.

It was only with the Enlightenment that the term 'modern' came to acquire its present meaning in the sense of a qualitative claim about 'newness'—namely that the age was not only different from everything that had gone before, but also superior. The modern age, in a word, was acutely self-conscious. The Enlightenment was aware of making history—its own and everyone else's. In time, terms such as 'revolution', 'progress', 'development', 'Zeitgeist', and even 'history' itself were invested with an importance that stemmed from the fact that everything was unprecedented. This was one of the key ideas of modernity, and it was stated most explicitly by Immanuel Kant in an essay he wrote in 1784, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?'

The essay was important for two reasons—it inaugurated a discourse *on* modernity, a discourse which took living in the present as a specific object of philosophical speculation within a conception of history that was free both from a backward-looking comparison with the ancients and a forward-looking Christian expectation of doomsday or the day of judgement. Secondly, it constituted the philosophical discourse *of* modernity insofar as it postulated that reason could validate its own laws including the meaning of history within the present, without reference to history or tradition. In other words, the Enlightenment produced the belief that it was possible to decode history as it happened, to keep in step rather than fall behind.

The Enlightenment was important for another reason: it gave birth to the French Revolution, the most self-conscious revolution of all. Everyone knew its importance from the beginning. The goal of humanity, St Just famously declaimed, was to drop anchor in the future. What remained after the revolution failed was a new vocabulary of politics. The terms 'left' and 'right', 'popular sovereignty', and 'national self-determination' all came into popular currency for the first time. The causes the revolutionaries championed—popular rights, national independence, economic growth, and even social security—were the familiar themes of the modern world's discourse with itself.

Modern War

When the two combined, war became a great narrative of collective sacrifice, and no narrative was more powerful than Hegel's claim that history was the story of freedom becoming conscious of itself. Hegel happened to be living in the town of Jena when Napoleon passed through in 1806 before defeating the Prussian army in one of his most famous victories the following day. He later wrote to a friend that he had seen the World Spirit riding through the town to a parade. In the person of Napoleon he saw a historical principle—the idea that man could become free through his own efforts.

He was, of course, spinning a myth. And myths are what we spin. No matter how hard we strive for purely rational thought there has always been—and always will be—a reservoir of mythical images which animate us. The meaning of an event may be referred either to the goal at which the historical course aims, or to our human destiny which is either being actualized in history or which demands such actualization. All wars are usually rooted in myth, not only in rational thought. What made the modern age different was the fact that its myths were directed to the future, not the past. Each time I demand freedom I reveal the secret of humanity since I reveal that humanity ought to have freedom. No reading of history can support this belief. It is anchored entirely in the story we tell ourselves about our own destiny (Kolakowski, 1989: 31).

In the course of the nineteenth century those myths were translated into three ideologies which were encapsulated in the defining mantra of the French revolution—Liberty (liberalism), Equality (socialism), and Fraternity (fascism—the brotherhood, not of Man, but one's fellow countrymen). The word 'ideology' was first popularized by Napoleon to describe the ideas of writers that were so abstruse and academic as to be useless to a man of action, such as himself. By the 1850s its meaning had changed. It now described the ideas of philosophers that had enormous popular appeal, in part because they motivated people to fight and join up, and ultimately die for their beliefs.

For a belief to be ideological it must ring true with its supporters. It must be instrumental and offer a code by which to live. And it must be proved true in action. Unlike religion, ideology does not require faith or belief in the unknowable, such as Providence or the Almighty. It requires the conviction of one's own eyes. And what better way to test the validity of an idea than on the battlefield. 'You say that it is the good cause that

hallows every war', says Nietzsche's Zarathustra. No, 'it is the good war that hallows every cause'. That idea received a twentieth century affirmation from the German writer Ernst Junger: 'Of course, our cause sanctifies battle, but how much more does battle itself sanctify the cause' (White, 1990: 35).

When ideology was harnessed to the power of the industrial revolution it became murderous. It produced what Agnes Heller calls a 'technological civilisation', one which she defines in terms of three elements: mediation, efficiency, and instrumental rationality (Heller, 1999).

In terms of the first element, value was attached to the means since society expressed little interest in how the means were applied. If something could be built—such as the atom bomb—it would be built, even though the invention of nuclear weapons might mean the 'end' of war, the end of history, or even the end of humanity. Technology, in a word, was indifferent to the ends to which it was put. The car was not responsible for death on the road any more than the production of poison gas to eradicate pests was responsible for the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The relationship between people also became more functional or impersonal. We can see this at work in the redefinition of courage. Courage in modern warfare, wrote the historian Marc Bloch, meant standing under fire, and not trembling (Hynes, 1998: 58).

Secondly, technological civilization was also characterized by the search for efficiency in the name of economic rationality. The late industrial worker was not only a labourer who used his muscle, he was a labourer who worked efficiently according to a rational use of time. The craftsman became the factory worker; the soldier became a technician. Technique became everything. Taylorism and Fordism were new capitalist ways of improving productivity. In 1940 James Burnham in his most influential book *The Managerial Revolution* claimed that politics was giving way to efficiency too. Both capitalism and Marxism had produced planned, centralized societies, whose new ruling class was made up of business executives, technicians, bureaucrats, and soldiers. All were lumped together by Burnham under the name 'managers' (Orwell, 1975: 350).

Thirdly, technological civilization was rational. Of course, reason had always been valued as a mark of civilization—the triumph over the irrational or the instinctive. What made the modern age different was the way that reason was harnessed to technology. Like everything else, writes John Ellis, in *The Social History of the Machine Gun*, the history of technology is part and parcel of social history in general and the last chapter of his book sets out his case particularly vividly. As Ellis writes, the nineteenth-century Europeans thought that the machine gun, precisely because it encapsulated the principle of serialization, was the product of a rational culture—those who did not have it by definition could not build it (Ellis, 1976: 9). The logic of the machine gun was deceptively simple and it was stated pithily by G. E. Moore, the Cambridge philosopher who taught Keynes. *We* are more advanced than *they* because we can kill them faster than they can kill us (Midgley, 2006: 246).

European societies employed the machine gun in the last and most frenetic phase of European imperialism in an attempt to persuade non-Western societies to 'see reason'—in this case to appreciate the benefits of their own subordination to European rule. They

were anxious to persuade native societies to act more 'reasonably' and they were quite willing to punish them if they proved wilful instead. There is one essential explanation for why the people of Pondoland in the Eastern Cape decided not to fight the British, and allowed themselves to be annexed to South Africa in the 1890s without a fight. Cecil Rhodes mowed down a mealy field with machine guns in front of the Paramount Chief and his councillors and explained that they would suffer the same fate if they did not submit. And so they submitted as did many other colonial peoples who even if they did not suffer directly themselves, saw their neighbours suffer and chose to submit before they experienced the worst. One could take the argument even further: either the world is one in which there are limits to human reason, at which point there are sanctions against indulging in human impulses and ambitions, or it is a place where reason is so untrammelled and unlimited and the strong (or reasonable) are the more civilized, that the latter can be confident in the exercise of power. And one is never more powerful than when winning an argument, or depriving the weak (as did Rhodes) of even the satisfaction of being right.

Of course in 1914–18 the British were to suffer the same fate: the majority of casualties on the Somme were accounted for by German machine guns—the cracking of the machine guns reminded the poet Edmund Blunden of the screeching of 'steam being blown off by a hundred engines' (Ellis, 1976: 138). It was a telling metaphor for the British army's first introduction to industrialized warfare. By then rationality had become mechanical, functional, and essentially empty. Human beings had become the object rather than subject of human action. As the twentieth century progressed people began to be seen by governments in statistical terms. They began to be seen as abstractions.

Weapons designers were engineers who concerned themselves, not with death but 'lethal area estimates' and 'kill probabilities', as well as 'sensitivity and compatibility studies'—the procedures for making sure that a given bomb could be used in a given airplane. In C. P. Snow's classic account of intrigues in Whitehall during the Second World War we learn of the bitter arguments over the strategic bombing of Germany between those for whom bombing has become a matter of faith and those who doubt whether any country can be bombed to the peace table. The disputes are not about the ethics of bombing but the statistical probabilities of success: 'In private we made bitter jokes of a losing side. "There are the Fermi-Dirac statistics," we said. The Einstein-Bose statistics. And the new Cherwell non-quantitative statistics. And we told stories of a man who added up two and two and made four.'

Let me quote the German playwright Friedrich Schiller, writing in the early nineteenth century: 'A man can be at odds with himself (and his humanity) in two ways: either as a savage when feeling predominates over principle; or as a barbarian when principle destroys feeling.' In a technological civilization the savage was despised for putting feeling first. In Aldous Huxley's dystopian vision of the future, *Brave New World*, the Savage despises modern man for putting reason first. In privileging reason he had destroyed feeling. He had become a 'barbarian' in danger of being alienated from his own humanity. The Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset condemned scientists for being 'specialised barbarians of the twentieth century' who had no respect for the past

which they destroyed and none for the future which they threatened to deny through their inventions (Ortega y Gasset, 1932). In the case of war no invention was more terrifying than the atomic bomb.

Post-Modern War

When we speak of the *post-modern condition* we are speaking of modernity coming of age. What is post-modernity if not a response to the unfulfilled promises and thwarted hopes of the modern era, a recognition that there can be no final resolution to the dilemmas of life? The modern mind has been forced to take a long and sober look at itself. It is modernity coming to terms with its own impossibility. And that means looking at what modernity has discarded at the end of the century: the grand narratives by which it used to explain history, its redemptive model of politics, and last but not least its relationship with technology.

The post-modern condition, to turn to the grand narratives first, is an intellectual dissatisfaction with the idea of a rationally ordered world; it is a recognition that fragmentation is the sign of the times. In a word, we are willing to live with the contradictions and ambiguities of the modern world in a way that previous generations were not. We are thus forced to re-perceive the world and ourselves as agents. There is no big picture that we can grasp. War no longer carries the great meta-narratives that states used to spin to mobilize their populations for war.

This first became apparent in the Gulf War (1990–1), which even at the time people saw as the first post-modern conflict. The media saturation coverage of the event was remarkable. It has been estimated that on average 600 million people throughout the world watched the nightly TV news reports as the war unfolded. In the end, wrote Jean Baudrillard, the war remained 'a televisual subterfuge'. Its televized images degraded war as an experience and in so doing robbed it of its historical content. War had been emptied of meaning as social experience—the very feature that had made it 'modern'. The villain of the piece in his analysis was the media. The images that were relayed, replayed, freeze-framed, and debated every night exhausted events of their historical content. All they had to offer was a 'synthetic meaning' (Baudrillard, 1995: 32).

Baudrillard liked to provoke his readers as French intellectuals have been doing since the mid-twentieth century. Many of them like to 'dazzle'—the French word, *briller*, has no real English equivalent. But he was also a scintillating critic of our times, especially on the constructed nature of reality. His larger claim was that in the post-modern world everything is historical but it is difficult to discover what is 'historic'. We now know that there are no great emancipatory forces (including History) that are working towards some finite end. We can no longer excuse the 'inhuman' or unjust—the collateral damage of 'progress'—by incorporating ourselves in such forces. We have lost those alibis of aggression that allowed us to act in good faith. We are burdened with a bad conscience. Today, we no longer tell ourselves Hegelian stories, or glimpse World Spirits, let

alone follow world historical figures to our death. The stories we tell ourselves are more modest.

Secondly, for that reason we no longer think of war as *redemptive*—we can no longer take war on trust as we once did. We now know too much. The history of modern war differs from that of pre-modern, primarily in terms of radically changing fields of perception. And nothing changed perceptions more than the invention of photography. Photosensitivity is about 'exposure'—when things break to the surface, the time of the sudden take. Photographers capture the telling moment, which is why surrealists used to call the camera 'the savage eye'. What artists have shown in the past, at their most graphic (Goya's depiction of the atrocities in the Napoleonic Wars), show that things *like* this happen; what the photographer shows (Frank Capa's photo of a Republican soldier being killed in the Spanish Civil War) is that the atrocity actually *did*. A photograph doesn't evoke, it reveals; it illustrates as well as corroborates, and it asks all of us to confront an embarrassing question: who is responsible—those who commit the deed, or those who send them off to do battle? (Sontag, 2003.)

Post-modern war has taken this much further—for war is now almost entirely *transparent*. By the time of the next Gulf War (2003) it had become clear that the character of war had changed. The 'social' dimension was still there but in the form of networked relations between people in digital space. *Time* magazine's Person of the Year 2007 wasn't a Head of State or a Chairman of a large company. It was 'You'—the individual. A new network of peer-to-peer relationships have replaced or augmented the role of the official media: YouTube—a video sharing site; MySpace or Facebook, two social networking sites; Wikipedia, a collaborative encyclopedia; EBay, a person-to-person auction site. This new digital environment has changed the character of war, in ways that radically empower the individual. It is now quite likely someone, somewhere, with a digital camera or mobile phone will capture the most telling incidents in a conflict.

The abiding metaphor for this is a network. And the importance of the network is *non-linearity*. Instead of cause and effect, images broadcast across the world can produce cascading effects, or what the philosopher Raymond Aron once called 'polymorphous correlations'. 'Stuff happens', Donald Rumsfeld infamously remarked of the looting of Baghdad. The media may create the reality and structure and frame the discourse but it is the networked effects of broadcasted images that can delegitimize an operation overnight. In short, the media can make transparent what governments would prefer to conceal. The war zone is no longer a military-dominated space, it is shared with a multiplicity of actors including NGOs, private security companies, and coalition partners. In this world of enhanced visualization of power, governments are drawn into the ambit of visibility and in that ambit the human body appears intimately in close-up. The image of civilians recovering from a mistimed airstrike; the image of children in the rubble of a village—all diminish reputations by exposing the illegitimacy of power, or its use. War may still be necessary but it is now no longer *redeeming*.

Ironically, the third major change in the character of war—a very different relationship between man and machine—is promising to take post-modern war in a very different direction. Even in the nineteenth century Nathaniel Hawthorne had foreseen that his

countrymen would strive to transfer war from the personality of man into 'the cunning contrivance of machines'. He predicted that by making themselves emotionally distant from the battlefield soldiers might succeed in displacing their own aggression.

The archetypal example of emotional distancing is the story of the navigator of the *Enola Gay*, the plane which dropped the first atomic bomb. He claimed to have 'come off the mission, had a bite and a few beers and hit the sack, and had not lost a night's sleep over the bomb in 40 years'. In *Dr Strangelove*, the ultimate movie version of nuclear war, Stanley Kubrick's masterstroke (wrote J. G. Ballard) was 'to tilt the dramatic action of the film so that the audience's sympathies slide across the value scale and eventually lie with the machines of destruction—the B52s with their sleek A-bombs and their brave but baffled crews'. The question the film raises is whether by externalizing technology we lose ourselves as the 'subject' of our culture, and therefore the subject of myth. Atomic bombs have a social history too, and so do the robots we are planning to send into battle in the not too distant future. If we are what we build, are we programming ourselves out of war? One day soon will we be asked to see war from the machine's point of view?

In their book *The Future of War* George and Meredith Friedman proposed that all societies can be understood by their technology. In the computer they see the definitive American system. What makes it definitive is its pragmatic character. The computer doesn't contemplate aesthetic or metaphysical or moral issues. Its programming language focuses on solving practical and immediate problems. To that extent, it expresses the pragmatic, unphilosophical American spirit (Friedman and Friedman, 1996: 10). It is not only the computer, however, which can be seen as taking the metaphysics out of war; so also do Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

The military's ambition is to increase efficiency. The body requires sleep and food and is prone to fatigue. Unmanned machines can perform at higher rates of efficiency, in part, because they have no fear. And they have no fear because they do not risk personal injury. Of course, they are reliant on software, programming, refuelling, and rearming. In other words, they are not truly 'autonomous' since they rely on human support. But their human operators too are largely—or often entirely—out of harm's way. The enemy is remote, beyond the horizon. The challenge is not that individual pilots will be replaced by a machine but that they may find themselves increasingly embedded in a cybernetic world, largely detached from the mayhem around them. No longer at risk themselves, they are no longer required to exhibit courage.

And this applies too, remember, to the politicians. Operators of drones can now speak directly to senior military commanders at the top of the chain of command, or even be linked to the War Room in the White House. The kill chain has been radically shortened. The implications of this have not been lost on Hollywood. Ridley Scott's film *Body of Lies* (2008) shows a CIA chief ordering a strike from his mobile phone while taking his children to school. The mental strain of authorizing a strike one minute and watching the children play football the next requires them to make a huge mental jump. A Reaper mission is not a topic of conversation at the breakfast table.

Is the increasing interlink between man and machine evidence of what Stephen Milgram calls 'agentic shift', the process by which human beings transfer responsibility

for outcomes from themselves to more abstract agents? In the pre-modern age it was Providence or God. In the modern age it was the Party, History, or the Cause. In the post-modern era it is the computer. Is this the result of a technological demand of the times? Have we ourselves become problematic 'bottlenecks' in the circulation and processing of information? Will we all have to be 'reprogrammed' by computer technology so that we can be better equipped with the 'trained perception' to locate the 'truth' (Heim, 1993: 8)? The phenomenology of human–machine interaction is changing fast as computers become more interactive and sophisticated. Is the task to make us more machine-friendly?

Collision of War Forms

The picture I have sketched is true of only one part of the world, the post-industrial. The world is much larger than this. Today there is no World Order, or even a semblance of it. Writing in the early 1990s two respected analysts, Max Singer and the late Aaron Wildavsky, described the situation in their book, *The Real World Order: Zone of Peace, Zone of Turmoil*. Its premise was laid out starkly at the beginning of the first chapter: 'The key to understanding the real world order is to separate the world into two: a zone of peace, wealth and democracy, and a zone of turmoil, war and underdevelopment'. This presents us with an almost ontological rift in the human web; it also admits to a high degree of violence intrinsic to the life and experience of the Zone of War. In his own work the diplomat Robert Cooper prefers to divide the world into three historical time zones: the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. The question is not whether such divisions exist—the point is that we think they do, and we believe that violence tends to break out when the zones intersect (Cooper, 2000).

Within the post-modern world itself there are pre-modern enclaves of violence. If the world is dividing into separate time zones, they are not mutually exclusive. For the reality of life in some of the inner cities of the United States is not all that different qualitatively from the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro where drug barons decide who dies and lives, where local gangs impose curfews on the citizens at night and generally determine who gets what. America's cities too are the site of what Martin van Creveld calls 'low intensity conflicts' and Hans-Magnus Enzenberger calls 'molecular civil wars'. They play host to open-ended conflicts which blur the distinction between crime and war, and reduce certain urban areas to 'criminal anarchy'.

The modern world, by comparison, has to deal with pre-modern enclaves on a much larger scale than America's inner cities. And the methods it uses tend to be more brutal. In 1995–6 Russia fought a two-year war in Chechnya in which 69,000 lives were lost. A war launched by a regime in Moscow which espoused free market reforms, democracy, and human rights proved as brutal as anything launched by the old Soviet Union. Vacuum (fuel air explosives) and fragmentation bombs were dropped on the heads of Chechens and Slavs alike. Concentration camps were opened. Marketplaces were bombed by jet

aircraft. It was as total as war can get and there is no guarantee (except for the parlous state of the Russian armed forces) that it might not be repeated again.

And what of the pre-modern world? The South African poet, Breyten Breytenbach, writes of a world in which the prophets and charlatans and the ideologies they once espoused, such as communism and fascism, have been discredited at last. The conspiracy of ideologies originally imposed a pattern upon history at the cost of murder—'the big kill intended to confer a purpose upon small death'. But the world Breytenbach paints is one in which little has changed for the disenfranchised and the dispossessed, who face a bleak future especially in Africa: 'that exotically miserable continent constituting the ghostly sub-consciousness of history'. Africa has 'time but no history'. It is in danger of being rendered history-less (Breytenbach, 1996: 6).

Robert Kaplan paints an even more disturbing picture of a world fast regressing into barbarism, a world which was about to be reclaimed by a history we thought we had escaped. Kaplan offers a nightmare vision of an age in which the past has returned in the shape of disease, criminal anarchy, and the breakdown of the state system, a world in which groups who we used to think had become figures of history—warlords in Somalia, bandits in Liberia, private mercenary armies in Sierra Leone—have stolen back into our consciousness. The future Kaplan sketches is of 'an epoch of theme-less juxtapositions in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged glass pattern of city states and nebulous and anarchic regionalisms'.

Whenever the post-modern world intervenes in the pre-modern—mostly in the form of peacekeeping or 'nation-building under fire'—it has to confront what Alvin and Heidi Toffler call 'a collision of war forms' (Toffler and Toffler, 1994: 189). Post-modern societies fight their wars as well as keep the peace in their own fashion. Pre-modern societies, however, tend to do the same and have very little time for post-modern methods. The conflicts that rage across the globe from Afghanistan to Somalia involve warlords and militia leaders, pirates and drug cartels, most employing small arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)—weapons that make war increasingly asymmetrical.

It counts for much that they are no longer the national liberation armies familiar to us from the Cold War. Instead, they are more open-sourced and decentralized, and organized around distributed or quasi-independent groups. In Iraq they engaged in distributed swarms, learning from each other's experience, sharing information, and responding quickly to change. In the early days their innovation cycles were often faster than those of the Coalition forces. They also differ from the old national liberation movements in another critical respect. They are interested in outcomes, not order-building. Unlike the old national liberation movements, they are usually not interested in holding territory, though they may be ready to lure the enemy to fight for it as the insurgents did in Fallujah on two separate occasions in 2004. They are not usually interested in building schools (though like Taliban they may empty them, especially of girls); and they are not even interested, unlike the criminal cartels in Colombia, in creating social welfare nets to legitimize their presence. Some, like Hezbollah, resemble the old national liberation forces; they are real estate owners (now the largest in the Lebanon). Others, however, thrive in the *lawless* spaces created by the collapse of law

and order. They don't construct anything, or take responsibility for anything they do. As a result, they are hard to take out (Robb, 2007).

Policing the Frontiers

The modern security paradigm owes much to Clausewitz, as Raymond Aron noted in his book *War and Industrial Society* (1958). Aron chose to contrast the security thinkers of the nineteenth century, including Clausewitz, with those of the time that he was writing, the mid-twentieth century. 'The thinkers of the last century had a stronger feeling of living in a period of transition and did not hesitate to make prophecies whose boldness and dogmatism astound us' (Aron, 1958: 3). Clausewitz saw war as order-building, and operating within ordered principles of its own: 'before/after'; 'war/peace'; 'subject/object'; 'offence/defence'. It is important to remember that Clausewitz didn't write for us—he wrote for his contemporaries. He reached for a contemporary frame of reference when writing about the character and nature of war. He helped to forge what Aron called the 'sociological imagination' of the nineteenth century and imposed on us as a result the dialectical thinking of German Idealism. For him the dialectic of war involved a clash of opposites, some of which I have outlined above. One of the most critical was the dialectic between 'absolute' and 'real' war.

The other writers whom Aron identified as critical to the nineteenth century 'sociological imagination' were Comte and Spencer, Marx and Nietzsche. All four 'imagined' war and peace in terms that seem to us to be overly dogmatic. The first two saw the promise of peace as industrialization broke down the old class barriers and forged a more pacific union of mankind. The other two predicted that industrialization would produce more lethal weapons and unleash an era of mass warfare. Aron argued that both schools of thought were right and wrong at the same time. Neither the optimists, nor the pessimists, recognized that industrial society created opportunities for peace and war, just as it created opportunities for different modes of social development, from socialism to social democracy and the Anglo-American model of capitalism. Industrial society created its own opportunities and dangers. It created the welfare state and transformed the citizens of the West in due course into consumers embracing consumerism as a creed. It also created two vast armed blocks, West and East, who were quite prepared to annihilate each other in a nuclear confrontation. Aron grasped that Clausewitz was right to argue that every age has its own kind of war, and Aron, of course, was one of the most astute interpreters of Clausewitz (Aron, 1983).

Today many sociologists contend that the industrial society which Aron wrote about has changed into a risk society and that the cultural grammar of war is changing too. Risk society is defined in many ways, but one common to the work of Anthony Giddens, and Ulrich Beck, is that its citizens have come to see their society's development as a 'theme and a problem for itself' and to see war too accordingly, not in terms of the means/end rationality about which Max Weber wrote so eloquently, but in terms of 'reflexive

rationality'. We have to manage the consequences of our own actions. We now employ a post-Clausewitzian paradigm. In the collision between the pre-modern and post-modern worlds war is in the process of becoming risk management in all but name.

And if post-modern war is still a continuation of politics by other means, politics itself is changing. In the twentieth century its main aim was to rationalize life. Politicians set out to reorder society; to make everything uniform by applying a single model, in part to eliminate 'anomalies' in the system. Politics not only involved the increasing use of instrumental rationality in the sense that its only purpose was political (the existential world was bypassed—that is what made life in Max Weber's words so 'disenchanting'). Politics was also bound by rules, and at the same time it was rule-making.

In the post-modern era, by contrast, life is too complex to be reordered, and even if this were not the case war is too imperfect an instrument to do the reordering. War is no longer a problem-solving device that can be applied to any complex issue. Politics isn't about order (either New World Orders or orders on the ground), and it no longer involves utopian projects of social engineering. For most of us no longer believe there is a perfect society. Politics is now largely about purpose. And in the post-modern era our purposes are different from what they were fifty years ago. We are now in the business of 'managing' insecurity, or 'enabling greater or lesser stability', or guaranteeing better 'service provision'. We have these particular vocabularies because we have such a multiplicity of purposes. As history evolves, so new vocabularies come on stream but none of these vocabularies or purposes are more or less 'superior' to any of the others. Our present management of global insecurity is not necessarily better than the nation- or state-building of old. It just happens to be more relevant for us. It is all that we can aim for though we must hope, of course, that the purposes served may be better.

And the chief purpose of war is management of the Global Disorder that obtains. The world is a dangerous place that needs to be policed against a range of enemies from terrorist movements to criminal syndicates and drug cartels. The US military is already being radically restructured in keeping with this vision. The army is currently modularizing its force structure, moving from ten divisions up to forty-eight stand-alone brigades comprising up to 4,000 personnel each, which will be quickly deployable, self-contained, and self-sustaining. Pride of place is going to Special Forces, who are likely to find themselves in the front line of operations, replacing the large-unit combat forces that hit the Normandy beaches in 1944 and served as far afield as the Gulf in 1990. They may yet be transformed into a fifth branch of the armed forces, just as the Air Force only became a distinct service in 1947. The US Marine Corps is also experimenting with 'infestation' tactics that might radically change the face of ground warfare. The Corps calls it 'plug in and play', a concept that involves rotating units in the field for months or even years at a time as autonomous nodes in a larger network.

So, where are we heading? The battlefield is an increasingly dematerialized one for many in the military, and all too material for those unfortunate enough to find themselves on the ground. The ontological status of the military is changing. 'To be' used to mean to be somewhere, to be situated, to be grounded in the here and now. But the essence of being which is grounded in a locality is denied by the instantaneity, the immediacy,

and the ubiquity of our post-industrial weapons systems. There is a fear among today's soldiers, writes Peter Singer in his book *Wired for War*, that the new technologies will turn the experience of war into something else quite alienating. There is also the promise, of course, as Aron for one would have recognized, that these technologies may even transform our role in the world for the better. But even that hope is mainly driven by our inability to move beyond the conflicts that have shaped human history since the beginning. The differences between modern and post-modern war may be radical in some respects but not in others. As in the modern age we may soon find that it is we, not our machines, that are still wired for war (Singer, 2009: 436).

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CHAPTER 5

ALLIANCES AND WAR

YVES BOYER

'I will make my agreement with you and [...] never again will the waters come over all the earth for its destruction.'[1] This allegory drawn from the most emblematical pact ever made suggests that alliances are first and foremost about confidence, trust, and protection. They bind countries that regard their allies' security needs as their own and are thus prepared to pay the price of blood to side with friendly nations under aggression. Such shared aims are precisely at the origin of the word alliance, which comes from the Latin *adligare*, which means 'binding'.

One of the first 'classical' European strategic thinkers who, in the seventeenth century, explored the concept of alliance was Montecuccoli,[2] the great rival of Marshall de Turenne. At that time, this notion was mainly associated with obligations binding cities or countries sharing common dynastic interests. This kind of guarantee could last for decades. That was the case for the House of Hapsburg, whose two branches, respectively in Madrid and Vienna, were tied to each other until the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. History brings to memory abundant examples of other famous alliances in Europe, such as the Quadruple alliance against Spain,[3] or, later, the 'Holy' alliance against any possible French temptation to rewrite the strategic map of Europe after the victory of the Allies in 1815. France, however, joined this alliance later on when its rationale shifted from prevailing against hostile nations to protecting regimes confronted with liberal movements, spreading throughout Europe and inherited from the ideals of the French revolution.

Alliance purposes are diverse. They may be about seeking supplementary forces to balance a hostile power: in this case, an alliance is offering a positive correlation of forces against the unknown or against an opposite country or group of countries. In that sense, it stands for the best antidote to isolation. When France, at the beginning of the twentieth century, set up the *Entente Cordiale* with the UK, it put an end to a period of isolation that was already noticeable when the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1 erupted. An alliance may also be concluded to reach, geographically and strategically, a favourable correlation of forces for obtaining diplomatic gains or for future military operations. In that sense they make easier the preparation of offensive operations to expand one's

own sphere of influence. This was the case with Rome, which gradually extended its grip to the whole of the Italian peninsula through a series of alliances. Alliances can also be made in order to bind countries sharing similar circumstantial concerns and objectives, as was exemplified at the occasion of the 1859–60 war against China when London and Paris fought together to obtain common advantages, notably on trade issues. Alliances can tie countries that may feel they are being challenged by unfettered forces of transformation triggered by religious movements (the alliances during the Thirty Years War in Europe in the middle of the seventeenth century), hostile ideologies, or enemies whose success may dramatically jeopardize their continued existence, security, place and role on the international stage. Such was the case, as an example, of the Triple Alliance, arranged against the Triple Entente between London, Paris, and Moscow prior to the First World War.

The role and functioning of alliances may range from minimum entanglement, with very few commitments (such as merely diplomatic consultations), to the most compelling set of agreements for planning and organizing, well in advance, the conditions of joint military operations under a unified command (as was the case of NATO during the Cold War). Alliances are supposed to work efficiently when the political preconditions and modi operandi that made them achievable are the result of positive will unconstrained by any kind of unfriendly pressures. On the other hand, volte-faces are possible, as exemplified by the Tauroggen convention, in 1812, when Prussia renounced the treaty of Tilsit forced on it by Napoleon,[4] and made a U-turn in favour of siding with Russia against the French. A more recent example of a rapid change in an alliance system is offered by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Treaty, which did not survive very long the fall of the Berlin wall and saw most of the former European satellites ('allies') of the USSR eager to move towards their former opponent, the Atlantic alliance.

Such plasticity of the concept of alliance explains, in large part, the duration of many pacts throughout history and the variety of the statuses that their members could hold within alliances. Although militarily integrated under the command of Marshall Ferdinand Foch, at the end of the Great War, the American republic remained only 'associated' with the allies, essentially France and the UK, because it did not want to be politically constrained either by Paris or London. That posture gave President Woodrow Wilson a huge margin of manoeuvre when participating in the negotiations for the Versailles treaty.[5] More recently, France cultivated a particular place within the Atlantic alliance—between 1967, when Paris withdrew its armed forces from the military integrated structure, and 2008, when it decided to return to the allied command structure. The diversity in the quality of alliance memberships and in the functioning of alliances creates a clear distinction between the solemn moment of sealing an alliance, the intrinsic purposes it encompasses at the very precise moment of its formal establishment, and its actual functioning during its existence. The former phase, which does symbolize shared political aspirations and common military aims, is generally long lasting when the latter phases are amendable and flexible enough to prevail over unforeseen changes and the growing diversity of the members' interests with the passing of years. Is this not the case for the Atlantic alliance in the present day?

The Atlantic Alliance: From an Agreement on Objective to a Difference on Purpose Between Members

The Atlantic alliance is the longest-lasting alliance in modern history. Its establishment in 1949 was by and large the result of different and distinct needs among its future members which, however, coincided at a precise moment. On the one hand, the West Europeans, under the Brussels treaty of 1948, had set up an integrated military organization, whose commander in chief was Marshall Bernard Montgomery. But the lack of financial and military resources faced by the five European countries that were signatories to the Brussels treaty made it almost impossible to build an effective and reliable defence against Soviet forces should they attack. A rapprochement with the United States, the most powerful nation of the world at that time, appeared as the only solution to overcome such a deadlocked situation. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans, after a period of hesitations, finally did define, in 1947,[6] a new grand strategy (the 'Containment') aimed at holding back—including by military means as embedded in the well-known NSC 68 document—the possible expansion of communism under the flag of the Soviet Union.

The two sides of the North Atlantic Ocean, although they were motivated by different purposes and dissimilar aims, found an arrangement representing the best possible world for each of them. By signing the Washington treaty, the West Europeans felt much more confident about their security. For their part, the Americans could begin, according to eminent US geopolitician Nicholas Spykman,[7] building on the *Rimland*, the network of alliances they sought to establish with friendly nations, from Norway to Japan, in order to contain the Soviet Union and its allies. In that sense, the Atlantic alliance pre-1989 was a fine example of a traditional alliance, meeting successfully the expectation initially placed in it by all of its members. The weaker states sought reassurance against a major existential threat. The strongest state was recognized as the leader by endorsing what looked like a traditional '*traité de subsides*'. In previous centuries, this type of treaty was the usual modus operandi linking weaker allies to a stronger one which provided funds, men, and equipment to support the military operations of its junior partners. Such was the policy pursued by France under Louis XIV or Britain during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The dominant power provided support to its junior partners on the condition that they actively contributed to deterring the common adversaries. That was clearly the attitude of Washington in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when money and equipment were sent in quantity to Europe in the framework of the Marshall Plan and, after the signing of the Washington treaty, substantial amounts of military equipment were leased to the worn-out West European armed forces.

The economic recovery of Western Europe, at the end of the 1960s, and the rising costs of the Vietnam War, however, led the USA to ask for a more optimal 'burden-sharing' of

costs between the two sides of the Atlantic. A claim Washington has since then never ceased to bring up with its European allies. The Atlantic alliance did perform magnificently during the Cold War and cemented the determination of the allies in their collective will against the authoritarian Soviet power. The formidable success of the Atlantic alliance has had, however, side effects which are now felt by its members. In a way, the efficiency of NATO was gradually associated and even equated to the debatable notion that, after all, a shared belief in democratic institutions was as important as the military organization of the alliance. This development is now posing more inconvenience to the allies that they would have thought.

When the existential threat that bestowed on the Atlantic alliance its primary *raison d'être* vanished with the disappearance of the Soviet bloc, the justification for carrying on the alliance needed to be reset. By and large, at the beginning of the 1990s, after a period of relative uncertainty on NATO's role in the absence of an identified enemy, the alliance's leaders were inclined to base its perpetuation more on its identity and characteristics rather than on its purposes. Hence the emphasis put, since that time, on the alliance as a community of friendly nations sharing the same democratic values and principles: the uniqueness of the West in the community of nations. The alliance became thus more 'ethical' and principled and it was captured under a new brand name—'the transatlantic democratic community'.[8] Then, the question of its scope—both geographically and functionally—started being debated. In the mid-1990s, Washington sought to enlarge the perimeter of NATO's activities outside its traditional Euro-Atlantic sphere; 'out of area' or 'out of business' became the persistent signal sent by Washington to the Europeans. Subsequently, the alliance had to go through a transformational process in order to be able to project its military arm outside the traditional boundaries of its sphere of responsibility. The Allies thus launched their first ever military operations against 'deviant' powers—Serbia, Saddam Hussein's Iraq (in the framework of a coalition of the 'willing') and, later, Afghanistan under Al Qaeda's and the Taliban's grip. The motives behind these operations were more about restoring human rights and punishing rogue leaders than strictly defensive in purpose.

From Hard Security Goals to Ethical Objectives: 'A Bridge too Far' For the Atlantic Alliance?

At the end of the 1990s, consideration of ethical principles and human rights became the new mantra of the Atlantic alliance. Spin doctors were actively promoting the idea that, because of its ideal of democratic values, the alliance had become the distinctive and unique means to promote worldwide stability—a goal they linked to the restoration of human rights when blatant infringements were perpetrated. Such a goal is embedded in NATO's charter: 'based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule

of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a lasting peaceful order in Europe. However, the achievement of this aim can be jeopardized by crisis and conflict outside the Euro-Atlantic area.'[9] This goal is, however, far from the *realpolitik* objectives which were at the origin of the Atlantic alliance if one considers that, at least on the US side, its objective was also and maybe primarily to perpetuate a geopolitical situation where the United States benefited from a position of pre-eminence in the international system. As pointed out by Spykman:

> The statesman who conducts foreign policy can concern himself with values of justice, fairness, and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objective. They can be used instrumentally as moral justification for the power quest, but they must be discarded the moment their application brings weakness. The search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power.[10]

The new ethical approach significantly shifted the centre of gravity of the alliance from Europe to the wider world and was spectacularly reinforced under George W. Bush's presidency between 2001 and 2009. Various forms of association, short of full membership, have been considered for Alliance partners since the mid-1990s, with a view to enlarging the geographical perimeters of NATO. Hence the shadow of the alliance now reaches up to the Chinese frontiers. This 'de facto' geographical and functional enlargement of the alliance's purposes opened new domains of concern for the alliance. As stated by a prominent official of the Bush administration, 'NATO increasingly looks outward, to dangers that can have roots far beyond Europe. These dangers include violent extremism, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks, and insecurity of energy resources.'[11] However, the limits of such an approach were exposed on the occasion of the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. The alliance was called to act unanimously but failed to do so. Two of its key members explicitly demonstrated their reservations if not their opposition: Turkey refused to allow the US 3rd infantry division to deploy through its territory to attack Northern Iraq; Germany disapproved of the intervention, which did not receive the endorsement of the UN Security Council. A few months before that episode, the European allies had invoked Article 5 of the Washington treaty after the Al Qaeda attack against New York and Washington. The US declined that offer and intervened to drive the Taliban out of power in Kabul. Later, at the UN talks in Bonn (Germany) in November–December 2001, Washington asked the alliance to provide assistance for protecting the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In fact, a disorderly situation gradually arose. The European allies, with the exception of the UK, were in Afghanistan to save the alliance's face and image of unity; the USA was there to continue the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban . . . Such a variety of goals provoked acrimonious debates within the Western alliance. The US feels unsatisfied at the many caveats imposed by some NATO countries on the employment of the forces they have deployed in Afghanistan. Those same countries hint that this war is not their war; the caveats are, indeed, the expression of their political dissatisfaction with the war, which in addition remains far from being popular at home.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Western allies met the limits of their commitment to emphasizing human rights as the foundation and the engine of their 'out of area' interventions. When confronting opponents with a different *Weltanschauung*, notably in the Islamic world, this commitment has clearly found its limit. This discrepancy between goals and aims undermined the objective of the alliance to 'win hearts and minds' of populations whose religious beliefs and societal behaviours obey different rules from those existing in Western countries. Victory would mean 'adaptation' of those populations to a democratic and liberal model of society that counters aggressive Islamism and the set of prescriptive religious principles and normative rules and rights that it champions. The local populations are not willing to perform such a shift despite the proclaimed 'universality' of the alliance's goal. This issue is far from new. In Afghanistan, Pashtun values remain unaffected and the *Pashtunwali* rules are still in force. Such a reality was even acknowledged by the staunchest supporter of the war and led the then UK defence minister Liam Fox to declare, in Kabul in spring 2010, that British troops should not stay 'for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country'.[12] As explained by Philip Windsor, after the French revolution, modern strategy and warfare 'had to be determined in terms of the clash of societies and not merely the conduct of operations in the field'.[13] Such a contradiction in aims and purposes based on divergent understandings of what constitutes values is something Montesquieu already scorned in his Persian Letters: 'the English tell how one of their kings, having conquered and taken prisoner a prince who disputed his right to the crown, began to reproach him with his faithlessness and treachery, when the unfortunate prince replied, "It was decided only a moment ago which of us two is the traitor" '.[14]

The primacy given to values in the 'new' post-9/11 Atlantic alliance contains its own seed of contradiction within and outside the alliance. NATO has established, through the Partnership for Peace programme, close links with regimes that are far from being democratic, particularly in Central Asia. The deficit in ethical values was after all a key aspect of the functioning of part of the Western financial system which led, by and large, to the economic crisis that swept the world in 2008–9. Values are general principles which are effective insofar as they become norms, i.e. are translated into concrete processes through adequate legislation. In this matter, the discrepancies between the two sides of the Atlantic should neither be exaggerated nor ignored. On many ethical issues—death penalty, climate change, genetically modified organisms, etc.—views differ. These phenomena are the visible part of the iceberg when one looks at the state of the Alliance in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Hence, the growing feeling emerges that the transatlantic alliance 'is not living up to its potential'.[15] How could it be otherwise when the cement against a common enemy which for so long gave its strength and *raison d'être* to the Atlantic alliance has disappeared? On both sides of the Atlantic, domestic issues have taken precedence over external affairs. The painful difficulties caused by the financial and economic crisis have exacerbated tensions between the USA and the EU by generating disagreement on the way to treat the economic crisis and trade reform. Europe is striving for an austerity strategy to end the economic crisis while the USA wants to maintain a fiscal stimulus.

Side Effects of an Infinite Alliance

Once the political victory was achieved against the Soviet bloc, without one shot being fired between the two former enemies, the Atlantic alliance was kept in place and subject to further adaptations to a new context. This phenomenon is rare in history. Once the main purpose of an alliance has been achieved, its *raison d'être* rapidly and naturally vanishes. It has not been the case for the Atlantic alliance, however. One should reflect on the reasons for that perpetuation, which most if not all Western analysts and politicians seem to consider unquestionable. The most obvious reason is provided by the Treaty of Washington itself. The alliance

> will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being (art. 2)… The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all (art. 5)…

However, the transformation of the international order, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, made the concept of alliance less functional in the absence of perceived existential threats. Hence the idea that, in the military sphere, ad hoc and temporary coalitions are easier to set up than alliances. Alliances are indeed too binding and, in a way, too cumbersome, to be fully efficient in an era of great fluidity in international relations. *Ad-hocism* could prevail when force may be required to solve intra-state conflict, a situation acknowledged by the USA National Security Strategy of 2010, where it is unequivocally stated that although the United States can stand alone if needed, military action will be generally performed within coalitions. If NATO will remain its bedrock alliance, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and other groups could form 'coalitions' tailored for a specific mission.

The enlargement of the Atlantic alliance into something more global that it has not been able to deliver, as exemplified in the emblematic case of Afghanistan, could prove more harmful to the Western alliance than the disagreements that have punctuated its life since its inception in 1949. However, despite the new international setting of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the alliance, whatever its internal evolutions (enlargement, new Strategic concept adopted in Lisbon in November 2010…), is still functioning with unwritten old rules. It contains a country which dwarfs its partners in military affairs, and has a global world responsibility when most of them have not. Some NATO European countries that also belong to the EU are committed to deepening the European construction, including through building a European defence. However, in defence affairs they continue as ever to oscillate between the primacy given to NATO and their desire to set up a European defence organization within the framework of the Maastricht treaty. Accordingly, US analysts acknowledged that transatlantic relations are affected by such developments: 'the transatlantic

relationship is in the midst of a wrenching transformation. . . . the current tensions in the transatlantic relationship stem more from the changing internal balance of power between the United States and Europe'.[16]

The huge discrepancy between the different alliance members' military capabilities and international responsibilities has had worrying side effects. Since most of the European members of the Atlantic alliance have no longer any ability to think and to act militarily at the strategic and even at the operational level, the driving force in terms of concept, doctrine, and modus operandi has been implicitly transferred to the strongest member of the alliance. To put it bluntly, most European states have ceased to think strategically and henceforth have ceased to have any significant impact on many issues affecting international relations. How can it be otherwise when, between the United States and its partners in the Atlantic alliance, the ratio of military budgets can be as much as 150 to 1? The scene of strategic affairs in the Western world has thus become a shadow theatre. The Cold War masked that difference, which was, in addition, not as huge as it is today. The Soviet military, however, already recognized that situation and their war plan under Marshall Ogarkov's command was, in case of an offensive in central Europe, to implement the main attacks against what were perceived as the weakest links of the Alliance in Central Europe (Dutch and Belgian corps of NORTHAG) while encircling the strongest—notably the US 7th and 5th army Corps.[17] Nowadays, this state of affairs of the growing imbalance within the Alliance is highly concerning and explains, in part, the growing relative lack of interest of US political and military leaders in Atlantic alliance affairs. This represents a radical departure from past US tradition as explained by a former high-ranking US diplomat: 'American policy from 1917 to 1999 was all about Europe. It was the most important aspect of American foreign policy. Our global policy was a function of our European policy.'[18] Robert Gates, then US Secretary of Defence, thus proposed dismantling the US Joint Forces Command, which, beyond its own rationale for US forces, remained one of the two US commands linking the USA to the military machinery of the Western alliance.[19]

This development is largely due to the success of the Western alliance; it is also the result of globalization. Globalization is modifying in many ways the notion of alliance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Firstly, while balance of power and possible inter-state conflicts still matter, they are no longer key parameters in the current reshuffle of the correlation of forces at world level. Paradoxically, when Western countries, to begin with the USA, are still investing so much in defence (NATO's countries are still responsible for about two-thirds of military spending worldwide), their principal economic and trade competitors are lagging far behind in defence spending. It can be argued that part of that expenditure, at least in the USA, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, also contributes to inspiring fundamental and applied research and development efforts that have a positive effect on the economy as a whole. But, as is particularly striking in the US case, the enormous defence budgets and their continuous increase between 2001 and 2010 have coincided with a rather similar increase in the many deficits which have beset the USA since the mid-2000s.

Secondly, globalization is bringing its own set of disturbances that cannot be dealt with by traditional alliances. For example, the success or failure of the war waged against drug traffickers launched by Mexico's President Calderón, who declared war on the drug cartels in December 2006 (the 'war' has caused thirty thousand deaths in four years), will determine the intensity and the nature of the drug network in the USA, Western, and Asian countries with more or less deleterious effect on their respective societies. Differently, at the time of the world economic and financial crisis China has accumulated the most significant foreign currency reserves (EUR 2.14 trillion in April 2011), allowing Beijing to take rather strong economic positions in Europe, a situation will have a real impact on the China–EU relationship. China is gradually taking over, in economics and finance, the role once played only by the United States and will probably become in the next decades the world's economic keystone. Such a development will not be without consequences for the nature and the notion of alliance.

Conclusion

The propensity to conclude from the cultural, political, and military conditions met by US and European forces in far-away countries such as Afghanistan that a 'new' form of conflict depicted as 'asymmetrical' is appearing has a strange resonance to say the least when looking at what warfare was in Europe for several centuries. War was a seasonal occupation; armies were made of mercenaries, skilled technicians in warfare, representing a costly asset that had to be preserved as precious capital like modern soldiers in professional armies, hence yesterday and today the notion of 'zero death'. Today like yesterday, such an ideal situation for organized armies was blown up when they were confronted with combatants animated by passion and faith, as exemplified during the religious wars in Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and today against Islamic fundamentalist warriors.[20] Moreover, the indirect strategy based on harassment practised for centuries is now being based on indiscriminate fire (IEDs) rather than on the traditional mobility of forces. Such a 'return to the past' provoked at that time discordant discussions between general Petraeus, commander in chief of allied forces in Afghanistan, and NATO's Secretary General, M. Rasmussen, in July 2010, about the strategic direction to be given to the intervention in Afghanistan. General Petraeus was more concerned about the next hearings before the US Congress while M. Rasmussen was preoccupied by the Atlantic alliance summit of November 2010.

As a result, with the extended role sought for the Atlantic alliance, the dedication of the EU populations to their armed forces risks being increasingly eroded. Already, there is no longer a strong link between individual soldiers being sent to Afghanistan (or in Iraq) and the specific country they belong to. They are all, with the exception of US personnel, NATO soldiers or 'coalition soldiers'. Making them anonymous severs the fundamental pact that for decades has linked the armed forces to their respective countries. The next step in this gradual dispossession is in motion: the chain of

command in Afghanistan (as it could be elsewhere) has ultimately escaped European hands; concepts and doctrine (as exemplified with the concept of 'transformation') are grown outside Europe; finally, for most members of NATO (with the exception of the UK, Canada, and the USA) the language used in military exercises and combat missions is a foreign language. More and more, international affairs regarding security and defence are seen through the prism of American ideas and perspectives. Such a remark should not be misinterpreted. It is too easy to invoke anti-Americanism and thus disregard the argument. This is definitely not. This is, in essence, about the depressing state of most European armed forces. Among the EU, six member states[21] spent, in the late 2000s, 82 per cent of all defence expenditure by the EU. In other words, twenty-one EU member states are spending 18 per cent of EU defence expenditure. As a result there is a growing heterogeneity in terms of know-how in operational art and strategic military affairs, which has vanished in most European countries. To an extent, the alliance bears responsibility for that situation.

The present transformation of the international scene and the dynamic of globalization are also transforming the global balance of power, with the emergence of centres of powers located outside the Western sphere having profound geopolitical and strategic consequences. The West is becoming increasingly constrained in its various attempts to set the rules of the game on a huge variety of questions, ranging from leadership of international organizations to strategic stability. From such evidence derive basic and conventional considerations. New centres of power will formulate their rights and justify their actions, which will not necessarily correspond to the West's best interests, if not to its vision of international order. From a European perspective, containment of hostile actors by military means (states and non-state actors) will remain possible but at a growing cost and for a limited duration; rollback will no longer be realistically feasible or possible against new centres of power; non-entanglement would signify a retreat from history, leaving others to determine the course of international politics. There remains as a sole option engagement (activism, integration, détente, bargaining) based on using a huge variety of tools. The military tool can however find its place only through the complete appropriation by the Europeans of their defence. Grand politics, political objectives, strategy, and military organization will thus be reunited in a European context. This raises the question of the place and role of traditional alliances such as NATO.

Notes

1. Genesis 9:9.
2. 'De foederibus Maxima', Montecuccoli.
3. Treaty of London, 2 August 1720.
4. 7 July 1807.
5. It was the first time since the Rastatt treaty of March 1714 that the French language was not the sole diplomatic language used in Europe—the treaty was drafted both in French and English.
6. Yergin, 1977.

7. Spykman, 1942.
8. Fried, 2007.
9. http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf
10. Spykman, 1942.
11. Fried, 2007.
12. 'Liam Fox calls for Afghan mission to be scaled back', *The Observer*, Sunday 23 May 2010.
13. Windsor, 1987.
14. Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no. 105.
15. José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, interview to *The Times*, Thursday 15 July 2010.
16. 'Friends by Necessity', Craig Kennedy and Stephen Grant, Worldlink, http://www.worldlink.co.uk/story (www.worldlink.co.uk is currently under development; link due to be available again between Dec. 2011 and March 2012).
17. Hines, Petersen, and Trulok, 1986.
18. Speech Given at the Automobile Club of France, Paris, by Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 12 June 2007.
19. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4669
20. See Cardini, 1992.
21. France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.

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CHAPTER 6

BRAZIL, INDIA, AND CHINA: EMERGING POWERS AND WARFARE

ALFREDO G. A. VALLADÃO

Introduction

A twenty-first-century 'Emerging Power' (EmPo) faces an unprecedented challenge: how to pursue a traditional Westphalian sovereign power rise in an increasingly interdependent, post-Westphalian world. Most of the new century's challenges have a universal character that threatens an emerging 'international community interest'—or 'interest of mankind' (Pardo, 1967; Baslar, 1998)—and have to be tackled by collective action. Traditional rivalries between national interests do not disappear, but they are strongly limited by this new political environment.

The rise of the new EmPos—and of their military capabilities—is a direct consequence of their brisk economic successes, boosted by the global marketplace and growing interdependence. Paradoxically, globalization has also undermined a country's capacity to master its own economy, the most important ingredient of traditional national power. 'Money is the sinews of war and the grease of peace,' wrote Richelieu in the seventeenth century (Cardinal de Richelieu, 1740: 123). Obviously, some states are more sovereign than others, but this slow dilution of power also applies to the last 'omnipower' (Legro, 2008: 2).[1] The USA is the main promoter and defender of last resort of this globalization process, which at the same time is restricting its own margins for sovereign action (Valladão, 2006: 243–60).

Nowadays, any emerging country that seeks to enhance its own influence in world politics cannot but develop a strategy of further integration into the global economy. The bigger the power ambition, the larger the part one will have to play in strengthening the present liberal order, which, in turn, is watering down the 'national' state power. This

does not make it impossible to break collective rules, to ignore international institutions, to adopt different degrees of mercantilist self-centred policies, or even to indulge in military adventures. It simply means that the price to be paid for such conduct is getting higher and higher.

Status-Seeking versus Accountancy

Emerging Powers are trapped in a dilemma. On one hand, they are struggling for important changes in the post-Second World War power system in order to be admitted as peer players in the exclusive 'big power' club. But on the other hand, they are also compelled by the need to maintain the status quo from which they derive their growing international protagonism. EmPos are, essentially, status-seeking—but not necessarily accountable—powers. They want to make sure that the present system keeps favouring their national 'emergence' and they try to ramp up enough political clout to ensure that global strategic decision-making outcomes will not hamper their 'rise' to power. For the moment, they are pushing for seats at the decision-makers' table, but are still very reluctant to assume their part of responsibility for building and implementing a new international collective order that could constrain their own sovereign margins for manoeuvre. 'If you're not at the table, you are on the menu' says the popular dictum. But that doesn't necessarily mean that you have to do the cooking.

No EmPo is envisioning its future as a world hegemon. Their ultimate goal, for the time being, is to become strong enough to be able to play balance of power games without rocking the boat. But they are confronted with a delicate balancing act: pursuing their ambition of building national strategic military capabilities in order to be taken seriously by the established powers and, at the same, being compelled to answer the call to become ever more engaged in the collective defence against global threats. Now, an ever-deeper security and defence cooperation with the established powers may jeopardize their chief priorities: a self-defined military doctrine and force organization with a power-balancing bias, as well as independent defence and procurement policies.

BICs—Brazil, India, China: The Three Big 'Emerging Powers'

One should beware of 'Eurocentric' *partis pris*. Each state has its own strategic culture rooted in its historical military experience and in the role that the armed forces played in its state-building process. EmPos have very diverse historical paths. The standard tools developed for studying the Western way of war (e.g. Fuller, 1957; Howard, 1976; Jones, 1987) are definitely not enough to understand the actual foundations of the military strategies and security perceptions of the new powers (Black, 2004).

Another difficulty is defining who is an 'Emerging Power' in geostrategic terms. Jim O'Neill's 2003 'BRICs' economic metaphor (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003) lumping together Brazil, Russia, India, and China, cannot answer that question. If Brazil can certainly be labelled an EmPo, India and China could be better defined as 're-emerging' powers, while Russia can be seen as a 'submerging' ex-superpower. Sometimes, for reasons of regional representation or intra-regional sensitivities, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, or Indonesia are placed in the EmPo category. But none of these states, not even Indonesia, has the resources and clout to play a meaningful role in global affairs in the foreseeable future.[2] Actually, Brazil, India, and China (or 'BICs') are the most serious candidates: they are 'monster countries' (Kennan, 1994: 143) with enormous territorial, natural, and human resources, they are already exerting a fair degree of influence outside their own regions, and they have been showing a strong will to make use of this new-found influence.

Differently from Western experiences (European, North American, and, in part, post-Meiji era Japan), BICs don't have a history of imperial expansionism and force projection in faraway places.[3] Their armed forces served more as guarantors of internal stability and defence against foreign threats and incursions. Before their modern 'nation-state' status, they were all self-contained 'empires' (or, sometimes, part of foreign-controlled empires) much more concerned about holding their many parts together, under a single authority, than conquering new territories. Most of the time, military confrontations were the result of internal political fragmentation, with local power centres competing for pre-eminence or trying to secede. As for defence against foreign enemies, battles were more local border wars and skirmishes or, as in the case of India and China, huge defeats against a much stronger invader.

Old Defensive Strategic Cultures

Traditionally, the possession of a vast and diverse landmass has its strengths and weaknesses. Strength, because a hostile power had to think twice before planning to conquer and administer such huge spaces and masses of human beings. Weakness, because of the difficulties of maintaining centralized control and political stability in view of ever-resurgent centrifugal local political ambitions and the sheer size of forces needed to cover a geographical behemoth. These particularities have nurtured a specific strategic culture. War is seen through defensive lenses: holding a neighbour's hostile forces at the borders and suppressing domestic insurgencies. Therefore, the objective of inter-state warfare is not all-out 'victory', but the best possible political settlement allowing a return to the *status quo ante*—though this prudent approach did not often apply to the power rivalries of intra-state conflicts. This is a long way from the European or American focus on expeditionary campaigns or some hardcore expressions of the 'Western way of war'—particularly in the US military tradition—with its 'Jomini bent' on mobilizing every resource available in order to secure the enemy's unconditional capitulation (Colson, 1993).[4]

In this defensive strategic culture, priority was given to building up very large land forces, leaving the naval and aerial components in a weak and subordinate role. Part of the army was assigned to man the most problematic borders in peacetime, but its primary mission was domestic: population and territorial control. The military played (and still plays) a large number of domestic functions: constabulary force, civil engineering, social assistance, relief operations, and repression against domestic opposition or insurgencies (sometimes akin to actual war operations). Procurement and deployment of the two other forces were directly linked to the Army's specific missions. Air forces, developed in the 1950s–80s, were made mainly of helicopters and tactical aircraft adapted for the defence of mainland and possible counterinsurgency roles. Surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns against foreign aerial threats complemented these missions. Obviously, each BIC country had to adjust its air force assignments to a more or less conflictive environment. For China, defence of the mainland against aerial and tank offensives was the top priority, while India had to give more weight to close air support, tactical bombing, and air superiority for border war operations.[5] Brazil, on the other hand, benefiting from its significantly safe neighbourhood, could prioritize domestic aerial missions (civilian airlift and interception of crime-related civilian aircraft) alongside the classical mainland defence. Absent from this picture was any serious aerial power projection capabilities. As for the BIC's navies, they were clearly underdeveloped and their missions were limited to a coastal role—and even this circumscribed task could hardly be met most of the time. But it is also true that they could rely for their security, sometimes reluctantly, on the *Pax Americana* guaranteed by the US blue-water fleets.

During the 1960–1970s, a last and new element was added to these essentially defensive grand strategies: the nuclear dimension. Nuclear (small) arsenals were not seen as tools to play balance of power games with the two great Cold War superpowers, but as a way to 'sanctuarize' the national territory against neighbouring powers and foreign aggression in general. China, in the 1960s, was first in acquiring an atomic weapons capability. Its main goal was status-seeking—to enhance its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council by becoming a member of the exclusive nuclear powers' club—but it was also to buy an insurance policy against possible future threats to its territory coming from the USSR, the USA, or even Japan. In the 1970s and 1980s, development of a nuclear deterrent was pursued by all three BICs, basically in the framework of regional arms races: India versus China and Pakistan, Brazil versus Argentina, China versus the USSR and India.[6]

Accumulating Power without Sparking Hostile Reactions

The novelty, in the last ten to fifteen years, is the 'emergence' of the BIC countries as putative global players. Now they have to pay attention to the impact of their rise to power not only on their neighbourhood, but also on the world at large. They are also

confronted with the necessity to protect a set of national interests situated very far away from home (trade flows, lines of communication, access to raw materials, space, etc.). In addition, they now have to manage actively the consequences of a more open relationship with the outside world on their own political systems and on their political elites' hold on power (flows of global information, cultural and population control). For the first time, they are forced to become committed players in the international arena.

In today's interdependent world system, newcomers are deeply dependent on reliable and beneficial working relationships with the traditional powers. The BICs have to square the circle of how to keep accumulating power and asserting it on the world scene, without triggering a hostile reaction from those they are displacing that could destroy their ambitions. The most explicit political theorization of this delicate balancing act was China's 'peaceful rise' concept introduced in its official foreign policy, in 2003, at the beginning of the Hu Jintao administration—before being abandoned, one year later, in favour of 'peaceful development', a less benevolent and less constraining concept (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007: 291–310).

In this context, military power is being perceived as a way to pursue a two-track policy. First, as a means to consolidate the country's 'rise', above all *in its own region*—considered as an indispensable step in the road to become a global player. Second, in order to be recognized as cooperative non-threatening partners by the established powers, EmPos have to show their willingness to take responsibility for the maintenance of global security. Trying to put together a military apparatus that can combine these two broad missions is a tall order and can only be an incremental and lengthy process.

Military Modernization: The Capacity to Say 'No'

BICs have many differences, but there is a common pattern concerning their military strategies' priorities. Regarding the 'first track'—to become the most important regional military power—all of them are trying to build modern war-fighting capabilities to ensure their traditional missions (border and domestic security) but also—and mainly—to achieve two new strategic goals. First: the capability to 'say no', which means a credible deterrence against established powers' pressures. Today, nuclear 'mutual assured destruction' has limited use when faced with the overwhelming power of modern conventional high-tech weapons. One does not counter a circumscribed conventional aggression with a suicidal nuclear strike. This is leading the EmPos to enhance their nuclear capabilities (for those that do have one, which is not the case for Brazil) but also to search for conventional military solutions. All of them are prioritizing, one way or another, the idea of 'asymmetric warfare', which, in this context, means acquiring and mastering high-end civilian and military technology,[7] not primarily for long-range force projection (at least for the time being), but in order to deter big power or rival regional

power interventions in their near-abroad. In the last decade, all EmPos have been reformulating their military missions and acquiring high-tech capabilities, particularly in the field of information and network-centric warfare.

The second strategic goal is to build an overwhelming 'regional' military power, not only as deterrence against neighbours but also as a way to affirm one's leadership. This entails growing military capabilities to project power in the near-abroad. This evolution from a 'passive' to a more 'pro-active' defence posture is also linked to the new security challenges arising from the BICs' dependence on the global economy. Reliable export and import transport routes for goods, energy, mineral and agriculture commodities, parts and components, are at the core of the EmPos' economic performance. To provide security for their strategic trade flows—Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) in particular—and to uphold their sovereignty over their Exclusive Economic Zones or other large resources-rich national territories (e.g. the Amazon) are fast becoming primary missions of their armed forces. That means enhancing strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities as well as building and strengthening the capacity for joint operations between the three forces.

Asserting dominance over a wider area beyond traditional defence perimeters has been translated into anti-access/area denial strategies, clearly pursued by the Chinese military (US Department of Defense, 2009: 10–19), but also present in India and, with less emphasis, in Brazil. The mainly outmoded territorial defence forces are being converted into modern flexible forces able to operate and to project power, at least in their enlarged neighbourhood, in both offensive and defensive mode. Ground forces, while still remaining the backbone of domestic security, are shedding their static defence traditions and adopting a more offensive manoeuvre-oriented posture. Modern conventionally armed short- and medium-range missiles, land-, air-, and sea-launched, as well as cruise missiles, are being added to the force structures. Air defence is being tailored for local air dominance. Air forces are procuring modern strike aircraft for extended regional air operations beyond their national borders—including, in the case of China and India, maritime strike planes equipped with anti-ship missiles—and aerial-refuelling and early warning and control capabilities (AEW&C). Yet, the real novel development is certainly the new priority given to building relevant green- and even blue-water navies: conventional and nuclear-powered submarines, advanced destroyers and frigates equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), and aircraft carriers that are slowly and gradually showing the flag in manoeuvres or missions sometimes far away from their littoral environments. Finally, the EmPos have wakened up to the crucial importance of space for the modern battlefield.

'Asymmetric Warfare' Doctrines

Each EmPo has to cope with a very specific geopolitical situation. First, there is a clear distinction between those who live in dangerous Westphalian environments (regional power military competition, border tensions, 'vital' strategic threats to their

sovereignty) and those who benefit from a more pacified milieu: China and India on one hand, Brazil on the other. Second, these countries are differentiated by the degree of vulnerability of their political regimes. Legitimacy of the national political system and institutions, and the presence—or not—of radical anti-systemic opposition movements are two key elements that determine the military vision and planning. If regime survival is perceived as the top priority of the power elite, the control of the domestic population will be placed high on the agenda of the security forces, and the armed forces' 'police' function will be important. Even civilian information flows and technologies are seen as lethal weapons. China, as well as other authoritarian non-EmPo regimes, like Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, or North Korea, have been trumpeting that they are engaged in 'information wars'. Democracy represents the great divide. The power elites of democratic Brazil or India feel safer than China's Communist Party (CCP) leadership, and this has a deep impact on their conceptions about the role of the armed forces and about war itself.

China: Near-Abroad Dominance

China's ruling elites are confronted with perceived threats arising from a regional nuclear balance of power, border disputes with India, Japan, and some of the South China Sea coastal states, possible spillover effects of the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India tensions, North Korean uncertainties, old anxieties about the Sino-Russian border, and the overwhelming presence of the US Navy in the region. But they also have to deal with domestic instability: the Taiwan conundrum, the Tibetan and Uighur revolts, growing regional imbalances between coastal and interior provinces, worsening of social inequalities, and the fear of a gradual loss of legitimacy of CCP rule. How to deal with the linkage between these external and internal dimensions is at the core of what China's strategists call the 'comprehensive national power'. In their latest Defence White Papers, military authorities have clearly stated that security issues are related to upholding national security and unity, as well as to the struggles for strategic resources and locations, like energy, commodities, finance, information, or shipping routes. This broad combination of tasks is expressed in the doctrine of 'asymmetric warfare' that stresses a multidimensional concept of warfare: 'war is not only a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law' (Guangqian and Youzhi, 2005).

China's nuclear deterrence forces, and their permanent upgrading (especially of its nuclear-armed submarine fleet), are still seen as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival against a foreign foe. But at the conventional operational level, the new doctrine is embodied in the concept of 'active defence': China will not initiate wars of aggression but, in order to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, its armed forces would have to fight and win 'local wars' by taking the initiative and placing the emphasis on 'active offense'. Part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is being transformed from a static border defence and internal security force to a more offensive force with emphasis on integrated operations with the air force. A real capacity for long-distance manoeuvres

and to project power in the 'near-abroad' is being added to the PLA's domestic tasks, which are still viewed as its core function.

Concerning the Air Force, integration with ground forces operations is complemented by the concept of 'Joint Anti-Air Raid' for anti-access and area denial that calls for attacks against an enemy's bases and naval forces. As for navy operations, they are conducted under the 'Offshore Active Defence' concept with a focus on Taiwan and the first island chains. But a new dimension being discussed by Chinese military strategists—'Far Sea Defence'—envisages the fleet's presence much farther away, outside China's claimed 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, well into the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, or even the Indian Ocean. Construction of aircraft carrier task forces—linked to the actual expansion of a sustainable long-range attack submarine fleet (Eaglen and Rodeback, 2010)—is being considered as a possible step in order to be able to defend the country's maritime interests in a broader definition (US Department of Defence, 2009). In any case, China is already expanding its naval footprint to the west based on its 'string of pearls' concept of building bases along the Indian Ocean rim: Gwadar port in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, listening posts in the Burmese Coco Islands, container ports in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and a naval base in the Maldives (Pant, 2010b).

The crucial role that C4ISR (Computerized Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) plays in modern conflicts has led Chinese thinkers to develop the idea of 'integrated network electronic warfare'. All 'active defence' operations are being planned 'under conditions of informatization'. The goal is to disrupt an adversary's battlefield network information systems and to achieve dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum. The testing of an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT), in January 2007, was clearly a demonstration of China's will to acquire significant counter-space capabilities (Covault, 2007). Another aspect is cyberspace warfare, which includes the civilian networks. The controversy between Google and the Chinese government, in January 2010, over censorship and cyberattacks against the Silicon Valley firm (Markoff and Barboza, 2010), as well as suspicions of widespread 'hacker' intrusions into US private and governmental networks, is an indication of how Chinese authorities look upon the internet and the transnational flows of information as one of the main modern battlefields.[8]

India: The 'Cold Start' Doctrine

India's strategy is driven by the perception of more immediate threats: persistent tensions on the borders with Pakistan and China, proxy terrorist attacks coming from its western neighbour, and an entrenched domestic Naxalite-Maoist insurgency affecting significant parts of its western states. In 2004, the Indian Army High Command unveiled a new war doctrine dubbed 'Cold Start' (Kapila, 2004). The main goal is to acknowledge the importance of using advanced technology, particularly electronic networks, to fight a short-duration limited conflict in a nuclear environment. The 'Cold Start Strategy' is aimed at Pakistan and has a declared offensive bias. The Indian army would no more stand at the border waiting for an act of aggression in order to counterattack, but would

launch 'blitzkrieg' type operations at the onset of a conflict. The military goal is not to capture small parts of Pakistani border territory—to be used as trump cards in the negotiations following a ceasefire—but to destroy the Pakistani military without too much damage to civilians. 'Cold Start' is a 'pro-active' war strategy based on quick mobilization and overwhelming use of firepower to annihilate the enemy's forces.

This doctrine is a stark choice in favour of mobile warfare based on 'integrated battle groups' combining armour, infantry, artillery, and combat air support. A modern and technologically upgraded Indian Air Force is paramount for assuring overwhelming air superiority and close air support. For the first time, even the navy aviation is supposed to support the ground troops' offensive, and conventional ballistic and cruise missiles have a central role as the main firepower against the adversary's military forces and installations. However, this weakening of the distinction between strike corps and defensive corps does not mean a conversion to expeditionary operations, long-range strikes, or the occupation of large parts of the enemy's territory. The military goal of 'Cold Start' is to fight a violent but limited war, inflicting heavy damages to the enemy forces in order to force a ceasefire without triggering a nuclear exchange.

Since 2004, India's military establishment has integrated two more variables to its new strategy: border tensions with China and containing the rising Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In 2009, the Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor, announced a new 'two-front war' doctrine: 'there is now a proportionate focus towards the western and north-eastern fronts' (Pandit, 2009). The missions of the Indian Air Force, besides acquiring a leading role for nuclear deterrence, have also been widened to cover an extension of the strategic reach from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca. But the most important novelty is certainly the development of the first ever Indian maritime doctrine contemplating a 'blue-water' role for the fleet and nuclear-armed submarines for strategic deterrence. India, which already has Asia's most powerful fleet, is planning to add about one hundred warships to its navy by 2020 (Lamont and Sood, 2009) and to enlarge its naval footprint. New Delhi has already signed maritime defence cooperation agreements with Oman and Qatar, has established an electronic monitoring station on Madagascar, and has shown a clear interest in developing a naval base and trading entrepôt at Iran's Chah Bahar port as an answer to China's presence in the Pakistani port of Gwadar (Blanche, 2009; Kaplan, 2009). India is also leading and upgrading the *Milan* biennial Indian Ocean-Asia-Pacific naval exercises, where China is conspicuously absent (newKerala.com Online News, 2009).[9]

Considering India's strategic position between potential nuclear foes with significant modern conventional capabilities, these more offensive military doctrines rest on a credible nuclear deterrent and the capacity to master the most modern conventional warfare technologies. Hence, India is following China's path in enhancing its nuclear arsenals, by developing longer-range ballistic missiles as well as nuclear submarines, and prioritizing the inclusion of top-of-the-line information and electronic warfare technologies into its operational plans. India's armed forces do have important missions of domestic security, but their main function is clearly to build enough endogenous military strength to avoid being constrained to seek outside help from the USA or other big powers.

Brazil: Mastering Technology and Naval Projection

Brazil is in a very peculiar strategic situation: the lack of military threats, either from its neighbours or a big power. Historically, South America, although plagued by civil wars and domestic insurgencies, has been one of the most peaceful regions on the planet regarding inter-state conflicts, and could indeed be defined as an 'intriguing anomaly' (Holsti, 1996). The region is also located far away from the world's historically important battlefields and has benefited, since its independence in 1822, from the implicit strategic protection of the British Royal Navy first, and then the US Navy. A small Brazilian expeditionary force did fight with Allied troops in Italy during the Second World War, but the country has not otherwise taken part in an armed conflict since the Triple Alliance War against Paraguay (1864–70). Its huge and sometimes inhospitable landmass is one of its best deterrents. Thus the primary mission of the Brazilian armed forces, confronted with the challenge of controlling a relatively unpopulated continental-size territory, has always been to guarantee internal security. Debates about national defence were traditionally unknown among the country's civilian elites. Pacifism, the promotion of international law, and the idea that conflicts between states should be solved by diplomacy and arbitration are part of the national identity.

This benign neglect has been changing since the 1990s. For the first time in its history, Brazil is having a significant economic and diplomatic impact outside its own region and its economic success is linked to deep interdependencies with the rest of the world. Brazilian leaders are now aware that the country has many interests that need to be defended outside national borders. Brazil wants to be part of the world's decision-making process at the highest level, participating in the G-20, laying claim to a greater 'voice' in international fora like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Simultaneously, Brasilia has vigorously pursued South American integration and a Brazilian leadership in the region as a power base for its global ambitions. In that context, military power is becoming an important element of the country's international projection. The first ever Ministry of Defence, headed by a civilian, was created in 1999, replacing the old structure of three military ministries (one for each force). The first official 'National Strategy of Defence' (NDS), was published at the end of 2008 (Brazilian Ministry of Defence, 2008). The country's defence budget is traditionally low but has nearly doubled in the last decade. In March 2010, the Brazilian Congress approved the establishment of a Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, directly subordinated to the minister of Defence, and the creation of a quadrennial National Defence White Book.

The 2008 NDS states emphatically that the country is not willing to exercise power over other nations—'Brazil does not have enemies' (Brazilian Ministry of Defence, 2008: 16). Hence, the armed forces should be organized in terms of capacities and not specific threats. The second important guideline is achieving national independence by building an autonomous technological capacity and a strong defence industry, particularly in the spatial, cybernetic, and nuclear strategic sectors. Concerning the armed forces missions, the priority is still to monitor and control the vast Brazilian air space, territory,

and jurisdictional waters, and to respond to any aggression. The new strategy envisages a more pro-active posture, specifically in two huge resource-rich areas: the Amazon and the sea zone surrounding the extensive pre-salt oil and gas reserves discovered in 2007 (Durham, 2009). For the army, it means mastering joint operations and all the tools of electronic and information warfare, in order to transform static ground forces concentrated in the main southern urban areas into flexible and mobile units capable of power projection inside the national territory and organized in Rapid Reaction Strategic Force brigades. Like China or India, Brazil stresses the importance of an 'asymmetrical war' (identified as a 'national-resistance war'), as the best way to fight a military enemy 'with far superior power' that would 'disregard the unconditional Brazilian sovereignty on its Amazon region, assuming alleged interests on behalf of mankind' (Brazilian Ministry of Defence, 2008: 16). Despite this hypothetical scenario, the new ground forces' mission is still to contribute, alongside the police forces, to guaranteeing internal security. This is also the main mission of the air force, which prioritizes territorial air surveillance and the capacity to fight and ensure local air superiority at any one point of Brazil's immense landmass. The army will also take on growing responsibilities in UN peacekeeping operations, deemed essential for Brazil's status as a global protagonist.

The real novelty concerns naval power. Without naming any adversary, the stated principle of the nation's fleet reorganization is clearly 'sea denial'—so much so that 'power projection' is hierarchically subordinated to this principle. The defence of oil platforms, sea-lanes of trade, islands in national waters, and the capacity to join international peacekeeping operations are the navy's main tasks. At the operational level, priority should be given to a powerful underwater force—conventional *and* nuclear-powered submarines—as well as to conventional aircraft carriers. The concept of asymmetrical war is also applied to sea combat: the surface forces are considered as tactical or strategic reserves for the forward engagement of the underwater forces. A submarine equipped with a nationally designed and produced nuclear engine has become the icon of the new national defence policy. But in any case, Brazil will have to deal with the same ambiguity that characterizes the other BICs' strategies: a defensive area-denial posture but with offensive out-of-area capabilities and the possibility of a doctrinal geographical expansion of its perceived security perimeter.

Doubts could also arise concerning nuclear technology. Brazil has developed a uranium enrichment plant with its own centrifuge technology, but the country is also strongly committed to nuclear non-proliferation. Its constitution forbids any military use of nuclear technologies (Art. 21, § XXIII-a) and it has signed all the relevant agreements (Non Proliferation Treaty, Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group), plus a bilateral intrusive safeguards regime with Argentina (ABACC—Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet, because of the nuclear submarine programme, the NDS states clearly that Brasilia will not subscribe to the IAEA Additional Protocol (Brazilian Ministry of Defence, 2008: 36). Since the beginning of the 2000s, Brazil has decided to upgrade its nuclear programmes for peaceful use and has hinted that it is interested in becoming a nuclear fuel exporter by tapping its uranium ore deposits. Mastering

the whole nuclear cycle is seen as an essential element of the country's regional and international leadership role—something that, in the future, could introduce some degree of uncertainty about Brazil's nuclear doctrine.

From Active *Defence* to Active *Offence*

Like it or not, the emergence of local military powers with significant area denial capabilities, particularly at sea, is a matter of concern not only for neighbouring countries, but also to the big established powers. In its 2010 QDR Report, the US Department of Defence has clearly stated that America should maintain 'unmatched capabilities' so that it can 'deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments' (US Department of Defence, 2010). Strategic concepts like India's 'Cold Start' or China's 'active defence' rest on the ambiguities surrounding the connection between 'strategic *active defence*' and the primacy of seizing the initiative in *active offense*, and between defence of the national territory and dominance of the near-abroad.

If Brazil's modernization programmes are still embryonic and the country benefits from a peaceful neighbourhood, this is not the case with the two Asian BICs. The prospect of China becoming a dominant regional naval power has already pushed India, Japan, Australia, and the USA to strengthen their naval cooperation (Chellaney, 2007), even if this 'Quadrilateral Initiative' was subsequently somewhat toned down. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other ASEAN countries, which have maritime territorial disputes with Beijing, are hedging their bets by facilitating the US naval presence in the region's waters and ports. India, in 2009, has made public its plans to greatly expand its 'blue-water' fleet. On the other hand, New Delhi's announcement of its new 'two-front' war doctrine is steering concerns in China and Pakistan (Pant, 2010a), strengthening their already close military cooperation. Competition for military dominance between these three regional nuclear powers, plus the USA and (as yet) non-nuclear Japan, is not the best recipe for regional stability.

Sharing the Burden of Global Security: Pick and Choose

In order to pre-empt aggressive balance-of-power developments and to convince the established powers that they are responsible global players, EmPos have been showing a willingness to share at least a small part of the burden of guaranteeing global security. BIC countries are starting, cautiously, to subscribe to some operations designed to secure what can be called an enlarged definition of 'global commons':[10] protection of maritime trade and seabed infrastructure for communication and information networks, cyberspace security, confronting threats posed by transnational crime, terrorism, and piracy,

or contributing to peacekeeping missions. These limited shows of military support for the public good has many advantages. First, it is a legitimate and consensual manner to begin exercising power projection. Second, it is a way to pre-empt accusations of 'free-riding' on the big powers' global security guarantees. Last but not least, securing access to resources critical for the smooth functioning of the transnational production chains and protecting economic lifelines is absolutely vital for sustaining the EmPos' economic growth.

In 2009, China sent a small group of warships to the Gulf of Aden (Task Force 529) on a counter-piracy mission, in parallel with the European naval forces (EU NAVFOR Atalanta), and other Western and US ships—even India and Russia have contributed a destroyer each. But the Chinese Task Force has been very reluctant to accept more than a basic informal level of coordination with its counterparts, and its main objective is to protect only Chinese merchant ships. Actually, China has used this mission as a peaceful way to test the enlargement of its naval footprint into the Indian Ocean. India and Brazil have also shown that they are concerned by any increase in coordination with Western navies that could limit their doctrinal and operational elbow-room. India does participate in the Quad Initiative with the USA, and the Brazilian Navy is the main partner, along with the US Navy, in the annual South Atlantic UNITAS manoeuvres, but both countries have been strengthening their naval links with bi-oceanic trilateral naval exercises with South Africa, and have been averse to granting any legitimacy to big-power naval presence in their maritime regions.

Peace missions suffer from the same tensions. Since 2000, there has been a twentyfold increase in Chinese peacekeepers, who are now deployed in ten different theatres, particularly in Sudan, Liberia, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Gill and Huang, 2009). India has a long history of peacekeeping missions, while Brazil is leading the MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and has fielded more than 1,500 troops on the Caribbean island. But the three EmPos insist on a strict application of the principles of non-interference and absolute respect for national sovereignty, which makes them extremely reluctant to take part in international sanctions or armed forces 'police' interventions, even sanctioned by the United Nations, and even in case of extreme human rights abuse.[11] In general terms, they shun the ideas of 'stakeholdership' for global stability and refuse to enter into formal military alliances, even at a regional level. They consider that to cooperate with the established powers on specific issues is in their self-interest provided it is not a long-term commitment, that they can pick and choose how and when to do it, and that their armed forces do not have to be subjected to a collective discipline or command.

Conclusion

War, for Brazil, is still a theoretical proposition far away into the future. For India, living with permanent tensions at its borders, it is perceived as an actual possibility. For China, it is an uncertain contingency that must be prepared for in its quest for regional military

clout, even if that means some kind of local confrontation with the US superpower. But the BICs share the same vision: military power is an essential ingredient in their 'rise' to world player status and they are ready to commit a greater percentage of their national budgets to upgrade their armed forces' doctrines, organization, and equipment. Their strategic goal is to be respected by neighbouring states and to be able to withstand eventual pressures from the big established powers. No BIC country is projecting itself as a world 'hegemon'. They are not interested in exporting their 'values' or 'way of life'. In fact these countries seek to be recognized as peers by the established big powers and to participate in the most important international decision-making fora, but reject any comprehensive and formal collective responsibility to care for global security and global governance. China and India more, Brazil less, act as if 'the only effective multilateralism is lucrative multilateralism' (Holslag, 2006: 11).

Yet, the three new players know that, in their own interest, they have to accept some responsibility for maintaining the world order, and they have to show that their 'emergence' does not constitute a strategic threat, either to the neighbouring countries or to the established powers. But the Emerging Powers have to live with a paradox: a rising defensive military power that is based on operational offensive capabilities and doctrines. This ambiguity breeds mistrust of their real intentions and could generate countervailing military responses from neighbours and big powers alike. In that case, having to cope with a belligerent environment, the EmPos would have killed the goose that laid the golden eggs.

Notes

1. Cf. Legro's definition of 'omnipower': 'The United States has a unique position in the world today because it is a regional power in all the world's regions.'
2. The same can be said concerning some over-ambitious governments, such as Venezuela and Iran, that dream of acquiring this kind of status.
3. Some consider that China was an expansionary power during the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. As a matter of fact, China was conquered by Genghis and Kublai Khan's armies. The Mongol Yuan dynasty's unsuccessful campaigns against Japan, Champa, Vietnam, or Java at the end of the thirteenth century can be seen as the last spurts of Mongol expansionism. The succeeding 'Han' Ming dynasty, founded in 1368, spent most of its resources in pushing back the Mongols and, then, defending China against recurrent Mongol and Japanese threats, until its demise in the seventeenth century. The Chinese maritime expeditions of 1405–33 had to face the Mandarins' hostility and remain a weak-willed interlude in China's foreign policy history.
4. E.g. Douglas MacArthur's famous quotations: 'The American tradition has always been that once our troops are committed to battle, the full power and means of the nation would be mobilized and dedicated to fight for victory' (MacArthur, 1964: 27–30) and 'war's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory' (MacArthur, 1951: 334–5).
5. Since 1947, India has fought five major border wars, four against Pakistan and one two-front war against China.

6. China's first nuclear test occurred on 16 October 1964. India's first explosion took place on 18 May 1974, but its reprocessing facilities were launched at Trombay in 1964. Brazil started its military nuclear programme in the 1970s, under a military government, but abandoned it officially in the 1980s, after the re-establishment of a democratic government and a bilateral agreement with Argentina, in 1985, to put a definite end to their nuclear arms race.
7. Asymmetric low-tech solutions stressing the role of irregular forces and/or terrorist outfits as state weapons are not a priority for the three EmPos. These strategies are being conceived either by non-state combatant forces or by confrontational local regional middle-powers, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Venezuela. Most of the time, those kinds of solutions have only a very limited strategic deterrence function, but are pursued as one possible instrument of tactical war-fighting capacities.
8. In March 2010, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, the Pentagon announced the formal establishment of a Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), a unified sub-command of the US Strategic Command responsible for the nuclear arsenal and global deterrence, as well as space and information operations. A full general will command the USCYBERCOM.
9. The Milan biennial naval exercises were established in 1995. Thirteen nations participated in the Milan 2010 naval meeting: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam.
10. The OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms still defines 'global commons' as 'natural assets outside national jurisdiction such as the oceans, outer space and the Antarctic'.
11. The EmPos have been very critical of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) concept, promoted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and adopted explicitly in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document (United Nations, 2005).

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PART II

THE MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF WAR

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CHAPTER 7

MORALITY AND WAR*

PAUL SCHULTE

Warfare is often assumed to be the most ruthlessly amoral of all human activities, the field in which, notoriously, everything is fair. Yet conditionally positive descriptions of organized killing are fundamental if societies are to accept war as a legitimate collective activity. Military organizations could not otherwise be accepted as honourable institutions, nor combatants respected as potential heroes rather than murderers.

Opinions across the world on the overall morality of contemporary conflicts are becoming increasingly divided and confused. Debates can be bigotedly partisan or, elsewhere, exactingly moralistic. For advanced open societies, choosing to wage war now requires painstaking maintenance of consensus between governments, electorates, and armed forces over its justification, costs, methods, and chances of success. The concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW)[1] describes strategic efforts by state and non-state opponents to influence such consensus within nations and between allies, and to win over international opinion. Worldwide moral controversy consequently becomes a key theatre of war. Concern over the cumulative strategic impacts of dissent now overshadows previously academic debates. Military ethics has moved out of the pulpit and lecture hall into the realms of public diplomacy and strategic communications.

Today's transfixing moral war dramas revolve around prolonged, asymmetrical violence between high-technology conventional forces and irregular, though sophisticated, opponents. But this picture could change profoundly should Great Power antagonisms revive, threatening wars of necessity involving national (or at least regime) survival. In such a world, the central ethical dilemmas would change, and might indeed matter little for patriotic and embattled nations.

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Morality and Strategic Culture

Three major moral positions recur, resting on far-reaching disagreements over the consequences of renouncing war. The mix and relative intensity of such convictions among populations is a major determinant of national strategic culture (NSC), 'a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force'[2] arising from historical experience and geopolitical setting, and imposing boundaries (though often imprecise or long term—and more flexible over covert operations) to the moral decisions that a nation can tolerate in conflict. NSCs condition national appetites for strategic risk, and capacities to deter, reassure, or intervene. They can change profoundly if different moral positions gain electoral importance, straining alliances when change occurs unevenly between members. (In the German Marshall Fund 2010 Survey, 49 per cent of Americans strongly agreed that 'Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice.' Only 9 per cent of those polled across twelve European NATO nations felt similarly.)[3]

Key Contemporary Moral Positions on War

Pacifism

Absolute Pacifists reject all war on principle. Variants include 'WMD Pacifism' (renouncing inherently indiscriminate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons), 'Contingent Pacifism', rejecting particular wars for failure to meet essential moral standards, or 'Practical Pacifism', urging greater general reluctance to support war.[4]

'Realism'

'Realists' insist that moral standards will never seriously constrain conflict. This position overlaps with 'Exceptionalism', the claim that the importance of a favoured cause justifies transgressing allegedly universal restraints.

The Just War Tradition (JWT)

Adherents of JWT believe that war can sometimes, under demanding conditions, be *morally right*: an indispensable exercise of force, to resist aggression and protect the weak. In combining consequentialist and deontological considerations, JWT emerges as

the closest equivalent to a shared global framework for the moral evaluation of conflict. Its origins are Judeo-Christian Roman, in the natural rights tradition. It has since evolved into a general global set of criteria now carried over into the judgements of 'legitimate use of force' under the UN Charter. The latest major public restatement of the case for JWT was President Obama's 2009 Nobel Lecture.[5] JWT's tenets are not fundamentally contradicted by other civilizational traditions,[6] partly because it is 'a thin code' or a universal, necessarily abstract, formulation, shared by the world's maximal doctrines.[7]

Critics, suspicious of JWT's utility in legitimating interventions, warn of a slippery slope towards concealed exceptionalism in the service of power. James Der Derian, for example, claims that, in America, JWT has mutated, through vast technical investment, into what he ironically entitles 'Virtuous War',[8] offering precise, paralysing force, positive media coverage, and minimal friendly casualties, for 'disciplinary' conflicts. Those supporting resistance to such military power characteristically argue that moral restrictions on irregular fighters, especially inhibiting concerns for civilian immunity, would hand victory to their expensively armed opponents. With opposite anxieties, other critics caution that JWT's contemporary interpretation in the West creates so great a 'presumption against war', that it amounts to 'functional pacifism', reversing its founders' intent that worldly authorities should re-establish the 'tranquillity of order', composed of justice, security, and freedom.[9]

Since moral discussion of military choices is now impossible without using JWT categories, their requirements, implications, and current ambiguities are outlined below.

Ethical Imperatives of the Just War Tradition

Jus ad Bellum: The Right to Wage War

For just resort to war, *all* the following requirements must be satisfied.

Requirement 1: Just Cause

> The initiating side must have a proper reason for going to war, such as protecting the innocent, restoring rights . . . or re-establishing just order. Revenge, punishment . . . or upholding a ruler's prestige are insufficient.[10]

The paradigmatic 'just cause' is defensive resistance to territorial aggression, by the victimized nation and its allies, until repulsed. It is impossible for both sides to have a 'just cause' but perfectly possible that neither does, although all concerned might sincerely believe that right rests with them.

Today, threats arise most frequently from unconventional attack. Many military operations are officially justified as intended to reduce such future dangers to both civilians and soldiers. Combat operations can also have indirect purposes, such as enabling reconstruction and nation-building, or re-establishing deterrence by reasserting national

military credibility. The most ambitious responses to international terrorism involve prolonged transformative occupations to eliminate sanctuaries and diminish pools of potential recruits. Armed interventions may also be conducted for new universal principles such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Similar claims were employed in 2001 and 2003 to justify intervention and regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, to many, especially outside the West, these are capricious and self-interested pretexts, threatening hard-won national autonomies and risking renewed imperialism in humanitarian guise. The resultant international compromise is an extremely wary acceptance of forceful intervention on an inconsistent, case-by-case basis.

Requirement 2: Right Intention

> The aim must be to create a better, more just and more lasting subsequent peace than there would have been without going to war.

JWT developed through consideration of separately identifiable state ventures of organized military-on-military violence. Those wars are fortunately uncommon, and in prolonged undeclared hostilities there may be no single intention behind new operations, consciously planned to branch flexibly in response to developments. Government decisions may be motivated by popular outrage, although aggressive military operations, despite appearances, do not necessarily prevent, and can even stimulate, back-channel negotiations. Almost always, the chances of a better peace will shrink—perhaps disappear—without a complementary political strategy.

Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists can claim to justify almost any action as aiding their protracted militancy. The only realistic near-term objective available for either side within intractable low-intensity conflicts may be a somewhat better truce or lull. JWT does not address the relative claims of conflicting but intertwined communities or the unbalanced underlying impacts of prolonged political, legal, cultural, social, or economic processes—further modified by counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations.

Issues of determination are inescapable, since war remains a coercive contest of wills, in which physical force is unavoidable. Both sides try to dominate the wills of the opposing Clausewitzian Trinity: the equivalents of People, Armed Forces, and Government—while protecting their own. Kinetic action—rocketing, bombing, shelling, and occupying territory—aims at protecting or reassuring friendly forces and civilians, while eroding enemy determination by physical elimination or capture of assets in the struggle. To avoid war crimes, kinetic action needs to stop short of *direct* attack on civilians and causing excessive collateral damage. Walzer argues that 'the surest sign of good intentions in war is restraint in its conduct'.[11] Yet restraint within humanitarian interventions must be a less convincing priority, and many insist that very fierce state reactions are essential against 'hyper terrorist' attacks such as 9 September 2001.

Requirement 3: Proportionality of Effects (or Macro-Proportionality)

> To warrant engaging in war, with all its likely evils . . . those deciding must have a reasonable expectation that the outcome will entail enough good (beyond what might be achieved in any other way) to outweigh War's inevitable pain and destruction.

War will obviously destroy and damage people and property. But the scale and distribution of harms may be deceptively unpredictable, and conflicts could begin with proportionate intentions resting on grossly erroneous estimates. There are also new concerns to add into contemporary proportionality calculations. Uncertain numbers of surviving soldiers and civilians will suffer from newly established conditions such as mild traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder. Similarly, there is intensified sensitivity to social dislocations and physical legacies of war such as ruined infrastructure, environmental degradation, and unexploded projectiles. Strategic cultures differ decisively in their weighting and acceptance of threats and provocations, or costs and harms, and willingness to inflict them. There is no accepted position of authority from which they could be corrected.

Requirement 4: Right Authority

> The decision to go to war must be made by those with proper authority for so grave a step. Historically, this has usually been the ruler or government of a sovereign state…, new and complex questions arise about how far and when, international authority may be required…

Concern for compliance with law is a pervasive concern for responsible states, though not their antagonists. International law, unlike criminal domestic law, provides no simple guide in every situation. Kofi Annan, when UN Secretary General, described NATO's military operations over Kosovo as 'legitimate but not legal'. There is no legal certainty about the scope for humanitarian intervention, the crime of aggression, or acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons. Some warn of 'Lawfare' as a calculated strategy, increasingly employed by states and non-state actors, 'of using or misusing law…to achieve military objectives'.[12]

There are also deep rifts about which authority can give sufficient legitimacy for the use of force in cases other than self-defence. Some hold that, without unanimous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval—which is rare, often for self-interested geopolitical or commercial reasons—all military action against other states will tend to undermine law-governed supranational world order. So liberal internationalists will find refusal of prima facie legal constraints an important reason to denounce military action. From other perspectives, however, the UNSC should be treated, not as the 'management committee of our fledgling collective security system', 'but as simply the security talking shop of the Great Powers'.[13]

The effect of military action upon the rule of law in the world is certainly important. But, while it is a *possible* moral position that no military action should ever be taken unless completely unchallengeable by international lawyers, it is not the only position. Without previously controversial interventions, international law would not have developed its present qualified recognition of a responsibility to intervene and protect. It is unclear why sovereign nations should accept others' interpretations about disputable boundaries of international legality, unless they have formally accepted the jurisdiction of supranational bodies such as the International Criminal Court. Conversely, if the worst regimes or terrorists could enjoy complete immunity from military action

(for example by securing the selfish veto of a Permanent UNSC member), their behaviour is unlikely to improve. Removing any possibility of military consequences would impoverish available international diplomatic inducements in crises.

Requirement 5: A Reasonable Prospect of Success

> The initiators must see a reasonable chance of succeeding in their just aim . . . arms must not be taken up nor lives sacrificed if, on honest appraisal, the likely result is simply death and suffering without making things materially better than they would otherwise have been.

Problems in identifying a single aim have already been discussed. But 'making things materially better than they would otherwise have been' could cover any aspiration from total victory to a slightly more satisfactory 'hurting stalemate', from which a sullen ceasefire might emerge.

While all consequentialist moralities have to address uncertainties in prediction, strategic judgements involving complex interactions with adaptive autonomous actors are particularly subject to 'moral luck': the notion that the perceived morality of a moral agent's actions may depend on uncontrollable good or bad fortune.[14] It is the professional responsibility of national security institutions to minimize the need for luck in their country's choices. Defence departments, intelligence agencies, armed forces, and presidents may possess unique expertise and vital secret knowledge. They may, however, lie, distort, or exaggerate—and may certainly be sincerely mistaken. Sincere collective professional error often derives from unwillingness to examine presuppositions, fostered by self-serving biases, illusions of control, and over-optimistic expectations: 'group think'. Democratic oversight and debate within the politico-military system are important remedies for this, while public belief in the resultant quality and honesty of national security decisions is an important aspect of NSC.[15]

Requirement 6: Last Resort

> Arms must not be taken up without trying (unless there are good grounds for ruling them out as likely to be ineffective) every other way of adequately securing a just aim.

Unless actually invaded, it will almost always be possible not to fight until after another round of talks. Reasonable forbearance will depend on contextual aspects such as an adversary's real likelihood of accepting a negotiated settlement. Aggressors can dexterously play for time to wear out international will, as Saddam attempted after occupying Kuwait in 1990.

Nor is it obvious that aggressors should always be allowed to begin wars by attacks of their own choosing. Terminologies here are, however, cosmetically confused. *Pre-emption* ought to mean an anticipatory defensive necessity that is 'instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'.[16] This is historically rare. The nearest example is Israel's surprise attack in 1967 on mobilized and threatening forces—though it may never be provable whether an Arab assault would

have occurred. Impending WMD attacks would probably be harder to detect (and subsequently confirm) than a major conventional invasion. There are obvious hazards in attributing worst-case offensive intentions—at the extreme by relying on a Launch on Warning nuclear doctrine. Yet rapid decisions might not be responsibly avoidable, and legally tidy prior UNSC authorization cannot be relied upon.

Preventative war is inherently more controversial as it needs no instant and overwhelming necessity; only a judgement that the danger from a hostile power is so great, inevitable, and growing that it is better met early. But some have insisted that certain preventative military actions are morally justified. For example, Israel's 1981 air strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor was a limited preventative response to WMD proliferation, forestalling an existentially threatening nuclear capability. Reviled at the time, it has become grudgingly admired. And denunciation of appeasement in the 1930s seems to amount to criticism of democratic Anglo-French unwillingness to risk a preventative war against Nazism.

Governments facing serious emerging threats may see few boundaries between discretionary and obligatory conflict or preventative and pre-emptive war.[17] There has been a recent proposal to refer instead to *morally permissible military action* against a threat whose seriousness and emergence is sufficiently evident and where no effective non-military alternatives are available. Conversely, *premature*, *morally impermissible military action* would be directed at a threat whose seriousness and emergency were insufficiently clear or against which effective non-military alternatives remained.[18] Revised formulas cannot resolve agonizing dilemmas over responsible national reactions to the growing strength of determined enemies.

Jus in Bello: Limits of Acceptable Wartime Behaviour

These considerations address the justice with which war is actually waged. It is entirely possible that what began justly could be fought illegitimately, by unjust means. Avoiding injustice principally requires observing a 'Duty of Care' not to harm the innocent. That duty cannot be absolute: insisting upon perfect civilian immunity would amount to contingent pacifism. Indeed it remains demonstrably problematic how far and at what 'rate of exchange' such a duty actually ought to apply against friendly forces or civilians.

Requirement 7: Discrimination (Sometimes Called Distinction)

> War must not involve deliberate attack on the innocent i.e. those 'not involved in harming or helping to harm'.

Difficult judgements multiply about exactly who is to be regarded as a 'non-combatant'. The only certainly legitimate targets are those 'engaged in harming'. But civilians, who are not so engaged (even if inflammatory advocates of the war), will also inevitably be imperilled. Worldwide efforts to ban landmines and cluster bombs, which maim civilians long after the shooting stops, prove international concern for greater discrimination.

The key, but constestable, principle developed to excuse and moderate the fundamentally immoral possibility of harming the innocent is the 'Doctrine of the Double Effect' (DDE) originally proposed by St Thomas Aquinas as a general guide to moral agency. In conflict, it can only mitigate choices made for just causes. The DDE asserts that actions with foreseeable harmful effects, inseparable from desirable intended consequences, are justifiable if:

- The intended act is itself good, or at least morally acceptable
- Those carrying it out intend the good effect and not the bad collateral consequences
- Good effects can be expected to outweigh bad
- The context is sufficiently serious to justify inflicting such consequences
- The agents conscientiously attempt to minimize harms.

In the canonical military example, causing proportionate civilian casualties from bombing would be justified if they were not themselves the purpose of the bombardment, but foreseeable yet unavoidable collateral consequences of destroying legitimate military targets.

Asymmetrical Complexities

Some ethicists in the JWT tradition also argue that, in asymmetrical war, the technologically favoured side has a moral obligation to hold back from potential military advantage in order to minimize civilian losses and destruction of infrastructure. Certain others propose further calibrating the Principle of Discrimination, by discouraging targeting of 'naked soldiers'—those unprepared for conflict or unable to shoot back—and minimizing casualties amongst enemy conscripts with a lesser responsibility than professional soldiers or civilian ideologists.

There are arguments against traditional assumptions that all combatants are equally entitled to defend themselves ('the moral equivalence of soldiers') since, today, those fighting unjust wars (who are much more likely to be invaders than defenders) are better able to appreciate that they can enjoy no right to kill others, however discriminatingly, for an immoral cause.

As liberal academics, like advanced militaries, seek ever greater precision, angry and unpersuadable exceptionalists continue the indiscriminate killing of civilians, by suicide vests and car bombs. Their spokesmen and websites justify this by the transcendent justice of the bombers' cause (whose otherwise crippling conventional military inferiority exemplifies the unfair distribution of global power), and an emergent right to avenge 'their' civilians already collaterally killed by elaborately equipped and virtuously instructed regular forces. Less openly, they may expect a 4GW strategic advantage from widening international outrage over tragically growing overall civilian casualty counts.

Discrimination is intrinsically hard in the 'mixed settings' of modern 'wars amongst the people', lacking front lines and driven by the polarized resentments of military occupation. Fundamental problems occur in reliably predicting, or later counting, various kinds of casualty, or establishing whether they occurred through deliberate planning, organizational recklessness, or pardonable accident. Nevertheless, underlying intentions emerge, debatably, from repeated outcomes.

Irregular fighters conduct ambushes, employ (increasingly capable) IEDs or missiles, then mingle, unavoidably or deliberately, among host, or captive, populations. Regular forces respond with greater or lesser discrimination and restraint. Legal views differ on the definition of irregular combatants and whether they can be legitimately killed when not actively fighting. Some see a need to go beyond legal definitions to emphasize the reality of 'civilian ambiguity' and 'non-innocence', accepting 'complex notions of involvement and participation, including the subtle attributes of sympathy, incitement, encouragement, support, potential, coercion and choice', precisely to resist temptations to indiscriminate killing.[19]

National legal interpretations vary over which human beings and physical objects constitute legitimate targets. Destroying infrastructure, even if it is being militarily utilized, or blocking its reconstruction for security reasons, will certainly inflict lasting civilian suffering. Where serious collateral consequences are foreseeable, there will be suspicions, as over the 2009 Israeli operations in Gaza, that they constituted the actual punitive intention behind the attack. Michael Gross emphasizes how both sides commonly put pressure on civilians in asymmetrical conflict, and postulates campaigns that neither could win without targeting civilians.[20]

Targeted Killings: Legality, Convention, and Practice

The planned killing of otherwise unreachable irregular enemies is the contemporary equivalent of 'assassination' of named individuals, which has been traditionally forbidden by most military codes. Targeted killing can be performed by Special Forces on the ground, by precise aerial bombing, or by other methods. 'Drone strikes' (missile attacks from remotely piloted aircraft) are already a lethally effective but controversial subtype. US drones have conducted a decapitation strategy over Northwest Pakistan, eliminating 'high-value targets' in 'ungoverned spaces' where they would otherwise enjoy sanctuary.[21]

Criticisms include violation of national boundaries, lack of lawful safeguards, alleged numbers of innocent civilians killed, stimulation of infuriated resistance outweighing the advantages of killing individual leaders, and general degradation of international legal restraints.[22] But experts observe legal limits widening: 'International law develops through its violation … an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries. Most governments and international bodies considered … targeted assassination illegal in 2000; but … it is' (now) 'in the centre of the bounds of legitimacy'.[23]

Disputable 'Human Exchange Rates'

Controversies over drone strikes exemplify recurrent accusations of *collateral murder* in asymmetrical war. Governments characteristically reply that, in the responses they are forced into, 'a tragedy is not a crime' and that they are also highly motivated to minimize civilian casualties to win international credibility and local hearts and minds. Risks to civilians are being mitigated by new 'technologies of warning' such as mobile phone calls, texts, or warning 'knocks on the roof' by non-explosive projectiles, or by 'humani-

tarian' (restricted blast) munitions.[24] Nevertheless, it is widely felt that some targets, like hospitals or civilian shelters, ought never to be attacked at all and irregular combatants usually intend to benefit from international revulsion if they are.

In contemporary 'small wars', few operations are decisive or final and there is little disposition to accept heavy regular losses. While the strategic desirability of avoiding casualties to civilians is widely appreciated, it may not serve as an overriding *moral* reason to accept many extra avoidable friendly deaths in individual engagements. Some ethicists argue, however, that the Duty of Care obligation absolutely requires governments to adopt a one-for-one 'substitutability ratio' between their own citizens' lives and those which might be collaterally lost in anti-terrorist or counterinsurgency operations: 'when a country, or its army, acts in a manner that [endangers] civilians . . . then that country's (or that army's) responsibility to minimize the peril inflicted on those individuals ought to be the same regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, creed, etc.'[25]

This far-reaching principle would rule out air or long-range artillery support in all expeditionary operations, just as they are unacceptable in domestic counterterrorism within democracies. It is noteworthy that an analogous posture of 'courageous restraint' was proposed in 2010 to guide the general conduct of NATO's campaign in Afghanistan and gain local consent by significantly restricting use of air power.[26] But its operational realism, and fairness to troops put in greater danger, has since been strongly challenged.[27]

There are moral, as well as popular, counter-arguments that a nation's soldiers should not be treated as 'pawns of war', but as citizens in uniform forced into danger by others' aggression.[28] However, that approach may slide into 'Zero Risk' operations planned precisely to transfer risks away from friendly forces and onto civilians. Judging whether the discriminatory duty of care has been properly discharged is complicated by the lack of worldwide, or even national, consensus on 'exchange rates' between the lives of 'our soldiers', 'our civilians', and 'hostile' or even 'neutral' civilians.

Just War Requirement 8: (Micro-Proportionality)

> Action must not be taken in which the incidental harm done is an unreasonably heavy price to incur for likely military benefit. Harm needs to be weighed particularly . . . [over] the lives and well being of innocent people. The lives of friendly military personnel need to be brought into account, and sometimes even those of adversaries. The principle of avoiding unnecessary force always applies.

The general humanitarian imperative is to minimize avoidable suffering and the law of armed conflict consequently aims to safeguard the human rights of prisoners of war, wounded soldiers, and civilians by forbidding atrocious actions, including rape, or poisoning water supplies, and facilitating the restoration of peace. 'Excessively injurious' weapons such as blinding lasers or flame-throwers are also banned or restricted.

The requirements of proportionality are widely misunderstood and misrepresented, but should rest on forward-looking calculations of future harms and gains rather than tit-for-tat infliction of losses. Balanced combatant casualty counts are not obligatory; no enemy has a right to equal prospective losses. What should determine

proportionality is the scale of advantage that the military action aimed to achieve, how many non-military deaths were genuinely non-combatant, and, of those, how many might have been avoided, particularly by a greater willingness to accept friendly losses.

Jus Post Bellum?

By the end of the twentieth century rather cautious moral conditions had been proposed for 'just termination' of war:[29]

Just Cause: reasonable vindication of initially violated rights, including rollback from captured territory.

Right Intention: avoiding revenge, exploitative confiscations, or territorial gains; even-handed investigations of all war crimes allegations.

Legitimate Authority and Public Declarations: open statements of available terms of peace by combatant nations.

Proportionality would generally argue against requiring unconditional surrender and regime change, which risk prolonging the fighting, and for early release of prisoners of war and arrested non-combatants.

Regime Change and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Yet recent campaigns have developed more transformative agendas for imposing benign change after military invasion. Justifications for military intervention now include planned post-conflict reconstruction through a comprehensive (or '3D': Defence, Development, and Diplomacy) approach, to protect oppressed groups or traumatized majorities, stabilize conditions precipitating conflict, foster development, and permanently improve human security. But stabilization operations are frequently forced into wars of contested state-building against insurgencies. Where a comprehensive approach is contemplated, it would therefore be morally inadequate, after repeatedly failed campaign, to enter into a conflict without adequate manpower, local knowledge, planning capacity, money, institutional coordination, and patience. Success, though, raises its own disputes over occupying forces' entitlement, even after supervised elections, to impose far-reaching social or political changes to produce a post-war order which they judge acceptable.

Ethical Practice Within the Military

> A world without armies—disciplined, obedient and law-abiding armies—would be uninhabitable. Armies of that quality are an instrument but also a mark of civilization, and without their existence mankind would have to reconcile itself . . . to a lawless chaos of masses warring, Hobbesian fashion, 'all against all.'[30]

This vision represents the self-image of many militaries, typified by the US Navy's (trademarked) mission statement 'A Global Force for Good'. Military educators emphasize that the chaos of combat prevents pedantic application of abstracted moral principles. As in Aristotelian 'virtue ethics', military ethical training emphasizes formation of strong moral character rather than sets of rules. By functional necessity, no military ethos is likely to be ethically innovative, or to encourage individual soldiers to reach disruptively negative personal conclusions on the morality of the conflict in which they are engaged.

Martial character formation is better described as conducted within a military *ethos* than taught through systems of *ethics*.[31] It often involves allegiance to an overall statement such as that within the US Army Field Manual FM 100–1, setting out fundamental and enduring values: 'Loyalty to the Institution, Loyalty to the Unit, Personal Responsibility, and Selfless Service'. Sydney Axinn argues that these reflect underlying choices between universal fairness, social utility, individualism, religious position, and the willingness to sacrifice oneself for something more than specific human beneficiaries.[32] He similarly describes military honour as involving both duties to the government and the laws of warfare, aimed at reconciling all these considerations, overcoming 'the tyranny of the mission' and 'the imperative of immediate success'. National militaries will consequently develop characteristic moral styles based upon their balancing of value choices.

Self-control, and the preservation of the warrior's honour, is especially difficult in asymmetrical warfare, confronting implacable enemies offering infuriated provocation rather than any reciprocal restraint. Special training may be necessary to compensate. Psychologists emphasize that 'situational and systemic vectors' disturbingly outweigh individual character, even if initially formed in a virtuous ethos.[33] Keeping the behaviours of soldiers, policemen, or prison officers consistently moral under pressure requires constant discipline, leadership, and conscientious surveillance, or entire units may turn to criminal cruelty. Among senior officers it is equally important to avoid a desensitizing process of 'military drift' to less and less proportionate actions eventually amounting to barbarism.[34]

Civilian Ethical Imperatives of Contemporary Just War

Close, sympathetic, well-informed, yet questioning, senior civilian involvement and review therefore seems important if war is to be justly fought. This is just one of the exacting and often contradictory demands upon democratic societies implied by JWT. Decisions about force need to combine painstaking legal analyses with rigorous diplomatic, intelligence, and military assessments of probable outcomes and non-military alternatives. This has to include calculation, by the responsible political leaders, of their chances of maintaining domestic support while facing 'adversarial justification and

review', including formal public enquiries using leaked or declassified material. The decision process in democracies will probably be 'prudential',[35] which need not imply timidity. Public support for military engagement will depend on convincing public argument, stressing both legitimacy and national interest.

Once fighting begins, ensuring just conduct implies consistent public questioning and genuinely minimized security restrictions on media examination and commentary. Public scrutiny and debate should be able to address true national objectives, current possibilities of success, the suffering inflicted on combatants and civilians (including enemy supporters), and non-military alternatives. Government, media, and citizens should be confident that effective mechanisms exist to ensure their forces operate under 'pro-civilian' tactical doctrines, emphasizing discrimination and proportionality, rigorous investigation, and appropriate punishment for proven guilt.

All this involves tolerating painful accusations, disturbing images, and public acrimony. History illustrates the difficulties in combining scrupulous self-examination and effective wartime leadership. But it would be morally contradictory to downgrade the imperative of preserving national resolve, unless a campaign was judged hopeless and to be ended. Determination remains indispensable for even limited military *success* although outright *victory* might now appear an old-fashioned and unattainable objective. Soldiers are entitled to expect their governments to provide sufficient military resources and to ensure that their lives are properly valued—while also showing leadership by spreading belief in a persuasive *strategic narrative*, communicating the realism and justice of objectives and methods, and strengthening military morale, domestic political will, and international credibility.

The Unlikelihood of Moral Consensus on Future War

There is little cause to expect increasing agreement about the moral dilemmas outlined here. Some factors seem biologically unchangeable. Controversies frequently revolve around interpretations of underlying intention or motive. Here social psychologists would observe that 'correspondence bias' (also called 'fundamental attribution error') implies an inbuilt human tendency to understand—and normally excuse—personal or in-group actions as responses to an external situation. But antagonists' choices tend to be interpreted—and condemned—as revealing their intrinsic nature.[36]

New Technological Threats

There are also foreseeable new areas of dispute involving powerful nascent technologies (e.g. bioscience, nanotechnology, cybernetics, and robotics). These will raise the uncertainty, complexity, and stakes of future warfare. Combined with inevitably imperfect

intelligence on global terrorism and clandestine state sponsorship, some may represent 'debounded risks', whose probabilities of occurrence and scales of impact cannot be calculated—posing intrinsic problems for judging the proportionality of prevention, pre-emption, or response.[37]

The Moral Status of Nuclear Weapons

Dispute is certainly unavoidable over sixty-year-old nuclear technology, given the lethality of nuclear weapons and their centrality to global power relationships. Nuclear use, or even threat, would certainly ignite long-running recrimination, accompanied by war crimes indictments. But the acceptability of continued nuclear possession is contested, and aspirations to Global Zero have recently revived. While the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty regime is arguably inequitable, further spread of nuclear weapons, or even enabling civil technologies, is an undoubted international anxiety. Proliferation pessimists see proliferation as unavoidably raising the risk of nuclear war, especially given the unpredictability of many potential proliferants. Hence preventing or reversing proliferation might be morally justified. Proliferation optimists, conversely, hypothesize that proliferation could be stabilizing.[38] From the UNSC downwards, there is no sign of an emerging international consensus about the acceptability of coercive counter-proliferation, whether by economically immiserating sanctions, cyber attack, sabotage, or assassination of individual scientists.

Conclusion and Prospect: Can War be Moral?

With no convincing historical guide to successful future strategic practice, there is little chance of agreement on the necessity, effectiveness, political impacts, proportionality, and discrimination of specific military choices. As global opinion becomes more significant for the outcome of discretionary wars, we should also expect to see opinions polarized (often deliberately, by professionals) over new complexities. The positions which individuals adopt over the morality of conflict serve as impassioned signifiers of their political and cultural identities.

Intensifying disagreement need not entail general collapse of ethical restraints in conflict. National reputation is valued within most strategic cultures. There is a huge international momentum to publicize and address the protection of civilians. The categories of JWT have not been refuted or superseded, and most nations sincerely believe that they fight within them. JWT analysis can be tried on new developments, stressing proportionality and applying historical precedents wherever possible. And, while proportionality itself may often be indefinable, agreement may be found on what is grossly disproportionate.

Nevertheless, JWT's precepts are losing direct relevance to the most critical strategic choices. Its abstracted set of conventions no longer grips the increasingly convoluted landscapes of twenty-first-century conflict. This creates a disputatious screech of lost moral traction. Statesmen, philosophers, soldiers, and lawyers will have to work hard to rethink JWT's intellectual purchase on events. Just possibly, as after the Thirty Years War,[39] new ordering principles and distinctions of authority will eventually re-emerge, regulating conflict in a strategic environment of widely proliferated WMD, super-empowered global non-state actors, proxy wars, cyber offensives, humanitarian munitions, suicide bombers, potent (invulnerably piloted) drones, and autonomous robots. But obtaining even grudgingly constraining additional agreement is unlikely while present conflicts continue without settlement.[40]

Notes

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2. Longhurst, 2004: 17–18.
3. www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/2010_English_Top.pdf (accessed 25 April 2011).
4. Fiala, 2008: 129–36.
5. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html (accessed 25 April 2011).
6. Popovski, Reichburg, and Turner, 2009.
7. Orend, 2000a: 185; Walzer, 2006.
8. Der Derian, 2009: xxxi, 264.
9. Weigel, 2009.
10. All statements of JWT principles are from Quinlan and Guthrie, 2007.
11. Orend, 2000a: 119.
12. Kennedy, 2006; Dunlap, 2007.
13. Kenneth Anderson's Law of War and Just War Theory Blog: http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com/2009/06/un-collective-security-and-us-security.html (accessed 25 April 2011).
14. Nagel, 1993.
15. Johnson, 2004.
16. Letter of US Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Special Minister Ashburton, 27 July 1842, addressing the Caroline Incident of 1837.
17. Freedman, 2010.
18. Biggar, 2007.
19. Slim, 2007: 183–8, 209.
20. Gross, 2010: 154.
21. Schulte, 2010.
22. Report of the Special UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, May 2010: www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf (accessed 25 April 2011).
23. Daniel Reisner, quoted in Weizman, 2009.
24. Weizman, 2009.
25. Letter from Menahem Yaari, strongly supported by Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer, in the *New York Review of Books*, 8 October 2009.

26. Dill, 2010: 6.
27. *Daily Telegraph*, 11 July 2010: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7884017/Britains-top-general-in-Afghanistan-admits-courageous-restraint-must-change.html (accessed 25 April 2011).
28. 'Israel: Civilians & Combatants', an exchange between Walzer and Margalit, on one side, and Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, *New York Review of Books*, 14 May and 11 June 2009.
29. Orend, 2000b.
30. Keegan, 2004: 384.
31. Robinson, de Lee, and Carrick, 2008.
32. Axinn, 2009: 37, 63.
33. Zimbardo, 2007; Bradley, 2009.
34. Glover, 1999: 33.
35. Harries, 2005.
36. Hogg and Vaughan, 2008: 91–3.
37. This is a concept associated with Ulrich Beck, quoted in Coker, 2009: 75–6.
38. Sagan and Waltz, 2002.
39. Münkler, 2005.
40. Bobbitt, 2003.

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CHAPTER 8

THE EVOLVING LEGAL ASPECTS OF WAR

SERGE SUR

International law on the one hand, war and peace on the other hand, have always been intertwined. One of the first general theories of international law, that of Grotius in 1625, is entitled *De jure Belli ac Pacis*. For centuries, the sovereign and monopoly right of states to resort to war for national purposes was above any international limitation, except for some procedural standards, like a formal declaration of war. This state of law, corresponding to the period of European world dominance, was correlated with numerous wars, sometimes limited, sometimes general, involving a large number of European states. Later on, the Napoleonic wars changed the picture by their length, scope, and destructiveness, but less than the two world wars of the twentieth century. Those two wars, between them, have generated the decline of Europe as well as given rise to a lengthy effort to abolish wars, and that endeavour has been based on international law.

The Charter of the United Nations is an international treaty which contains legal rules with the purpose of establishing long lasting international peace and security. Nevertheless, even if the concept of war has been repudiated, international violence has not vanished. It has been substituted by the more flexible and unstable formula of armed conflict, which still belongs to the realm of international relations—and of international law. This substitution means that *jus ad bellum*—the right to use internationally armed force—and *jus in bello*—the law supposed to govern the conduct of hostilities—remain nowadays, despite their evolutions, at the centre of the problems of international peace and security.

The Contemporary Legal Approach to War and International Violence: A General Overview

In the aftermath of the two world wars of the twentieth century, the general aspiration of the community of nations has been to put a definitive ending to that kind of catastrophe, and to establish a set of international rules and mechanisms to avoid their re-emergence. The result was the Charter of the United Nations, formally adopted in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, even before the end of the Second World War. The UN Charter remains till now the main legal instrument, including specific rules and related bodies, about the international use of force, its limitations, and enforcement thereof. The Charter had been preceded by several decades of efforts leading to a general prohibition of war in international relations among states. The Versailles Treaty in 1919, which included the Covenant of the League of Nations, made some moves in that direction, and was completed ten years later by the Briand–Kellogg pact (1928), banning war for national interest purposes.

All these efforts and agreements were nevertheless unable to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. Despite that failure, the Charter has followed the same legal pattern. It was provided, however with hugely stronger means: rules for the limitation of the international use of armed force by member states and enforcement of these rules by an international body, namely the United Nations Security Council.

The purpose of the Charter is to prohibit war among nations. The whole Charter is built towards fulfilling that objective. As a matter of fact, however, the word 'war' itself does not appear in its text, with the exception of the Preamble, whose beginning states '. . . to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time had brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . .' That wording indicates that the founding fathers of the Charter were building on past experiences, and were trying to avoid new wars of the same kind in the future. This is already a point to be noticed: the Charter is not, contrary to the League of Nations, linked up with any peace treaty and is therefore not locked in by the past. Nevertheless it was conceived in the context of the two previous world wars, and the authors of its principles and mechanisms were not in a position to foresee the future occurrence of international violence, conflicts, threats to or breaches of the peace.

This is not to say that the Charter does not encompass a comprehensive approach to those threats or breaches. On the contrary, the Charter substitutes for 'war' the concept of 'establishment and maintenance of international peace and security' (Article 26, for instance). Such a large concept should include not only the prohibition of war, but also preventive, dissuasive, and corrective measures aimed at avoiding or correcting threats to or uses of force against international peace and security. Indeed, the Charter provides all these kinds of tools, mostly in its Chapters I, V, VI, VII, and VIII, which, between them, constitute the heart of its legal structure. About prevention, there is also its

Article 55, in Chapter IX, relating to the conditions for creating 'peaceful and friendly relations among nations'. These conditions dwell on 'economic and social progress and development' of people, as well as on 'standards of living, full employment', 'human rights and fundamental freedoms', without any kind of discrimination 'as to race, sex, language or religion'. As a matter of fact, this article was, and still remains, unimplemented. If it were, the result would be a structural peace among nations, like the peace which exists among member states of the European Union, which can be described as a perfect application of the spirit of Article 55.

So what remains in fact at the core of the Charter are the dissuasive and corrective approaches to the maintenance or establishment of international peace and security—meaning a more traditional approach, that of diplomatic and military means. Peace and security are always intertwined in the Charter, even if peace is more related to diplomatic means and security to military means. Theoretically, these ways and means are impressive. Not so much the preventive ways for the pacific settlement of disputes, provided for by Chapter VI, as the coercive capabilities of the UNSC set forth in Chapter VII. The Security Council may impose on member states measures not involving the use of armed force, but it is also entitled to decide on the use of armed force against states threatening or breaching international peace and security. Legally speaking, the Security Council has conferred upon it by Members of the United Nations the 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security', and 'in carrying out its duties' it 'acts on their behalf' (Article 24). Looking at the Charter as a whole, one could think that this legal apparatus, if not perfect, should ensure a long-lasting peace among nations, providing efficient ways to settle disputes, deterring aggression and other breaches of peace, and if so needed, using coercive means in order to restore international peace and security.

Indeed, there have been no more world wars since the coming into force of the Charter—but it is difficult to argue that its provisions and mechanisms are at the origin of that situation. In any case, they do not stand alone. Other considerations could be important as well: the willingness of the more powerful states to avoid major military confrontations among themselves—nuclear deterrence playing a major role in this respect—and to limit the use of armed force by others. It is, however, impossible to contend that the Charter and its multilateral mechanisms have played no role in establishing this result. In any case, one must note that international peace and security have not been entirely established or maintained in the sixty-five years following the entry into force of the Charter. Each decade, each year has known several conflicts, and several kinds of conflict, even if they were limited by their participants, their scope, their duration—but some of them were or are long lasting and destructive. In addition, new forms of conflict have emerged, which were not foreseen by the founding fathers of the UN, specifically conflicts involving non-state actors, like the so-called liberation wars, civil violence linked to the decay of failing states, or international terrorism.

International law pertaining to international violence and the Charter are at stake in these various situations, when its rules and mechanisms are not able to prevent or control the threat or use of armed force by states, or have to cope with new and unforeseen forms of conflicts. Is the framework of the UN still relevant? In principle, the classical

jus ad bellum, or right of states to use armed force internationally, has been strongly reduced, and reduced with their consent. In fact, conventional wars have not vanished—Israeli–Arab wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973), the Falklands War between Argentina and the UK (1982), the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8), the American coalition vs Iraq war (2003), and the Russia–Georgia war (2008) being examples. Other types of conflict have emerged—the Vietnam conflict, the Kosovo intervention, the military action in Afghanistan, international terrorism and the struggle against it, various conflicts linked to the failure of states, e.g. Yugoslavia, or Western, Central, or Eastern Africa . . . Overflowing the apparent prohibitions, more and more legal justifications for using international violence or armed force present themselves. In this context, there is nowadays a revived interest in the *jus in bello*, or the law applicable to wars or armed conflicts. The Charter itself is mute in this respect, but beyond the Charter efforts have been got underway to develop, strengthen, and implement what is currently known as humanitarian law—which, in fact, remains rather weak.[1]

Jus ad Bellum: From Prohibition to the Multiplication of Legal Justifications

The dominant opinion in the literature about the prohibition of force by member states in the Charter is that it is a general and complete one in the field of international relations, according to its Article 2 (4), with the exception of the right of individual or collective self-defence, regulated in its Article 51. In addition, the Security Council may decide on the use of armed force when it deems so necessary, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. Such an analysis needs to be specified, completed, eventually corrected, according to the provisions of the Charter itself on the one hand, and according to the member states' and UN's legal practices on the other hand. Firstly, because it is not correct to state that there is a general and complete prohibition enshrined in the Charter; secondly, because self-defence cannot be seen, or seen only, as an exception to such a prohibition; thirdly, because other hypotheses of international use of force can be found and sustained by legal practices and argumentations. In this context, the result of sixty-five years of legal practice is not so much an enrichment of the stipulations of the Charter as an erosion of its provisions.

The Prohibitions Included in Article 2 (4) of the Charter

Article 2 (4) belongs to Chapter I of the Charter, 'Purposes and Principles'. It reads as follows:

> All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Even without discussing the interpretation of some legal concepts, like 'international relations', 'force', 'threat', and 'political independence', which are left open, it is clear from this reading that this article does not contain a complete and general prohibition. Such would only be the case if the sentence ended after 'the threat or use of force'—full stop. Any subsequent specification is indeed a limitation of the prohibition: threats or uses of force that are not against territorial integrity of any state, or its political independence, and could be consistent with the purposes of the UN, are not prohibited. It applies obviously to self-defence as well as to the support given by Members to the use of armed force by the Security Council. It must also be noted that not all uses of armed force constitute aggression, and could thus only justify appropriate and proportionate countermeasures.[2] But, apart from these explicit limitations to the prohibition of force in the Charter, other implicit limitations could be discussed as well, namely humanitarian interventions and extensions of self-defence beyond the specific provisions of Article 51. They will be considered below, with the relevant practices and legal justifications of member states or of UN bodies.

Self-Defence and its Extensions

Article 51 reads as follows:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

This article, pertaining to Chapter VII, is indeed at the very core of the Charter. The Charter would not have been accepted by its signatories without it. It means that the member states keep the ultimate responsibility and power concerning their own security, and that they are entitled to maintain armed forces in order to defend themselves or to contribute to the defence of other States. This—inherent—right cannot be seen as an exception to a general and complete prohibition of the use of force, not only because there exists no such prohibition, but also because self-defence is more an indirect consequence of the prohibition of force: it is because and inasmuch as force is prohibited, that self-defence is authorized.

In principle, self-defence could also contribute to collective security, and this is the spirit of the Charter. Article 51 is the last one of Chapter VII, devoted to 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. Self-defence is supposed to respond to armed attacks, synonym of aggression. It should be controlled by the Security Council and remain a kind of safety valve, a provisional measure allowing member states to defend themselves, awaiting a decisive action by the Security

Council. The practice has been fairly different, and the extensions of self-defence have reintroduced a rather indefinite right to use force by member states. This extended conceptualization has even authorized the building of military alliances like NATO: the NATO Treaty explicitly refers to Article 51. The reasons for this practice can be found in the occasional paralysis of the Security Council, when for political reasons it finds itself unable to act quickly to stop acts of aggression, even to come to agreement among its members about what constitutes an act of aggression. Furthermore, it is the right of member states to give their own interpretation of self-defence, which interpretation cannot be legally overcome in case the Security Council is unable to decide. Indeed, there is a definition of aggression provided for by the General Assembly in its Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, but this definition is itself subject to interpretation, and in any case it is not binding, neither for the member states, nor for the Security Council.

According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),[3] self-defence is a rule of customary law, and this customary rule is in a way referred to in Article 51, which states explicitly that self-defence is 'an inherent right' of states, and that 'nothing in the present Charter shall impair' it. So this right is not established by the Charter, rather, it is recognized by it, and remains partly independent from it. The Charter undertakes to regulate it, but it remains as well autonomous, as shown by its practice. Indeed the main contemporary problems related to the use of force pertain to the practice of self-defence, which in some respect has reintroduced the concept of legal international violence in a system which intends to exclude it. Among the main questions arising from these practices, one should mention foremost the so-called preventive, or pre-emptive, self-defence. Theoretically, defence is permitted against actual aggression, whatever its forms. But could it be legal to use preventive armed force in order to defend oneself against imminent aggression, considering that it is the only way to repel such an act of aggression, which would succeed if it were able to develop? Arguments in favour are balanced by arguments against, but the practice seems to imply its legality, provided that the aggression is certain and that the means used to prevent it are appropriate—which in a way refers to the principle of proportionality of self-defence, balance between the armed attack and the riposte to it. As this customary principle of proportionality, not mentioned in Article 51, pertains to *jus in bello* as well as to *jus ad bellum*, it will be considered later on.

A second question concerns the invocation of self-defence against non-state actors. The Charter did not envisage the hypothesis, and seems only to be relevant to the relations among states. There is no doubt that any act of aggression by a state against another state is a case for self-defence for the state or states aggressed against. But what about international terrorism or armed force used by non-governmental militias? In this respect there seem to have emerged differences between the states' and Security Council's practice and the position of the ICJ. States as well as the Security Council, specifically in its Resolution 1368 (12 September 2001) following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, have recognized the right of self-defence of the USA, even if no state was at first glance implied or targeted by its provisions at this time. The ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion regarding the building of an Israeli wall within Palestinian territories (9 July 2004),[4] stated that Article 51 concerns an act of aggression by a state against

another state. It goes beyond the above-mentioned practice of the Security Council, and also against the practice of states. For instance, when Israel launched an armed attack in south Lebanon, in 2006, against Hezbollah, it stated that the target was not the Lebanon as a state, but Hezbollah firing from Lebanese territory. Protestations from other states were based, not on the principle of the Israeli reaction itself, but on the supposed lack of proportionality of the self-defence advanced by Israel.

Evolving Practices of the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council is neither a military nor a judicial body. It is a political body, by its composition, its procedures, its powers, the kind of decisions it has to make, the evaluation of factual situations it has to build upon, and the purpose of its actions, namely establishment, maintenance, or restoration of international peace and security. It is not in charge of the implementation of international law. One must keep that in mind when appreciating its practice. For sure the Security Council has to act in accordance with the Charter as a whole and to respect the specific provisions made for its functioning. But it has a discretionary power to interpret them, and these provisions are large and flexible enough to authorize a huge set of measures, even of types not envisioned formally in the Charter. For instance, the Security Council managed to develop the doctrine and the practice of peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI; furthermore it succeeded in establishing special criminal tribunals for prosecuting the authors of international crimes in specific conflicts, such as ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda.[5] In addition, on the basis of Article 103 of the Charter, its decisions are not only binding, but supersede any other agreement among member states. And these decisions are very difficult to contest. No judicial body is in a position to rescind them, despite some suggestions or wishes from authors. The only way for a state to try to escape their authority is to pretend that they are contrary to the Charter, and then declare them void—but the Council remains theoretically able to implement them, even by use of coercion, be it non-military or military.

For several decades, the Security Council was not in a position to implement Chapter VII and specifically to decide on the use of armed force, because of the divisions between its members, mainly the permanent ones. Nevertheless, after the decay of the Soviet Union, during the 1990s and thereafter, the Council was able to use Chapter VII and to recommend or decide on the use of armed force. It did so in various ways, but in fact never as was provided for in the Charter, which illustrates the flexibility of interpretations it could sustain. The Charter, in Article 42, refers to 'actions by air, sea, or land forces', undertaken by the Security Council itself, with the disposal of armed forces of member states, on the basis of agreements with them. It means that the Council should control international armed forces, eventually overwhelming forces coming from the permanent members and use them under its responsibility. They should be under the strategic direction of a Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members (Article 47). But in fact these agreements have never been concluded, and the Security Council does not have military forces at its disposal for coercive

actions. The Korean War at the beginning of the 1950s remains an exception, but in fact it was American armed forces which were engaged, and the commander in chief was nominated by the United States.[6] Another exception is when, under the framework of a peacekeeping mission, armed forces of the UN are authorized by specific rules of engagement to use force—the Congolese operation at the beginning of the 1960s being the main example.[7]

So the Security Council, in the current practice, does not use armed force itself. The absence of military contingents at its permanent disposal is not the only, not even the main reason. It is more because, as an entity, the United Nations is supposed to be a peaceful organization, built to make peace and not war, and is perceived as such by a large majority of states. One should not kill in the name of the United Nations, except in case of individual self-defence of the personnel involved. But the Council may authorize the use of force by member states, either in the case of self-defence under Article 51, or in order to enforce its decisions. For instance, in the Iraq-Kuwait case in 1990, the Council authorized 'states cooperating with Kuwait' to use 'all necessary means' to liberate Kuwait—but the coalition led by the United States was not under the flag of the United Nations (Resolution 678, 30 October 1990). After the Kosovo intervention driven by NATO members (1999)—and not decided by the Council—it authorized, by its Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999), the creation of a security force able to enforce security in the territory, with significant participation by NATO. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Council recognized that the United States were in a situation of self-defence, giving a legal basis to the military intervention in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in the Kosovo case, as well as in the case of the war against Iraq in 2003, armed forces were used on a very dubious basis, without any specific authorization from the Council, even if some resolutions were called upon.[8] The result was, first, a crisis of the collective security system established by the Charter, and second, an effort aiming at rationalization of the practice of the Council itself.

Even before these events, questions arose about the content and the extent of the authorizations given by the Council. For several decades, the Council did not mention any specific provision of the Charter to justify its resolutions. During the 1990s, it began to mention Chapter VII, without any specific article, in order to demonstrate the binding nature of its decisions. But their content could remain at this time rather vague, and was often judged too broad by various states—for instance Resolution 678 in the Iraq-Kuwait case, which posed no limit to the use of force. The word 'force' was not even mentioned, and the authorization was in some respects implicit. Possibly as a consequence of this, some states considered—wrongly in the opinion of a large majority—that authorization was implicitly given by the Council to the interventions in Kosovo in 1999, or in Iraq in 2003.[9] The result of these deviations, or transgressions, even violations of the Charter by intervening states is that, nowadays, the Council tends to refer to specific articles, in order to make precise and to limit the scope of its authorizations or decisions. The purpose is to clearly exclude the use of armed force when imposing coercive measures. For instance, with regard to the Iranian situation, for instance, in imposing sanctions to Iran against its nuclear activities, the Council referred to Article 40, which mentions 'provisional measures', and to 41, 'measures not involving the use of armed force', whereas the use of armed force is foreseen in Article 42.[10]

From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect

Among the hypotheses of implicit legality of the use of armed force by states, not contrary to the provisions of Article 2 (4), arises the question of humanitarian intervention. It is different from the so-called 'droit d'ingérence', which implies the right of humanitarian NGOs to assist peacefully, with the consent of the concerned state and the partnership of other states, populations in distress resulting from conflicts or natural catastrophes.[11] Humanitarian intervention could be justified in case of genocide or long-lasting and large-scale mistreatments of its own population by a government, including deportations, tortures, systematic deportations, massive slaughters—to make it short, in case of gross violations of humanitarian law. It could imply the use of coercion, even armed force, by other states to impede it and to put an end to such behaviour. One could plead that political independence does not authorize a state to adopt such policies, and that when other states should intervene, it is not an attack against territorial integrity—which is a concept differing from territorial inviolability—and certainly not 'inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations'. Indeed the Kosovo case in 1999 was the most important case in which such a doctrine could have been invoked to justify the military intervention of NATO members, without any specific authorization from the Security Council. Other previous cases could also be mentioned, in Zaire at Kolwezi by France (1978), in Cambodia by Vietnam against the Khmer Rouge (1978), or in Uganda by Tanzania (1979) for instance. But, despite some claims about its existence, there was not a general legal doctrine formulated by states to justify these actions, which were presented as exceptional cases.

Humanitarian intervention would suppose that international bodies are ineffective, that the massacres and other mistreatments can be objectively and independently established, and that there is a systematic policy implemented by a government, or that a government is failing and unable to maintain public order on its territory. In such cases, a state or a coalition of the willing could intervene militarily in order to restore peace and security. After the Kosovo intervention, whose legality was dubious, intervening states fell short of referring to the UN Charter. A commission was nevertheless established, the Evans–Sahnoun Commission,[12] with a mandate to study the matter and to make proposals in this respect. The result is that this commission, working on 'the Responsibility to Protect', killed the very doctrine of humanitarian intervention. On the one hand, it recognized that a state has the right and the duty to protect its own population, and that it should be liable for failing to do so. On the other hand, this commission provided no other solution in case of violation than the Security Council measures, which could be adopted anyway under the Charter. The only new suggestions from the commission are, firstly, that permanent members should not use their veto right in such cases—which is pure utopia—and secondly, that, if the Council is paralysed by a veto, the General Assembly be seized of the matter under the Acheson resolution provisions[13]—which is unlikely to happen, given the large hostility of a huge majority of states to the very

concept of humanitarian intervention. So remains a practice, rare but not exceptional, without any clear legal justification.

Use of Armed Force by Non-State Actors

The Charter, and more broadly international law, are in principle only applicable to member states and to other subjects of international law like international organizations. Non-state actors for their part are supposed to be subject to various domestic laws, but to lack the international personality which would bring them directly under international rules, establishing rights or obligations enforceable in their favour or against them. It does not mean that they are not bound by general or specific international rules, but in principle these rules are applied to them by the states which have jurisdiction over these non-state actors, inasmuch as international rules are recognized as part of the relevant domestic law. This is a consequence of the dualism between international law and domestic law. In fact, however, non-state actors can emerge, and effectively emerge as international actors, specifically as far as the use of armed force is concerned. Liberation movements, militias, mercenaries, insurgents in civil wars, international terrorist groups, private military and security companies have been or are still for decades actors in international violent dramas. They contradict in fact the legal monopoly of use of armed force by the international organizations or by the states acting under the UN Charter. As they are not bound by the international rules pertaining to the use of armed force, they pose a specific problem for international peace and security.

This problem must be envisaged firstly on a legal theoretical basis, and secondly on historical and political grounds—i.e. taking into consideration the legal practices. Legally speaking, a general distinction has to be made between on the one hand those non-state actors which in fact could be linked to specific states, acting overtly or covertly on their behalf and under their control (in this respect these actors could contribute to uses of force amounting to aggression, as stated in its definition by the General Assembly, and their activities could involve the liability of states); and on the other hand, private non-state actors using force purely on their own initiative, for their sole purposes, which are subject to the domestic law of the states concerned relating to the internal use of force, and in this respect to the criminal law. Concerned states could implement exceptional rules relating to public order, including the use of armed forces, to maintain or restore public security. But it is also possible that, due to the international dimension of their activities, non-state actors are relevant to and targeted by international rules. These rules may either accord some rights to them—allowing them to use force, or protecting them, for instance with humanitarian law—or, to the contrary, impose obligations on them, allowing the states concerned to use legal coercion against them, or prosecuting in international tribunals the authors of international crimes. These various, even opposite, approaches are linked to historical-political considerations.

As a matter of fact, non-state actors have been treated differently, not so much on the basis of their activities as on consideration of their purposes. Generally speaking,

movements of liberation fighting colonial domination in the 1950s and 1960s were considered to be engaged in legitimate conflicts, and supported by the General Assembly. The legal argument was that article 2 (4) of the Charter was not intended to limit the right of people to self-determination, and that colonial domination was in a way a kind of permanent aggression against them. So they were in some respect in a situation of self-defence. These considerations have for decades impeded any international prohibition of terrorist activities. However, further to the development of terrorist attacks against civil aviation, several conventions were concluded,[14] and after the decay of the Soviet Union, the Security Council, even before 11 September, stated that international terrorism was a threat against international peace and security.[15] It was taking as a first step a judicial stance, and after 11 September recognized that terrorism could be an act of aggression. Non-state actors have since been specifically targeted by some resolutions relating to the struggle against international terrorism.[16] Another very different situation is that of the private military companies, recently developed by some states. They act on behalf of governments, which may try to provide domestic or international immunity to them. This outcome is a far cry from the previous condemnations of mercenaries made by General Assembly resolutions.[17] In any case, it is clear that these so-called private companies should be more closely regulated, whether at international or at domestic level.[18]

United States Doctrine about the Use of Armed Force and the Relevance of the Charter

For several decades after the entry into force of the Charter, doubts about its relevance and ability to direct international relations in the field of peace and security were related to the Cold War, which impeded the functioning of the Security Council, at least of its Chapter VII obligations. These attitudes were based on political motives, not on legal ones. After the end of the Soviet Union, there was a bright interval in the Council's history, with its action in Iraq in 1991 and the following years. But it rapidly ran into new difficulties,[19] which culminated in the Iraqi case in 2003, even if the Kosovo case was a forerunner. In the case of Iraq, the US made it clear that it did not accept any precondition or control by the Security Council before or while using armed forces in the safeguarding of its national interest. This situation was a dramatic change, given the fact that the US was at the very origin of the Charter and of its rules and mechanisms relating to the use of force. Beyond the political reasons explaining such a shift, legal arguments have been invoked.

Some of these arguments are of a general nature, namely the idea that article 2 (4) is no longer valid, due to destructive practices which have given rise to new customary rules.[20] Such a thesis cannot be admitted, because this article would be part of *jus cogens*, a concept not useful in this case, and generally speaking not useful, but because the Charter has certainly not to be modified by practices which were frequently critized by a number of states, thus impeding by their protests the development of a new custom. The main arguments are based on the specific posi-

tion of the United States. In other words, the USA claims that it has so many international powers and duties that it cannot be bound by the rules applicable to all other states. Being a unique superpower, an indispensable nation, under the rule of law and governed by democratic institutions, it cannot bow to international bodies without legitimacy, or to a majority of non-democratic countries. So, the relevant question for the USA is the legality of an armed action under the American Constitution, which, in its view, supersedes any international rule or body.[21] This is the justification of American unilateralism, which is not linked to the George W. Bush Administration, but was claimed before and remains intact after him. This concept justifies 'wars of choice', like the Iraqi intervention in 2003, like preventive or pre-emptive wars, even if some resolutions of the Security Council were also invoked, albeit in a way that did not convince the large majority of member states. Conceivably, NATO could be claimed to be a substitute for a multilateral authorization to use armed force, as in the Kosovo case, being a coalition of democratic countries. However, the idea of replacing the Security Council by NATO failed, specifically in the Iraqi case in 2003, where its members were profoundly divided.

American unilateralism is a direct threat to the relevance of the Charter, and has a mirror effect in Israeli military policy. International terrorism gave to the two states an argument in favour of a claim of a 'global war against terrorism', and in addition both of them do not exclude the principle of military action against a would-be nuclear-proliferating state. Is it possible to foresee other mirror effects, considering that no state accepts the idea of any single state being placed above the general rules of international law? Already, in 2008, the Russian action against the entry of Georgian forces into Abkhazia echoes the military intervention in Kosovo. China clearly indicates that it could use armed force to impede any unilateral proclamation of independence by Taiwan. This question is of a different nature, however, because Taiwan is not a member of United Nations and is not recognized as a state by a large majority of states, which adhere to the 'one China policy'. Nevertheless, nobody knows yet what kind of legal doctrine China will support when its armed forces are developed enough to be an asset for the implementation of its national interests, and whether China will not emulate the United States in this respect. So, are the Charter and its prohibitions only applicable to militarily weak states?[22]

Jus in Bello: From the Development of Humanitarian Law to its Crisis

For centuries, ethics or religion rather than law set the limitations of violence during wartime. During the nineteenth century legal rules emerged, firstly domestic ones, then international conventions based on the principle that combatants do not have the right to use unlimited violence. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants was essential, as well as the respect due to the neutral. The International Red Cross Movement, born during this period, was behind the creation of some instruments, and

at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Hague Conferences tried to limit the use of destructive means in wartime.[23] The two world wars were, however, not very respectful of these principles, so other efforts were made afterwards. The current picture is a complex one, with a varied set of rules, instruments, and actors, and in this context it is only possible to make some general comments.[24] Recent decades have seen a trend towards the development of these rules, by a process of unification under the general concept of humanitarian law, as well as by their reinforcement. However, numerous loopholes remain, and humanitarian law seems to get stuck in a permanent crisis.

Unification

This unification concerns the content, the subjects, and the extension of humanitarian law. According to the ICJ, as for the content we face today the combination of two sets of rules, namely the Law of Geneva, including the four Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols of 1977, on the one hand, and the Law of War proceeding from The Hague Conferences on the other.[25] In addition, some specific conventions are also part of it, like the Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons (1925), the Genocide Convention (1948), the Convention on inhumane conventional weapons (1981), or the Convention Against Torture (1984). In the same spirit, humanitarian law concerns by now not only formal wars, but more generally armed conflicts, including international as well as non-international conflicts. The rules deal for instance with prisoners of war, protection of non-combatants or of specific locations, occupation, and the use of various lethal weapons.

As for the subjects, they concern the states, but also international organizations—UN Peace Operations for instance[26]—and they should apply also to non-state actors, including their criminal prosecution in case of violations. NGOs, and specifically the International Red Cross Committee, have a say in their application.

As for their scope, they are supposed to be part of general customary law, whatever their origin, by treaty or custom.[27] In particular, Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, is at the core of humanitarian law, establishing a minimum standard of treatment and protection for every person affected by an armed conflict, whether international or non-international.[28] It has been recognized as applicable by the US Supreme Court even to so-called 'unlawful combatants'.[29]

Strengthening

A large part of the doctrine contends that these norms have the reinforced authority of *jus cogens*, meaning that they should be respected in any circumstance, without reciprocity, excluding reprisals of the same kind, being absolute obligations. Some decisions by special international tribunals established by the Security Council support this position.

Legally it is not necessary to refer to *jus cogens*, a concept doubtful in international law. The concept of 'intransgressible obligations', used by the ICJ, seems better, less contested, with the same results.[30] The latter concept justifies the criminalization of violations of such intransgressible obligations before international jurisdictions, special tribunals, or the International Criminal Court established in 1998 by the Rome Statute.[31] Their jurisdiction includes genocide, other crimes against humanity, and crimes of war. Recently, in this context a definition of aggression has been adopted leading to the possible prosecution of individuals, whether private persons of officials, which extends the criminalization beyond *jus in bello* towards *jus ad bellum*.[32]

Loopholes

In itself, the development of the *jus in bello* and the criminalization of its violation do not really constitute progress for international law. By implication it means that conflicts of all kinds continue, that humanitarian law is violated, and that the prohibitive rules of *jus ad bellum* are not effective. In addition, as they stand, the rules remain incomplete. There is still a need for new rules and conventions—like the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (18 September 1997) or the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions (3 December 2008)—and the conventions in force are not ratified by some of the main states involved in conflicts. In addition, the customary nature, and consequently the universal scope, of some rules are subject to legal disputes. No wonder, for the content of the rules is sometimes dubious. For instance, the ICJ was unable to conclude whether the use of nuclear weapons was unlawful or not under any circumstance.[33]

This Advisory Opinion is an example of a larger difficulty: to evaluate what 'proportionality' implies and what should be its threshold. More generally, some instruments make the reservation of 'military needs' so as to exclude a strict application of the prohibitions. The concept of 'collateral damage' is too well known. Recent practices in time of armed conflict illustrate the limits of humanitarian law. Specifically, the American doctrine related to the war against terrorism has denied the benefit of humanitarian law to various people, under the general concept of 'unlawful combatants', and protests have been ineffective. The rules of occupation are largely ignored by Israel, despite numerous resolutions of international bodies; furthermore, the targeted preventive assassinations of would-be terrorists are indeed a negation of international law.

Beyond these specific cases, military people frequently lack the necessary information on the subject matter; also, states are at least reluctant to prosecute their own personnel on this basis, notably when they do not have recourse to covert actions or to private military companies so as to bypass the prohibitions.[34] As for the other non-state actors, whether terrorist organizations, militias, or paramilitary forces, they seem not to be impressed by humanitarian law. In the context of failed states, the violations of humanitarian law are frequent and rarely repressed, even when the authors are identified.

In brief, the best way to implement humanitarian law is to prevent conflicts and maintain international peace and security through peaceful means.

Notes

1. Many questions discussed in the following sections are analysed at more length in Sur, 2010.
2. See ICJ, *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA)*, Merits, Judgment, *ICJ Reports 1986*, 14.
3. Ibid.
4. See ICJ, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, *ICJ Reports 2004*, 136.
5. Respectively by UNSC Resolutions 808, 23 February 1993; and 955, 8 November 1994.
6. UNSC Resolution 85, 31 July 1950.
7. UNSC Resolution 161, 21 February 1961.
8. Specifically UNSC Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, which could justify the use of force against Iraq in case of violation by Iraq of its provisions, and Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, which states that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations.
9. See the meetings of the Security Council in early 2003, during which a large majority of states contested the use of armed force against Iraq. In trying to obtain a specific resolution, the USA and UK seemed to share this opinion, at least provisionally.
10. Resolution 1696, 31 July 2006. It should be noted at this point that military people are more keen to see specific rules of engagement in UNSC resolutions than references to any article or chapter of the Charter. These references fall generally short of giving specific military instructions. In the case of the Israeli military intervention against Hezbollah, in the context of UNSC Resolution 1701, 11 August 2006, a Strategic Military Cell was established within the UN Secretariat in order to give the necessary military expertise to the Secretariat, and specifically to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations PCKO. See Centre Thucydide, 2007.
11. See Bettati, 1996.
12. The 'International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty' (ICSS) issued its report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, in December 2001.
13. UNGA Resolution 337 (V), 3 November 1950, currently known as the 'Acheson Resolution', states that in case of paralysis of the UNSC by veto, the General Assembly may vote resolutions in the field of international peace and security, including a recommendation to use armed force. The practice remains exceptional.
14. Successively the Conventions of Tokyo (14 September 1963), The Hague (16 December 1970), and Montréal (23 September 1971).
15. UNSC Resolution 748, 31 March 1992, targeting Libya.
16. Notably with UNSC Resolutions 1373, 28 September 2001, and 1540, 28 April 2004. More generally, see Glennon and Sur, 2008.
17. International use of armed force by mercenaries or paramilitary forces was also declared illegal by the ICJ, in the *Military and Paramilitary Activities* Judgment (above, note 2). On the basis of UNGA Resolution 44/34, 4 December 1989, an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries has been adopted, but not extensively ratified.
18. An academic study is currently being undertaken by the EU on 'Priv-War', with the aim of recommending rules of conduct for member states and private military and security services.
19. Principally with the Yugoslav conflicts and with an intervention in Somalia.
20. See for instance Michael Glennon, 2005: 'How International Rules Die', *Georgetown Law Journal*, vol. 93, 2005, 939.

21. This is the permanent position of the US Supreme Court. For the interventions in Iraq in 1991 and in 2003, the vote of an authoritative Resolution by the Congress was deemed more important by the Administration than a UNSC Resolution.
22. The ICJ has been referred to in various cases of use of armed forces for several decades, and has contributed to defining the rules of *jus ad bellum* as well as *jus in bello*. But some of its decisions were never implemented or taken into consideration. See Etienne, 2002. The impact of ICJ jurisprudence on state practices in this field remains limited.
23. The two successive conferences of The Hague (1899, 1907) led to the signing of the Conventions of 29 July 1899 and 18 October 1907.
24. See Sassoli and Bouvier, 2003.
25. ICJ, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, *ICJ Reports 1996*, 226.
26. Observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law is codified by the UN Secretary General, 6 August 1999, ST/SGB/1999/13.
27. See the ICRC data base on customary humanitarian law: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home (accessed 25 April 2011).
28. See the text at: http://www.icrc.org/eng
29. See for instance Supreme Court of the USA, *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 29 June 2006.
30. ICJ, *Legality of the Threat* (above, note 25): 'instransgressible principles of international customary law' (par. 79).
31. *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, treaty of 17 July 1998, in force in 2002.
32. Kampala conference of revision of July 2010. The provisions, once ratified, should enter into force in 2017.
33. Point E of the decision: '…the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake' (above, note 25).
34. Which seems to have been or to be the case in the Afghanistan conflict after 2001 and in the Iraqi conflict after 2003.

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PART III

THEORIES ON THE PRACTICE OF WAR

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CHAPTER 9

THE HISTORY OF GRAND STRATEGY AND THE CONDUCT OF MICRO-WARS*

COLONEL BENOIT DURIEUX

The theory of war is part of the very idea of war and at the same time opposed to war itself. Whatever form it takes, war is only thought of, prepared for, and anticipated so that it can be shortened and, at times, avoided. Over the long term, such preparation takes the form of works of military science, often based on past experiences; closer at hand, as seen daily in Afghanistan, a battle plan or the concept of a modern operation are still kinds of theories of war. It is therefore not surprising that the theory of war always manages to slip out of the hands of those wanting to explore and to perfect it. Clausewitz himself addressed this problem, going as far as to single out three factors that make an unambiguous doctrine of war impossible: moral forces and their effects, the reciprocity of opponents' actions, and the uncertainty that reigns on the battlefield.[1] Today we must surely add to this list a fourth difficulty, at whose characteristics Clausewitz only began to hint. According to some analyses, changes in warfare over the past centuries, especially owing to the progress of technology, have been so profound that they call into question the lessons of the past. Globalization, the weakening of state structures, the pace of changes in information technologies, and the growing importance of terrorist violence are all factors that lead some to postulate the end of inter-state conflict and others to describe them in a wholly new way, such that the strictly military aspect of conflict becomes secondary or only part of a much bigger picture.[2] Classical strategy therefore disappears little by little, absorbed in political science, sociology, or economic theories.[3]

* I propose to use the term 'Micro-Wars' to describe developments of a broader crisis in which local political, social, and military factors outweigh the factors that determine this larger conflict and give to a local confrontation a certain autonomy.

Looking closely at these two problems —the intrinsic complexity of the phenomenon of warfare and progressive disappearance of its traditional outlines—invites us to take a pragmatic approach to the relationship between the theory and the practice of war and to ask ourselves: can the reflections of strategic masters of the past still guide those who must wage real war in today's world?

To answer this question requires one to take a certain distance from the main models of war that are usually used as foundations for reflections on modern conflicts. The model of a classic war between nations that has long been the basis for traditional analysis, whether expressed in an inter-state war, a revolutionary war, or the virtual confrontation of nuclear powers, seems to be fading away, even if only for a time. Today it is certain that the chances for the leader of a Western state to apply such and such a lesson from the great masters of strategy are rare indeed.

For all that, classic warfare between political bodies has not disappeared. Rather, it has left behind the realm of large-scale political structures to make its home at a lower level. What we are dealing with here then is more a question of scale. Western armies often intervene in regions of crisis in order to stabilize them. A good example of this phenomenon is the Afghan conflict: here the word 'Taliban' is used to describe a rather loose network of groups and bands of men that each has its own agenda, the coordination of whose actions is often hard to see, if it exists at all. For a decision-maker on the national level, the task at hand is more to resolve chronic instability than to subdue a well-identified enemy. Nonetheless, the military leader engaged in Afghanistan, for example the commander of a battalion or of a company confronted by an armed group with its own objectives, is still engaged in a strategic confrontation. It is at this very local level that the relationship between the use of armed force and the pursuit of political objectives stands out, even if these objectives are limited to a level of only local significance. The overall confrontation in Afghanistan is therefore more the result of the combination of a multitude of purely local, small-scale conflicts than the clashing of a handful of powerful actors at the national level.

These micro-conflicts provide a good example of the unending dilemma of classical strategy. This dilemma, which underlies all theories about the use of military force throughout history, is the choice of those circumstances in which one will let loose a means, military force, which becomes far more complex to control once it is released. Put another way, strategy is a theory that aims to make its own objective, war, ineffective, either in the long term or in the short term. In the past, this theoretical dilemma has taken many forms. In antiquity, during which time we find in most authors a certain distrust of war, ways were often sought to win battles more easily, or even to avoid them altogether. From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, the gradually-developed consciousness of the complexity of war and of its consequences helps to put it more squarely in its political context than was done in the past, a theory that was to culminate in the nineteenth century in the works of Clausewitz. In the twentieth century, the temptation to domesticate each of the aspects of war translates into the progressive fading away of the borders between war and politics, and this is not without risk.

Clearly, it is not practical to systematically review all of the numerous thinkers who have written about these issues since antiquity. But the study of some of the most

influential provide a good picture of the main trends of strategic thought over time and illustrate its extreme relevance for modern conflicts.

Distrust of the Uncertainties of War Among the Masters of Antiquity

To us, the wars of antiquity often seem to have been very deadly events, uninterrupted successions of fighting and slaughter. But the literary works of strategy from antiquity tell a different story, and most often show a great reluctance to resort to the trial of arms. We find this trait in the works of the Chinese masters, of whom Sun Tzu remains the emblematic representative, as well as in the works of Thucydides and in the Roman literature, such as the works of Vegetius or Frontinus. It is striking to see how relevant these lessons are for our own times. An aversion to risk has become an essential part of the action of Western forces deployed in Afghanistan. The human and political cost of each soldier killed is in fact much greater than the strictly military cost—that is, the loss of operational capacity that a soldier's death entails. Five aspects of the teachings of the ancient masters are absolutely central to the action of the military leader in this conflict.

Sun Tzu is surely the writer who most openly refuses to exalt great battles, even if victorious. 'To undertake one hundred battles and to win one hundred victories is a good thing, but it is not the best. To immobilize the enemy's army without giving battle, this is excellent.'[4] Today, this remains the objective of the Western military leader in an operational sector of Afghanistan, for he knows well that the spread of fighting, even if successful, would serve to re-enforce the legitimacy of the insurgents and would pit the population against him. The losses inflicted upon an enemy are not always the main factors of success, and the remark of Sun Tzu, 'heaven will never approve the shedding of human blood', echoes today's humanitarian concerns. In Afghanistan, in order to bring back peace, we must very often apply the precept of Sun Tzu, who adds: 'An able general knows how to subdue the enemy without giving battle.'[5] In this he agrees with Pericles, whose strategy against Sparta, some two centuries earlier, consisted of avoiding land battles against the Lacedaemonian forces: 'we ought not to persist in defending our goods in order to deliver a decisive battle against the Peloponnesians.'[6] One of the reasons behind this strategy was his desire to avoid losses, for, as he said, 'let us not bewail the loss of our houses and our territories, but rather of human lives'.[7] We find this same idea in Frontinus' collection of examples taken from Roman military history. He reports Scipio Africanus' retort to one who accused him of not being belligerent enough: 'In me, my mother brought into the world a general, not a warrior.'[8] Later, and still in the Roman era, Vegetius strongly advises against risking all in one battle, because 'fortune decides a battle as often as bravery',[9] adding that 'the great generals never give battle if they are not presented with a favourable opportunity or forced by necessity'.[10]

Sun Tzu is still the writer who wrote in most detail on the means that would allow one to avoid battle and its hazards. He first recommends 'looking for a peaceful solution to the problem among populations and not delivering battle until all other means have failed'.[11] Frontinus would say more or less the same thing many years later: 'Domitius Corbulo says that one should conquer the enemy with the *dolabrum*';[12] that is, he recommended advancing into enemy terrain slowly and surely, consolidating the army's march with camps and roads, rather than carrying out rapid and risky raids. This admonition has kept all its relevance in today's micro-wars. Rather than launching operations in which we advance for forty-eight hours into an insurgent zone, it is essential that each advance be consolidated by the creation of a post held by the Afghan army and, if necessary, by the creation of new roads.

When battle must be given, however, Sun Tzu stresses the need for it to be given only in conditions of very likely success. 'In the past, those who had experience in fighting never engaged in wars that they did not foresee finishing with honour. Before undertaking them, they were already assured of success.'[13] Today, this maxim ought to lie at the heart of the battalion commander in the Afghan theatre, for even if he has the freedom to decide whether or not to undertake any given operation, to make contact with the local population or to search a suspect zone again, he cannot allow himself room for failure. Sun Tzu adds: 'it is not good to undertake small actions from which you are not sure to gain, but it is even worse to undertake a large-scale action if you are not sure of total victory'.[14] This shows that in his day, as in our own in Afghanistan, the gains to be taken from a tactical success are often infinitely less important than the consequences of failure. 'The engagement of a decisive battle should not take place unless you have planned it and have prepared for it for a long time. Do not count on chance.'[15]

This distrust of chance is common to all the writers of this time. Frontinus highlights the approach of the Byzantines, who 'in their war against Philip, avoided all chance in combat'.[16] This leads the authors to recommend, above all, avoiding mistakes rather than counting on the mistakes of the enemy. For Sun Tzu, the old masters 'only attributed their success to their attentive care to avoid even the smallest of mistakes'.[17] It is in this light that we should understand the many counsels of the Chinese master as to the terrain or as to which precautions to take. These counsels seem obvious when taken in isolation, but their combination translates into a great complexity. As for Pericles, he 'fears our own mistakes much more than the plans of our enemies',[18] and he notes that the ancestors of the Greeks had 'pushed out the barbarians more by chance than by their intelligence'.[19] This remains absolutely true for the NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan, for whom the planning of very detailed operations has become an essential task. The methods of modern tactical reasoning could profit from the precepts of Sun Tzu, according to whom the general 'should know how to discern, among the gains that are worthwhile and those that are not, what is real or relative in the losses sustained and to compensate gains and losses with each other . . . One should not guess but rather work always in security.'[20] And once again: 'victory is but the fruit of exact calculation'.[21]

From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment: Gaining Consciousness of the Uncontrollable Nature of War

The writers of antiquity would long be the main sources of inspiration for all those who, from the Renaissance on, would later reflect on the art of warfare. The first of these, Machiavelli, shows himself to be in close agreement with Roman and Greek writers, all the while putting emphasis on new imperatives for the most part overlooked until then. He explains that 'before committing to combat', a general 'should never undertake an action unless he see in it an assured advantage or unless he be forced by circumstances to do so'.[22] Likewise, when he notes that 'Fabius did not refuse to give battle to Hannibal, but only wanted it to be in circumstances advantageous to him',[23] he falls right in line with the ancient writers. But he does put certain limits to this thought. First, he notes that 'one cannot avoid battle when the enemy wants it at all costs'.[24] Then, more so than writers before him, he underscores the need to seize opportunities both in the military and in the political realms, a concept that remains a daily reality in Afghanistan. At times, one must try to avoid engagements that would give insurgents legitimacy in the eyes of the people. But often, when insurgents are looking to fight at all costs, one must know how to offer battle on a chosen terrain in order to profit from it by showing one's victory to the whole population. Machiavelli also singles out the role of chance. In order to avoid the blows of Machiavellian *Fortuna*, one must prove his *virtù* by taking the hard decisions needed in order to master events. This is an important reality in a stabilization operation: a political as well as a military actor, the battalion commander should be able to impose, little by little, a rhythm of events on local politics. To adapt to circumstances, to undertake 'quick and large' operations as Machiavelli recommends, these lessons remain most pertinent, even when run up against the heavy and complicated planning of modern military operations.[25]

The Marshal de Saxe writes in the same vein. He recommends observing the enemy and taking advantage of favourable moments, but all the same he 'is not in favour of battles, especially at the beginning of a war', and he is 'persuaded that a capable general can make war all his life without being obliged to give battle. . . . One can wage war without leaving anything to chance; and it is in this that we see the highest point of a general's perfection and ability.'[26] But Saxe is also aware of the role of *Fortuna*, since he opens his work by stating that 'war is a science covered in shadows in which one cannot walk with even one assured step'. And while always seeking to limit the role of *Fortuna*, he is not all that far from Machiavelli: he adds that 'nothing does so much to reduce the enemy to absurdity as this method'.[27] This strategy can be applied in many situations in Afghanistan. By establishing a favourable balance of forces in each operation, it is possible to dissuade insurgents from engaging in action against the coalition. In this way, little by little, they are 'reduced to absurdity' by becoming incapable of action; their

legitimacy likewise erodes in the eyes of the population and the subsidies paid to them by Taliban sources for their actions against a Western force would dry up over time.

In the works of two writers as different as Machiavelli and Saxe, the idea comes up that nothing can be controlled in warfare. Faced with the potential blows of *Fortuna*, courage, cool-headedness, and awareness of the 'higher levels of warfare' are essential. At the end of this period, on the eve of the French Revolution, the question remained to know when one should enter into war and why. The writers of the nineteenth century would bring a response to this question.

The Political Contextualization of War in the Industrial Era

In France, Napoleon Bonaparte profited as much as possible from the rebirth of armies and the new form of war ushered in by revolutionary tumults. Most notably, he crushed Prussia at Jena and fascinated his contemporaries with his apparent mastery of military strategy. One of these would revolt against the formal art of war as practised in the eighteenth century, one that had delivered such a resounding defeat to his country. We find the search for decisive battles only at the beginning of Clausewitz's intellectual development. By the end of his life, it can be argued that the Prussian general had become a theorist of limited war. Today, there is hardly a passage in his treatise *On War* that is not applicable to the Afghan theatre.

The paradoxical trinity described by Clausewitz in the first chapter of the first book of his treatise provides a convincing foundation on which to base our model of the Afghan political and military conflict at the local level. Clausewitz says that war consists of a 'remarkable trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity…; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination as an instrument of policy… The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.'[28]

In most Afghan provinces, the first pillar of the Clausewitzian trinity—i.e. the political spectrum—is dense and varied. It is seen in the numerous local actors wielding authority or, more often, influence over local society, each of whom has his own aims. These men are the official representatives of the government, such as deputies, deputy-governors, and bureaucrats. They are also the most senior representatives of traditional authority structures. On the insurgent side, the most important group leaders, foreign Taliban authorities, as well as those that furnish arms and money, also represent political authority. And last, within the forces of the coalition, the commander of the ISAF battalion often undertakes dialogue of a political nature with these different parties. Such dialogue is held in *shuras*, assemblies of notable people in which each can have his say, as well as in bilateral meetings.

Second, in the military sphere, the forces of the coalition and the Afghan government are pitted against the different insurgent groups. Such conflict is not something ongoing or even daily, nor is it something spread over the whole zone of each battalion. The truth is that in this insurgent conflict, we see that attacks take on a very classic character. The insurgents control certain zones, the government controls others, and between them lie contested zones where so-called 'battles' regularly take place; that is, confrontations mutually agreed to by the two forces present and limited in time and space. Little by little we see the creation of a real front line that moves along with the pace of operations. In the period of six months, a battalion commander is made to carry out several operations, each limited to a given zone and able to be grouped into a 'campaign', following the vocabulary often used in the great works of strategic theory.

The third and last sphere of the trinity is that of local Afghan society. It is commonplace to say that this is the real battleground in this kind of conflict. It would be more correct, however, to say that this sphere will be the conflict's final judge. The population supports either the government or the insurgents, each in their zones, and usually turns to the side that offers the most security.

Surely, the political nature of war is the best known of Clausewitzian maxims. It includes in it three realities, all present to the mind of a battalion commander. Firstly, we have the objective reality of the political situation. War carried out between two belligerent parties is first determined by the overall political context. In this way, the war in any single district is the manifestation of the balance of political power between the supporters of the Afghan government—often inhabitants of towns, who are relatively sophisticated and have steady jobs—and the inhabitants of the remote valleys, who are disgusted by a feeling of abandonment and deeply troubled by the unstoppable advance of a modernity that they believe to be contrary to their traditions and beliefs. The second aspect of the political nature of war is the policy taken by each side, which determines the objectives of each of the two belligerent parties. For the battalion commander, he should not undertake an operation *without* a political objective. Speaking broadly, the political objective is to re-establish the authority of the Afghan government. But each operation often has its own political objective, which could be, for example, to discredit the insurgents in a given zone. Third, war is the continuation of politics because each combat is a way to send a message to insurgents, to force them to enter into a process of negotiation that begins with weapons in hand but that should end sitting at a table.

Thus, when Clausewitz explains that one cannot know how to create his war plans without first having an intimate knowledge of the political situation, his remark is essential for the battalion commander, who should not start an operation in a sector until he knows the political layout of the region. Who are the important figures? Are they likely to support the action of the coalition force, or would the operation in question work more to unite several heretofore uncommitted actors against the government? In some ways, Afghanistan could be called a 'Clausewitzian' country, because it is usual for belligerent parties to talk between themselves, even if they are on the point of fighting, while non-belligerent parties are very keen observers of a combat whose outcome will help to determine their future allegiance. Thus, each engagement changes the political

situation; equally important, so does each non-engagement. It could easily happen that if the international force hesitates for too long and does not engage in large force in a zone known to be controlled by insurgents, its credibility will be affected in the eyes of the population. In this country more than in others,

> war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.[29]

Here is one of the fundamental differences that we might have with an author like Jomini. Even if he does admit that some military objectives can be set by political authorities, which he calls 'political objectives', he maintains that 'their choice should be subordinated to the interests of strategy, at least until the great military questions be decided by the test of arms'.[30] This is another possible concept applicable to the mission in a conflict like the one we see in Afghanistan. Its main idea is that before each attempt to resolve the crisis by a political action, one should first try to wipe out the insurgent movement by the most effective military operations at our disposal. In truth, this idea stalls quickly as it runs up against the operational realities of the Afghan theatre. The pressures of the population and the vain character of military operations without political inspiration condemn visions like that of Jomini.

Of course, this does not mean that combat should be avoided at all costs. One must not forget that 'it is inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive from combat'.[31] Faced in particular with insurgents who are looking for battle, one must know how to give battle: 'if the opponent does seek battle, this recourse can never be denied him'.[32] Clausewitz here only repeats the observations of Machiavelli. In Afghanistan, its truth is borne out, because it is sometimes necessary to engage in a show of force and to win it, both in order to break the will of insurgents and in order to gain credibility in the eyes of a population that does indeed respect force.

In giving battle, the military leader should, however, keep two things in mind. On the one hand, it could be the case that the combat remains only theoretical: 'Combat is the only effective force in war; . . . that holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting the enemy would be destroyed.'[33] This circumstance is rather common, where, faced with a disproportion of forces, an insurgent party does not engage in combat, which is another way of admitting his defeat: 'it is true that the defender can avoid an engagement by abandoning his position. But this kind of success already constitutes the better part of victory for the attacker—the recognition of his provisional authority.'[34] On the other hand, the intensity of combat should be weighed with care. Without doubt, we must heed the Prussian master's advice that one must avoid confronting an enemy wielding a sharp sword 'with only an ornamental rapier'.[35] In this conflict, one must do everything to prevent an escalation to extremes.

Among many others, this operation shows the difference between total war and real war as defined by Clausewitz and that has since been the cause of many debates. For Clausewitz, real war does not escalate to extremes, because war is never an isolated act.

It is never a single blow without duration and it never has an absolute result. We should remember that, by contrast, total war consists of an unleashing of extreme violence, instantaneous and isolated from its environment. Aron thought that such total war was of limited value and could not be achieved in reality. We can keep in mind that it characterizes perfectly, however, combat on the individual level, in which a soldier gives death to another and exposes himself to the deadly blows of his adversary. Death given or taken is exactly this instantaneous unleashing of extreme violence that puts the soldier in a situation where the political environment, even if only temporarily, no longer has any sense for him. But as one considers the engagement on a higher level, for instance on a platoon level, a company level, or a battalion level, real war reasserts itself: it takes place in time, it applies limited means, it depends on the political context and it is subject to friction in all its many forms.

The question that then comes to mind is what objective we must have for operations. We know that Clausewitz singles out two kinds of war, that in which the objective is to vanquish the enemy in order to dictate to him the terms of peace and the other, whose objective is only to capture the borders of a province with an eye to future negotiations. In counterinsurgency, if the first objective seems natural, the second is probably more appropriate, precisely because the objective is to bend the will of those among the population who presume to fight against the government If the objective is to eradicate the insurrection, then it is an impossible objective; it is, however, possible to convince insurgents to consent to an agreement by making them see, little by little, the improbability of success, as Clausewitz recommends.

Thus, the theories of Clausewitz necessarily tend to confine the phenomenon of warfare. This is all the more true as no one more than he highlights the importance of chance, which tends to take warfare out of the hands of those who think they have mastered it.

The Progressive Disappearance of Political Borders of War in Post-Modern Strategy

After Clausewitz and Jomini, in the second half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, total war slowly began to appear in the debate. This process merits description, as it would gradually blend the science of classical strategy with political science; in this regard, France provides an interesting example. In the nineteenth century, when all military thinkers were looking back to the Napoleonic victories, the cult of the 'decisive battle' reigned, which was another way of controlling the phenomenon of warfare by channelling it into a single and brief event. This was especially the obsession of French military writers who were looking to take lessons from their defeat in 1870, but it is also the first idea of generals during the Civil War in the United States. Military strategy then was focused on putting armies in the best possible condition to

deliver the decisive battle, which is to say that it was subordinated to tactics. Over time, this relationship was to reverse.

Among the first to signal this change, the future Marshal Foch observed that it is important that the decisive battle be managed in such a way as to allow the army to exploit it in order to seize an important strategic objective, such as a capital city.[36] In the same era, in France, the idea emerged that in the wars of the future, all means, both military and non-military, must be used in order to achieve victory, and so that this victory be achieved as surely and as rapidly as possible. General Iung first introduced the idea that 'these two situations [peace and war] correspond to the same phenomenon, which is the competition of societies both in peace and in war… In truth, war is but the continuation of the peacetime struggle between nations by other means.'[37] This idea was later developed by Major Mordacq, future chief of George Clémenceau's military cabinet.[38] After 1918, each agrees that the slaughter of the Great War ought to be avoided by a renewed approach to strategy. Thus we see Sir Basil Liddell Hart's idea of an 'indirect approach', which represents the idea of all those wanting to ease or to support strictly military operations by the involvement of the whole society. This tendency would find its most developed expression in the writings of Erich Ludendorff, who wrote after the First World War, which remains the most outstanding example of total war: 'the whole of politics should be made to serve war'.[39]

After the Second World War, the arrival of the communist theory of revolutionary war on the strategic scene as well as the reality of nuclear bombs helped to confound war and politics. On the one hand, the nuclear button became the exclusive prerogative of politicians, and military strategy becomes a permanent component of politics when it does not determine politics. On the other hand, Marxist theorists tended to import the classic theories of strategy into the struggle between social classes within a single nation. General Beaufre's theory of a 'total strategy' is a telling example of this time. According to this concept, strategy 'should aim to conduct violent or insidious conflicts, carried out simultaneously in different realms—political, economic, diplomatic and military—that therefore present a total character'.[40] Raymond Aron sharply criticized this approach: if the concept of strategy implies the use of force or restraining it, then when the 'total strategy' includes all the sectors of national life, 'the permanent recourse to this strategy equates to permanent war that the whole interstate world experiences, in all the phases of its study of war'.[41]

Nowadays this tendency to link strategy to total war continues to determine the evolution of strategic and military thought. The concepts of an 'Effect Based Operation' and the ideas of strategic paralysis developed by writers such as John Warden agree on the necessity of considering the enemy to be a global system that must be made unable to function or, at least, brought to a point where any of its possible military actions would be unable to change current circumstances.[42] The need for a so-called global approach is still present in most of the works that today treat counter-insurrection or, on a larger scale, modern conflicts, such as that of Rupert Smith.[43] This is yet another attempt to master war and to finish it more quickly, as if one did not wish merely to limit it by politics but also to master each of its components.

This conceptual intertwining of military and civilian affairs is closely linked with the difficulty of defining war in modern politics: if war is everywhere, it is nowhere. This

echoes most post-modern writings about strategy: they rarely focus on the best way to achieve victory or strategic success; instead they analyse the evolution of war and debate its gradual vanishing. That is the case for Colin Gray when he analyses the future of war,[44] and Martin van Creveld when he thinks about the transformation of war.[45] Similarly, this is closely related to John Keegan's thoughts and even to Rene Girard's views about the substitution of war for violence.[46] If violence replaces war, it becomes much more difficult to master.

The experience taken from an operation such as that in Afghanistan provides an empirical test for these evolutions of post-modern strategy. First, the importance of the inextricable links of the civilian and military realms ought to be qualified. It is surely necessary to lend all one's weight to the civilian side of reconstruction and in order to help impoverished populations. But it is no less important carefully to isolate the civilian and military fields of action. The use of force should be confined to brief periods of time and to a limited space. Above all, we must aim to promote the clearest division possible within Afghan society between those who fight and those who do not fight. This is a daily challenge, but one whose solution may be found in limiting the opportunities for armed engagements to situations that allow for the above distinction. For example, it is often possible to offer combat only in uninhabited zones where every individual present is reckoned a combatant. Today as in ancient Rome, the god Mars must step outside the city walls. Therefore, and this is the second point, war, even in micro-conflicts, unveils one of the important aspects of its true nature: the difficult attempt to regulate violence and to avoid its generalization.

Conclusion

The brief historical overview above shows that the most enduring strategic ideas are those that allow for the limitation of the hazards of war as well as the hazards in war. The ancient masters' search for security, the awareness of the need to master chance in the modern era, Clausewitz's political conceptualization of war, and the attempts to mix warfare with a social approach to conflict are all inspired by the above pre-occupations. And when the theories have shown themselves to be dangerous, this is often because the elementary lessons of the great masters have been forgotten. At all events, this is what is suggested by the experience of counterinsurgency warfare in Afghanistan, which, at the end of the day, is a conflict governed by the laws of classical strategy, much more than by more modern sophisticated theories of counterinsurgency.

Notes

1. Clausewitz, 1984: 137–40.
2. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 2002: 208.

3. Coutau-Bégarie, 2002: 72.
4. Sun Tzu, 1993: 23.
5. Ibid. 24.
6. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, I, 143, 5.
7. Ibid.
8. Frontin, 1999: 236.
9. Végèce, 1948: 121.
10. Ibid. 123.
11. Sun Tzu, 1993: 66.
12. Frontin, 1999: 235. The *dolabrum* was a tool with two sides, which could serve at the same time as an axe and as a pick, a symbol of the Roman method that alternated combat with the construction of routes and of camps.
13. Ibid. 27.
14. Ibid. 38.
15. Ibid. 39.
16. Frontin, 1999: 60.
17. Ibid. 28.
18. Thucydides, I, 144.
19. Ibid.
20. Sun Tzu, 1993: 45.
21. Ibid. 28.
22. Machiavel, 2001: 282.
23. Ibid. 176.
24. Ibid. 177.
25. Machiavel, 2004: 282.
26. Saxe, 2002: 223.
27. Ibid.
28. Clausewitz, 1984: 89.
29. Ibid. 610.
30. Jomini, 1994: 156.
31. Clausewitz, 1984: 95.
32. Ibid. 99.
33. Ibid. 97.
34. Ibid. 246.
35. Ibid. 99.
36. Foch, 2000: 17–18.
37. Iung, 1890: 281.
38. Mordacq, 1912.
39. Ludendorff, 1922: 6.
40. Beaufre, 1999: 182.
41. Aron, 1976: 260.
42. As expressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Batschelet, 2002: 36.
43. Smith, 2006: 448.
44. Gray, 2006.
45. Van Creveld, 1991.
46. Keegan, 2004; Girard, 2007.

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CHAPTER 10

THE STRATEGIC OBJECT OF WAR

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Introduction and Programme

'With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad' states the European Union's Security Strategy of December 2003 (EU Council of Ministers 2003). It is a passage much quoted to show that (even) the EU can be enlightened and up-to-date in its strategic thinking. But what is the *last* line and the ultimate, strategic purpose of Western defence efforts today? What are we fighting to protect or to promote; against whom; and who is actually doing the fighting and with what tools? The answers will show that in the discourse of the developed West at least, ideas of military 'defence' have now been stretched well beyond the basic idea of maintaining the physical integrity, independence, and viability of a political unit. The language of 'security', simultaneously, has been widened out to cover many dimensions of collective and personal existence, most of which could still involve using military assets but in other modes than traditional war (Buzan Waever, and de Wilde, 1998; Croft, 2008; Collins, 2010). And while these new approaches may not yet inform the *thinking* of states facing more traditional threats in other regions, the concepts involved do have power to explain almost every variant of twenty-first-century security *behaviour*.

To untangle this complex set of changes, the chapter addresses the purpose of contemporary defence and security efforts by exploring the three questions already asked—the thing to be defended, the antagonist(s), and the specific field(s) of action and actor(s) involved. It ends with brief speculations on what this evolution might mean for the whole world strategic scene.

Territorial and Non-Territorial Defence

Defence of the homeland is a strong, simple, and universal motive for fighting. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, acknowledging the universal right of self-defence, is most straightforwardly read as referring to it. However, it does not follow that this has always been the default model and that anything more complex is a modern artefact. Many ancient and modern empires made their main military efforts at or beyond their peripheries, to conquer and then protect lands and peoples remote from the metropolis. Equally traditional—in all regions—are uses of force to defend lines of supply and access, to protect citizens and assets when away from home, or to defend/enforce a religious belief or other ideology that might be only distantly or not at all related to the preservation of terrain.

Indeed, the heyday of the modern nation-state—in the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century northern hemisphere—might be seen as just a temporary swing towards more literally 'national' defence. The trench warfare of the First World War, and the blitzkrieg or the island-by-island naval battles of the Second World War, typify an idea of supremacy based on possessing territory and (for the Axis powers) determining which races should live upon it. While the subsequent East-West Cold War shifted the level of competition from the single state to the bloc, its battle-fronts both within Europe and in proxy wars elsewhere followed a comparable logic where a grip on any given territory meant the right to decide which worldview would steer its governance—much like the 'cuius regio, eius religio' principle of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. This age also saw the elevation of nuclear weapons, a kind of *ne plus ultra* in terms of what lengths a nation might go to for the sake of keeping its territory intact, and/or annihilating an enemy's.

From the mid-twentieth to the twenty-first century, at least four counter-trends have tempered the role of the nation-state as the basic unit, object, and agent of defence, and also challenged the notion that war happens between comparable actors for comparable (including territorial) prizes.

1. First comes the creation of unprecedentedly tight and would-be permanent *multinational groupings* for like-minded states: the strongest models being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with its mutual defence guarantees, and the European Union (EU) with its creation of a single multi-state territory for trade, movement, and other purposes (Bailes and Cottey, 2006). These offer the nation-state 'safety in numbers' in the relevant dimensions of security, but also oblige it to add to its national aims the defence of allies (NATO) and collective non-military security policies (EU).[1] After the end of the Cold War when their Eastern counterparts—the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO, Warsaw Pact) and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also COMECON)—collapsed, NATO and the EU have expanded to cover twenty-eight and twenty-seven states respectively[2] and are likely to continue at least as

far as most or all of the Western Balkans. This creates a historically unique situation throughout Europe where both the goal, and the *principles and manner*, of defence are defined at collective level—thereby also making war *within* the groupings virtually impossible; yet the huge majority of *means* of defence remain under national control, highlighting the transitional nature of the regime and explaining many of its tensions.

2. Paralleling new, more-than-national commitments at state level is the vaguer but still influential stretching of notions of civil *society* or individual i*dentity* beyond the confines of national borders or formal citizenship. Again the EU provides the most novel development with the notion of an 'EU citizenship', which is far from implying common military service but does require common efforts to protect all EU nationals in consular emergencies abroad. Overseas protection of citizens is an ancient concept but the new popular mobility, and real-time movement of information, in a globalizing world gives it hugely extended scope and urgency. The same changes offer new reasons for states to concern themselves with linked ethnic groups beyond their frontiers, including long-range migrants who affect national security negatively (planning terrorism or regime change from afar) or positively (sustaining the national budget with their remittances).

3. As for the meaning of the 'enemy' and of 'threat', it would again be wrong to suggest that the past limited it to fellow nations (or empires). Violent suppression of internal insurgencies is age-old, as are sabotage, assassination, piracy, and other dangers posed by non-state actors. Nevertheless the post-Cold War period has seen a rapid switch of strategic attention, by Western powers in particular, towards the 'asymmetric' threats (Thornton, 2006) from international terrorism and illicit spread of mass destruction techniques—both *transnational* phenomena par excellence—plus 'rogue' states that are seen as threatening Western homelands existentially even when small and remote. (In the Cold War, the USA might have worried about a nuclear Iran attacking its own regional allies or proxies; now it presents the Tehran regime as a threat to itself.) Following the massive terrorist attacks of September 2001 on US territory, the Administration of George W. Bush developed—and published in its National Security Strategy of September 2002 (White House, 2002)—a doctrine of extended self-defence that allowed such enemies to be attacked not merely in their own homes but 'pre-emptively' on the presumption of a threat. NATO has gone some way in the same direction by stating its duty and readiness to take action worldwide 'to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come' (NATO, 2002), and has used collective force accordingly in Afghanistan if not in Iraq (following invasions of those countries by US-led coalitions). Such new doctrines could also provide a new prima facie rationale for wars in defence of vital supplies, communications, or non-sovereign assets abroad—as hinted by the naval operations launched by NATO and the EU against Somali pirates in 2009.

4. Fourth and last, a parallel movement of liberal-internationalist thought has identified *humanitarian* grounds for military action in support of universal rights and values, or of global 'order', even when no territorial transgression may be involved. Genocide is commonly seen as the strongest possible trigger for such action, but typically occurs within a nation. The UN Security Council has always had the power to

authorize 'enforcement' actions beyond traditional peacekeeping and has made more use of it since the early 1990s; but the novelty of the new concept lies in allowing the criterion of serious damage to 'international peace and security' to be met even when all victims are non-state and borders stay intact.[3] This idea of a collective 'responsibility to protect' achieved its first global recognition in the document adopted by the UN's fiftieth-anniversary summit of September 2005.[4]

As all these four trends have developed side by side—and overlapped not a little—a typical developed state today will have a 'mental map' of potential triggers for/objects of defence operations similar to that sketched in Figure 10.1. Elements marked with an asterisk depend on membership of specific institutions or defence pacts. Deliberately left out are 'traditional' peace operations without coercive force, and other uses of military assets, e.g. for training, assistance, verification, and disarmament, that are largely consensual—even if undertaken partly for a national interest. In terms of this book's theme, the word 'war' could be used at least loosely and journalistically of any kinetic action undertaken within the chart, but not outside it.

Of course, in most regions today and even within the West there are states that retain a narrower and more basic view of what defence is about. NATO's switch of focus to external 'operations of choice' has been swallowed reluctantly by many members on its northern and eastern peripheries who see their security still challenged by Russian rearmament and unpredictability. In southern Europe, meanwhile, the public may see more obvious roles for armed forces in helping with non-warlike but concrete threats like large-scale crime, home-bred terrorists, mass immigration, or natural disasters (on which more in the next section). The US authorities faced criticism for mishandling a destructive hurricane (Katrina) in 2005, with the cream of their regular forces and many of the National Guard absent in Iraq. Even without the growing doubts throughout the West about the legality and legitimacy of new uses of force, such counter-trends help to



Figure 10.1 An extended model of 'defence' for the twenty-first century

explain why NATO in 2009, its sixtieth-anniversary year, started to seek a rebalancing between its traditional and its global defence duties and to pay greater attention to the needs of stability (including some modern version of détente with Russia) on its own home ground.[5]

Other twenty-first-century trends like global warming and rising food prices, followed by land hunger and mass migration, as well as the opening of the Arctic regions to commercial exploitation, could yet refocus strategic thinking more generally on the possession or control of land. It is a focus from which the other great modern powers, such as Russia, China, and India, let alone warring neighbours in other regions, have never really departed. The difference of course is that EU/NATO members will, or at least should, be thinking about the safety of their *collective* territory and populations, in a way that distinguishes them from old(er) empires as well as free-standing nations.

Defence Against Whom or What?

It has been already been stressed that the nineteenth- and twentieth-century model of inter-state conflict for lands and resources, which also inspired the dominant realist theory of international relations, was not the norm throughout earlier history. A balance-sheet of armed violence worldwide over the last two millennia would show a massive contribution by what we now call 'non-state actors'—rebel movements, traders fighting among themselves or as proxies for states, and 'mercenary' soldiers working for both state and non-state masters.

If the non-state challenge has leapt back into focus at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this can be put down mainly to three developments:

- the shift in overall frequency of major *armed conflict* worldwide to consist almost exclusively of intra-state conflicts,[6] thus focusing attention on the agents of violence who typify such conflicts, and on the indirect as well as direct damage they cause for people, states, and global security. The 'new wars' thesis of Mary Kaldor and others captures these challenges well, even if hardly any of them are really 'new' (Kaldor, 2006);
- the perceived *vulnerability* of the USA and other *'strong' states* to non-state opponents exploiting new technologies and 'transnational' modes of recruitment, procurement, and operation. In the northern hemisphere, where armed conflict is rare and mostly ring-fenced, such human threats stand out by arising in 'peacetime' and subverting an expected 'order'. In forms such as terrorism, international crime, smuggling, people-trafficking, money laundering, and illegal trading in destructive technologies, they may thus be treated as challenges for civil law and order, *and/or* for national defence;
- the effects of *globalization* in enhancing the relative power of all types of non-state or trans-state actors, from multinational corporations through to violent extremists. Globalized conditions help non-state antagonists to access and attack both

> state and non-state targets, in virtual as well as physical space, both on home territory and abroad (Coker, 2004). This dark side of globalization is almost inextricable from the productive side: the risk comes as much from states' and societies' growing dependence on worldwide economic partnerships and communication lines, as from the ability of hostiles to exploit global reach and mobility.

The concerns bred of these three trends in combination have driven the major developments of recent years in combat and conflict, and led to what are now (as of 2010) seen as some of the most fateful miscalculations. To retell the story in state and non-state terms: having suffered massive attack in September 2001 by non-state actors (Al Qaeda terrorists) pursuing a global millenarianist agenda, the US state mobilized a wide range of other states (including Russia and China) to collaborate in law-and-order-type, essentially 'civil' responses such as improvements in transport safety, stricter travel controls, and export controls, as well as information exchange. By developing regulations in related fields that changed some of the basics of business practice,[7] it also co-opted legitimate non-state actors to help. It went on, however, to use military force against Al Qaeda's Taliban allies in Afghanistan, and against a regime in Iraq that was seen as posing an analogous danger through its alleged (though now seen as unproved and improbable) possession of WMD and support for terrorism. The result was to start new armed conflicts that rapidly shifted to 'intra-state' mode and gave new opportunities of mischief to non-state actors of all kinds, from 'pure' terrorist networks to internal combatants using terrorist methods, through private military contractors, and down to smugglers and antiquity thieves. The USA itself escaped further terrorist attack on its own soil during this period, but lost many troops to terror weapons in combat theatres and exposed itself to major military burdens and costs from which—especially in Afghanistan—there is up to now no clear and satisfactory exit.

The same story can be told in terms of the rise and fall of the concept of a 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT), as defined by the US Administration of George W. Bush in late 2001. Critics argued from the start that extending the language and methods of 'war' to such a new type of adversary was misguided. The opponent could not be physically localized or even clearly identified, and was not likely to be easily stopped through physical losses. It was liable to fight back with its original 'asymmetric' tactics, which undercut a large military power's normal advantages; while its contempt for 'rules of war' would tempt the USA also to bend or circumvent those rules with serious longer-term consequences.[8] Finally, such enemies were not likely or probably able to offer lasting closure through a formal surrender or peace.[9] All these theoretical concerns have been proved only too real in the violent laboratories of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The overall lesson seems to be that the more a threat diverges from the typical features of attack by a Westphalian state, the less likely it is that the supreme weapons of defence by such a state—i.e. military assets designed originally for seizing land—will be the right ones to counter it. It is arguable that at least some US decision-makers chose Iraq as a second target for invasion, not just for historical and/or economic (oil) motives, but because it gave a chance to 'dress a non-state threat in state clothing' and find a target lending itself to traditional attack. If so, the results showed not only how easily military

action can 'win the war but lose the peace'—a truism applying equally to altruistic interventions—but also that destroying the state element in a suspected state/non-state conspiracy gives the non-state actors more space, not less, to play their deadly game.

If the last decade has tried to force some new threats into old moulds, it has also, however, witnessed a growing understanding that the total range of today's defence and security challenges is much wider. Both rich and poor societies face many hazards beyond hostile human action, ranging from man-made accidents, through natural hazards (one-off disasters, longer-term climate change, diseases of humans, animals, and crops), to risks of breakdown in essential supplies and services. The latter include infrastructure malfunction, shortage/breakdown/denial of energy supplies, interruption of other basic resources, and withdrawal of critical services and utilities (fuel, water, food, etc.). Somewhere in the same spectrum come social unrest and disorder outside an 'armed conflict' context—riots, industrial unrest, low-level intra-social violence including ethnic and religious enmities, brigandry, kidnapping, and general lawlessness.

It is not rare to find such challenges also described in the language of war, defence, enmity, and threat. Aside from the recent 'war on terror', there has long been talk of a war on want or poverty, on drugs or crime, against certain diseases, and so forth. Public policy seeks to 'defend' against floods or epidemics, and a 'strategy' may be adopted by a nation, institution, corporation, or NGO to deal with any and all such hazards (Bailes, 2009). For theoretical and executive purposes, of course, it remains important to distinguish such 'soft' or 'non-military' dimensions of security from traditional defence, and one way to do it is to separate (concrete, adversarial) 'threats' from contingent 'risks' stemming largely from humanity's own choices and dependencies (Bailes, 2007). Another is to trace a full spectrum of challenges from the warlike to the 'softest' end, as a starting point for distinguishing but also prioritizing and seeing connections between the different dimensions. Each political community may make its own judgements on exactly what to characterize as a security issue; on what are its most existential challenges within that agenda; and on what, by contrast, is best handled by making least fuss about it.[10] Issues can be added to the security programme either by top-down or bottom-up process, and for manipulative as well as objective reasons—e.g. if rulers exaggerate a threat to justify stronger discipline over their people, or people inflate the importance of the latest and most obvious disaster.

The next section relates these broader definitions of 'security' to the nature of key actors, as well as objects, of defence in the twenty-first century. Before closing here, however, some of the special challenges imposed by a multifunctional threat/risk analysis may be noted:

1. A nation or organization that defines multiple dimensions as crucial for defence and security may have to set new *relative priorities* among them that affect the *application of resources*. After the Cold War most European states, including the Russian Federation, signalled such a judgement by reducing their military budgets sharply.[11] Conversely, a weak post-conflict state may need actually to spend more on defence to reclaim a central monopoly of force and the ability to protect its borders.[12] Military spending—above all, on equipment—is however notoriously inelastic and prone to non-rational influences, so that the pattern of resource investment can be driven more by available tools than underlying needs and, especially, may sell short the non-military sectors.

2. At the same time, an entity's military defence and other factors of its security and welfare are *co-dependent*. Without military control of its territory a state is hampered in confronting other threats and risks, and when hit by them becomes a tempting target for attackers. Conversely, good armed forces are hard to build in an environment of poverty, bad health, social divisions, lawlessness, and pollution. (Both points combine in 'weak states' like Somalia or the Congo.) This means resources cannot be too hastily or radically swung from one field of public responsibility to the other.

3. Thirdly, wars can be fought *because of resource problems* of all kinds, and in some cases *with* strategic resources (e.g. the 'energy weapon' wielded in modern times by both Arab and Russian suppliers). Experts are now debating how far environmental processes, likely to be aggravated by climate change, can be seen as triggers for war (Brzoska, 2009). At all accounts, a non-military emergency or dispute in these or other fields—including population pressures and movements—*could* in principle always be dealt with by non-warlike means; and one of this century's top challenges is precisely to find such non-violent solutions for potentially multiplying problems.

4. Fourthly, military forces and assets can be used to *support the civilian authorities* in dealing with security problems of non-military origin, from natural disasters to riots, within their own states and internationally. In some nations this internal function has become a major and explicit task for the military.[13] Foreign forces have also frequently delivered humanitarian aid in recent decades, though most analysts would like this to be more the exception than the rule (Ahmad et al., 2008).

5. Finally, given such a wide range of security tasks and the possibility to combine civil and military tools for almost any of them, *coordination* across the whole spectrum becomes absolutely crucial. Priorities and inter-linkages must be established at the level of doctrine and macro-planning, possibly in a national security strategy (Bailes, 2009). Mechanisms are needed to handle linkages between the different fields in 'peacetime', and to react coherently in emergencies—whether caused by hostile action or not. Such multi-sectoral planning is also found in classic military warfare, as seen in the notion of a government's 'war powers' and practices like requisition and rationing, or the fear of sabotage. Where modern practice has evolved is in grasping that similar comprehensive approaches, central powers, and possible suspensions of normal governance are *also* needed for 'natural' and accidental crises; and—in many developed states—in gradually shifting 'preparedness' efforts away from warlike contingencies towards such 'civil' emergencies (Habegger, 2008).

What is Defended and by Whom?

When land is no longer simply cognate with power and a wider range of national assets and attributes are understood to be at risk, not just the motives and contexts for war but the notion of *who and what is being defended* can vary across a wider spectrum. Literal territoriality has in practice always been tempered by the idea of a 'nation' (or empire) as

a human construct with a history, culture, and values that provide part of its *raison d'être*, and with multiple sources of strength including influence and assets abroad. Modern concepts that seek to systematize such non-state, non-territorial goals for defence include:

- the idea of 'human security', which posits that the starting point for good security is the survival, welfare, and freedom to develop of the individual, rather than the state (Hampson, 2008). For weaker countries and their conflicts, this analysis stresses the importance of non-military hazards to life such as hunger, poverty, and disease. Its prescriptions however include respect for human rights and freedoms, which could be no less at risk in richer nations *inter alia* from the state's own excesses;
- the notion of 'societal security', developed especially in Germany and Northern Europe, which covers a similar range of issues though with armed conflict playing less and terrorism more of a role. It starts from the assumption of an already functioning society and aims *inter alia* to draw upon private actors' own security-building and emergency response capacities. Since 'society' does not necessarily stop at the physical bounds of a state, some thinkers have advocated applying it across the whole EU space (Boin et al., 2008);
- concepts that might be called 'group' security, dealing e.g. with the rights of territorial and non-territorial ethnic minorities and confessional groups, or 'gender security'. While these approaches may highlight 'positive' rights of representation, self-expression, and so forth, they share a basic concern for the physical protection of their objects that implies a further subset of security duties for the modern state.

These concepts focus first and foremost on states' duties towards their own and others' citizens. Just as with traditional defence, governments and their agents may pursue them by using military and/or non-military tools, acting alone and/or with international partners. Generally, however, these new agendas tend to emphasize the need for transnational solutions: first because the risk factors concerned cut across national borders, and second because the very notion of putting humans first calls for actions that do likewise. Advocates of 'human' security have, indeed, spent much effort on making the case—e.g. to the EU—for humanitarian operations abroad (EU Council of Ministers, 2004).

The other possibility underlined by such ideas is that humans, societies, and groups can become subjects as well as objects of defence. While some non-state actors (terrorists, pirates) aggravate security problems, the growing breadth and immediacy of the demands this places on the modern state should in principle be possible to tackle by devolving part of the job back onto citizens themselves. It is generally thought undesirable for every man to be his own soldier but there is no such objection to every man or woman helping with first-aid, holding sensible emergency supplies, virus-proofing home computers, or indeed pointing out suspected bombs. Again, when privately-owned resources, utilities, and services are threatened, it makes sense to encourage companies to do their own 'business continuation' planning and to provide as much self-help, mutual help, and social support as possible in actual emergencies.

This is a different matter from the delegating/outsourcing of traditional military (or police) functions to commercial companies—a growing phenomenon in the Anglo-Saxon world that is often, though inexactly, called the 'privatization of defense' (Bailes, 2008; Bailes and Holmqvist, 2008). Developed states typically use such providers under contract for a set purpose and duration, without 'privatizing' the underlying responsibility or transferring official property. This is more like a government leasing a piece of defence equipment, instead of making it itself or buying it outright. The reasons why it has become a more common and large-scale practice in the West lately are best seen as a combination of overstretch for militarily active states with the fashion for exploring new public-private partnerships in the non-defence sector. There are of course costs to pay, not just in frequently exaggerated prices, but also the problem of avoiding abuses by contract personnel—from excessive violence to blatant profiteering—and enforcing justice when they do offend. In weaker and poorer states, private military companies can mutate into just one more variety of destructive non-state actor when they work against the recognized government, for over-ruthless private companies, or for governments too weak to control them.

Lately, misconduct by some private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has contributed to a backwash of opinion against over-reliance on them; just as incidents in the civil sector have led governments to claw back direct control of certain key services or at least strengthen regulation and monitoring. This is timely, for if private service suppliers are going to remain a feature of modern security governance they need to be made more easily governable.[14] It would be a wrong, however, to let mishaps in this field of public-private burden-sharing discourage the building of broader partnerships between the state, private business, and society for defence and security purposes. The arguments for them are cogent at at least three levels:

1. *Conceptual:* threats that include hostile non-state and trans-state actors must be countered both deep within the state and across a multi-state space, demanding as a minimum the involvement and compliance of multiple non-governmental actors. It makes more sense for the state (or responsible institution) to seek *active* support and partnership from commercial, societal, non-governmental, media, and other relevant players than to herd them like sheep or impose new rules on them from a distance.

2. *Practical:* successful delegation and outsourcing saves the state energy, perhaps money, and reduces the risk of the public sector growing too large for economic efficiency. Fostering competence at grass-roots level promotes faster reaction when a problem starts or is first noticed locally. 'Subsidiarity' also applies here: businesses are likely to find the best answers to intra-business threats (e.g. cyberattacks), local populations are best attuned to local emergencies, etc.

3. *Ethical:* whether one stresses the responsibility of the individual to help protect other humans, or the need to protect human freedoms and dignity against over-harsh state security measures, empowering individuals and groups—within the bounds of law—to contribute to their own security in both preventive and reactive mode offers one of the best guarantees against an atomized, hyper-vulnerable, and repressed social community.

In principle, the ideal model for tackling today's functionally and geographically extended security challenges—both within the state, and internationally—is a triangular relationship between the state, the private business sector, and society or 'the people'. Each point of the triangle depends in diverse ways on the two others even as it supports them, in the context of traditional military operations just as much as when tackling new opponents and new hazards.[15] Recent experience suggests that if one of the three players commits a serious abuse, the other two combined will have enough weight to check it and—sooner or later—often do so.[16]

Ways Ahead

The analysis in this chapter can at best only support future scenarios for the parts of the world where its premises on the changed notions of war and defence apply to some degree. Most of today's actual wars (= internal conflicts) do not take place in these parts, but in regions where human actions and ideas reflect an earlier, more purely 'Westphalian' or even pre-modern approach to preserving oneself and one's territory and winning advantages over others. The fact that the great powers of the northern hemisphere have all—even Russia to some extent—moved on from this pattern offers the best hope that Cold War-type global hostilities can be avoided and that specific military excesses committed in any quarter need not trigger escalation. The coexistence of different understandings also means, however, that the more 'advanced' players may belittle and neglect the problems of those living in another reality or, when they do intervene, will damagingly misunderstand who they are dealing with and what they have got into.

As the first post-Cold War euphoria faded, it became fashionable to warn against 'renationalization' in Western states' strategic behaviour. A decade later, fears of a 'new disorder' were aroused by the George W. Bush Administration's taste for unilateral actions or non-institutionalized coalitions. As of 2010—and not just because the USA has a President called Obama—such fears have lost some of their sting. It is partly that the economic crash has reinforced a US shift towards caution in the near term, and partly that it has exposed the long-term shift of strategic initiative towards a China that seems to prefer not to get its way by military action (as distinct from deterrence, flag-waving, and occasional bullying). Where US and French thinkers squabbled in the early 2000s over 'multipolarity' as nightmare or ideal, the end of the decade may be showing a glimpse of a multipolar world that works. It could be, historically, more than a coincidence that President Obama has revived the vision of trying to run this world in the reasonably near future without the crude mutual restraint of nuclear weapons—or perhaps, more realistically, with the big powers minimizing theirs to facilitate a common front in containing the smaller nuclear addicts.

Against this background, the limited penetration of the new ideas on war and defence discussed here is not a reason to decry their importance. Climate change, energy hunger, crippling epidemics, and changing patterns of population, production, trade, and

transport will place further extreme strains on the global security order in coming decades. That some of the actors (not just states) who are hardest hit, or are most tempted by windfall advantages, will resort to old-fashioned armed violence within or beyond their own borders can hardly be doubted. As argued above ('Territorial and non-territorial defence'), the most advanced societies are likely to rediscover in the process that older strategic verities like the importance of controlling land and its resources still apply to them too. It will matter a great deal whether, in such a world, the states and organizations with greatest power to intervene are driven (again) by an extended notion of security vulnerability and defence responsibility to use warlike means on their own account; or whether mounting evidence of the non-military determinants of survival and welfare—and the genuinely common plight of mankind in facing most of them—will conduce to self-restraint, a preference for non-warlike tools, and the reserving of military capacity for more benign and constructive tasks. In the latter case the world would still know many wars, but never again a world one.

Notes

1. For countries in the EU's Schengen scheme these include the collectivization of *border* management, one of the main objects of traditional defence; while all EU members have made a 'solidarity' pledge (now incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty) to come to each other's aid against terrorist attack or major natural disasters.
2. Correct at end-2010.
3. See chapters 7 and 8.
4. The key language in paragraph 139 of the September 2005 UN Summit outcome (UN, 2005) authorizes 'collective action . . . through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity'.
5. The NATO Summit declaration on Alliance Security of April 2009 (NATO, 2009) states 'We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face *that impact directly on Alliance territory*, emerge at strategic distance *or close to home*' (author's italics). The Summit commissioned a new Strategic Concept for NATO, designed *inter alia* to re-examine the balance between the alliance's local/global roles and 'harder'/'softer' sides.
6. For conflict data see the University of Uppsala database at www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ (accessed 25 April 2011).
7. E.g. UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which set worldwide norms on terrorist financing and private-sector WMD transactions respectively, and new regulations adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on port, harbour, and container security.
8. See chapters 7 and 8.
9. See chapter 13.
10. This perception of a partly subjective 'securitization' process has been developed par excellence by Ole Waever, whose research profile and latest works are at http://cast.ku.dk/people/researchers/ow/ (accessed 25 April 2011).
11. For a military expenditure database, see http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/milex (accessed 25 April 2011).

12. Such rebuilding is part of Security Sector Reform as documented at the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, http://www.dcaf.ch (accessed 25 April 2011).
13. In Denmark since 2002 it is one of the army's two *primary* tasks, the other being peace missions abroad.
14. Among manifold initiatives to this end, the 'Montreux Document' of 2008 (see http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc accessed 25 April 2011) has won support from many Western states.
15. Similarly, modern peace-building efforts find NGOs/charities and business investors working alongside state-led troops, while reconstruction includes the revival of legitimate local business and positive social engagement.
16. Government and people may both seek to bridle violent and corrupt private military companies; US business joined libertarian NGOs in opposing over-strict US visa and entry regulations after 9/11.

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CHAPTER 11

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND WAR

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Deterrence is as old as war, and war itself seems to have been a constant feature of human behaviour since the origins of evolution of primates into men. Prof. Azar Gat, in *War in Human Civilisation*, describes war as one of the main activities of hunter-gatherers having—which makes it all the more mysterious—no substantial possessions to defend.[1] Deterrence, i.e. the action of convincing actual or potential adversaries not to attack one because they would incur damage that would be greater than the benefits they could hope to reap from such attack, has always been a fundamental aspect of war. Thomas Schelling defines it as 'a threat . . . intended to keep an adversary from doing something'.[2] Michael Quinlan, in a concise formula which encompasses its multiple dimensions, writes that '[d]eterrence is a concept for operating upon the thinking of others'.[3]

The Historical Legacy of Nuclear Deterrence

The advent of nuclear weapons changed the very *nature* of deterrence. The power of these weapons, their short- and longer-term effects, led strategists to consider deterrence in an entirely new light: 'Thus far', wrote Bernard Brodie, 'the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.'[4] Herman Kahn, in an early RAND Paper, expressed a similar opinion.[5] Although one may take issue with it, it has become—at least in Western democracies—accepted and widely shared. Besides, the debate has been raging now for sixty-five years about the morality of nuclear deterrence and of avoiding major war

at a price that seems to some too high or based on inherently immoral threats.[6] The ethics (or lack thereof) of nuclear deterrence, which would warrant a study of their own, will not be discussed here. It should be kept in mind, however, that the discussion of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and war cannot but take as its basis the fact that nuclear deterrence has prevented major war for more than a half-century, and that this success alone influences the analysis of the future relevance of nuclear deterrence.[7]

In this respect, three important lessons can be derived from the history of Europe and Asia in the twentieth century.

The first is that so-called 'conventional' war is a terrible reality. Conventional wars waged between 1914 and 1945 caused eighty million deaths.[8] Even what are now called 'low-intensity wars'—Iraq and Afghanistan are a good case in point—can result in the death of hundreds of thousands of people.

The second is that major conventional war, or direct conventional war between major powers, is in and of itself one of the surest routes to nuclear war. The scenarios according to which a nuclear war could be triggered 'by accident' are wholly implausible: nuclear weapons are the category of weapons that is both best protected and best controlled.[9] However, the escalation from conventional to nuclear always is a possibility, especially if, in the course of a hitherto conventional war, (i) the conventional forces of a nuclear-armed state were about to be overwhelmed; or (ii) the regime governing such a state considered that its survival were at stake; or (iii) one of the combatants made a wrong evaluation of the other's/others' objectives or determination.[10]

The third is that, short of war itself, intimidation and blackmail supported, explicitly or not, by military means have been repeatedly used during the twentieth century by states aiming at challenging the existing international order either as substitutes for war or, more often, as preparation to it. More recently, it could be argued that the policy of Russia towards its 'near abroad'[11] or of Iran towards the Gulf countries[12] is nothing more than the repeat of this age-old tactic. In effect, 'Iran seeks to become the indispensable power, without which no regional policy can be implemented,' and 'the indisputable regional power without which no regional issue of importance can be addressed', whereas the United States and their allies are both pursuing a policy of 'access and denial: access to the region's oil supplies and denial of the region and its resources to a hostile power',[13] with all the resulting consequences in terms of security guarantees and military commitments.

Can nuclear deterrence as we know it, based on the Cold War experience, function in the age of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation and mass-casualty terrorism and prevent major war? What role can it play in diplomacy and war against state and non-state adversaries whose rationality may perhaps be more remote from that of the West than the Soviet Union's was?[14] In other words, is there a chance that nuclear deterrence will remain effective and relevant in the twenty-first century? How will it work in connection with conventional power and ballistic missile defence technology? In summary, is nuclear deterrence, as instrument of the prevention of major war (conventional or nuclear) still a valid and relevant paradigm?

The Continued Relevance of Nuclear Deterrence: Old Certainties

Commentators and analysts—especially in the United States—have developed at length the view that, in the post-Cold War environment, nuclear weapons have no *deterrence value*; that they have, in fact, little advantage over conventional capabilities, all the more since, for the foreseeable future, the United States enjoys a significant conventional superiority over its potential adversaries.[15]

However, what the Iraq and Afghanistan wars show is that the most powerful armed forces in the world (namely, the US ones) *do not* in fact enjoy such a level of superiority over rather primitively organized and armed enemies. In addition, even if the United States were able to extract itself from the Iraqi quagmire and concentrate solely on Afghanistan, its situation, insofar as military resources are concerned, differs significantly from that of its main Western allies. The United Kingdom and France, to quote but two, see their armed forces stretched thin solely by reason of their commitment to Afghanistan, in addition to their other ones (in the Balkans, Africa, the Gulf, etc.). As a result, nuclear forces and nuclear deterrence may still have a unique role to perform, namely, as has been the case in the past, *influence the decision-making of potential aggressors or blackmailers* intent on threatening Western interests in areas of instability or where the stakes of Western defeat would have ripple effects of unknown magnitude.

In such a context, as Keith Payne puts it,

> to assert confidently that . . . nuclear weapons no longer are valuable for deterrence purposes . . . is to claim knowledge about how varied contemporary and future leaders in diverse and often unpredictable circumstances will interpret and respond to the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear threats. . . . Nuclear weapons may be so much more lethal and distinguishable from nonnuclear threats that, on occasion, they can deter an opponent who would not otherwise be susceptible to control. . . . However we might deter or prefer to employ force, the actual behaviour of adversaries on occasion [Payne refers here to the 'implicit' deterrence exercised by the United States vis-à-vis Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War] suggests that there can be a difference between the deterring effects of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. . . . In the future, as in the past, the working of deterrence on such occasions may be extremely important.[16]

He adds:

> In contemporary cases, however, as in the past—if the complex variety of conditions necessary for deterrence to work are present and the challenger is risk- and cost-tolerant—then nuclear deterrence may be uniquely decisive in the challenger's decision-making.[17]

Western nuclear deterrence (involving US and, in a supporting role, British and French nuclear forces) also works by providing 'collective goods' such as what Barry Posen

calls 'the command of the commons' of land, sea, and air space, thereby contributing to guarantee the free flow of people, goods, information, and, more generally, the preservation of an organized and peaceful international society.[18]

Nuclear deterrence, in summary, applies to the protection of *intuitively identifiable stakes* covered by guarantees, both being formulated in a somewhat *ambiguous manner*. As the 2006 British White Paper on *The future of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent* puts it, 'We deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. *We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities*. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of our nuclear weapons' (emphasis in the original text).[19] In other words, apart from protecting what the British call 'supreme national interests'[20] and the French 'vital interests',[21] the main function of nuclear weapons is to allow Western countries which own them to exercise (*de jure*, when an alliance exists, or *de facto*, if it does not) extended deterrence. This is a major role for the US nuclear forces, which provide such extended deterrence to thirty US allies or so, as well as for the British and French nuclear forces, which contribute to the deterrence provided by the US nuclear deterrent. Just as supreme national or vital interests are left carefully undefined by the governments concerned, the conditions triggering nuclear guaranties cannot be too specific in order to avoid circumvention, i.e. the strategy consisting, for an adversary, of never crossing the 'red lines'[22] but finding other ways to reach its objectives.[23] As Keith Payne writes, in a section of his already quoted article which applies to US nuclear deterrence but may as well apply to de facto nuclear deterrence exercised by other Western states, '[T]heir [American commentators'] speculation about US threat credibility, however, ultimately is irrelevant. For deterrence purposes, it is the opponent's belief about US threat credibility that matters'.[24]

Moreover, in the post-Cold War context, *actual or potential enemies must not necessarily be identified* in order for deterrence—as well as extended deterrence—to work. As Michael Quinlan words it, 'in the post-cold war world, a deterrent stance addressed simply "To whom it may concern" may be entirely appropriate'.[25] But it must include a *commitment to use* because, although unspecified as to the circumstances and conditions under which it would materialize, such a commitment is integral to the credibility of deterrence. As former chiefs of staff of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have stated in 2007 in an American publication, 'The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to avoid truly existential dangers.'[26] It can be added that, beyond preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear deterrence can—and should—be used to prevent *any kind* of major war and blackmail supported by military threats (including conventional ones).

Beyond this, it is likely that nuclear deterrence—and nuclear weapons—will continue to play an important political role in a world characterized by *nuclear multipolarity and proliferation* and the progressive shifting of 'areas of strategic focus' to 'East

and South Asia and the Middle East.'[27] Since the fall of the Soviet Union, three nuclear-armed states have emerged—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—and one is suspiciously close to reaching the threshold where it will be considered as a nuclear-armed state—Iran.[28] Others, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Algeria, have ventured into nuclear weapons development, without much success so far, or before giving it up. Besides, nuclear trade, once relatively well-controlled, is diversifying as potential suppliers of nuclear technologies multiply.[29] This makes the world of deterrence more complex and unpredictable, at a time when all nuclear-weapon states under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—with the exception of communist China, the nuclear arsenal of which has been expanding rapidly for the last decade—have considerably reduced their nuclear arsenals (by one-third to three-quarters). This should be taken into account by Western nuclear-weapon states in order to avoid being caught in a 'Nuclear 1914' by reason of the miscalculation of new nuclear-armed states, the culture of deterrence of which would be limited if not non-existent.[30] Without going into details about non-proliferation measures which are outside the scope of this piece, it should be noted that trade and other types of sanctions—whether UN-approved or not; after all, containment of the Soviet Union by NATO was not—can be an element of deterrence if properly and consistently used, without ruling out, if necessary, more extreme measures.

The present world, and even more so that of the coming decades, will also be one of *ballistic missile proliferation*. The failure of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is, combined with nuclear proliferation, a particularly worrying evolution.[31] Combined with nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile proliferation is a potent threat against Western interests and requires to be analysed and confronted: in most cases, nuclear deterrence (if exercised with the proper type of weapons, which poses problems of its own, see below) will remain a potent instrument to prevent aggression and strengthen extended deterrence, without excluding, however, the contribution of ballistic missile defence to the reinforcement of deterrence (see below).

In summary, as former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, co-chairman of the Experts Panel of the Congressional Commission on the strategic posture of the United States, in his statement introducing the study of the strategic posture of the United States, reminded the members of the Panel and of Congress, 'the requirements of Extended Deterrence . . . remain at the heart of the design of the US nuclear posture. Extended Deterrence still remains a major barrier to proliferation.'[32] It is quite possible that, should US extended deterrence weaken—either because its political credibility would be questioned or because its technological and operational credibility would be deemed inadequate—some countries would reconsider their choice to forgo nuclear weapons, with political consequences that could be profoundly destabilizing.[33] This contribution of extended nuclear deterrence to non-proliferation is of particular salience at a time when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes under increased attacks by states intent on using nuclear weapons to pursue regional policies aiming at challenging local equilibria by force or the threat of force.

The Continued Value of Nuclear Deterrence: New Challenges

Nuclear deterrence is however facing two major challenges.

The first is that *nuclear deterrent weapons and systems remain technologically credible*. This condition is especially critical since, as Sir Michael Howard argued in his seminal article 'Reassurance and deterrence: Western defence in the 1980s', in Western democracies nuclear deterrence is as much about credibility (vis-à-vis potential enemies or blackmailers) as it is about reassurance (vis-à-vis the population of the deterrer).[34] It means that the technical and operational characteristics of the nuclear deterrent must provide the political authority in charge of exercising deterrence with an array of options that is sufficiently flexible to make such deterrence credible, i.e. transfer the uncertainty about the political and military calculus of aggression to the blackmailer or aggressor.

In this respect, the technological future of nuclear deterrence is far from being assured. Even in the United States, where simulation has progressed significantly, it would still be a tall order to rely solely on it to manufacture nuclear warheads that would have a technical safety and a level of performance comparable to those of the current generation of weapons, which are aging rapidly. Britain does not have simulation installations (it relies on those of the USA) and France is experiencing significant difficulties with its own.[35] In addition, because of the relative neglect suffered by nuclear establishments during the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, most of the scientists, manufacturers, and engineers who manufactured, tested, and maintained nuclear warheads have gone into retirement without transmitting their craft and *tours de main* to their successors; they are now either very old or dead.[36] Nuclear-weapon building is not mainly about science (except in a few areas such as penetration techniques and decoys); it is about *operating a high-level technical and industrial apparatus*. Technical and industrial credibility is the condition of operational credibility, and therefore of the political credibility of deterrence. In spite of the assurances uttered repeatedly by Western officials, it is still uncertain that this technical and industrial credibility can be assured without nuclear testing: proof is that four out of five of the P5 nuclear-weapon states—France being the exception—have not actually dismantled their nuclear test site(s), contenting themselves with their mothballing, which could be reversed in a matter of months.

This evolution has gone largely unnoticed but is critical to ensure that nuclear deterrence remains credible and relevant in a world characterized by instability and new forms of conflict. It would warrant a separate study of its own, but elements are lacking to conduct an unclassified one, and it is probably best left to specialists within the nuclear establishments of the countries concerned.

In addition, a question remains as to whether the *technical composition of the current nuclear arsenal of Western powers is adapted to the present and foreseeable conditions of exercise of deterrence*. This issue, which has triggered a heated debate in the United States about the modernizing of the nuclear arsenal—the so-called 'Reliable Replacement

Warhead' controversy—also concerns the United Kingdom and France. It can be summarized as follows: are the nuclear weapons currently owned by Western powers apt to deter potential enemies who are risk- and cost-tolerant, in other words prepared to incur a high level of casualties and destruction to achieve their challenging of the international order? Western democracies are averse to 'collateral damage', as the Balkans war proved, and there is therefore a strong political inhibition to use weapons the characteristics of which would result in damages of a vastly superior scale than that required to execute a credible deterrent threat vis-à-vis narrowly defined targets such as, for instance, the sanctuaries where the political and military leadership of a state might take refuge or their nuclear or military installations. In order to place at risk what the leadership of such rogue or authoritarian or vastly populated states value most, i.e. themselves and their military means and power infrastructure, it may be that new nuclear weapons will have to be developed combining a better accuracy, lower yields, and possibly special effects (such as earth penetrators).

Indeed, nuclear weapons having these characteristics would be more easily usable. *It does not mean, however, that they would be more likely to be used*. Quite the contrary: because of their higher possibility of use, they would in fact have a stronger *deterrent* effect, i.e. ultimately, be more stabilizing—to the extent the logic of deterrence applies, and experience has shown that it does.[37]

The second challenge is that *the use of nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes be politically credible*, in other words that a sufficiently solid political consensus prevails about the legitimacy of nuclear use in case of crisis. A problem in this respect is that the *political legitimacy of nuclear deterrence in Western democracies is coming under increasing questioning*, not solely from its traditional adversaries (roughly speaking, the 'peace movement', left-wing parties, 'alternative' organizations, and a few academics) but also from the political establishment itself. President Obama's speech in Prague on April 5, 2009 stating 'America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons' had been preceded by several proposals of 'wise men' supporting this idea.[38] (Mr Obama had been careful to state that the elimination of nuclear weapons 'might not happen in [his] lifetime'.[39]) Among Western powers, France appears as the 'odd country out', being less shy than the United Kingdom to voice its scepticism about the desirability of the abolition of nuclear weapons, but appears increasingly isolated.[40] Since then, it appears that the Nuclear Posture Review going on in the United States has undergone numerous travails and sometimes ferocious bureaucratic battles;[41] similarly, the British Defence Review scheduled to take place after the 2010 general election is likely to include a nuclear component.[42] As for NATO, the new Strategic Concept painfully put together may include a nuclear component, but its shape and substance are still unknown and the reticence of some member states—Germany more specifically—to accept the continued stationing of US nuclear weapons on their soil may lead to a situation where nuclear deterrence is for NATO less a 'tie that binds' than a 'burden that separates', with the predictable consequences that might ensue.[43]

Can nuclear deterrents, and therefore nuclear deterrence, be maintained in the face of widespread lack of consensus in Western countries about their legitimacy and use?

Addressing this question probably requires a difficult and at times widely unpopular educational effort directed towards public opinion. The French, who have so far enjoyed a remarkable degree of public consensus over the national *force de dissuasion*, have conducted it relentlessly for fifty years; each of their presidents, beginning with Charles de Gaulle, has taken care to publicly support, explain, and justify the national deterrent and the national nuclear deterrence strategy to the French people. The task is less easy for the British government: first, because of a contradiction between the increasing British dependence on US technology at a time when US relative decrease in power and the robustness of the US nuclear guarantee should strengthen the case for an independent nuclear deterrent; second, because of the cost of foreign military commitments which are creating pressure to reduce the (already minimal) part of the defence budget devoted to the nuclear deterrent.[44]

Education of the public, however, does not cost much and may be one of the most effective ways to bolster the credibility of nuclear deterrence, rather than vapid speeches on the elimination of nuclear weapons which, if taken literally, would in all likelihood not even bring the world back to a pre-nuclear age since it is unlikely that China, India, Pakistan, and several other countries would renounce nuclear weapons. In any event, even if that happened, would the world be safer for Western (in particular European) countries? A world where, to borrow from Bonaparte's formula, God would (again) be on the side of the big battalions might be considerably less friendly and safe for Western countries—including the United States—than the current one. Wishful thinking is hardly compatible with strategic thinking.

Nuclear Deterrence: An Element of Global Deterrence

In summary, as Michael Gerson puts it,

> many of the fundamental deterrence concepts from the Cold War (and the debates that surrounded them) remain relevant today. The core logic and dilemmas of nuclear weapons and deterrence from the Cold War—deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial, counterforce and countervalue targeting, compellence, crisis stability, arms race stability, pre-emption, credibility, and the stability-instability paradox, to name a few—remain important and relevant today. However, while it is a mistake to assume that the logic of deterrence is completely different today from that in the Cold War, it is equally problematic to assume that past deterrence concepts and strategies will work today exactly as they did during the US-Soviet standoff.[45]

In this respect, the relevance and credibility of nuclear deterrence obviously have to be analysed in respect of factors which, although far from new, assume a new salience because of the fast-evolving strategic context.

In order to be effective, deterrence must be proportionate to the stakes of a conflict, raising, as mentioned above, the issue of the *circumvention* of nuclear deterrence. This problem had been debated at length within NATO in the 1960s and resulted in the NATO doctrine evolving from what was called 'massive retaliation'—labelled as unrealistic and ultimately self-defeating because of its lack of credibility by Kissinger and Maxwell Taylor in their 1957 and 1960 books[46]—to 'flexible response', adopted formally during the NATO 4–6 May 1962 summit in Athens,[47] which became NATO official military doctrine after the adoption of document MC 14/3 by the Defence Planning Committee on 12 December 1967.[48] The underlying idea of flexible response was that the burden of escalation should lie on the aggressor;[49] in order to achieve this, NATO had to have conventional forces strong enough to resist a conventional aggression by the Warsaw Pact. Thus the responsibility to escalate to nuclear weapons would bear on the Soviet Union and not on the Alliance, where it would have been in all likelihood difficult to reach a common decision on the use of nuclear weapons—the Americans being wary of the Europeans' intent to trigger a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union even at the price of skipping their conventional 'burden-sharing' obligations, while the Europeans were suspicious of the Americans' desire to limit a nuclear exchange to the European territory (to the extent such a war could be limited).

The situation confronting Western military planners now is very different: the theatres of war are shifting to faraway countries where, in any case, the vital interests *stricto sensu* of the Western powers are not at stake—although this might be debatable with respect to the Gulf.[50] The question then becomes: how to exercise deterrence on theatres of operation where the nature of the threat does not always justify that it be nuclear? Indeed, potential trouble-makers know that, should they engage in military conflict with nuclear powers, they are taking a risk which they had better not underestimate. But the question of the articulation between the conventional and nuclear levels of deterrence remains a problem, even more so probably than during the Cold War. The lesson of recent military operations is that it still indispensable for Western countries to have conventional means strong, diversified, and efficient enough to counter military-supported blackmail (Georgia), political destabilization (Afghanistan, Pakistan), or hypotheses of 'asymmetric' war (Iraq, Afghanistan, Indian Ocean).

On this point, however, the evolution of Western military forces since the end of the Cold War offers a rather depressing picture. Aging and almost entirely devoid—with a few notable exceptions: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, until recently The Netherlands, and France—of the 'spirit of war' that it cultivated for so long,[51] Western society appears almost incapable of preparing to resist any threat or blackmail supported by force, or even of devoting the resources needed to prevent its emergence, and could see a carefully nurtured 'lifestyle' jeopardized by states or non-state actors aiming at challenging the world order. In the Western world, the percentage of national GDP represented by the defence budget is higher than 1 per cent in only the USA, UK, and France, and forecasts, in the United Kingdom as well as in France, appear to be pointing downwards, at a time when the cost of military equipment, of maintenance, and of foreign operations is increasing significantly.[52]

The lesson of the past decade is that *deterrence is global* and that its various components must be maintained, and evolve, in a balanced way: the time is no more when it was possible, for the Europeans, to rely on the US nuclear guarantee (or, for the United Kingdom and France, residually on their own)[53] and to sacrifice their conventional forces to the financing of their welfare state. It is likely that, in the decades to come, Western powers will have to make a massive shift in their budgetary priorities in favour of their military, security, and diplomatic functions at the price of a reduction in entitlements and various non-core state functions which could be privatized. This will mean, as far as defence is concerned, an increase in both nuclear and non-nuclear programmes in order (i) to maintain a technically and operationally credible deterrent (even if reduced in numbers); (ii) to fund anti-ballistic missile defences (see below); and (iii) to maintain and strengthen conventional forces, which will allow Western intervention in theatres of operations remote from those where the United States and its European allies historically planned to intervene. This latter imperative will require a reassessment of conventional procurement programmes and quite possibly a reorganization of the conventional armed forces of the countries concerned.[54]

Nuclear Deterrence and Anti-Missile Defence: Friend or Foe?

More than a quarter of a century after the famous 1983 speech of US President Reagan stating the goal of rendering nuclear weapons 'impotent and obsolete',[55] anti-ballistic missile defence is now an important factor to be taken into account in the development of nuclear deterrence forces: it is both a means to reinforce nuclear deterrence against rogue states that would try to use conventional or chemical ballistic weapons to threaten Western countries (especially European ones) and forces, and a factor that will impact on the structure and the size of their nuclear deterrents, especially those of medium-size nuclear powers such as the United Kingdom and France.

Anti-ballistic missile defence could play a role as a reinforcement of nuclear deterrence, of which it is a complement.[56] The nature of the ballistic missile threat has changed: whereas in the past any Soviet nuclear attack would have involved tens of thousands of warheads, the threat from states such as Iran, North Korea, perhaps one day Syria or Algeria will be, at least for the next fifteen to twenty years, of a few dozens of warheads—although the NASIC *Ballistic and cruise missile threat* study of April 2009 mentions a specific threat, that of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, which could amount to hundred of missiles[57]—against which Israel is already well-advanced in developing defence systems. Countries such as France and the United Kingdom have always made clear that any *nuclear* attack on their soil would trigger an immediate *nuclear* retaliation. As for conventional or chemical warheads, the existence of anti-ballistic missile defences would contribute to what Glen Snyder called 'deterrence by denial' and therefore play a

role of reassurance vis-à-vis the population of Western states while, at the same time, being a relatively effective way of defeating limited attacks by rogue states.[58]

It is, therefore, necessary for NATO to engage in a reflection on how to put together an anti-ballistic missile defence system without, however, substituting missile defence for nuclear deterrence as the main area of burden-sharing between allies. NATO is and will remain a nuclear alliance, if only because the possession of nuclear weapons by three of its members (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) calls for a mechanism of management of the nuclear aspects of common security, not least for the reasons outlined above. This reflection has been going on since 2009 and should result in decisions being taken at the Lisbon Summit in the autumn of 2010. These decisions should address issues of (i) political management of ballistic missile defences, just as the Nuclear Planning Group was created to issue the political guidelines regarding the conditions of use of nuclear weapons by NATO; (ii) command, control, communications, and battle management; and, inevitably, (iii) burden-sharing (through financial or in-kind contributions). These issues are far from trivial; NATO procurement officials, in particular, have already expressed their frustration with the ongoing process of decision,[59] because the industrial stakes pit various American and European industrial actors and national lobbies against each another in a manner reminiscent of past battles which resulted—for instance as far as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) of NATO is concerned—in years of delay and a technical and operational performance much lower than expected.

Anti-ballistic missile defences, however, could also become a problem for Western nuclear-weapon states—especially, but not solely, medium-size ones—should they become available (as they undoubtedly will) to states vis-à-vis which the former might want to resort to deterrence. One remembers that the development by the Soviet Union of an anti-ballistic missile defence system around Moscow (the Gorgon/Gazelle/Galosh system) in the 1970s forced the United Kingdom and France first to develop costly penetration aid systems and, ultimately, to modernize their ballistic missile systems.[60] Today, states like Russia and China are developing anti-ballistic missile systems the efficacy of which is likely to be far superior to that of previous ABM systems: it is therefore likely that, a few years from now at the most, the question will be posed of what to do to guarantee the efficacy of the British and French deterrents. Not only that; the US deterrent could be concerned, too: the decrease of the number of US and Russian warheads and missiles, if the current strategic armament reduction negotiations between the United States and Russia eventually result in further limitations to the strategic nuclear warheads deployed by each country, is likely to increase the impact of any deployment or progress in the field of anti-ballistic missile defences.[61]

In other words, to the complexity of multilateral deterrent relationships—as opposed to the bilateral US–Soviet relationship that prevailed during the Cold War and in which other nuclear countries played only a marginal part—must be added the fact that the deployment of ballistic missile defences by states armed with weapons of mass destruction and intent on challenging the security and economic interests of Western countries at some point may pose new technological and operational risks to all Western nuclear-weapon states, therefore resulting in a devaluing of their extended deterrence

commitments and weakening their regional alliances and partnerships. These risks should be hedged against before they materialize, lest they undermine the deterrent investment made by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Terrorism: Undue Alarmism or Shape of Things to Come?

A common preoccupation among nuclear analysts and commentators—and among governments as well—is that *non-state actors* have acquired a *sophistication* and *means* far beyond those deployed by terrorists in the 1970s. Whether terrorist groups will, in the foreseeable future, gain access to either nuclear weapons or what is referred to as 'dirty bombs' (i.e. explosives mixed with nuclear waste or radioactive sources) is unclear: a heated debate is currently taking place about the probability and credibility of such a threat.[62] It would, however, be foolish to disregard a threat which, if it materializes, might have a worse psychological impact on Western societies than 9/11, leading in particular to further constraints on civil liberties.[63]

One thing is certain: the principles of nuclear deterrence would ill apply to the use by a terrorist group of nuclear weapons or 'dirty bombs', unless this terrorist group is supported or abetted by a state. In such a case, using nuclear forensic technologies—provided they are available, and they seem scarce in the United States[64] and almost non-existent in other Western countries—would make it possible to trace back the origin of the fissile material and of the other parts of a crude nuclear or dirty device. States are however easier to deter than terrorist groups and it should be made clear to them that the supply to, and aiding and abetting of—inadvertently or wittingly—terrorists of the means to build and detonate a nuclear or 'dirty' device on the territory of the United States, the United Kingdom, or France or that of their allies or partners will be punished promptly and in a manner commensurate with the judgement made about this type of aggression—i.e. including nuclear retaliatory strikes.[65]

The means required to counter the threat posed by non-state-supported terrorist groups are less costly (if not always easier to implement) than the launch of military—especially nuclear—strikes. In fact, the main weapon and new paradigm of the struggle against nuclear terrorism is the appropriate direction and use of *intelligence*. The record of Western intelligence agencies in this respect is less bad than is generally thought: after all, failures not successes make the headlines in this field (as in many others). Intelligence agencies are, however, confronted by an array of challenges that is far greater than used to be the case during the Cold War, when the enemy was known and terrorism heavily linked to strictly regional stakes (ETA, IRA, Palestinian groups, etc.) and to the assistance provided, directly or indirectly, by the Soviet Union, which made it possible to entertain at least a modicum of deterrence against their actions.

Today, '[o]ur opponents are formless in their leaders and operatives are outside the structures in which we order the world and society. The threats they pose are not directly to our states or territories, but to the security of our people, of other peoples, our assets and way of life so as to change our intentions and have their way.'[66] Consequently, Western intelligence agencies will have to adapt their methods of work almost constantly, because the organization of the terrorist networks and the nature of the threat are evolving rapidly. The obstacles facing non-state-supported nuclear terrorists are huge, but human imagination is almost limitless, which makes it difficult for the Western intelligence agencies to rest on their laurels because of their past successes.

Another instrument that should be developed in Western countries against nuclear terrorism is the systematic organization of the increase of society's *resilience* in the event of mass-casualty attacks. Resilience had been disregarded from the 1960s because it was deemed ineffectual against massive nuclear attacks; the situation now is quite different. On the negative side, modern societies are much more complex and fragile than they were in the 1960s; their economic and social structures, much more flexible, also are weaker in the face of sudden and traumatic events; their resistance to aggression is as strong as that of their weakest parts and their increasing reliance on information technologies and various networks for both industrial and service activities and public utilities,[67] as well as the lean supply chain modus operandi, resting on the just-in-time principle, now common to almost all economic operators, make them particularly vulnerable to any terrorist act on a massive scale.[68]

On the positive side, the systematic organization of the increase of society's resilience is something that can be put in place with relatively simple (if sometimes costly) means and procedures. Of particular interest in this respect is the protection of public utilities and especially of the big operating networks—water distribution and treatment, electricity supply, pharmaceutical products distribution, and telecommunications—which are heavily regulated and with which public authorities interact daily. More complex is the organization of the supply of fuel for cars or of food to supermarkets and city centres, which is largely based on commercial imperatives in normal times and needs to be ensured almost at all costs in time of crisis. This type of organization will require an increased and sustained cooperation between economic operators and public authorities; this type of cooperation is, in any event, critical in case of natural catastrophes, which should make its utility (and its costs) more palatable for private corporate actors.[69]

Increasing resilience will require an approach based on the following elements:[70]

- A good capability of risk identification and assessment, which means increased cooperation between national intelligence and counter-intelligence services, as well as international cooperation in this field;
- That resilience be strengthened through five approaches:
  - Centralized but flexible crisis management capabilities
  - Generic capabilities adaptable to a variety of contingencies, well-trained and easily mobilized

  - Specific capabilities to address threats of a well-defined nature and against which no lead time exists for the supply of effective counter-threats (e.g. vaccines against pandemics, or antidotes against the poisoning of water supplies with neurotoxins)
  - A constant and persistent interaction between the public authorities and the business community in sectors deemed critical in times of crisis
  - A systematic assessment of the efficiency of the means involved in minor or major crises (deriving either from intentional threats or natural causes) in order to constantly improve them;
- High-degree of citizen adhesion and participation (perhaps the most complex of all the elements listed here).

In other words, countering nuclear terrorism requires an approach that is only marginally based on military action and nuclear deterrence, and much more on intelligence and resilience-building. It is indeed a new sort of war against a threat that will be with us for an indefinite future.[71] As such, it will require interrogations on the nature of the means used to prosecute this war. The work on this matter is not very advanced but contributions to the transposition of the theory of the 'just war' to the war against terrorism have already been made and should develop in the coming years.[72] They warrant a study of their own.

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence may have become less central to the strategic relationships between states, but it has also become more complex and must be exercised in a world characterized by a greater uncertainty and instability. This situation therefore requires that *greater* efforts be made and *deeper* reflections be conducted to shape the deterrence doctrine of Western powers during the decades to come, which will be crucial for the credibility of a stable, safe, and effective nuclear deterrence model.

Nuclear deterrence is, as it always has been, only part of a more global deterrence system, including conventional forces. The changing nature of the threat makes it also now indispensable to include anti-ballistic missile defences in this array of means. But what is above all important is that Western countries do not fall into the trap of wishful thinking. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented; nor can they be eliminated with certainty. 'Thinking about the march of human affairs,' writes Machiavelli, 'I am of the opinion that the world remains in the same state as it always was; that there is always the same sum of good, the same sum of evil; but that this good and evil only shift through various places and countries.'[73] It is therefore of the utmost importance and relevance that Western strategists and military thinkers, as well as statesmen, continue to think, strategize, and plan realistically, pragmatically, and without illusions or wishful thinking, about nuclear deterrence and how to make it more effective and more credible in the future: this is the price to pay for preventing major war and maintain a modicum—imperfect, but nonetheless better than the alternatives—of peaceful order in international society.

Notes

1. Gat, 2006: 14, 16.
2. Schelling, 1966: 69.
3. Quinlan, 2009: 27.
4. Brodie, 1946, quoted in Brodie, 1984: 3.
5. Kahn, 1960.
6. See for instance Burns, 1970; US National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response. A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace*, 3 May 1983; Bundy, 1983; Quinlan, 1983; Higgins, 1985; Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez, 1987; Foelber, 1989; Hassner, 1995; and Quinlan, 2009: 46–58.
7. See for instance Gaddis, 1986; Jervis, 1989. For a dissenting view, see Mueller, 1989; Wilson, 2008; Mueller, 2010, chs 3, 'Deterring World War III: Essential Irrelevance', 29–42, and 4, 'Modest Influence on History', 43–54.
8. On the First World War, see Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 2000. As regards the Second World War, the Blitz (i.e. the German *Luftwaffe* attacks against London from mid-1940 to mid-1941) resulted in approximately 18.8 kilotons (18,800 tons) of explosives being dropped on the city, resulting in 40,000 civilian casualties: DeGroot, 2005: 68.
9. See in particular: for the United States, Bracken, 1987; Abella, 2008: 35–43; for the Soviet Union, Meyer, 1987. The British and the French keep their command-and-control procedures under much tighter wraps.
10. Quinlan, 2009: 62–71. Also Copeland, 2000.
11. The Georgian war of the summer of 2008 appears as an example of this type of behaviour. A mildly optimistic analysis of it is made by Oksana Antonenko (Antonenko, 2008). The Western (especially US) diplomatic quandary resulting from the absence of prior guarantees granted to Georgia is analysed by Lincoln Mitchell (Mitchell, 2009). A possible explanation of Russia's general attitude and policy motivations is developed in Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009/10.
12. Jafardzadeh, 2007: Part III, 'The Secret Insurgency', 61–124.
13. Chubin, 2006: 16, 115–16, 117, and footnote 12.
14. The Soviet nuclear doctrine was in fact for a long time much less close to that of the United States and NATO than had been assumed by Western planners. See for instance Mastny, 2000. Also see Fursenko and Naftali, 2006: 6f.
15. Kaysen, McNamara, and Rathjens, 1991; Nitze, 1994; Kimball, 2005.
16. Payne, 2009: 44, 45, 51.
17. Ibid. 53.
18. Posen, 2003.
19. MoD and FCO, 2006: 18.
20. Freedman, 1980: ch. 2, 'From *Skybolt* to *Polaris*', 17–18.
21. Tertrais, 2007: 95–9.
22. For a definition of 'red lines', see Defense Science Board, 2008: 'A "red line" in this report is a boundary that, if crossed, will trigger punitive action against the offender.'
23. Quinlan, 2009: 23–4.
24. Payne, 2009: 50.
25. Quinlan, 2009: 25.
26. Shalikashvili et al., 2007: 94.
27. Colby, 2009a: 23.

28. IISS, 2008.
29. Tertrais, 2009a.
30. For a concise and demonstrative analysis of this kind of risk, see Sokolski, 2009: 206–8.
31. For a general picture of the ballistic- and cruise-missile threat, see NASIC, 2009. For a recent example concerning Iran, see Meotti, 2009.
32. Statement of Dr James Schlesinger in Bolz, 2009: 10–13.
33. Levite, 2002–3; Campbell, 2004; and Einhorn, 2004. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, 2004: Part II, 'Case studies', illustrates the analysis made in the two preceding chapters with examples of specific countries (Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan…). Also see Colby, 2009b; Einhorn and Hersman, 2009; Litvak, 2009.
34. Howard, 1982/3.
35. Morin, 2010a.
36. United States: Beckner, 2009; Brooks, 2009; Wade, 2009; Whiteman, 2009; Shultz et al., 2010. France: Morin, 2010b. No detailed unclassified study is available on Britain, which relies heavily on the US Weapons Laboratories for the maintenance and improvement of its warheads.
37. Yengst, Lukasik, and Jensen, 1996.
38. Preceding President Obama's speech, four US elder statesmen, Henry Kissinger (former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State of Presidents Nixon and Ford), Sam Nunn (former Chairman of Armed Forces Committee of the US Senate), William Perry (former Secretary of Defense of President Clinton), and George Shultz (former Secretary of State of President Reagan) had written two articles in the *Wall Street Journal* of 4 January 2007 ('A world free of nuclear weapons') and 15 January 2008 ('Towards a nuclear-free world') advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons. One of them, Henry Kissinger, later recognized, in an article published on 6 February 2009 in the *International Herald Tribune*, 'Containing the fire of the gods', that this objective was probably unrealistic and that the best that could be hoped for was a limitation of the number of nuclear weapons, which was a return to a more pragmatic and reasonable arms control position.
39. For an analysis of the Obama speech and the problems raised by the elimination of nuclear weapons: Rose and Debouzy, 2009. The most detailed—but in my view unconvincing—study of the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons has been made by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, 2008.
40. For a perceptive analysis of British contradictions, Strachan, 2009: 56–7; on the French position, Tertrais, 2009b.
41. Butcher, 2009; Loukianova, 2009; US Department of Defense, 2009.
42. For a hint of the possible reduction of the format of the British nuclear deterrent, see MoD and FCO, 2006: 7, 26; Chalmers, 2009, does not mention possible cuts in the nuclear deterrent; Strachan, 2009: 66–9. The British Ministry of Defence's *Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review* (London: HMSO, 2010) released on 3 February 2010 devotes four paragraphs (3.16 to 3.19) out of fifty-four pages to the issue of nuclear deterrence.
43. Chauvistré, 2009; Gregson, 2009.
44. Strachan, 2009: 56–7.
45. Gerson, 2009: 155–6.
46. Kissinger, 1957; Taylor, 1960.
47. See 'Final communiqué', http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/nato-nuclear-policies/index.htm (accessed 28 April 2011).

48. http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf (accessed 28 April 2011).
49. The theoretical justification of this strategy was formalized by Bernard Brodie, 1966.
50. French President Chirac, in his speech at l'Ile-Longue on 19 January 2006, for instance said: 'For example, safeguarding our strategic supplies or the defence of allied countries are, among others, interests that must be protected. Assessing the scale and potential consequences of an unbearable act of aggression, threat or blackmail perpetrated against these interests would be the responsibility of the President of the Republic. This analysis could, if necessary, lead to consider that these situations fall within the scope of our vital interests,' thus clearly including a threat against the oil supplies of France as one warranting at least consideration of the exercising of deterrence (Présidence de la République Française, 2006).
51. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 2000. About the general reluctance of European public opinion to support the Afghanistan war, Cowell, 2009; Knowlton, 2010; Kulish, 2010.
52. For the United Kingdom: Chalmers, 2009; Strachan, 2009: 66–9; Chalmers, 2010.
53. Trachtenberg, 1999: for the US reaction to the theory of the 'trigger' (the fact that France would use its nuclear weapons to escalate a war hitherto limited to the European continent to a global war involving both superpowers), see p. 338.
54. Desportes, 2009. An example of such a review is the French *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008).
55. Reagan, 1983.
56. United States: US Department of Defense, 2010, notably 4 (description of the threat), 6–7, 12, 22–3 (analysis of the need for missile defence in order to supplement extended nuclear deterrence). United Kingdom: the British White Paper on *The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent* states: 'Ballistic missile defences are only designed to be able to defend against limited missile attacks. They do not, on their own, provide a complete defence against the full range of risks set out in this White Paper. They should be regarded as complementary to other forms of defence or response, potentially reinforcing nuclear deterrence rather than superseding it' (MoD and FCO, 2006: 21). France: See French Presidents Chirac's (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/france-060119-elysee01.htm) and Sarkozy's (http://acronym.org.uk/docs/0803/doc09.htm) speeches of 19 January 2006 and 21 March 2008.
57. NASIC, 2009: 13, 17.
58. On the debate about 'deterrence by denial' vs 'deterrence by retaliation', see Snyder, 1959, 1961.
59. Steuer, 2010.
60. United Kingdom: on the history and debate on the deployment of *Chevaline* penetration aids on the Polaris missile, Freedman, 1980: chs 5 'Chevaline', 41–51, in particular p. 48; and 6, 'The Problem of Replacement', 52–8; *Britain's Nuclear Weapons: History of the British Nuclear Arsenal* (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Uk/UKArsenalDev.html); on the political context of this deployment, Claire Taylor et al., 2006: 10–11, n. 11. France: on the M-20 missile (single-warhead IRBM of a range of 3,000 km launched from strategic submarines of the *Redoutable* class) penetration aids: Lennox, 2007: 551. The M-20 missile entered service in 1977 and was withdrawn from 1985 when its successor, M-4 (then its enhanced version M-45), entered service. On the M-4/M-45 missile (MIRVed IRBM of a range of 5,000 km launched from strategic submarines of the *Inflexible* class) penetration aids: Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 1994: 294; IISS, 1995: 288.
61. China conducted on 11 January 2007 an anti-satellite test demonstrating its exo-atmospheric interception capability (Covault, 2007). It tested an anti-ballistic hit-to-kill system on 11 January 2010 (IISS, 2010; Rajagopalan, 2010).

62. For a detailed, if biased, overview of this debate, see for instance Mueller, 2010: Part III, 'The atomic terrorist?', 161–240.
63. United States: Leventhal and Alexander, 1987: 28–9; in particular Goldberg, 1987. United Kingdom: Wilkinson, 2006. No equivalent academic publication exists in France concerning this issue.
64. Joint Working Group of the American Physical Society and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, *Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, and Program Needs*, 2008.
65. See for instance the statement made by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley in February 2008: 'The United States has made it clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to any use of weapons of mass destruction . . . The United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorists to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction' (cited in Bolz, 2009: 88–9). French President Chirac, in his speech at l'Ile-Longue on 19 January 2006, for his part said: 'As I emphasized immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001, nuclear deterrence is not intended to deter fanatical terrorists. Yet, the leaders of States who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would consider using, in one way or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and adapted response on our part. And this response could be a conventional one. It could also be of a different kind' (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/france-060119-elyseeo1.htm). No statement as open has been made by the British Prime Minister, but there is little doubt that the substance of the United Kingdom's policy in this respect differs little from that of the United States and France.
66. Smith, 2006: 372.
67. Castells, 1996.
68. Mottram, 2007.
69. See Sir David Omand's testimony before the French Defence and National Security White Paper Commission, 22 November 2007: *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008), 333–7.
70. *Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2008), 'Renforcer la résilience de la nation', 187–98.
71. Tebbit, 2007.
72. One reason the 'global war on terror' (GWOT) launched by the administration of US President George W. Bush failed to be accepted by public opinion is that it was widely deemed to be unethical (mostly because of the methods employed to obtain operational information from terrorists captured by US forces). For an overview of the 'just war' paradigm, see Quinlan, 2004; and Quinlan, 2007.
73. Machiavelli, 1964: 510 (author's translation).

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CHAPTER 12

UNCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF WAR

CHRISTIAN MALIS

(Re-)Thinking the Relationship Between Conventional and Unconventional Forms of War

'Unconventional warfare' is ambivalent: it may relate to 'non traditional forms of warfare', as well as 'morally illicit' forms of war, meaning uncompliant with the 'laws and customs of war'. Laws and customs of war belong to the ethical-legal corpus of the '*jus gentium*' dating back to the eighteenth century: if this was one of the periods in history when war was most thoroughly codified, other ages were characterized by an effort to domesticate military violence and restrain warfare inside conventions, like Greece in the fifth century BC[1] with cities fighting in highly-codified hoplite battles,[2] or medieval Europe (eleventh and twelfth centuries) with the aristocratic *bellum*.[3] Restraints in war have often had a religious ground. Among the most fundamental war conventions are the distinction between *civilians* and *combatants* and the moral obligation to preserve the 'immunity' of non-combatants, but also the clear distinction between war and peace, the necessity to conclude war by a treaty, customs regarding the way to treat prisoners and wounded adversaries, even the customs for surrender.[4] Fundamentally, if *conventional war* puts in the forefront regular armed forces and strategies usually oriented towards the search of the decisive battle, as in the Clausewitzian framework, this can be ascribed to the very idea of *convention*, as the French philosopher Jean Guitton underlined in the aftermath of World War II: 'Since the beginning of civilization . . . , war had remained an ordeal. In conflicts between human groups sharing religious ideals, a convention was agreed according to which a fraction of the male population was armed on each side.'[5]

Being defined negatively, it is difficult to propose a typology of unconventional forms of warfare: intuitively it encompasses, in the current context, such heterogeneous

forms as irregular warfare and asymmetry, chemical/biological weapons, psychological and information warfare, economic warfare, cyberwarfare, and nano-warfare. However, three criteria can be used which will help us structure our reflections. The common root of unconventional forms of war is that they don't primarily target, at least strategically, the enemy armed forces, but rather the enemy's will, populations, or resources. Another criterion is the legal status of the fighters involved, be they 'irregular' fighters, or pure civilians, or even criminals, or some combination. A third criterion may be the nature of a given weapon when by nature it offers a high potential for targeting of critical or vital non-military assets, as with chemical/biological weapons or cyberwarfare.

It is significant to consider that historically, *conventional and unconventional forms of warfare have been often blended*, even within the same conflict. Considering our times, as Hew Strachan observed in a conference dedicated to irregular war, 'irregular war has been the norm for Western armies not just since the 9/11 attacks or the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, or since the end of the Cold War, but since 1945. Irregular wars are therefore frequent.' Going back further in history, war in Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was a mix of *bellum*—conventional war opposing for a 'just cause' two kings in a codified battle (*proelium campestre*) comparable to the hoplite battles of the ancient Greeks—and (more frequent) *werra* : raids, razzias, plundering, kidnapping, etc. At the beginning of the Hundred Years War Edward III combined devastating 'chevauchées' (analogous to modern strategic bombing) and the search for decisive battle (Crécy, 1346). The same scenario occurred with 'Cast Lead': strategic bombing of cities was supposed to clear the way for the conventional land assault of infantry forces against irregular Hamas warfighters while the Israeli military used internet-based advanced psychological warfare. Previously, the Israeli Army had been stopped by well-equipped irregular Hezbollah soldiers.[6]

That's why we'll try to answer the following questions: to what extent do current unconventional forms of war give new opportunities to the challengers of the current international balance of power, be they 'revisionist' (aspiring) great powers or non-state players? What might be in the coming years the 'chemical mix' of conventional/unconventional forms of war?

We shall do it by successively examining unconventional combatants, starting with the analysis of current concepts of asymmetry and irregular warfare; unconventional war on will, by analysing today's forms of psychological warfare; and unconventional weapons, by focusing primarily on the most promising emerging fields of cyberwarfare and nano-warfare.

Asymmetry and Irregular Warfare: the New Figure of the Partisan Warfighter

The concept of asymmetry has inspired a broad literature, both academic and doctrinal, with the effect of obscuring rather than clarifying the debate. Originally it was created to point out the significant disparity in power between opposing actors in a conflict, as in

Andrew J. R. Mack's article 'Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars'[7] and gained momentum in US doctrinal thinking after 2003. Armed struggle not originating primarily from regular armies, but nonetheless difficult to cope with and eradicate, was raising an unprecedented challenge to the most powerful military force in the world. Therefore in recent official definitions 'asymmetric warfare' refers to 'threats outside the range of conventional warfare and difficult to respond to in kind (e.g., a suicide bomber)'.[8] But new thinking has emerged to take into account the status of most asymmetric fighters, be they in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, or Lebanon: 'A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW.' In 2008, UK doctrine, according to JDCC (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre) documents, blended smugglers, militias, insurgents, and criminals within the artificially uniting concept of 'complex irregular activity'. As H. Coutau-Bégarie has stressed, 'irregular warfare' is ambiguously blending legal and strategic dimensions.[9]

It is true that within the current strategic context Western-type 'transformational' regular militaries have to cope with adversaries too weak to win through direct confrontation and resorting to classical courses of action when the correlation of forces is significantly unfavourable: irregular activity, guerrilla, terrorism. Their first strategic target is not, as in the classical Clausewitzian framework, the enemy armed forces, but populations as source of political will (enemy population *and* population on the insurgent side). Militarily and from its origins, current irregular or asymmetric fighters tend to use the tactics of 'small war', as described by M. de Grandmaison in *La petite guerre, ou Traité du service des troupes légères en campagne*.[10] The issue is that insufficient effort has been put into distinguishing the different levels of warfare—tactical, operational, strategic. How do current conditions, especially the impact of modern technology, modify the means of 'small wars' when, especially due to absolute inferiority in airpower, it becomes the only or preferred course of action for an adversary? And, thereafter, to consider the political objectives of the fighters involved.

Tactical Level

We should say that there is no such a thing as 'irregular warfare' but only 'irregular warfighters'. Irregular warfighters do not wear a uniform, do not openly carry weapons, do not belong to an identified military hierarchy. On today's theatres of operations they mostly use terrorist and guerrilla tactics. In 1963, in his *Theory of the Partisan*, Carl Schmitt identified four distinctive features: *irregularity*, *intensity of political commitment*, *mobility*, and *telluric (territorial) attachment*;[11] only the third one having a distinctively tactical signification. Last but not least, the morale dimension must be specifically addressed.

Regarding armaments, current adversaries of Western forces are differently endowed: Hezbollah militias have sophisticated anti-tank weapons, night-vision devices, Unmanned

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), anti-ship missiles, while Fallujah militia-men or Taliban fighters are much less well-equipped. But all benefit from the large spread of small arms on the black market. In addition, as colonel P. J. Lassalle recently pointed out, there is an 'equalizing power of the network': civilian information technologies (mobile phones, GPS, satellite imagery, etc.) are now easy to acquire and low-cost. Ingenious use of civilian technology can be of immense tactical consequence: the US JIEDDO[12] spent around $20 billion to fight improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, a programme comparable in size to the Manhattan project.

Ingenious use of technology and tactical creativity are also often encountered: *swarming* tactics were specifically a feature of Hezbollah soldiers in August 2006. Regarding *mobility*, the historic trend seems to be clearly on the irregulars' side: the need for reinforced protection mixes with the high-tech trend towards 'Future Soldier' programmes (FIST in the UK, FELIN in France, etc.) to weigh down Western soldiers, especially against such agile soldiers as Pashtun fighters. Although future projects comprehend even exoskeletons, it seems that our modern soldiers more and more look like iron-covered medieval knights:[13] in 1302 the latter were killed on the ground by Flemish 'villains' armed with their working-tools and disrespectful of the 'laws of war'.

Finally, *moral asymmetry* is perhaps one of the most striking features on today's theatres of operations, if one think of it as working in favour of the Western forces' enemies:[14] Taliban fighters, Iraqi insurgents, or Hezbollah soldiers fight for their land, their religion, and their family and show a resolution to take risky actions and die which is of high tactical significance.

Operational Level

At the theatre/operational level, three key aspects can be considered: the absolute dominance of airpower, the return of geography, the emergence of *technoguerrilla* warfare as a historically new type of military course of action. Current counterinsurgency operations depend on airpower for firepower but also for logistical back-up, close air support, intelligence, and deterrence (show of force, etc.).[15] 'Air strikes are more specifically a means to punish and so threaten a potentially insurgent people; because they render concentrated forces on the ground vulnerable, they are also a means to prevent irregulars from moving to more regular forms of war'[16] (as had happened in China and Vietnam). This overwhelming superiority is certainly the most outstanding trump card in the Western armed forces' inventory, but has also adverse effects. As Strachan pointed out, 'in so shaping irregular war airpower forces irregular warriors from rural areas, where they can be more easily tracked and hit, to urban spaces, where they can hide within the civilian population. As in 1909, geography is a key consideration in irregular war, but as a result airpower is more likely to inflict casualties on the civilian population.'

Indeed moves to ignore space in war strongly are sharply contrasted by the 'successful comeback' of geography, especially if enlarged to the 'human terrain'. Operationally, adversaries seek security in complex spaces (towns, mountains, jungles), where

information and air dominance are to a certain extent nullified. This extends to the remarkable return of siege warfare (Fallujah, 2004) and buried trenches/fortifications (Hezbollah, August 2006). Finally the Israeli/Hezbollah War might well have for a new type of guerrilla, the 'technoguerrilla'.[17] The first theoretician of warfare conducted by guerillas armed with advanced weaponry had been the French major Guy Brossolet in *Essai sur la non-bataille* (1975), and the German Horst Afheldt reused it to propose an alternative defence strategy in case of Soviet invasion in the 1980s. Recently, combining highly-mobile tactical units armed with advanced 'scientific weaponry', and mainly tactical missiles with UAVs and rocketry, makes of Hezbollah a perhaps unprecedented and paradoxical example of 'strong asymmetry'.

Strategic Level

At the cusp of war aims and political goals, three issues can be raised. First of all, 'can they win?' For above-mentioned tactical and operational reasons adversaries suffering a remarkable disparity of force against Western-type armed forces have shown an amazing resistance capability. Thinking of the Algerian case study, Raymond Aron used to say that 'not losing' was the military goal of revolutionary warfare, and this still stands probably true for the challengers of Western coalitions in Afghan- or Iraqi-type environments. Here the relation to *time* is key: Western forces having total and even revolutionary goals—for instance transforming a feudal society like the Afghan one into a 'national democratic State'—much time would be required to succeed, but the longer they stay, the more they tend to be considered as occupation forces: a typical antinomy. In Clausewitzian terms, irregular warfighters exchange successfully space against time, taking full advantage of the structural superiority of defence over attack. Another key feature is the very notion of 'victory': numerous authors agree on replacing it with the concept of 'success', which is far from being convincing. In today's conflict, tactical victory would be an enabler for attainment of political goals, although it would prove insufficient. Ambiguity is reflected in the legal uncertainty attached to the status of fighters and fight: 'What is the legal status of the armed forces of a coalition engaged in "operations other than war"? . . . How do we define the enemy? Is he a criminal or a combatant? . . . The most important question of all is: what is a war?'[18] Finally, current asymmetric ways of war question the political nature of the ongoing conflicts. David Galula had insisted in 1963, based on the French experience of the Algerian war, that the issue in counterinsurgency warfare was only 20 per cent military, and actually 80 per cent political, and that gaining the local population's support was a precondition to a favourable general outcome. 'Irrealpolitik': this approach points to the Western hubristic temptation of 'downloading democracy' in countries politically divided and culturally foreign to a liberal Western-type mindset'.[19]

Second issue: what might be the mix of symmetry and asymmetry in future wars? Many scholars have emphasized the predominance of asymmetry and irregularity as an evolution of the nature of war itself. In the aftermath military thinkers have proposed

new concepts to help doctrine writers and staff planners.[20] In this respect the most successful attempt is the recent proposal by Frank Hoffman of the concept of 'hybrid warfare': in the future 'Non-state actors may mostly employ irregular forms of warfare, but will clearly support, encourage, and participate in conventional conflict if it serves their ends. Similarly, nation-states may well engage in irregular conflict in addition to conventional types of warfare to achieve their goals.'

Third and last issue at the strategic level: should we have a unified vision of the 'asymmetric warfighter'? Again, the concept, which is ambiguous, is actually more political than legal or operational. According to Raymond Aron, Carl Schmitt had failed to propose a unique concept of the partisan—since there was none: the political goal of the fight introduced decisive differences between those fighting '*pro ara et focis*' and those for a revolutionary cause. Today, ethno-nationalist resistance, global revolutionaries (of the Al Qaeda Jihadist type), and fighters motivated by economic gains in failed states (like numerous warlords or like maritime pirates) should be distinguished, although their courses of action might be similar. By failing to adequately characterize the political nature of the conflicts we are involved in we cannot conduct effective warfare.

War on Will: Modern Psychological Warfare is Still Political Warfare

From 'War on Nerves' to 'Information Operations'

Machiavelli had already emphasized psychological warfare as a permanent dimension of the art of warfare, the tactical means of which are still valid: command of information, propagation of false news, intimidation through atrocities, manipulation of (religious) beliefs, terror, action on prisoners, etc. Hitler's 'war on nerves' was part of an 'enlarged strategy' (*erweiterte Strategie*) to divide and weaken the enemy before striking militarily. Raymond Aron had emphasized in 1955 that 'psychological warfare is a new word for a very old thing and since men have fought there is action upon the adversary's morale . . . In a number of battles, there were weapons which were more psychologically than physically efficient.'[21] A novelty of the twentieth century is the huge expansion of the mass media (the internet being the last and decisive 'new new thing') and of social psychology techniques (study of opinion changes). Strictly speaking one should not speak about 'psychological warfare' but about psychological action taking a military shape (either to deceive: trickery, stratagem, intoxication, etc.; or to frighten: strategic bombing, terrorism; or to convince politically: propaganda, censorship). This is consistent with the British definition of 'psy-ops': 'planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives'.[22] Psy-ops by Serbia in 1999 during NATO's *Operation Allied Force* were unprecedented in their quality and sophistication.[23]

In most Western current doctrines, psychological operations take place within the realm of 'information operations', a catch-all notion which generally also encompasses electronic warfare, attacks on information infrastructure, command and control warfare, cyberwarfare. Of course the context and the correlation of forces determine the magnitude and the role of psychological operations within the overall war context. Nowadays, asymmetric correlation of forces as well as the very nature of Western societies based upon 'free speech' and massive use of information put psychological action at the forefront. To some extent it becomes the *raison d'être* of military fighting for the asymmetric opponent: 'Communicating *by* war instead of communicating *on* war'.[24] Which again is not new: with the Tet Offensive in 1968, North Vietnamese leaders didn't intend to win, but to make the American people believe that their own troops were not winning the war.'[25]

Information Dominance or Achilles' Heel?

In relation to the psychological manoeuvre, today's world can be portrayed through three distinctive features: the existence of a 'compassionate public space' (Vincent Desportes); Western hyper-media-reactive governments; and the potential of new communication technologies (mobile phones, Internet, non-Western TV channels like Al Jazeera, etc.) for a cyber-*levée en masse*.[26] A key feature is the demultiplication of the power of image, very much used by Jihadists for instance to recruit, train, and indoctrinate. The 9/11 attacks aimed at a psychological effect concordant with traditional terror strategies: to trigger an 'overreaction', leading at the same time to the discredit of the USA and anti-Western popular mobilization in the Muslim world—which only partially succeeded.[27] On their own side, powers involved in counter-insurrection warfare try to resort to 'perception management' and the elaboration of relevant 'strategic narratives' so as to 'win hearts and minds'.

Tactical success is possible, but strategic success will be much harder to gain. The US-sponsored TV station in Iraq, Al Hurra, was rapidly dismissed as the mouthpiece of a foreign power. As Joseph Henrotin emphasized, commenting on Israeli psy-ops in Gaza, what is key is *why you fight*, which is easier to explain when defending the homeland than when 'fighting against terrorism':[28] ultimately the clash of strategic narratives mirrors deep popular political motivations. As Raymond Aron stressed during the Algerian War: it is not always possible to invent a 'politically relevant narrative'.[29]

With the internet and more specifically the dramatic expansion of social networks, conventional mass media are losing ground against the power of people to organize themselves and influence each other. As Rod Thornton puts it, 'the military and cultural colossus naturally generates an antipathy which exacerbates when it strikes'.[30] Which is also true on the home front: selection of military targets now takes into account the potential reactions of public opinion, as well as legal risks. By promoting free speech the West is unwillingly shooting itself in the foot, and this might give psychological warfare an even greater significance in future conflicts if seized by 'the weak state asymmetric adversary. The likes of China have a wonderful opportunity presented to them in the

shape of potential enemies who lean on information so much. Hit such a centre of gravity with care, and reliance on information can become a force disabler and not a force multiplier. In the action-reaction model, China will not look to try and match such information dominance, but will seek ways to undermine this information.'[31]

Targeting People: Biological and Chemical Weapons, Nano-War, Cyberwar

Biological and Chemical Warfare

The main chemical agents relevant to military use are lethal agents (suffocating, vesicant, neurotoxic, etc.), incapacitating agents (psychotropic), neutralizing agents (tear gas), defoliating agents ('Agent Orange' in Vietnam). Since the end of the First World War, chemical weapons were never employed as long as the enemy possessed similar means. But their use was not infrequent and proved tactically efficient several times in the twentieth century (Spain against Abd-El Krim, 1920; Italy in Ethiopia, 1936; US in Vietnam; Iraq against Kurds, etc.).[32] Biological weapons (which are of two classes: pathogens and toxins) don't seem easy to weaponize, and the only really known case of use was in the post-September 11 attacks (five deaths and eighteen cases). Today, legal prohibitions (1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting biological weapons and 1972 Convention prohibiting their making[33]) as well as the high sensitivity of public opinion make the use of non-conventional chemical/biological warfare means difficult in a counterinsurgency context. In contrast, for small groups aiming at terror, a surprise—the first effect sought when using chemical weapons—is still possible, as the sarin attack in Tokyo's subway (1992) attests.

Again the political aim must be considered: potential use is more especially probable from apocalyptic or millenarianist groups (Al Qaeda, US 'Weathermen') than from groups aiming at well-identified political and regional goals (Hamas, etc.).[34] Despite warning and protection means being developed and suitable for an efficient deterrence, according to a few analysts the issue is not 'What if ?' but 'What next?': *how shall we react when it has happened?*[35] As the head of MI5 in the UK has said, 'It will only be a matter of time before a crude version of a WMD attack is launched against a major Western city.'[36] Should we stick to conventional warfare methods in the framework of international treaties or resort to unconventional retaliation, with the risk of opening Pandora's box?

Nano-War

The concept of nano-war is fuzzy and does not seem to correspond to a new emerging field in strategy, as we shall see for cyberwarfare. Tomorrow, will nanotechnologies and molecular manufacturing raise the possibility of horrifically effective weapons, as

indicated by Admiral David E. Jeremiah?[37] For Alain de Neve, nanotechnologies could, through a new generation of weapon systems and combatants, create disturbing factors affecting the global military balance.[38] It might for instance be possible for future adversaries to proceed to hostile manipulation of the human nervous system, e.g. through disabling biochemical agents attacking the very core of the neural circuitry.[39] The successful test of the world's most powerful non-nuclear weapon, christened 'Dad of All Bombs' by Russian authorities (2007), showed the destructive potential of a partially nano-structured device. The US Army created in 2002 the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies, so as to prepare new solutions to enhance future combatants' survivability on the ground. It is probably true that through nano-materials stealthiness and protection will be increased. But, as far as we can see, nano-manufacturing should remain a heavy industry issue, therefore a 'state-sponsored' activity.

Cyberwarfare

While cyberwarfare already exists on a defensive level, offensive computer warfare is the fast-emerging field of conflict and doesn't seem to require large-scale state-type means:[40] computer attacks on enemy websites were noticed in all recent conflicts (Georgia, Cast Lead, etc.), and computer warfare is being institutionalized in Western countries. In Estonia, Russian hackers made a name for themselves by a massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, bringing down the website of the Estonian parliament along with the sites of banks, ministries, and newspapers.[41] On the Western side legal prohibitions might be increasingly lifted (see e.g. the recent French 'Livre blanc' advocating a 'Lutte informatique offensive'). This weapon looks very flexible: on the one hand, the difficulty of tracking the origin of an attack—*attribution*—should make it an efficient way of applying political/military pressure and indirect strategy; on the other hand, there is much discussion about the potential for a 'computer Pearl Harbour' and the 'resilience' of our hyper-connected societies. The ability to 'retaliate in kind' (Bernard Brodie) seems at first glance to be the only solution and some advocate copying the French model of nuclear deterrence.

Evidence that we are still in the infancy of what will probably, like airpower in the 1920s and nuclear deterrence in the 1950s, become a new strategic field of study is that the basic *lexicon* is still confused. Although the US *Dictionary of Military Terms* gives a definition for cyberspace—'A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers'[42]—globally there is a lack of commonly agreed definitions to differentiate cyberwar, cybersecurity, cyberdefence, cybercrime, information warfare, etc. The 800-page-long *Dictionary of Military Terms* doesn't even propose a definition for 'cyberwar'. Nevertheless the world of strategists has been set in motion in the United States, as the RAND study written by Martin Libicki (2009) and the CSIS report 'Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency' (8 December 2008) testify.

Nuclear deterrence is unquestionably a good intellectual starting point to initiate thinking on cyberwar, even up to arms control: Russia and the USA recently initiated talks about internet security and 'cyberwar' in the context of the UNO's Disarmament Office. Nevertheless, this will be true only as long as similarities and differences are properly understood. To some extent, cyberwar might even be said to be the opposite to and proof against nuclear war. 'The Internet was designed during the height of the Cold War to be redundant, decentralized, persistent, and survivable in the event of a nuclear attack.'[43] The cyberworld is as intrinsically decentralized as the nuclear world was centralized: aggression can come from everywhere, the principle of 'only one finger on the nuclear trigger' (which so much divided the United States and Western Europe in the 1960s) does not apply, the technical entrance barrier is terribly low, much of the defence has to be supported by the civilian/private sector, etc. To some analysts, given the easiness of use and proliferation of necessary technical means and of the high potential media leverage effect, cyberwarfare is an archetype for asymmetric warfare.[44] The main threats are *denial of service* (DoS), *intrusion*, *computer theft*, and *remote control.* Numerous other dimensions of 'cyberwar' are potential differentiators with nuclear strategy. First of all, the nature of an 'act of war' is different in cyberspace, given that damage to life is at most indirect. Secondly, the significance of defence: it might not be true that attack is always easy and low-cost and defence expensive and inefficient; defence will probably add significantly to deterrence. Escalation is a third question: what are the proper thresholds to trigger counter-attack, and of which type (military/conventional, cyberattack, etc.)? Another key differentiator with nuclear strategy worthy of mention is the *legal* aspect, which seems significant in cyberwar, given the complexity of civilian/government infrastructures and the fact that most cyberattacks might well happen outside the context of a declared war.

It is interesting to note that three countries of the 'revisionist' type show an emblematic face of future cyberwar. Russia experimented with cyberwar as a strategic and tactical tool in the framework of war (Georgia, 2008) or undeclared aggression (Estonia, 2007). China is perhaps the leading country in the use of cyberattack 'short of war': so-called patriotic hacking, 'e-spying', and computer attack networks (seemingly on a daily basis against the United States). India, especially against the Chinese threat, is investing strongly in 'strategic cyberdefense':[45] strategic cyberwar is feasible but would rapidly run out of control, therefore self-constraint is probable.

It is not the purpose of this article to provide a strategic framework for future discussions; but a few ideas can be proposed. First of all, *ambiguity* might well be a key concept in cyberstrategy. *Decentralization* is another one, and a potential source of danger: by resorting to 'patriotic hackers', countries like Russia and China also renounce a fully efficient command and control capability. The civil/military interface is a third dimension: future cyberstrategists will have to be close to military staffs as well as to the industry, and more generally cyberstrategy and cyberposture should be debated and discussed much more openly than nuclear matters. The best way to take up this debate is to ask the right question : 'What are we trying to achieve, under what circumstances?'

Cyberspace is a new medium, which will have its own rules. The nature of the future internet being difficult to forecast by its own nature (i.e. depending upon the users

themselves), those rules will evolve quite rapidly: for computer assault on Georgia the Russian government recruited hackers on social networks, but what will have become of social networks five years from now? In any case, it seems that 'cyberwar'—the use of cyberoffence and cyberdefence tools either as tactical or strategic tools—might be a misleading term, as really describing a very small part of future real uses of cyberweapons. Threats, intimidation, guerrilla attacks, hard-to-identify aggressions should be the mainstay of future 'warfare on the net'.

Conclusion

The scope of unconventional forms of war is the barometer and the 'radar signature' of the international order. In the Middle Ages *bellum* and *werra* coexisted, reflecting at the same time political fragmentation dating back to the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire, and the emergence of the modern state. In the eighteenth century the *jus publicum Europaeum*, celebrated by Carl Schmitt, had rejected non-conventional war on its margins, reflecting the moral unity of European states, as well as the nascent imperialistic hegemony of Europe over the 'non-civilized' world. Today Europe as a whole, as a consequence of the twentieth-century 'Thirty Years War' (1914–45), is more a strategic protectorate, owing its long peace to an external superpower, the United States. A rejuvenated *jus publicum Europaeum* would have to be enlarged to cover the planet itself and evolve into a *jus publicum universum*.

Supposing that there are ten- to fifteen-year-long strategic cycles and that we are in the midst of a 'small war' cycle after the '1990–2003 Transformation cycle',[46] the next strategic cycle might well see the return of 'classical' great power rivalries, as maybe heralded by the 2008 Georgian war. In this respect the will of 'revisionist' countries like Russia or China to implement their own 'Monroe doctrine' in their near-abroad areas, combined with the potential longevity of 'authoritarian capitalist regimes',[47] might usher in a period of 'short of war' confrontation between the USA and Russia and China, if not India. Therefore there is potential for a 'new Cold War' giving primacy to unconventional approaches. As prophetically put by Raymond Aron in 1961, a lot will depend upon our ability to build 'a spiritual community, superstructure or foundation of the material community that the unity of science, technique and economy tends to create, a unity wanted by History from a humanity more conscious of its quarrels than of its solidarity'.[48]

Notes

1. See Romilly, 1999.
2. Hanson, 2000.
3. Fossier, 1982: 423–5; Duby, 1992.

4. Lynn, 2003.
5. Guitton, 1969: 127, 188, 201. Translated into English by the author.
6. Goya, 2006.
7. Mack, 1975.
8. *US Dictionary of Military Terms.*
9. Coutau-Bégarie, 2008.
10. De Grandmaison, 1756.
11. Schmitt, 2007 (1963).
12. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
13. Cf. Fossier, 1982: 426.
14. See Brahimi, 2009.
15. See Lambeth, 2009.
16. H. Strachan, ibid.
17. See Henrotin, 2009a.
18. Ibid.
19. As underlined by Vedrine, 2008.
20. Hammes, 2006; Smith, 2006; Kaldor, 2007.
21. Quoted by Villatoux, 2007: 7.
22. *Joint Warfare Publication*, 3–45 (London: HMSO, 2000), quoted by Thornton, 2008: 198.
23. Thornton, 2008: 72.
24. Desportes, 2007.
25. 'PSYOPS stratégique: L'Allemagne en pointe', interview with Lieutenant-general W. Jertz, *Défense et Sécurité Internationale*, 29 September 2007, 38–41.
26. Cronin, 2006.
27. Strachan, 2006: 19.
28. Henrotin, 2009b.
29. Aron, 1976: 338.
30. Thornton, 2008: 75.
31. Ibid.: 77.
32. Cf. Lion, 2009.
33. See Yaakoubi, 2000.
34. Lepick and Daguzan, 2003: 116.
35. Cronin, 2009.
36. Quoted by Thornton, 2008: 33.
37. Vice-Chairman (ret.), US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an address at the 1995 Foresight Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology.
38. De Neve, 2008–9.
39. Ibid.
40. See the study by Georgia Tech University, October 2008.
41. 'Russian Cyberwar on Georgia', 9 October 2008, (http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/en/updates); Donner, 2007.
42. *Joint Publication 1–02, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*. Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, Joint Publication Division, J-7, 17 October 2008.
43. Cronin, 2006.
44. Maupeou, 2009.
45. Donnette, 2009.

46. Cf. Malis, n. d.
47. See Gat, 2007.
48. Aron, 1965 (1961): 342.

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CHAPTER 13

TERRORISM AND WAR

AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER

> Terrorism is the weapon of the weak…[1]
>
> …it's the old comrade, terror, at my neck…[2]
>
> *Terrorism: An attack or attacks against non-combatants—often but not necessarily including a random character—so that a broader category of non-combatants (civilians) will identify with those attacked and react in ways that are designed by the attacker (terrorist) to have a political effect that he desires.* (author's definition)

The term 'terrorism' has become one of the most common, overworked, and least well-defined and understood in the lexicon of warfare. This has been particularly true since 11 September 2001—known simply as '9/11'—the day that Islamist terrorists flew hijacked American commercial jet aircraft into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, along with an aborted third attack that crashed in a Pennsylvania wheat field. Even though the US is a relative late-comer to the ranks of victims of cross-border terrorism, probably more has been written and spoken about terrorism in the years since that dramatic day than in all of the long history of this technique, and terrorism has become almost a separate discipline within the canons of warfare.

The attacks of 9/11 spawned at least one major war (Afghanistan), contributed to the initiation of a second (Iraq), led to the development of a major counterterrorism industry in many countries, especially in the United States.[3] And while no hard-and-fast prediction can be made, it is most likely that the phenomenon of terrorism, with a significant impact on the behaviour of many governments and peoples, will continue for the indefinite future.

Given the contemporary impact of terrorism and its likely persistence, in one or another form and at one level of intensity or another, it is highly important to understand just what it is—and what it is not—as well as its place within the wider phenomenon of warfare. Indeed, the phenomenon of terrorism—or, more precisely, the different

phenomena that are often lumped together under that single term—has many different forms and as many different uses.

To begin with, terrorism is about the stimulation of fear, in particular intense fear. But as defined for the purposes of this study, it also has to be seen as something else: a deliberate act, as opposed to just random violence. Individuals (or groups or nations) can experience terror that derives from accident or even natural events—like earthquakes or fires, the reaction of the 'peasants in their terror' at Pompeii.[4] Here, by contrast, the element of deliberation is crucial, a conscious act. That definition can also cover acts of nihilism—given that just seeking to cause destruction, as of a particular social order, can be seen as purposeful in regard to promoting change. But the term 'terrorism', viewed from the standpoint of *motive* as opposed to *effect*, does not properly apply to acts designed solely to cause pain.

A useful definition of terrorism must include the idea that there is some *political purpose* in mind, in the sense of its having some impact on individuals or groups, either in anticipation of an act of terror or as a consequence, which could produce a response, either of action or inaction, which serves the purpose of the individual, group, or nation engaging in terrorism. For purposes of this analysis, a further distinction must be made, as between terrorism employed by established authorities within a society (or within a subnational entity) in order to promote a particular political end, as opposed to terrorism either employed by one country, group, or individual against another country, or element thereof, or as part of a civil conflict.

It is also important to consider the potential *motivations* for terrorism, within the overall rubric of a *political purpose*. This is particularly important in view of the central role that terrorism has come to play in recent years in analysis, policy, and response regarding a phenomenon which, for want of a better term, could be summarized as Islamist terrorism—and which itself can be viewed as a subset of ideological or religion-based terrorism. Of course, this raises questions whether such terrorism emanates from a religion, as such, as opposed to some form of *perversion* of a religion, as with Islam is in fact the case. This distinction is critical to bear in mind, given that some commentators, especially in the West seek to stigmatize a large number of, or even all, Muslims as being actual or potential terrorists. Such misapplication of the terminology of terrorism makes it more difficult to separate the sheep (real terrorists) from the goats (individuals or groups that can be inaccurately so characterized, often for political ends). In dealing with terrorism, it is important to apply rigour in analysis and potential response, free of ulterior motive. Nor is Islam the only one of the world's religions that has produced terrorists; few are proof against that perversion, and cults that practice terrorism abound.

Domestically-Oriented Terrorism

The use of terrorism by established authorities as an instrument of imposing control over a domestic population is as old as recorded history. Tacitus discussed the 'Reign of Terror' (AD 31–7) in his *Annals of Imperial Rome*; the same term was applied to a

thirteen-month period in the French Revolution (27 June 1793 – 27 July 1794); and, of course, terrorism designed for purposes of control was a common practice by the totalitarian regimes—and some authoritarian regimes (e.g. in Argentina, 1976–83)—of the twentieth century, most notably Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin.[5] In the last two cases, terrorism as a political instrument acquired a further aspect: a quality of *randomness*, with a disconnect between causality and response—i.e. 'What did I (or persons of such and such quality) do (or not do) that led us to be singled out in this way?' Terror used to suppress dissent, rebellion, or simple deviation—the very definition of totalitarianism—is effective precisely because individuals are incapable of calculating what behaviour would make themselves vulnerable to state violence and what behaviour would provide protection. The idea is to nip in the bud any possible deviation by reducing an entire populace to political impotence through fear, where the potential victim could do nothing to protect himself, even slavish devotion to the rulers.[6]

Terrorism in Warfare

Terrorism as warfare, as the phenomenon is most often considered, today, is quite different from its classical usage or even its usage in major wars of the twentieth century. The earlier usage related in particular to the engagement of civilian populations in warfare, as targets of attack for purposes of affecting a conflict's outcome. (This is quite different from punitive conflict or from genocide, where the objective is destruction of an entire people, whether in the ancient world—e.g. the Achaeans' slaughter of the Trojans or Rome's razing of Carthage—or the Ottomans' slaughter of 1.5 million or more Armenians and the German perpetration of the Holocaust.)

In Europe, the translation of practice in warfare from combat more or less limited to a fighting class to broader engagement of whole populations probably dated from the Thirty Years War (1618–48) but returned to its earlier pattern afterward—what has been styled 'cabinet warfare'[7]—in part because of the breadth and depth of the war's destruction—a primary motivation for the Peace of Westphalia.

The contemporary engagement of entire populations in European combat became clear at the time of the Seven Years War (1756–63), which saw (on the French side) the first systematic application of what came to be known, in the French Revolution and then Napoleonic France (under both emperors), as the *levée en masse*, the recruiting or uprising of a popular army from well beyond the professional class of fighters.[8] This also progressively eroded the distinction between combatants and civilians, with the latter becoming deliberate targets of warfare. Some of this eroded distinction has related to attacks on the sinews of warfare—especially economic and technological capacity; but some has related to efforts to impair an opponent's will to fight, focusing in one instance on the fighting forces themselves (e.g. German propagandizing of the Russian army in the First World War) and in another on civilian populations (e.g. major bombing of cities in the Second World War). With this extension of warfare into an effort to influence civilians—and

through them, governments—a variety of instruments and techniques were developed with the purpose of having such an impact, beyond the usage of such instruments in civil war, which perforce engages a civilian population.[9]

The American Civil War of 1861–5 saw the application of a civilianization of warfare developed beyond anything that had been seen, before, at least in Western experience, since the Thirty Years War. While that was a civil war—at least from one side's perspective[10]—it set a standard for many later major conflicts among nations in terms of deliberately extending conflict to civilians. This approach was most often followed by Union forces, if only because most of the fighting took place on Southern soil. Most famous—or infamous—was Major General William Tecumseh Sherman's march to the sea that began in Atlanta, Georgia (November–December 1864), in which he employed what came to be known in the Second World War (especially in the Soviet Union) as a scorched-earth tactic, designed to weaken political resistance by taking the war directly and deliberately to civilians and their capacity to sustain their livelihood. The centre of gravity, in Clausewitz's terminology, was thus, to a degree, shifted from defeat of the enemy's forces to destruction of the political will to resist.[11]

The First and Second World Wars saw the application by all sides, in significant measure, of policies, practices, and techniques that emerged from the American Civil War. Long-range artillery was one instrument of the civilianization of warfare, though mostly through what today would be termed collateral damage. The invention of the airplane, married to the earlier erosion of the distinction between combatants and civilians, had a more profound effect, as its use was extended from a battlefield-support instrument to becoming a weapon to bring industrial centres and, inevitably therefore, civilian population centres under attack. The aerial bombardment of cities in the First World War was relatively insignificant, however, compared to practice in the Second World War. Germany initiated the use of aerial bombardment in Spain (best memorialized, perhaps, by Pablo Picasso's *Guernica*)—the Soviet Union did likewise—and extended its use through the assault on Warsaw in September 1939, Rotterdam and other cities in May 1940, and followed by the blitz on London and other British cities, focusing not just on industrial production but also designed to break civilian morale and thus effect political change—but in the British case with the opposite effect. In fact, the vast bulk of aerial bombardment in the Second World War, including of civilian populations, was carried out by Allied air forces, both in Europe and in Japan, including the systematic destruction of German and Japanese cities, leading some commentators to apply the term 'terror bombing'.[12]

This civilianization of warfare paled in comparison—in theory though not in practice—with the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The term 'balance of terror' was often applied; although the objective of the strategies was not to cause terror, as such, but to place at risk the other side's population centres (countervalue) as well as its military assets (counterforce) in an effort to deter attack. The terror would come—in terms of fear produced by 'attack' (military action) as opposed to apprehension of a possible attack—only if deterrence failed. During the Cold War, both weapons and doctrines on both sides were modified over time, leading to a

situation characterized in the West as mutual assured destruction (MAD)—a neologism with a terrible, unconscious irony.[13] In fact, a combination of US and Soviet development of second-strike deterrent capabilities and the conclusion of the ABM Treaty, which left both sides' population centres vulnerable to attack, fostered a high degree of stability in the nuclear arms balance, opened the way to détente between the United States and the Soviet Union (and East and West) and, as a matter of both practice and perception, leeched the 'terror' out of the 'balance of terror', thus helping to make possible the Cold War's end.[14]

Terrorism Beyond the Cold War

Between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, the United States found itself in a situation it had not experienced since before Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941: there was no foreign enemy both willing and able to attack it with military force, in any serious way, in the domestic homeland. This was coupled with a perception that the USA possessed more power, in all relevant terms, than any other country and, indeed, with few if any parallels in history.[15] This situation had a number of effects relevant to this analysis of the relationship of terrorism and warfare. In the first place, the immediate post-Cold War period included a final release of tensions, an end to even vestiges of a balance of terror and of the abstruse—and emotional—calculus of casualties, posited as potentially being so high that a term for many millions of people killed had had to be coined: 'megadeaths'. In essence, following the end of the balance of terror, the metric for calculating risk (at least in the United States and Soviet Union and in other countries sensitive to Cold War risks) was reset radically—so much so that the 9/11 attacks on the United States, with the loss of just under three thousand lives, had a more profound effect in terms of psychological response, including fear, than anything that had happened during the Cold War, when potential US casualties in a nuclear conflict were conjectured to be well upwards of ten thousand times greater.

The psychology of reset can be placed in the context of a risk aversion index. Avoiding risk, where possible, is endemic to humankind. But it varies from country to country, culture to culture, and time to time and relates very much to prevailing attitudes of *expectations* about risk (or damage). For example, at least by reputation, the average American in contemporary society is believed to be highly risk-averse. In terms of threats that emanate from sources external to the country—including terrorism—part of this psychology of risk aversion derives from having been free of foreign invasion of the continental US since 1814. This unquantifiable risk aversion index can be a measure of the degree of tolerance of a society to acts of terrorism. It can lead to an enemy's calculating the costs and benefits of employing terrorism, as opposed to some other means, to try to achieve its political ends.[16]

The response in the United States to 9/11 also came against the background of a lack of much history of terrorism, particularly in recent times and certainly *externally*-originated

terrorism.[17] It also came against the background of a perception that the United States had regained the historical protection of the two broad oceans: thus the double shock on 9/11 of seeing both its low relative vulnerability infringed upon and limitations on its classic effort to defend the nation far from its own shores.

This historic low US vulnerability to outside attack is not unique in the Western hemisphere (a product at least in part of the Monroe Doctrine's success) but the United States has had less experience of externally-fostered terrorism than have a number of European countries, as well as many others in the Eastern Hemisphere. Amongst many other examples, in the recent past Britain faced decades of Irish-origin terrorism;[18] Germany from groups like the Baader–Meinhof; Italy from the Red Brigades; France from two sides in the domestic political struggle over the future of Algeria; and the Russian Federation as a spillover of conflicts in the North Caucasus.

Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare

In the United States, 9/11 ushered in what was perceived in the USA to be a new era in the use of terrorism: its employment against the American homeland as part of what can be termed asymmetric warfare. This is not a new concept, nor has terrorism been absent from it, even in modern, Western nations. But before delving more deeply into this aspect of the terrorist phenomenon, it is important to understand the nature and purposes of asymmetric warfare. To be sure, the application of military force almost always seeks to be asymmetrical—that is, an effort by each side in a conflict to bring to bear quantities, qualities, strategies, and tactics that will provide it with advantages, preferably decisive advantages, over the adversary.

In recent years, this generalized proposition about the nature of warfare has tended to take on a more restricted meaning. Today, the term 'asymmetrical warfare' is generally used to mean an effort by a party to a conflict that is weaker, overall, to offset advantages of the stronger party. The weaker party will assess the capacities of the stronger party and try to find areas—or methods of combat—where it can gain equality or even superiority. Of course, this strategy is not new, but has been the basis of many techniques, notably guerrilla warfare, which have been practised throughout history.[19] George Washington used it against the British and Hessians after the Battles of Trenton and Princeton in 1776,[20] as did General Francis ('the Swamp Fox') Marion in South Carolina. The term 'guerrilla' itself may derive from tactics used by Spaniards against Napoleon's army in the Peninsular War;[21] the Confederacy employed the technique in the American Civil War (e.g. cavalry raiders commanded by John Mosby and William Clarke Quantrill); Filipino opponents of American occupation (1898–1913) engaged in guerrilla warfare; and the technique was employed frequently in the twentieth century by a host of 'weaker' combatants, including the Chinese, Yugoslav, and Vietnamese communists, various national liberation movements, and resistance movements in major wars.

In general, instruments of asymmetrical warfare (i.e. used by the weak[er] party against the strong[er]) take several forms, but can be roughly divided into two broad and overlapping categories, the material and the moral. The modern application of terrorism as an element of asymmetrical warfare falls primarily into the latter category:

1. *Material elements:*
    1. Military equalizers, such as ambushes and unconventional weapons—e.g. improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—which have the advantage for insurgents/terrorists of being easy to fashion, but which, combined with guerrilla (insurgent) tactics, can be effective against much more sophisticated armaments within the battle space. For the perpetrator, terrorist attacks make up for inferiority in conventional military power, and thus, if not a true force equalizer, at least go some way to levelling the playing field in comparison with the military capacities of the government and its outside supporters.
    2. Degree of lethality or number of casualties, especially when unconventional weapons are used. (This is both a material and a moral factor.) This factor benefited the Islamist terrorists who attacked on 9/11 because of the instrument used—commercial airliners almost fully loaded with aviation fuel. So, too, there is greater fear of potential terrorism using true weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in part because of their potential lethality and level of physical destruction. However, WMDs can also have an added value for terrorists because of past employment of such weapons in warfare. Clearly, nuclear weapons are at the top of the scale, not just because of the potential destruction of even a single weapon, but because of memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the association of these weapons with the Cold War balance of terror. Radiological weapons have a similar potential for promoting fear, even though their lethality is far less, because of psychological attitudes regarding anything nuclear. Biological weapons would also have appeal to terrorists, not only because of their lethality, but because of their association with germ warfare and even the Black Death (bubonic plague) of the late Middle Ages. And chemical weapons, while at the bottom of the list in terms of potential lethality (along with their relatively low cost and relatively minor delivery-system problems), retain a significant potential for producing fear in part because of their use in the First World War and more recently by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
    3. Intelligence advantages, where fighters more familiar with the indigenous culture and language, as well as having superior local knowledge and contacts, can outperform more advanced intelligence-gathering, fusion, and interpretation capabilities.
    4. Relative economic (cost) advantages, as above with IEDs, in terms of the cost to a guerrilla or insurgent of a weapon or of a fighting soldier, versus the comparable cost of a fighting unit to more advanced military forces. However, relative costs also have to be factored in. Thus, where there is a vast disparity between the economies (wealth) of combatants, it may be economically less costly to an

advanced power to employ an expensive weapon than the employment of a notionally less expensive weapon would be to a less advanced adversary. (What, for example, was the relative cost of a primitive bridge destroyed by US bombing in North Vietnam versus the potential loss of an expensive military aircraft?)

2. *Moral (and Political) Factors:*
    1. Fostering or exploiting opposition to an unpopular local or regional government or other authority. This is a central feature both of insurgent tactics and of terrorism used by insurgents, including against civilians. The objective is to decrease the confidence of the civilian population in the government's capacity to provide protection and thereby to sap its popular support.
    2. Opposition to a foreign occupying force or one assisting the local government in countering the insurgency. Terrorism can be an important tool in reinforcing such opposition (nationalism) by underscoring the double penalty of tolerating a foreign presence (i.e. both the indignity or assault on national consciousness of the foreign presence and the personal risks that this can entail to the individual who becomes a target of insurgent terrorist actions).
    3. Competition between insurgents and their opponents in trying to seize the moral high ground in stigmatizing the techniques of the opponent as terrorist while characterizing one's own actions as purely defensive. This competition can be particularly important in efforts to seek external political support. (It also brings to mind Ronald Reagan's comment that 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'—which he immediately refuted: 'That's a catchy phrase, but also misleading.')[22]
    4. Appealing to outsiders, e.g. international institutions (such as the UN, etc.) or NGOs. This can include political opposition fostered by casualties inflicted on civilian populations by external military support of a government fighting an insurgency. This is a major element of psychological warfare on the part of insurgents, seeking to characterize insurgent terrorism as less objectionable or immoral than a foreign military force's counterterrorism response.
    5. Attempts to weaken political support in the homeland of a foreign occupier or counterinsurgent force through a variety of means, including the inflicting of casualties on the foreign forces, which are thus deemed by popular opinion at home to be out of proportion to the popularly-perceived stakes for that country in continuing the occupation or counterinsurgency. This was the most important practical impact of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam (January–February 1968). US, allied, and Vietnamese forces clearly prevailed militarily; but the psychological and political shock of the offensive played a major role in further promoting the US anti-war movement: the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese suffered a tactical defeat but gained a major strategic advantage.
    6. Mobilization of religious, ethnic, tribal, clan, cultural, or ideological loyalties or proclivities (either in support, opposition, or both). This has been a particular concern, especially in the West, since 9/11, as dramatized by the growth of Islamist terrorism—although the US and some other governments had for some time been preoccupied with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.[23] In this case, as

with other organizations and movements engaged in similar terrorism, this technique has not been directed primarily against a particular government, as a domestic issue or related to an insurgency, but rather against either a foreign government (e.g. the United States) or an even broader quality (e.g. Western or non-Islamic/Islamist culture and civilization).

7. Efforts to oppose activities in other countries or regions through terrorism, in support of allied, affiliated, or like-minded groups—e.g. insurgencies. This can include state-sponsored terrorism, where a government itself fosters terrorism, for purposes of weakening authorities of other countries or trying to sap political will, including through the targeting of civilians. This foreign sponsorship of terrorism can also include elements within a society—e.g. as often alleged regarding private individuals and religious groups in Saudi Arabia, providing material and ideological support for activities in other countries that either directly involve terrorism or help to promote it.
8. Efforts to make a point—e.g. to help motivate like-minded ideologically- or religiously-inspired individuals or groups in opposition to their enemies or perceived enemies. This has been particularly virulent in the rise of so-called Islamist terrorism, especially directed against the West (particularly the United States). The leveraging of relatively small actions to have a profound effect on major powers has proved to be effective, at least in provoking responses that terrorists seek as a recruiting device. The objective may not be to cause a political response *directly favourable* to the terrorists (e.g. a reduction or end of support for a government facing an insurgency) but rather to provoke *overreaction* that aids the terrorists' long-range goals. If the responding nation also damages itself through overreaction brought on by the *psychology* of the terrorist act (as opposed to the physical destruction or loss of life)—e.g. damage to its economy, loss of life in combat against the terrorists or their supporters, opportunity costs because of attention diverted from pursuit of other interests, or even erosion of domestic civil liberties—then the terrorists will have achieved a major leveraging of their actions. Thus *9/11 may have been the most heavily leveraged military action in history*, comparing the relatively small material cost of the terrorist act to the size, character, cost, and both short- and long-term implications and consequences of the responses.

Terrorism in the *Civilian* Domain

Terrorism in modern warfare is most often used in support of insurgencies, in order to have an impact either on the local situation or on outside supporters of established authorities. This application of terrorism requires a division between two targets: one is attacks on government officials or elites within a society—which can include judges, educators, religious leaders, and health professionals. It is designed not just to weaken the capacities of the state (the authorities) to govern, but also to deter other people from taking up such occupations.[24] The latter purpose introduces the element of randomness

in the application of terrorism precisely to have an enhancing effect—a *force multiplier*. This quality is found in the politically most effective terrorism, and thus is an important element of a unified definition of the overall phenomenon. The reasoning has two components. One is the distinction between individuals who are seen, by a population at large, as having some form of capacity as officials of a government being subjected to an insurgency or, more particularly, as members of the uniformed military or other security services. The other distinction is the factor of randomness among ordinary civilians—i.e. among people who are neither government officials nor security personnel. In both cases, the most important psychological and political effect of terrorism derives from the mental association that a non-involved civilian makes with someone who has been a victim of terrorist violence: 'There but for the Grace of God go I.'

Terrorism is thus most effective as a political or warfare instrument—as opposed to the use of a physically-destructive WMD—when it gains a force multiplier by engaging individuals who see themselves as part of the same class (identification) as those who have been targeted. Another central part of the mechanism is that members of the class in question translate their fear (*referred* fear, or terror by identification with individuals who have been attacked) into some political action that promotes the terrorists' objectives. Withdrawal of support for authorities is one such response; demands for protection against the perceived risk of being attacked are likely to be even more prevalent; a third response can be to press the authorities to adjust their policies and actions in order to lessen the likelihood of more terrorist violence. This last-named response can extend to pressure on authorities to cede power to the perpetrators of terrorism. It is the 'gold standard' for terrorists: to gain a political objective well out of proportion to their inherent power in classical economic or military terms. Where this tactic succeeds, the terrorist is the 'weak' gaining advantage over the 'strong'.

Thus, in political terms—as opposed to trying to weaken the authorities' capacity to employ force—terrorism is most effective when it is employed against civilians who see themselves as vulnerable simply by their existence—i.e. where nothing they have done has justified their being targeted and, by contrast, there is little or nothing they can do to avoid being a target, other than to absent themselves from the area, region, or even country and, where the element of surprise is involved, there is no forewarning of the need to do so. A potent example is provided by 9/11. The attack on the World Trade Center had a far greater psychological impact in the United States and elsewhere than did the attack on the Pentagon: the latter was a military establishment, and virtually everyone in the building was associated with the US government; but most victims in the World Trade Center were just 'average persons'. Thus assessment by non-combatants of a relatively high probability of becoming victims may have a greater impact on the translation of terrorist action into potential political effects (e.g., World Trade Center) than an assessment by non-combatants of a relatively low probability of becoming victims (e.g., the Pentagon), even in circumstances where there were the same number of casualties. Hence, the resonance in America, psychologically and politically, of isolated terrorist incidents in the US homeland that could not possibly pose a risk to the fabric of American society—like the so-called 'shoe bomber' on an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001 and the 'Christmas bombing' at the Detroit

Metro Airport in 2009—since millions of people regularly subject themselves to the loss of control over their immediate destiny that is inherent in air travel.[25] Of course, terrorists rely on modern media to inflate even relatively small incidents into proportions that can heighten fear and thus have political impact.

Terrorism involving civilians also tends to be enhanced as a political technique when it involves novelty, the unexpected, against which people have not armoured themselves psychologically. This may be one reason that terrorism in Great Britain committed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army lost at least some of its impact over time, as it became, if not commonplace, at least lacking in novelty value and hence the added fear-potential of being totally unexpected. This was in contrast to the intense popular response in Britain to the public transport bombings on 7 July 2005 (like the intense reaction in Spain to the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004). It is, of course, impossible to tell whether an event similar to 9/11, using a similar technique of hijacked commercial airlines (manned cruise missiles[26]) would have a similar psychological and political impact in the United States. It was striking that, beginning only a week after 9/11, there was a series of anthrax attacks in the United States. While this terrorism spawned some intense psychological reactions, they did not seem to be as intense as those which followed the 9/11 attacks. Part of the explanation was probably that casualties were few (twenty-two cases and five fatalities) and they were limited to government workers (postal workers and the US Senate) and employees of media outlets—not occupations with which the average American civilian would identify.[27] By happenstance, it may also be that, as a result of this terrorism, the American people have, to a degree, been somewhat inoculated against the fear of another anthrax terrorist attack, given the relatively low level of fatalities, thus potentially reducing its value to future terrorists as a weapon of choice.

This last point completes the definition of terrorism that is likely to be most useful, in terms of analysis and policy prescription. The definition here is not exhaustive; but it does provide a benchmark for understanding a phenomenon that shows no indication of lessening, in incidence or impact:

> An attack or attacks against non-combatants—often but not necessarily including a random character—so that a broader category of non-combatants (civilians) will identify with those attacked and react in ways that are designed by the attacker (terrorist) to have a political effect that he desires.

A Final Note

This discussion, especially in regard to terrorism's role in contemporary society, has focused primarily on its psychological dimension and—through it—on its political impact. In fact, it is possible to argue that, in the absence of significant destruction to people or property—including major elements of an advanced economy—the phenomenon of terrorism risks being overblown, itself potentially benefiting the political goals of terrorists. This does not reduce the pain and suffering to individuals who are victims; and

it offers no easy solution to dealing with the fact of fear, itself—the terrorists' 'coin of the realm'. But it is at least a call to try putting terrorism in perspective, to see it as one kind of warfare, rather than as something that, by its occurrence or its invocation as an explanation for some act of violence, inhibits analysis and reason and retards the crafting of responses that can deprive the terrorist of at least some of his capacity to inspire fear, to gain political effect, and thus to continue seeing merit in using this technique.

Notes

1. Tony Judt, 'Israel Without Clichés,' *New York Times*, 10 June 2010.
2. The watchman, in Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, trans. Robert Fagles.
3. This included the designation of countering terrorism, as part of a 'long war', as the most important task in the 2006 US Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review. See *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 6 February 2006, at http://www.defense.gov/QDR/archive/20060206qdr1.html (accessed 22 October 2010).
4. Pliny the Younger, *Letters*, VI.16.
5. Other regimes have engaged in mass slaughter of their own peoples, with or without physical torture of individuals, notably, in terms of the number of people (or the percentage of a total population) killed, Mao Zedong's China and Pol Pot's Cambodia.
6. Cf. George Orwell, *1984*, 1949: 71. The ultimate objective of terrorism was found in the final words of the novel: '…it was all right, everything was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.'
7. See Schivelbusch, 2001: 290.
8. Ibid. 8.
9. Thus both sides in the American War of Independence employed violence against civilians—though practised more by the British and their mercenary allies—as did different groups of 'civilians' against one another. On the latter, see, for example, Leiby, 1980. This was, in fact, the first US 'civil war'. (Terror, labelled as such, was also at times a deliberate tactic. See, for instance: 'Chapter Twenty-Six, War Out of Niagara: I. General Sullivan Spread Terror Along the Border', June 1779, in Commager and Morris, 1958.)
10. Hence, terms that arose in the South like 'The War Between the States' and 'The War of Northern Aggression'.
11. See Introduction to *On War*, Clausewitz, 1976: xxx.
12. See, for example, Messenger, 1984; and Taylor, 2004.
13. It was precisely the acceptance by each side that their cities would be left completely vulnerable to nuclear devastation by the other side—codified in the 'Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems', 26 March 1972.
14. The process was aided by many other factors, notably the *Conference On Security and Co-Operation In Europe Final Act* on 1 August 1975 (the Helsinki Final Act).
15. This was, in fact, 'incipient' power; translating the potential of power into influence is quite another matter.
16. A similar calculus, with a psychological-political basis, can be applied to the impact within a society of casualties in conflict, however they are produced. Thus the Vietnam War produced domestic opposition in the United States that eventually led it to withdraw; whereas there has been no comparable public opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of this no doubt derives from the relative number of casualties; but some derives

from the relative vulnerability to becoming casualties on the part of significant parts of the US civilian population: the difference between conscription during most of the Vietnam War and its absence now.

17. The United States has had a long history of *domestic* terrorism, notably some in opposition to the labour movement, some against minorities like Native Americans, and a lot in opposition to the rights of African-Americans.
18. The Irish historically experienced English terrorism, as did the Scots.
19. See, for example, Darius' being incommoded by the Scythian means of fighting, 512 BC (Herodotus, *The Persian Wars*, 4.127). The guerrilla tactics employed by the Welsh leader, Owen Glendower, who would melt into the mists of the borderlands, were the origin of Shakespeare's jest: 'Glendower: "I can call spirits from the vasty deep." Hotspur: "Why, so can I, or so can any man; But will they come when you do call for them?" '(*Henry IV, Part I*, Act 3, Scene 1).
20. See Fischer, 2004: ch. 18, 'The Forage War'.
21. See, for example, Chartrand, 2004.
22. Reagan, 1986.
23. See, for instance 'Times topics: Osama bin Laden,' *New York Times*: http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/b/osama_bin_laden/index.html (accessed 22 October 2010).
24. This tactic was widely employed by the Viet Cong in Vietnam.
25. See Elliott, 2002; and 'Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet', *New York Times*, 26 December 2009.
26. The 9/11 attacks were thus not conducted through the media of WMD—weapons of mass destruction—but rather by WMPD—weapons of mass psychological disruption.
27. See, for instance, CDCP, 2002.

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PART IV

THE STRATEGIC CONDUCT OF WAR

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CHAPTER 14

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND WAR

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

> Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.
>
> Aristotle, 'On the Origins and Nature of Tyranny'

Strategic leadership in war concerns the achievement of national political aims and organization of all national means to that end. In the wake of France's disastrous defeat in the Seven Years War the Comte de Guibert posed two questions: How to do better next time? Could war be fought in a different way? He offered four prescriptions. First, to succeed in war required a truly national effort beyond the purely military because the armed forces of France's coalition enemies would always be more numerous. Second, although somewhat quaint to contemporary Western thinkers, general conscription was essential. Third, sound logistics was a prerequisite for success and must be designed for the war at hand. Fourth, military flexibility was critical, with armies moving as independent formations.[1] Above all, Guibert believed morale was vital—not just military morale but that of the wider nation. In effect, Guibert was addressing a very modern problem—how to organize large means in pursuit of even larger ends and sustain the effort through inevitable setbacks.

Guibert concludes that the political and strategic are pre-eminent even if it is the operational and the material which meet the direct challenge. Guibert is thus very much a man of his Enlightenment age expressing an understanding of the relationship between means, ends, and morale which is the essence of sound strategic leadership. Sadly, it is the poor investment of inadequate Western means in pursuit of global strategic ends that have done so much to make the West look far weaker than it is in the first years of the twenty-first century.

In a sense strategic leadership is above war because its first duty (as much as is possible) is to decide whither war. Moreover, strategic leadership is itself a function of the position of a state in the hierarchy of prestige. Where one stands most definitely reflects where one sits.[2] However, once war has begun, strategic leadership requires an understanding of all elements of strategy—the successful organization and application of one's means to a satisfactory conclusion. Often known as war aims, they may transmute and mutate marginally in light of events but it is the job of the strategic leader to ensure all effort and purpose is made to fulfil them. Such leadership is by definition complex and difficult. Too much interference in military strategy can result in disasters such as Gallipoli in which strategy is beyond the means and wit of the military. Too little can result in disasters such as Verdun and the Somme in which the military is beyond the control of strategy. Effective strategic leadership thus rests upon consistent and informed strategic judgements.

Such leadership is not always forthcoming in war. Indeed, military leaders must often be restrained from acting *in loco* strategic leadership. Equally, the need for informed political judgement places a particular emphasis on the role of military chiefs in strategic leadership. Indeed, strategic leadership only makes sense if ends, means, strategy, and narrative are in balance. If not, planning rather than positive change becomes the story and an end in itself. 'Winning' is reduced to process and measured merely in terms of time spent in theatre and lives lost as part of a false story of success crafted to permit departure. Moltke the Younger once famously said that all plans essentially fail on contact with the enemy. He was in essence making the case for flexibility, realism, and patience. However, in the absence of such patience, requiring as it does political courage, armed forces will be asked to achieve far too much, too quickly, probably with nothing like enough resources. Indeed, strategic leadership must be built on a strong partnership between civilian and military leader with each knowing his place. Without trust a very real danger exists that responsibility for political failure will be imposed upon military leaders and undue risk transferred onto the 'poor bloody infantry' who in the end have to make ill-conceived strategy work.

Therefore, this chapter explores strategic leadership in war through the lens of both strategic and military art and science both ancient and modern. Specifically, the chapter considers the relationship between strategy, leadership, and planning. The core message is clear: to succeed, politicians and military leaders together must foster a new civil-military partnership able to generate the forces and resources to meet twenty-first-century challenges.

Fighting Wars of Limited Choice—the Simple Question of Winning

Alfred von Schlieffen once reacted to the suggestion that the art of war was essentially simple with the tart response that it was indeed very simple—it was a simple question of winning.[3] Today, one rarely wins and one can all too easily lose. Therefore, new

euphemisms are appearing for leaders to justify ends other than winning. Indeed, the greater the distance from success the greater the number and the greater the complexity of euphemisms used. Contemporary strategic leadership must thus grapple with an essential dilemma. How to 'win' in complex places over time and distance, given that cosseted Western societies lack strategic patience and political realism. Indeed, it is the very lack of strategic patience that is inimical to effective strategic leadership. Such a problem is more than mere strategic semantics. It makes Western militaries force an unlikely military-strategic pace, making the place and the people fit the plan, rather than the plan fit the place and the people.

Paradoxically, to 'win' modern war Western leaders may have to abandon the political Enlightenment which has shaped them and which insists wars can only be fought if the outcome is the transformation of the 'other' into a likeness of oneself. Counter-intuitively, grand strategy and the strategic leadership of the West may need to become far more modest. Success henceforth will be the absence of threat.

At the military-strategic level the consequences of grand strategic over-reach are profound. Much of the challenge of strategic leadership is to understand the difference between strategy and tactics and not conflate the two. This is not easy. As strategy fails the temptation is seductive to define success in terms of effort on the ground made rather than outcomes sought. Such strategic sleight of hand may indeed work in the short term because it creates a narrative of false success by emphasizing the strategically marginal: the number of enemy body bags versus one's own, the number of schools built, the number of hospitals equipped, etc., etc. However, ruthless honesty is critical to the high-level conduct of war (strategic leadership), requiring an unremitting focus on the strategic objective, openness to change and adaptation, but above all unity of purpose and effort based on a firm grip of reality. To that end, strategic leadership in war demands consistent coherence between political objectives, the political strategy, and the politico-military and military organization.

In today's world such a goal will require a very different kind of informed relationship between political and military leaders and publics. Traditionally, strategic leadership for the likes of von Bülow, Jomini, and Clausewitz (all of whom still inform Western military thought) concerned the movements of armies on campaign by military professionals. Today, wars of limited choice, i.e. wars that must be fought but which do not pose an immediate existential threat to the state, are no longer the preserve of military professionals. Moreover, they permit leaders only limited powers of taxation over society. This places a particular premium on Guibert's first dictum: to mobilize the nation behind the mission.

Critically, it is the complex nature of such wars which makes sound strategic leadership both essential and difficult. Wars today are fought to construct rather than destruct. The strategic objective is the after-war. Wars are thus fought to fashion stability from chaos through stable institutions for which close and intense civil-military bureaucratic cooperation is a prerequisite. Moreover, given the corrosive nature of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, the shaping and conduct of strategy takes place in public view. This places particular importance on what, to paraphrase Saxe and Puysegur, might be termed the

order of political battle. Clausewitz was indeed correct: war only makes sense as a function of social intercourse and must be planned as such. After all, social intercourse continues after war. Thus, war should indeed be an act of policy (i.e. a set of political choices and conduct).[4]

Strategic Leadership and the Role of Armed Forces

Consequently, contemporary strategic leadership opens an important debate about the role of armed forces in national security and defence policy. Armed forces must of course maintain the exclusive legitimate monopoly over the use of lethal power which is their primary purpose. However, they are today required to do so much more with so many more partners than has traditionally been the case. It is thus interesting to note the extent to which the essential geometry of the eighteenth century still informs the language of military leaders and planners alike. Centres of gravity, culminating points, bases and lines of operation, and theatres and zones of operation were all invented by the likes of Jomini and Clausewitz, designed to bring strategic order to the mind of commanders on both sides in a classical war. That is not to deny the utility of such concepts but to lament their often very narrow interpretation. Indeed, contemporary operations with their emphasis on presence rather than strike as the essential platform for stability are by nature defensive and negate such Jominian concepts as the need for internal lines of communication and force concentration.

Indeed, it is striking, the extent to which the Western way of war still reflects the thinking of a long dead age. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century European war had become highly ritualized, reflecting mutual and shared principles of cultural order. However, in today's conflicts there is no such shared order. Rather, the adversary specifically avoids acknowledging 'rules of the game' by endeavouring to reduce war to a Hobbesian state of nature in which anarchy negates the enemy's sources of power, better enabling them to exploit the Western 'weaknesses' of open and ordered society.[5] Thus, asymmetric warfare (of which terrorism is but one form of engagement) is a logical response rather than an aberration. Indeed, conflict today is essentially between the indirect strategic approach of prepared extremist fanatics and weak state backers and the direct approach of ill-prepared Western civilians. To paraphrase Stanley Baldwin, in such circumstances the terrorist will sooner or later always get through.[6]

Therefore, cotemporary strategic leadership must seek a new balance between societal protection, enhanced resiliency, and influence projection. Flexibility and partnership are thus key, both formal and informal and between armed forces, other government departments, and allies and partners across the international community. However, such partnerships are rarely sequential or linear, whilst armed forces, which remain essentially conservative organizations, view control over space and people as essential.

Effective strategic leadership in the first instance must promote new ways of doing business (a doctrine).

For second-rank status-quo powers this is vital, particularly in Europe. Britain and France are cases in point. To paraphrase Neville Chamberlain, Britain and France are in danger of becoming small countries far away from the centre of power about which they know little, locked as they are in a parochial struggle for the leadership of the irrelevant. For them strategy in an age of austerity must ensure effectiveness and efficiency are partners rather than contenders. As Clausewitz said, 'The best strategy is always to be strong, first in general and then at the decisive point.' No European can afford to be strong in the round and thus choices must be made.

The New Context of Strategic Leadership

The relationship between strategic leadership and planning is as intimate as it is critical. Indeed, strategic leadership thus concerns 'big' planning, i.e. creating true synergy between strategic planning, defence planning, operational planning, and logistics planning. It is not without some irony, as China re-emerges on the world stage, that the contrast between the big military thought of the Chinese ancients (Sun Tzu, Lao Tzu et al.) and the often military-technical trivia of much of the West reflects the fact that only armed forces have real planning power. In the absence of strategic leadership planning can become a metaphor for process—heat rather than light.

The object of planning for the West is order. Indeed, order is the natural state, a form of Tao (cosmic harmony), war being but an evil necessity prior to the return to Western-defined order. At the end of the four-hundred-year Euro-centric world there are deep psychological reasons for this. The very creation of the nation-state in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia testifies to the searing impact of religious intolerance on the European and Western political psyche. Indeed, in the aftermath of Westphalia, secularizing conflict through the gradual creation of the nation-state promoted a cult of order, central to which was a new partnership between the leader and led in which order (i.e. the absence of chaos) was the public security good. Planning became thus the father of the Enlightenment because order and rationality were themselves the basis of a 'sacred geometry', the absence of which by necessity fathers chaos.[7] In effect, order became religion.

However, the Enlightenment did not end war; rather it made war a civilizing tool. War became an instrument of rationality. Traditionally war had been a consequence of a state of nature in which 'all were against all', in which life was but 'nasty brutish and short'.[8] Indeed, the very organization of war ended a state of nature for it supposedly constrained anarchy. Ergo, order became the natural state for the West with norms and values, with war only justifiable in Europe as an *ultima ratio* to move from one order to

another and beyond Europe as the violent dawn of civilization. War between European nation-states thus became entwined with ideas of power as much as for power itself. Strategic leadership thus became progressively ideological.

For three hundred years following Westphalia Europe created a platform for the expansion and extension of Western ideals, structure, and power, and strategic leadership worked to that end. Indeed, structure followed power and thus the organization of power and structure became the essence of strategic leadership. Through empire Western order and structure were exported worldwide. Naturally, such order came at a price for those so ordered—the exploitation of people and resources in return for the public good that is order and the planning that necessarily partnered it.

There were attempts to overthrow the European order—cycles of Islamic revisionism were built on a collective memory of the Crusades between 1095 and 1291. The Mahdi famously challenged the might of the British Empire in the upper Nile in the late nineteenth century but no locally- or regionally-based caliphate could hope to challenge the planning might and power of the British Empire. In the wake of the First World War, as oil became the commodity of the new industrialization, the expansion of the Western state to the Middle East came at the expense of the Caliphate. Indeed, the very heart of the Caliphate, the age-old Ottoman Empire was abandoned as the Kamalist state embraced Westphalia, its means and ends, and practice and process that are the stuff of the nation-state. To some extent the Caliphate defined the anti-state and an alternative vehicle for strategic leadership.

Furthermore, the anti-state was never fully defeated. Much of the world tolerated Western expansionism, took those parts of its order and planning that would embed the powerful in power, but then rejected (or played with) those elements which ceded control. This made many new states inherently unstable. In the space of thirty years the First World War and Second World War effectively ended European grand strategic leadership. Indeed, European strategic leadership itself became unfashionable as America and Russia supplanted the old European powers.

Elsewhere, the nation-state was seen increasingly as a consequence of oppression and false order. Indeed, in Arab nationalism a new force for leadership emerged from the Arab heartlands that harked back to the Caliphate. For their Wahhabi leaders the earthly order of the infidel was the order of a false Prophet. Indeed, struggle against such imposed order, the geometry of Western power, the organization of Western war offered freedom through chaos. Indeed, chaos became a way of achieving the absolute freedom of faith, with chaos increasingly an end in itself precisely because chaos could not be ordered. And so the global anti-state movement that is Al Qaeda was born.

The threat posed by Al Qaeda created a conflict between two essentially very old ideas—faith and state. Whereas the titanic struggle of the Cold War was essentially a Western argument about the nature of strategic leadership—planning, order, and the state. This new struggle became increasingly about how to replace the state or to accommodate two very different ideas within it. It had always been there but had been missed during the systemic struggles of empires and the Cold War. Indeed, such were the forces involved on both sides of the state struggle and the self-obsession as each planned to

out-perform and out-organize the other that this quintessential struggle for and over modernism ignored the forces of pre-modernism. Consequently, proxy war after proxy war offered little from the post-imperial West other than destruction and death, possibly the death of the entire planet. For many the secularism and the planning and order that were born of it seemed suicidal.

Contemporary Strategic Leadership and Trinitarian War

Clausewitz wrote that:

> War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical Trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and of enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people, the second the commander and his army, the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.[9]

The Clausewitzian trinity—civil strategic leadership, military leadership, and popular support—is a vital prerequisite for all states at war. Crucially, the essence of the trinity implies no hierarchy between the constituting elements, and yet they are strongly interlinked, particularly in a world governed by massive change, massive insecurity, want, and naive power. Certainly, most European states conform to Clausewitz's metaphor of an object suspended between three magnets. This makes strategic leadership a very complex set of political and command interactions.

Clausewitz of course assumed that war was an affair of states (or governments). He was after all a child of the Enlightenment. However, if the actors in a war comprise more than states, the trinity mutates. This creates a real dilemma for strategic leadership. European integration implies the creation of a greater whole to afford security but at the cost of control. By implication the very search for collective security diminishes the importance and influence of the state. Raymond Aron remarked that the relationship between the head of state and the people is and will always remain the backbone of the trinity. Aron suggested that 'Clausewitz's emphasis on moral forces results from his interpretation of war as a social activity in which men are involved as a whole people—army, leaders, head of state—all interdependent, the moral union of the people and the sovereign constituting the ultimate foundation of the state.'[10] This raises a particular challenge for

strategic leadership in small states in which their very weakness would appear to absolve them of responsibility whilst reinforcing a sense of 'morality'. For many people war is a bad thing in itself and thus can never be justified as an instrument and because of weakness will likely never be used as policy.

Rupert Smith is surely correct when he argues that all three elements are vital for effective strategic leadership. 'It is my experience in both national and international operations that without all three elements of the trinity it is not possible to conduct a successful operation, especially not over time.'[11] However, generating and maintaining the trinity is harder for states with little or no ability to shape or influence either events or partners directly and Smith perhaps fails to make that distinction. Smith also points to another Clausewitzian concept of war which he affords great practical value, but which nevertheless is alien to the traditions of leadership in many countries. War is both a product of a 'trial of strength' and a 'clash of wills', and, 'if we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of the available means and the strength of the will.'[12]

Will is a vital factor in effective strategic leadership. In industrial war overwhelming force was used to crush the enemy's army (the centre of an enemy's gravity), with the aim of causing the will of the state to collapse. Although the use by the British and Americans, during the Second World War, of strategic bombing against the German people suggests that the understanding of what constituted the centre of gravity was already shifting, even if Nazi Germany was only defeated when its armed forces were crushed. However, Smith implies an interesting dichotomy between the American and European method when he states that:

> In our current circumstances it is actually the will of the people that is often the objective being sought—yet there is still a tendency to use overwhelming military force in the belief that winning the trial of strength will deliver the will of the opponent. But Clausewitz emphasized the two factors equally… meaning it is well to examine each situation to decide on the relationship between them.[13]

The role of the media is of course critical to effective strategic leadership. Indeed, in effect the media links the three elements of the Clausewitzian trinity in many democratic states: civil power, military leadership, and the population. However, some degree of censorship is necessary to protect strategic and operational security. Even in democracies the public is not entitled to know everything about sensitive operations. Moreover, it has been long assumed that whatever concerns national media may express about such constraints they are basically 'on side'. The globalization of the media and its many freelance operatives has seen an emerging self-view as an impartial arbiter between leader, armed forces and adversary, further complicating sound strategic leadership. There will certainly never be an ideal and natural balance between the need to maintain sensitive information discreet and the access rights of the Press.

Effective contemporary strategic leadership rests on three pillars; legality, legitimacy, and legions. However, there is a fourth pillar—institutions. In many ways these pillars are but the flip side of strategic weakness in which the absence of capability is replaced

by other forms of non-lethal coercion, most notably the body of laws and conventions. Equally, they are vital tools for strategic leadership. For example, arms control after all is part of defence policy because it denotes weapon systems that need not be afforded. Therefore, even if nation-states remain the essential building blocks of geopolitical relations (even during the struggle with the anti-state), international institutions provide the framework within which most powers exercise limited strategic sovereignty and with it bounded strategic leadership—both in peace and war. International institutions thus provide the all-important legal frameworks for strategic leadership in which coalitions of states can act together to preserve and restore international stability and security. Such actions may include military campaigns against aggressive states, interventions in internal state conflicts and/or against non-state entities. In other words, one of the fundamental pillars of strategic leadership is investment in its own constraint to prevent extreme state behaviour. Institutions such as NATO and the EU are important precisely because they legitimize the use of coercion whilst they offer at least the prospect of cost-effective aggregation. However, the implicit contract in such a deal—the security of the most powerful in return for a sharing of strategic responsibilities—also entails a loss of strategic leadership as one can all too easily be led into the wars of the powerful, whose choices are often paradoxically even more limited than those of the weak. This is especially so when it is the very state power that is the target of the anti-state. Al Qaeda attacked the US not simply because of its Judaeo-Christian heritage but because it is the superpower. Logically, European strategic leadership raises a fundamental question—in the face of such a threat is security afforded by being close to such power or by keeping one's distance?

Therefore, a profound question for contemporary leaders concerns the balance they must strike between the benefits of collective action and the loss of strategic freedom of manoeuvre. Moreover, if one continually cedes sovereignty the tools of sovereignty will begin to be shaped by such loss—particularly armed forces, which can become unbalanced. It is the mother of all strategic judgements to be made.

How to do Better

One of the leading British thinkers in the *interbellum*, J. F. C. Fuller, laid out six principles of war which today inform most Western military planners: the selection and maintenance of the aim, proper understanding of the point at which the enemy is likely to be decisively defeated, the need for sufficient mass of forces to dominate an opponent, the maintenance of the offensive, the security of the force, and surprise and freedom of movement.[14] To some extent such principles also inform effective strategic leadership, albeit adapted.

Six principles of strategic leadership would thus reflect a renewed marriage between strategic art and science (judgement and knowledge) and military art and science.

Vitally, distinctions between strategic planning, defence planning, force planning, and operational planning would be far better understood than they are today by those that lead for the very simple reason that a more effective division could then be established between civilian and military power tools and in the minds of the leader with both possibilities and constraints firmly gripped before they go to war.

Fuller's principles of strategic leadership would thus read as follows: the selection and maintenance of the minimum aim with all national and coalition resources needed to achieve such an aim (good governance in-theatre); a proper political strategy to distinguish between and to exploit reconcilable and irreconcilable elements to a conflict and to build framework alliances with states in region; sufficient coercive mass to intimidate, contain, and turn irreconcilables allied to sufficient co-optive mass to offer both a political solution and improved life quality; the maintenance of the political and media offensive to lead the 'message'; acceptable security of the force to keep the body count to a justifiable minimum, including those of civilian contractors and the newly established host government; the denial of all safe havens for irreconcilables and the freedom of movement of both forces and resources to ensure momentum towards the political objective. The alternative is simple but brutal—a punishment strategy.

The resource principle is critical to effective strategic leadership. US General Omar Bradley once said that amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics, whilst Sun Tzu put it succinctly; 'money is the sinews of war'.[15] Sound strategic leadership is of course about forces but it is really about the generation and efficient use of resources that are commensurate with the aim—which is not the case in Afghanistan today. Indeed, many of the small militaries in Afghanistan have been effectively swamped by the size of a challenge for which they lack both force and resource, which explains why so many of them went in the first place with the minimum force possible. It is a mark of the extent to which so many Europeans have ceded strategic leadership to the Americans that 'grand strategy' primarily concerns the extent of the bribe to be paid to Washington to maintain its leadership.

There is a further challenge implied by the six principles: what end to plan for? Indeed, the question of what to plan for has always been a central dilemma in war. Here the ancients are of only limited utility. Destroying enemy-state centres of gravity (most notably opposing armed forces) is all well and good within a single culture and within a power struggle between comparable state structures. However, when faced with a situation in which there are either no or many such centres the only option is either to construct an alternative centre of gravity or keep all others off balance. The latter approach was adopted by the British Raj in Afghanistan for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century and not without some success.

Today, strategic leadership must think and act laterally and address constantly a simple but pivotal question: can war be fought another way? Guibert was obsessed by the Seven Years War as much as Fuller was obsessed by the First World War. In effect, they wanted to fight the last war better when in fact they should also have been also considering the fighting of the next war. It may well be that the dangers posed by ungoverned spaces and

the interactions therein are the stuff of armed forces for the foreseeable future. However, history is full of sudden strategic shocks and the need to reconstitute force away from effective presence to credible mass could happen quickly. Strategic leaders must always keep that in mind. In the absence of informed political leadership it is often the military who decide (when and if the Services can ever agree) the shape of strategy, policy, and force, and they will always tend to want to do what they are doing better. Sound strategic leadership must ensure such decisions are informed by the military but keep the making of decisions away from them. Leaders must always retain the right to say no.

Effective strategic leadership also requires the exerting of influence over allies and partners. Coalitions are normally led by one major power or superpower. Normally, a coalition or alliance leader defines plans and parameters of operations. Power, after all, talks. However, to sustain a coalition, planning must reflect the strengths and weaknesses of all members. Incumbent upon the strategic leadership of the powerful is the need to say to allies more than 'here is my plan, now follow it'. This danger is increasingly apparent in Afghanistan in which a harassed America keen to get out and making 90 per cent of the effort is ignoring the allies. The USA plans on the basis of its forces and resources and thus the assumptions reflect American power. If smaller, weaker partners are fitted into such a plan they can be embarrassed because they lack the 'boots and the loot' to meet American planning assumptions. Of course, international institutions such as NATO are there to ensure a smooth relationship between size and performance. However, the American effort has become so dominant that NATO has been effectively supplanted by US Central Command as the planning nexus, leaving partners with a Hobson's Choice—either risk the breaking of their limited militaries by trying to keep up with American momentum or quit.

Critically, strategic leadership keeps the public committed to a war but understands that strategy must shift with the fortunes of war. In the past appeals to patriotism or jingoism would suffice. Defeats were concealed, victories exaggerated, and a compliant and pliant Press would duly oblige. Such an approach is no longer tenable. Consequently, the role of the public diplomacy becomes ever more important. As Sun Tzu states; 'The first of these factors is moral influence . . . by moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.'[16] Too often political leaders give the impression that war 'is nothing to do with me, guv'.

Above all, effective strategic leadership must insist upon the right of strategic leadership. Such leadership ultimately reflects political choices which must be imposed on military commanders, who by their very nature will always seek to draw more power to themselves in a crisis. Indeed, leaders must force militaries to look beyond stove-pipes. To that end, Wei Liao Tzu suggested that a commander-in-chief needed a chief of planning, five planning officers, three astrologers, three topographers, nine strategists or staff officers 'responsible for discussing divergent views', four supply officers, and a range of officers to ensure discipline and gather intelligence, as well as engineers, doctors, and accountants. Today, a commander-in-chief needs a constant flow of divergent views filtered to effect and it is the job of leaders to insist upon such views. This helps the creation

of a pan-planning culture that involves key civilians in the planning process and boths promote ownership of the plan beyond the military and reminds the military that they are means to a civilian end.

Critically, sound strategic leadership must be built on knowledge. However, expertise is too often sought and drawn from narrow, self-interested bureaucratic elites which in the absence of an existential threat place bureaucratic politics above strategic success. Much more needs to be made of extensive knowledge communities across the planning spectrum because insight is a critical commodity in war. Indeed, 'knowledge' is not just actionable intelligence but rather the context of information and the art of 'knowing', knowing oneself and others. As Sun Tzu states, 'know them and know yourself'.[17] This is not just the very essence of military strategy but of sound strategic leadership and a critical comparative advantage for most Western states. However, to realize and release such a commodity into the security and defence realm requires a new concept: the formal education of leaders—civilian and military alike—in matters grand strategic, security, and defence. To that end, both political and military leaders would do well to avoid the treatment of social scientists as a dog treats a lamppost, as one American officer once put it. Knowledge is after all the very essence of informed strategic judgement.

Sound strategic leadership is built on strategic judgement, which is turn is based on knowledge and planning. However, it is ultimately a question of leadership—pure and simple.

Notes

1. Guibert famously said that 'standing armies, while a *burden* on the people, are inadequate for the achievement of great and decisive results in war, and meanwhile the mass of the people, untrained in arms, degenerates. The *hegemony* over Europe will fall to that nation which . . . becomes possessed of manly virtues and *creates a national army*.'
2. Graham Allison's model of bureaucratic politics stated that where a bureaucratic actor 'stands' on any given issue is determined by where he or she 'sits' (Viotti and Kauppi, 1990: 203).
3. The Schlieffen Plan for the invasion of Belgium marks a failure of strategic leadership. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg once proudly recalled after the First World War that it had never been his 'business to comment upon grand strategy'. He noted that 'there never took place during my entire period in office a sort of war council at which politics were brought into the military for and against'. It would be difficult to find a greater abrogation of political responsibility. See Herwig, 1998: 71.
4. Clausewitz wrote: 'We see, therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means' (Clausewitz, 1982: 119).
5. Hobbes described the state of nature as a 'dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge . . . no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no

commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short' (Tuck, 1991: 89).

6. In 1932 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin remarked that: 'The bomber will always get through. The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves': www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/stanleybal166817.html (accessed 30 April 2011).
7. In the 1720s Jacques Francois de Chastenet, Marquis de Puysegur wrote, 'The Art of War by Principles and Rules' in which he wrote, 'without war, without troops, without an army, without having to leave one's home, simply by means of study, with a little geometry and geography' (Creveld, 2000: 85).
8. Tuck, 1991: 89.
9. Clausewitz, 1982: 128.
10. Aron, 1983: 120.
11. Smith, 2005: 58.
12. Clausewitz, 1982: 104.
13. Smith, 2005: 59.
14. Today the US Army espouses nine principles of war: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. See, 'Introduction to the Principles of War and Operations', at www.uc.armyrotc/ms2text/msl_201_102b_intro_to_principal, 171.
15. Van Creveld, 2000: 30.
16. Handel, 2001: 119.
17. Ibid. 215.

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CHAPTER 15

INTELLIGENCE AND WAR

SIR PAUL LEVER

Wars are won or lost as a result of a series of individual military events. These can be small (the detonation of an Improvised Explosive Device killing a single soldier); or large (the battle of Kursk, the biggest land battle ever, involved around four million men and thirteen thousand tanks). But in each case the goal is the same: to gain a decisive advantage, by destroying the enemy's forces and equipment, gaining territory at the enemy's expense, or undermining the willingness of the enemy to continue fighting.

Success can be achieved in a number of ways: through predominance in numbers or in equipment, better organization and tactics, superior morale and leadership, or surprise. But a crucial element in the planning and execution of any military operation is information: information about the terrain and the weather conditions, but above all information about the enemy's force numbers, dispositions, and intentions. This is why, both in the real world of war and in the portrayal of it in films and in novels, every military mission begins with a so-called intelligence briefing.

Information, Intelligence, and Secret Intelligence

The terms 'intelligence' and 'information' are often used interchangeably. Indeed in the German language the word 'Nachrichten' is used both in the name of the Federal External Intelligence Agency (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and as the title of television news programmes. But in war there is particular value in information which is not readily or openly available. So the word 'intelligence' tends to be employed to connote information some of which at least falls into this latter category.

But the fact that a piece of information is not readily available does not mean that it cannot be discovered through research. In recent times the advent of search engines such as Google and Yahoo have revolutionized access to knowledge. But even in the

pre-Google age careful reading of newspapers or scientific publications could often yield vital clues to help the build-up of an intelligence picture.

Today most serious intelligence agencies recognize the value of open source material and seek to maximize their capabilities for accessing it. There are far more analysts behind desktop computers than there are spies in the field. Nonetheless there will always remain a core of information which is kept secret and which cannot be found on any public database and which can therefore only be discovered by clandestine or special technical means. Such information, so-called 'secret intelligence', is the stuff of espionage legend and is still the reason why governments maintain special capabilities to acquire it.

Secret intelligence

There are three broad types of secret intelligence: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Photo-reconnaissance. The categories relate to the method of collection, rather than to the content or nature of what is collected. Each has its own characteristics, advantages, and limitations.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

HUMINT means intelligence acquired from human sources. It may be collected directly or indirectly. The provider of the intelligence may do so wittingly or unwittingly. He/she may or may not know to whom it is being provided. His/her confidence in its accuracy may or may not be high. The chain of provision may be simple or complex. There may or may not be wider motives at play. The intelligence itself may be oral or documentary. These potential variations illustrate both the value of human intelligence and its frailty.

Human intelligence is the classic type of espionage. It has also, in the English-speaking world at any rate, entered our language and our culture. Books, films, TV programmes, and plays have focused on spies and their activities; indeed many practitioners of espionage have themselves been, or have become, literary figures. Terms such as agent, case officer, handler, honey trap, dead letter box, cutout, coat trailing, and walk-in have become part of our entertainment vocabulary.

At one extreme human intelligence can provide the crown jewels of the espionage world: the document setting out the detailed order of battle of an opponent's armed forces, or the technical specifications and performance data of a new weapons system, handed over by or obtained from someone who can testify that they are genuine.

Such cases have occurred (the material provided to British intelligence by Colonel Penkovsky and by the British nuclear scientists Allan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs to Soviet intelligence fell into this category) and still do. But they are rare. It is much more common for human intelligence reports to be less than clear-cut in their content, their origin, and their reliability. This in turn means that they need analysis or commentary before they can be of real use to policy-makers or military commanders.

Among the questions which need to be answered in relation to any piece of intelligence received from human sources are:-

- Who is the person providing it and how confident can we be in his/her identity? Could he/she be a plant or a double agent?
- Does he/she have a previous track record of intelligence provision? If so, how regular and reliable has it been?
- What access does he/she have to the material being provided? How does he/she know that the document is authentic or that the views or facts being conveyed are true?
- What are his/her motives in providing the material? Political? Moral? Money? Blackmail?
- Does he/she have a personal agenda? Is he/she seeking to influence as well as to inform?
- Does he/she know to whom the information is being provided or is it the product of a so-called 'false flag' operation?

Despite these uncertainties human intelligence has unique features which enable it, in some cases, to provide insights which no other form of intelligence collection can offer. Markus Wolf, the Head of the Hauptverwaltung für Aufklärung (Foreign Intelligence Department) of the Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic from 1952 to 1986, and probably the most successful spymaster since the Second World War, described them in his autobiography as follows:

> No technical method can substitute for good human intelligence and judgement . . . you can intercept a phone call, but without a sense of the context it is easy to misinterpret; a satellite photo can tell you where the missiles are at the moment but a source in the military command can tell you where they are headed. The problem with technical intelligence is that it is essentially information without evaluation. Technical intelligence can only record what has happened so far—not what might happen in the future. Human sources can give information about plans, can analyse the political and military outlook, and can place documents and conversations in context.

This emphasis on the human factor is understandable from someone whose personal skills lay in the development of techniques in this area. (Wolf is particularly known for his employment of 'Romeo' spies to cultivate vulnerable women with access to classified information in West Germany and at NATO.) For most of his professional career technical intelligence did indeed suffer from the limitations which he noted. But in more recent times it is in the technical field where the most significant breakthroughs in intelligence gathering and analysis have occurred.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Particularly so in relation to SIGINT. As the name suggests such intelligence is derived from the interception of communications. The communications can be between people, sometimes referred to as COMINT (Communications Intelligence); or between machines,

for which the term ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) is used. The communications concerned can be open, as in the case of a telephone conversation conducted down a public line, or protected. Protection can take a number of forms, either through the physical concealment of the means of communication itself or, more commonly, through the encryption of the message being conveyed.

Comint

Military commanders, and their political masters, have always tried to conceal the content of their communications. Traditionally this was done by the use of codes or cyphers; and much energy was spent by their opponents in trying to gain access to them. The advent of wireless telegraphy increased massively the scope for secret communications both in terms of the number of messages which could be sent and their range. The invention of the computer dramatically improved the chances of interception and decryption.

The analysis of signals traffic can yield vital military information even if the content of what is being transmitted remains secret. Once it is established what form of transmission is used by, for example, tank units in a particular military command structure, then it is possible to identify when such units are communicating with one another. And by the employment of techniques such as direction-finding and triangulation it is possible also to determine their location and numbers. Thus modern armies seek to maximize their capabilities for detecting such signals, as well as their own abilities to avoid emitting them. This can be done either by maintaining radio silence or, more commonly, by the use of countermeasures to disguise either the nature of the signal or its location.

The interplay of signals, detection measures, and countermeasures constitutes what is sometimes called the electronic battlefield. As weapons themselves rely increasingly on electronic capabilities to achieve their missions, this battlefield is becoming a key determinant of war.

Elint

Electronic signals intelligence involves the use of electronic sensors to monitor emissions made by the opposing side's weapons systems with a view to establishing their location, their movements, and their capabilities. ELINT is particularly relevant in relation to radars, surface-to-air missiles, aircraft, and ships. It is the equivalent of monitoring communications signals without being able to access their content.

To be successful, electronic intelligence gathering requires a database of information about equipment signatures acquired over a sustained period. In the days of the Cold War both NATO and the Warsaw Pact invested significant resources in developing aircraft optimized for ELINT which flew sorties just outside the airspace of the countries of the rival alliance. Similar missions were undertaken by specially equipped ships and submarines.

Attributes of Signals Intelligence

There are many attributes of signals intelligence which make it attractive to intelligence gatherers. It is often (though not always) available in real time and can thus reveal

information which is current. It is, when authentic, direct, i.e. it shows what the authors and recipients of the communication are saying to each other, rather than what someone else has reported them as saying. And it can sometimes reveal a degree of detail and specificity about military plans and operations which is not easy to access by other means. It is also normally obtainable at a minimum level of risk. Listening posts or facilities can be located in space or on non-hostile territory.

But it is not infallible. Communications are not always intelligible without a knowledge of the context and background; and people do not always say what they really mean. Instructions to military commanders do not always reveal the wider picture; and it is unusual for political leaders to put on paper or in a signal their most private thoughts or motives. In general signals intelligence is most useful for providing information about specific military operations, movements, or deployments, less so at providing information about political intentions or priorities.

Photo-Reconnaissance

Photography has been used for intelligence gathering for as long as cameras have existed. Photographs taken on land or at sea are often invaluable aids to the identification of potential targets. But the most important contribution photography has made to intelligence gathering has been from the air.

Aircraft

Ever since the invention of the aircraft military applications have been a major driver in its technological development; and reconnaissance was the first such application: it was easier to take a photograph from the earliest generation of aeroplanes than to fire a gun from them.

When war has been declared there are no inhibitions about photo-reconnaissance other than ensuring the safety of the aircraft which undertake it. In peacetime the issue of legality, or at least deniability, may have to be faced if it is intended to enter the airspace of another state. In some cases the response has been to rely simply on a doctrine of *force majeure*. Israel, for example, which regards itself as being in effect permanently at war, makes no secret of the fact that it regularly violates the sovereign airspace of its neighbours in order to gain intelligence and, on occasion, to strike at targets which it considers suspicious.

In the early days of the Cold War the United States did the same, initially on a massive scale and particularly over the territory of the Soviet Union. Such flights were discontinued after the shooting down of Gary Powers' U2 aircraft in 1960 and the resulting political humiliation caused by President Eisenhower's initial denial of responsibility. But they were maintained over the territory of Cuba and were the principal intelligence source for the conclusion by the CIA that the Soviet Union was engaged in the clandestine construction of missile sites there for the installation of short- and medium-range missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of the mainland United States. Photographs

of the construction work at these sites taken by U2 aircraft were used to telling effect by the United States representative at the United Nations Security Council.

Reconnaissance aircraft still exist and play an important role in intelligence collection. But tactical and battlefield intelligence-gathering missions are now increasingly undertaken by Remotely Piloted Vehicles, sometimes termed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or drones; and for 'big picture' intelligence collection from the air it is satellites which are now the principal source of imagery.

Satellites

The successful launch in 1957 of its Sputnik satellite, the first man-made object to be deployed in space, was not only a technological triumph and valuable political propaganda tool for the Soviet Union. It also ushered in a new era of intelligence collection from the air. Satellites could be placed in orbit without infringing the sovereignty of anyone's airspace; and once there seemed in practice invulnerable (although in the twenty-first century technological developments mean that anti-satellite attack is becoming a potentially viable option in time of war).

The United States was the first country to install an intelligence-gathering satellite. Even before the U2 incident in 1960 a development programme for one was underway. But the loss of capability which resulted from the U2's withdrawal from service over the Soviet Union meant that these efforts were accelerated; and the first observation satellite was put in orbit later that year.

Initially the film taken by the satellite had to be ejected and parachuted back to earth, to be recovered from the ocean by a naval helicopter with a scoop. The initial photography was of poor quality and could not penetrate cloud or rain; and the satellite circled round the earth in a fixed flight pattern. The CEP (Circular Error Probable), i.e. the dimension within which images could be identified, was tens of metres.

But over time improvements were made. The recorded images are now communicated electronically back to earth. The use of infrared and other technologies means that satellites can function in virtually all weather conditions and to an accuracy of centimetres. And it is now possible to place satellites in geostationary orbit, which means that they can maintain coverage of a particular region of the globe and can be repositioned when required. If enough satellites are deployed, access to any part of the earth of intelligence interest is assured.

Satellites are expensive and few nations can afford them. For most of the 1970s and 1980s only the United States and the Soviet Union deployed them. But they are now operated by a dozen or more governments. And the advent of commercial satellite services mean that much imagery is now openly available. Google Earth offers for free pictures of a superior quality and definition to those which were previously only available to military analysts.

At its best photo-reconnaissance can reveal secret information to which access by other means may be impossible. Pictures from overhead imagery of military installations, troop movements or concentrations, or of the damage inflicted by military action, are of unique value to military commanders and planners. Given the speed with which

the trajectories of modern satellites can be adjusted such information can be available in real time. This can greatly facilitate the acquisition of certain types of target which would otherwise be too fleeting to locate.

But photo-reconnaissance material is critically dependent on the quality of the interpretation resources applied to it. Although the ability of satellite- and aircraft-borne photographic equipment to penetrate cloud and other weather conditions has vastly improved in recent years, some pictures are still indistinct. Many images are only intelligible in the context of information obtained from previous missions or on assumptions based on other data which may turn out to be false. And just as techniques of photography have improved, so too have techniques of concealment and camouflage.

Intelligence and Intelligence Assessment

Intelligence can be used in either a raw or an assessed form. Raw intelligence is the product, whether an agent's report, the intercept of a signal, or a photograph, obtained by the intelligence agency or collector. It can sometimes be of decisive value in its own right and usable for military purposes on its own. Many military operations have achieved success on the basis of a single piece of accurate intelligence.

But in other instances intelligence reports need to be analysed and assessed before they can be of any real use. This is because, as noted above, much intelligence is partial, unclear, contradictory, or only understandable in context. So resources are required not just to collect intelligence, but also to understand what has been collected and to review its credibility, accuracy, and relevance. This involves the exercise of judgement about individual intelligence reports themselves (how reliable is the source, how direct the access, how good the definition of the photograph, how unambiguous the content of the signal, etc.); but, more importantly, judgement about what a number of intelligence reports mean when taken together and when set against information available from open sources and previous experience.

The assessment of intelligence is particularly important if it is to be used to predict future events or patterns of behaviour. This is often what military commanders or political leaderships most value intelligence for. Not just to illuminate what is already happening (though this can still be a vital intelligence function); but to offer a prediction of what is likely to happen next.

The word 'likely' is crucial in this context. By definition there can be no certainty about future decisions. So predictions have to be based on an analysis of the likely aims and priorities of the key decision-makers, based on decisions they have previously taken and/or on what is presumed to be the way in which they calculate their interests.

But even when there are relevant precedents from past behaviour intelligence analysts can still get it wrong. At the end of 1979 the Soviet Union massed its troops on the border with Afghanistan. In 1980 it did so near the border with Poland. On both occasions the CIA and other western agencies had good intelligence about what was happening on

the ground, but little or none about Soviet intentions. They had to rely on past Soviet behaviour and what this showed about the way in which the Soviet Union would be likely to judge its priorities.

On this basis the agencies concluded that an invasion of Afghanistan was unlikely; but that military intervention in Poland was probable. They based this view on a, as it seemed to them, rational analysis of Soviet interests. Afghanistan was a peripheral country as far as the security of the Soviet Union was concerned. By contrast Poland was a core Soviet security interest. If the communist regime there were to fall, there could be damaging consequences for the stability of the other Warsaw Pact allies in Europe and possibly even for the stability of the Soviet Union itself.

Even with the benefit of hindsight it is hard to fault the logic that led to the CIA's, and others' predictions. There were no counter-indications which were ignored and no mentality of group-think which distorted the analysts' judgement. And yet in both cases they made the wrong call. Afghanistan was invaded. Poland was not.

The Limitations of Intelligence

The analysts' performance in these two cases illustrates one of the limitations of intelligence. It can provide accurate and reliable information about facts: military dispositions, numbers, capabilities, movements, etc. But it is only rarely able to provide insights of similar quality into future intentions.

This in part because decisions are often only taken at the last minute and on the basis of criteria which may be peculiar to those taking them. It is unusual for a foreign intelligence agency to gain access to the personal deliberations of the political leadership of a country or of a military commander (the placing of Gunther Guillaume, a member of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the GDR, in the immediate entourage of Willy Brandt, the German Chancellor, was one of the rare examples of success at this level in recent times). But it is also because often the most important political decisions are not recorded or not even openly communicated.

There is for example no documentary evidence of the decision taken by Hitler in late 1941 to order the physical extermination of all the Jews in Europe. Even the record of the Wannsee Conference of March 1942, had it been available to Allied intelligence analysts at the time, would, because of the circuitous and ambiguous language in which it was drafted, have left plenty of room for speculation about what exactly was envisaged by the administrative programmes under discussion there.

And sometimes, to use a phrase of the former American Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 'stuff happens', i.e. things take place without warning or without any obvious discernible cause.

This is particularly true of some great socio-political changes. The Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989–90 were all phenomena which resulted from the complex interaction

of long-term societal trends with the short-term behaviour of individuals. None of them were predicted by intelligence agencies. Not because these agencies were incapable of recruiting sources or interpreting evidence, but because there were no sources or evidence available of the kind which intelligence agencies can apply their expertise to acquiring or analysing.

A further constraint on intelligence is the willingness of those who receive it to believe what they are told, particularly if the intelligence message is an unwelcome one. The collection and analysis of intelligence is not an end in itself: its purpose is to help military commanders and political leaders achieve their goals. But sometimes, whatever the quality or persuasiveness of the intelligence, there is a reluctance on the part of those to whom it is submitted to accept its implications.

The example most often cited in this context is the refusal of Stalin in 1941 to accept the possibility that Hitler, with whom he had agreed the so-called Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, might be contemplating an attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler had informed his generals in July of the previous year that this was his intention and the Soviet Union had an impressive network of intelligence agents which soon picked up evidence that an invasion was being planned. As a result a stream of intelligence reports was made available to Stalin and to the wider Soviet political and military leadership.

But right up until the launch of Operation Barbarossa itself Stalin refused to believe that an attack was imminent or to take any precautions for dealing with it. The result was that when the attack occurred the Red Army was taken completely by surprise and the Wehrmacht was able to make massive rapid advances to the point that within five months it was within 24 kilometres of Moscow.

The reasons for Stalin's dismissal of the intelligence reports were in part personal: his suspicious and cynical nature made it difficult for him to trust anyone (which ought in logic to have made him suspicious also of Hitler). But it in part also reflected the difficulty which many dictators face in acknowledging the possibility that the strategy on which they have embarked might be misconceived or that their earlier judgement might be at fault.

The Uses of Intelligence

There are broadly two ways in which intelligence can be used in war: at the strategic/political level and at the operational/tactical level. At both levels it can be decisive for the conduct of military operations. But at the strategic/political level good intelligence is rare and often ambiguous.

Strategic/Political Intelligence

Knowledge of an opponent's political aims and intentions is often crucial for the development and conduct of strategy. For example, the Soviet Union, whose political and military leadership had ignored the intelligence indications of Hitler's plans to invade it

in June 1941, profited for the remainder of the Second World War from the intelligence it received from Richard Sorge and other communist sympathizers about Japanese political intentions. The fact that Japan was not disposed, despite urgings from Hitler, to declare war on Russia nor to build up significantly its military positions in Manchuria meant that the Soviet military leadership was able to concentrate all its resources on the war with Germany and did not have to worry about the possibility of having to fight on two fronts.

American use of political intelligence on Japan, by contrast, was less successful. In the run-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in November 1941 the United States knew from its ability to read Japanese diplomatic traffic that the option of war with the United States was under active deliberation in Tokyo. There was no conclusive evidence that a definite decision had been taken to pursue this option; and no indication of the time or place of any likely attack. But American political and military planners were at fault in not enhancing their levels of military preparedness and vigilance and for allowing the defences at Pearl Harbor to be in such a lax state.

Good intelligence can also open up options at the strategic level which would otherwise be impractical or too risky. The origins of the so-called Six Day War in June 1967 lie in part in Israel's superior intelligence capabilities.

Israeli intelligence had identified with a high degree of confidence the locations of all the Egyptian and other Arab airfields and the patterns of activity of the aircraft involved. They used this intelligence to launch a surprise attack which destroyed most of Egypt's, Syria's, and Jordan's air forces; and they were able to use their resulting dominance of the air environment to undertake a decisive campaign on the ground, leading within a few days to the occupation of the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights.

Without the quality and comprehensiveness of their intelligence they would never have had the confidence to undertake such a bold pre-emptive strike. It would have been far too risky a strategy. Their military achievements in 1967 are still the dominant reality of the Middle East today.

Operational/Tactical Intelligence

At the operational/tactical level the uses of good intelligence are more obvious. Any military commander contemplating offensive or defensive action needs to know the dispositions of the opposing forces; and the better the quality of the information he has, the better placed he is to devise a viable operational plan or effective tactics.

In most military engagements intelligence plays a supporting role. Other factors, such as numbers, leadership, morale, and imagination, are often more decisive. But it is the availability of intelligence which can enable these qualities to be exercised to the full. At the Battle of Kursk in July/August 1943, for example—the first occasion in the Second World War when a German blitzkrieg failed—Soviet defensive planning, the imaginative use of mines and artillery, good coordination by the Stavka (the Red Army's General Staff), delays by von Manstein in initiating his operation, the fact that the Germans no

longer enjoyed air superiority, and the sheer courage and indomitability of the Soviet soldiers, were all key factors in the eventual Russian victory. But the intelligence provided by the Rote Kapelle and Lucy spy rings about the planning of Operation Citadel (the German plan to attack the Kursk salient and try to apply a north/south pincer movement on the Soviet forces there) provided the basis on which Marshall Zhukhov and his colleagues could develop their tactics.

Similarly at the Battle of Midway in 1942, the other decisive battle of the Second World War. Sound tactical judgement by the US naval commander, Admiral Nimitz, coupled with mistakes made by his Japanese counterpart Admiral Yamamoto all contributed to the American victory. But the original decision by the United States to lure the Japanese navy into a military engagement there was taken in the knowledge that they had good intelligence (obtained mainly from signals intercepts) about the plans and locations of the main elements of the Japanese fleet, particularly its four aircraft carriers.

But the occasion in the Second World War when intelligence made the biggest difference to the conduct of operations was its use by Britain and the United States to safeguard the passage of convoys from North America to the United Kingdom. The British Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park was at that time the most sophisticated cryptological establishment in the world, staffed by a remarkable array of mathematical and other academic talent, and in May 1941 it managed to crack the code used by the Kriegsmarine (the German Navy) and was therefore able to identify where German submarines in the North Atlantic would be meeting their support vessels. This made it possible both to attack those submarines themselves and to plan convoy routes which would have the best chance of avoiding them.

The result was a dramatic reduction in the tonnage of shipping sunk. Of course other factors, such as more sophisticated sonar and detection systems and better maritime patrol aircraft, also contributed to this turning point. But the availability of good intelligence and, perhaps more importantly, the development of arrangements for making it rapidly available to operational commanders, was crucial.

The material from the decrypts of German military communications, which was codenamed ULTRA, was used in many other contexts during the Second World War: so much so that General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in the West, subsequently described it as having been decisive in the Allied victory.

Over-Reliance on Intelligence: The Invasion of Iraq

As noted above, there have been many instances in the history of war when intelligence has been vital to military success or when the lack of it, or the refusal to believe it, has been fatal. But in 2003 the United States and Britain, uniquely, used intelligence as the justification for starting a war.

This was not a case of disinformation or disingenuity. Both governments genuinely believed the advice they were receiving from their intelligence analysts to the effect that Saddam Hussein had continued, in defiance of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, to develop and stockpile weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The intelligence agencies of most other countries who took an interest in Iraq were also of this view. It later turned out, however, that he had not. There were no ongoing WMD programmes in Iraq; and Iraq's stockpiles of chemical weapons, which had indeed previously existed, had been destroyed.

The reasons for this failure of intelligence analysis have been examined in two enquiries in Britain and in the United States. In each case the conclusions were similar. The human sources available were of poor quality with no direct access and, in some cases, with personal political agendas; but those concerned with assessing the intelligence failed to subject them to proper scrutiny. The photographic evidence was ambivalent, and again those concerned with assessing it failed to consider the possibility of alternative explanations for the data. A further failure was the extrapolation into assumptions about Saddam Hussein's behaviour of Western, rather than Iraqi, ways of thinking.

The term 'Group think' has come to be used for this kind of failure. It underlines the potential fragility of intelligence-based decision-making. Those responsible for making intelligence assessments need to be honest with themselves (and with their customers) about the quality of the intelligence with which they are dealing. They need to be open to the possibility of alternative explanations for it. And, above all, they need to be ready to 'speak truth to power', i.e. to tell their political or military superiors things which may be unpalatable. Those who use intelligence need to be aware of its limitations as well as its advantages. Any military commander or political leader contemplating a decision in whose preparation intelligence has played a significant role should always address the question of what the consequences would be if the intelligence turns out to be wrong.

The Future of Intelligence

The world, including the world of military affairs, is more transparent than it used to be; and the trend towards greater transparency will continue. Even countries like China which have traditionally resisted the flow of information towards their citizens or towards the outside world are finding it harder to do so. The internet, mobile phones, Twitter, and other networking sites are revolutionizing the ways in which news, including news in real time, is distributed.

But some secrets will remain; and governments will devote resources to trying to protect and discover them. Many of the techniques which have traditionally been used to this end, particularly in the field of human intelligence, will remain as part of the armoury of intelligence collection. But two more recent developments will affect the way intelligence is used in war.

The first reflects the nature of war itself. If, as seems likely, insurgency warfare, or war among the people, or low-intensity operations continue to become more prevalent than inter-state conflicts, then the dividing line between war and criminality will erode. Intelligence is of course routinely used to combat crime (as well as for other purposes) and the methods employed to collect and assess it are broadly similar. But often different government agencies and different sets of people are involved.

In future this may need to change. For example, if a telephone conversation between an Islamist extremist in Europe and an Al Qaeda operative on the Afghan/Pakistan border is intercepted, then follow-up action may be required from both a police force at one end and a special forces unit at the other. The two may be of different nationalities and responsive to different command chains. Military commanders engaged in some of these types of operation will therefore need to coordinate their activities with a wider range of other agencies, and to take into account in their military planning a wider range of factors than hitherto.

The second change is technological. Improvements in the ability to collect technical intelligence (whether SIGINT or photo-reconnaissance-based) and, more importantly, to communicate and disseminate it to field commanders, offer the potential for instant, real-time reaction on the battlefield. Systems are under development, and in some cases are already deployed, which allow for a seamless progression between intelligence and target acquisition and munitions delivery. Network-centric warfare is the term often used to describe this phenomenon.

Submarine and anti-submarine warfare has always had this quality. The sonar systems which are the key instruments of this type of battle environment are devices which collect intelligence, identify the potential target, and guide the torpedo. The interval between the initial contact and the weapon launch can be very short.

This sort of instant or near-instant capability for intelligence collection and weapons delivery is now becoming available more widely. The concept of C2 (command and control) has evolved in recent years to the point where C4ISTAR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) is now the acronym of military discourse. The goal envisaged by some military planners is of direct access to a receiver in the individual soldier's helmet of information from a satellite.

The potential advantages of this technology are clear. It enables more targets to be identified and destroyed, particularly those which are fleeting in character. The widespread use by the CIA in Afghanistan and Pakistan of aerial drones such as PREDATOR and REAPER to destroy buildings thought to house elements of the Al Qaeda or Taliban leadership is only possible because of the quality and accuracy of the intelligence provided by overhead imagery and the speed with which this can be converted into an attack option.

But the increase in target availability also raises problems of target selection, particularly in the case of counterinsurgency warfare, where the avoidance of collateral damage is also a key requirement. The PREDATOR/REAPER operations have been criticized, particularly by some political figures in Pakistan, for the numbers of civilian casualties

and damage to civilian property which they involve and the negative effect which this has on the hearts and minds of the Pakistani population in general. However good the overall quality of the intelligence involved, there will always be occasional cases of mistaken identity; and difficult judgements have to be made about whether the potential gain from the elimination of a really high-value target warrants the launch of an operation based on plausible, but less than compelling, intelligence.

Conclusion

Intelligence will remain a critical element in the planning and conduct of military operations. The staff officers of J2 (the Intelligence Directorate of the United States Joint Forces Command) and their equivalents in other nations' armed forces will continue to be key figures. Though the technology will change, the nature of the judgements involved in the use of intelligence will not. The closer integration of intelligence collection and analysis into military operations themselves, and the blurring of the distinction between police and military intelligence requirements, will pose challenges for practitioners. The experience of the Iraq War may make political leaders, rightly, more wary of what their intelligence advisors tell them.

And, sadly for those of a romantic disposition, some of the mystique about intelligence and war has vanished. Few heads of intelligence agencies today would repeat the claim of Count Nicolai, the first Chief of the Imperial German Intelligence Service, that 'Secret work must always be the preserve of gentlemen. When this ceases to be the case, all is doomed to failure.'

There may, though, be one or two who wouldn't entirely dismiss the observation of his successor, Reinhard Gehlen, who served both Hitler and the CIA and was the first chief of the Intelligence Service of the Federal Republic of Germany, that 'It is the duty of every sophisticated Intelligence Service to keep open a channel of communication with the enemy.'

CHAPTER 16

THE POL/MIL INTERFACE AND WAR: THE FRENCH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

GENERAL JEAN-LOUIS GEORGELIN

The purpose of this chapter is not to break new academic ground. It is rather the result of the thoughts of a practitioner who has successively held the positions of Chief of Staff of the President of the French Republic and of French Chief of the Defence Staff.

This is the testimony of a military commander who, like each of us, is the product of his time and who knows that what was taken for granted yesterday may not be today, and that what we often tend to regard as inviolable truths will surely not stand the test of time.

It would be risky to try to give a universal dimension to the organization and mechanisms of the politico-military relationship that I will describe because they are intimately related to the history of France.

The style of the politico-military relationship results from the events that have marked the existence of each country. As John Keegan put it: 'Cultures remain what primarily determines the art of war.'[1] Thus the practice of war shapes human societies as much as the evolution of ideas and social practices shapes the conduct of this quintessentially human and political act that is armed confrontation.

It is thus history which led France, in the early years of the twenty-first century, to establish a direct link between its political authorities and its military leaders. France's leaders, with their culture and their purely national sensitivity, drew lessons from sometimes tragic events to finally come up with a close dialogue facilitating the alignment of the requirements, constraints, and demands of these two worlds that do not always operate within the same timeframe.

To achieve optimal performances, such a direct relationship also requires the visions of political and military leaders to converge. The military commander must make the

vision of the political leaders his; meanwhile, political leaders must understand the purpose, possibilities, and limitations of the armed forces. This requirement explains the critical role played by the French Chief of the Defence Staff. Standing at the crossroads of two worlds, he has wide-ranging powers that enable him to ensure the alignment of military means and political goals. 'In the line of fire' in times of crisis, he assumes responsibility for the employment of forces and is in command of military operations.

It is also the direct nature of that French relationship which is at the point of origin of the intense dialogue that is established during operations. The interaction that occurs between the political and the military spheres facilitates the establishment of political goals as well as their understanding at the tactical level. Conversely, events related to the conduct of the operations are immediately taken into consideration at the political level.

In What Way is the French Military Leader Engaged in Changes in the Politico-Military Relationship?

The politico-military relationship is not an intangible component of society. It evolves in its definition, its organization, and its practice as a result of movements in history.

An Evolving Relationship in its Organization and Operations

The Weight of the French Memory

In France and since the end of the Second World War, two events have influenced the French relationship in its definition, its organization, and its operations: the trauma of the summer of 1940 defeat and the war in Algeria.

'The strange defeat' of 1940, to quote the title of Marc Bloch's book, still weighs, often unconsciously, on the relationship between the political and the military spheres. This painful episode in French history has revealed the tragic failure of both the French high command and the political leadership. In the military field, the main lesson is the lack of a unified command capable of conducting a modern war. To meet this demand for more efficiency, in 1948, France created a General Staff, which gradually evolved into a Joint headquarters with continuously growing prerogatives over the various services.

The war in Algeria also determines the nature of the politico-military relationship today. This war has profoundly affected the perception of the military by politicians and vice versa. The extension of civil powers to the military in Algeria led to a mixture of genres ending on a tragedy, which saw soldiers standing up against political authorities. Today still, this episode is vividly present in the collective imagination.

The management of the 1956 Suez crisis also highlighted the failures of the politico-military relationship of that time. Indeed, during the preparation of the operation on the canal, the then Minister in charge of defence and armed forces, Mr Bourges-Maunoury, was the senior civil servant in charge. The head of the government of the day, Mr Guy Mollet, had given him complete freedom in the planning and conduct of the operation. This resulted in an inadequate level of consideration being paid to the diplomatic background of the time, which in turn led to the results we all know.

Thus, France's recent history has led to a double movement. First, the military and politicians have learnt to better manage their fields of competence. On the other hand, political authorities have repeatedly asserted their role as the supreme national political authority, thus consciously maintaining distance between themselves and the military leadership. Such a constitutional distance was in the past reinforced by a certain degree of mistrust but that has gradually disappeared over the past forty years of peace.

The Current Framework of the French Politico-Military Relationship

Today the principle of subordination of the military to the elected political leadership is no longer discussed. The principle of ancient Rome, which establishes the precedence of the toga over the sword, is fully accepted. This situation has led to increasingly normal working relationships, even more so since the end of the Cold War when the intensity of these relationships has increased under the combined effects of two pressing realities. On the one hand, the number and complexity of crises to manage has steadily increased. On the other, many reforms of defence capabilities have been conducted with and thanks to the positive involvement of the armed forces.

This relationship exists within French institutions that are sufficiently flexible to adapt the decision-making process to different political situations. Indeed, Article 15 of the Constitution states that 'the president is the head of the Armed Forces. He chairs the boards and senior committees of National Defence', which leaves considerable room for interpretation and practice.

Thus, the practice of decision-making on defence has gradually organized itself around the two bodies mentioned in the French Code of Defence:

- The Defence and National Security Council
- The Inner Circle of the Defence and National Security Council.

The first Council deals with the general direction of national defence. It groups, around the President, the Prime Minister, the Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy, and Finance ministers, as well as those ministers concerned by the agenda. Since the 1990s, its focus has changed. Today, it is concerned mainly with issues pertaining to military planning, including capability and budgetary aspects.

The Inner Circle of the Defence and National Security Council has gradually supplanted the Defence Council in the decision-making process. Around the President, it involves the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the President's Chief of Staff, and the Secretary General for National Defence.

Established in 1990, during the first Gulf War,[2] it had the initial purpose of ensuring a close political-military coordination in the conduct of operations. This role was then reinforced with the management of the complex crisis that broke out in former Yugoslavia and under the effects of the political 'cohabitation' in France. Indeed, in those bygone times when the President of the Republic and head of government did not belong to the same political family, the Inner Circle councils allowed the President to assert his role as chief of the armed forces and to demonstrate his authority in the field of defence.

More flexible in its operation than the Defence and National Security Council, the Inner Circle of the Defence and National Security Council has gradually expanded its scope.

In the conduct of operations, when crisis management requires a shorter reaction time, the President is directly connected with the Chief of Defence Staff. This short loop allows the political leadership to fully exercise, in the best possible conditions, its responsibilities under the Constitution.

But as much as the councils themselves, the preparation of those meetings is an essential element of the joint politico-military organization. Indeed, it is during these preparation stages that a dialogue is established between the various ministries and that collective solutions gradually emerge.

Through these councils and their preparation, military leaders have a remarkable ease of access to policy-makers. This relationship is maintained by a French specificity, namely the existence of military officers attached to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of Defence, and—this is of critical importance—by the existence of the President's own military staff.

It is primarily maintained by the relationship between the President of the Republic in his role as chief of the armed forces and the Chief of the Defence Staff, whose powers are very extensive.[3] The human dimension of this politico-military relationship is simply essential.

How does the Military Leader Accommodate Change within the Political Sphere?

The Importance of the Human Factor

The politico-military relationship is not a mere technical relationship between military and political leaders. It is not a technical link between a political world that would be settings goals in total isolation and a military world which would be nothing but a monolithic instrument. It is the result of a human equation and this aspect should be highlighted. In order to function properly, a relationship of trust needs to be established between individuals shouldering heavy responsibilities. To this end, mutual understanding is essential. Establishing a strong working relationship based on confidence is a guarantee of efficiency.

Even though it should not be seen as an inflexible rule, it is worth noting that since 1991 three of the five Chiefs of the Defence Staff have previously occupied the post of

Chief of the personal military staff of the President while one of the five was head of the military cabinet of the Prime Minister.

The Ownership of the Political Vision by the Military Commander

In order to be effective, the military commander must take ownership of the political and geostrategic vision of the political authorities. Thus, when a change in political leadership occurs, he can adapt to new working methods in order to effectively fulfil his role as advisor to the President of the Republic and to the Government. This learning process on how other people function is essential, as it determines the attention that the Chief of the Defence Staff will eventually get when addressing politicians. It is therefore an essential step if the military commander wants the political sphere to be able to accurately understand the actual capabilities and limitations on the use of the armed forces.

Typically, upon arrival at the Élysée palace, the newly elected president calls for numerous meetings to review progress on issues pertaining to national defence, and first and foremost on the issue of nuclear deterrence. These meetings constitute many opportunities for the military—and primarily the Chief of the Defence Staff—to make its view coincide with that of the President by virtue of the latter's role as chief of the armed forces.

A Growing Role as a Military Advisor

For the military leader, the role of defence advisor to the political sphere will probably have to grow under the effects of the professionalization of the armed forces. The decision to suspend conscription in 1996 meant that gradually, French political leaders would have less and less personal knowledge of military questions. They would no longer have military service experience to easily understand the operation and capabilities of the armed forces. At the same time, we are no longer in a society where the majority of French political leaders have experienced the tragedy of war. This new context must be taken into account by the military leader who, more than ever, must explain what are the means, capabilities, and limitations of the use of force in the defence of the nation, as well as explaining what makes the engagement of the military unique.

The Dialogue Between the Military Commander and the Political Sphere in the Field of Military Operations

Whether it is to prepare a military intervention or to conduct an operation, the proximity between the political and the military spheres will ensure that the relationship between the goals that are set, and ways and means used to achieve them, is strong.

Defining a Strategy to Handle a Crisis

Faced with a crisis, the role of the military leader is to translate political objectives into plans and actions. He is the custodian of military strategy, 'the art of distributing and implementing the military means to accomplish political ends'.[4] But, as Clausewitz said, the military commander should not be just confined to executing orders. For the strategy to be properly defined, he must be consistently associated with the production of the political goals. That is the role of the dialogue which has to be established between the President and the Chief of the Defence Staff in times of crisis. In the development of the strategy which will be in time submitted for validation to the President, this dialogue allows the commander to take into account political constraints in the broader meaning of the term. In order to fully play his role as an advisor, the military commander must consider diplomatic, economic, social, electoral aspects, and so on, to offer the most comprehensive and thought-out options. The work done in common on the periphery of a crisis, and on the possible solutions, is all the more important because, faced with a given international situation, the immediate perception of the political and military worlds do not always obey the same constraints.

The military commander must take into account these parameters to identify and then suggest ways and means to solve the crisis while explaining the constraints linked to military options and the possible consequences of some specific decisions.

The reality of this dialogue and this interaction between the political and the military spheres is not always perceived in France, either by the military or the civilian world. There is often a gap between theory and practice, between representation and reality. A gap born of a lack of understanding of the way the decision-making process actually works.

Once the strategy has been adopted, the commander is then faced with the challenge of disseminating guidelines and political priorities within the military. Because for a strategy to be efficiently implemented, it is essential that servicemen and -women on the ground make the political dimension of the strategy theirs and that they understand what is expected of them. The politico-military dialogue is therefore not intended to remain behind closed doors and the military chief appointed to command the operation must be fully conscious of all the aspects of its action. He must convey the political concerns and guidelines that are likely to have an influence on the tactical conduct of the operations.

Conducting Crisis Management Operations

Managing the Interaction between the Political and the Military Spheres in Times of Operations

A military operation always sees the clash of two acting entities. Therefore, the planning of an operation rarely survives the reality of combat and the evolutions produced by the opposition of wills on the ground. The conditions of the crisis evolve over time, either

towards more severe military actions or towards a decrease in the level of violence. It must also be noted that current military operations tend to spread over longer time periods, a fact which inevitably leads to a gradual change in the terms of engagement of the country's forces. These military developments may then impact on the political goal which had initially led to the decision to intervene. The current deployment in Afghanistan shows us that the level of ambition of the political goals currently pursued by the coalition is evolving in relation to the violence and insecurity caused by the insurgents.

Conversely, changing political conditions have a direct impact on the conduct of military operations. The conduct of the war in Algeria is a case in point. Indeed, a changing diplomatic environment in a global context of decolonization, the weight of the isolation of France vis-à-vis the Allies in general and the United States in particular, a changing society which wanted to enjoy the benefits of economic growth and which no longer could see the link between the war and the nation's best interests all influenced the choice of the political authorities to radically change position and move towards the independence of Algeria.

Managing a crisis inevitably creates an interaction between political goals and military actions. The military commander must adjust the ways and means used to suit purposes that will change with time, while keeping in mind that he also has a role to play in defining those purposes, since it is his responsibility to advise political leaders so that they do not pursue goals that might prove beyond the reach of their capabilities. This coherent link between goals and means constitutes the foundation of any strategy.

On the same topic, the military commander must favour courses of action that offer political leaders enough room to adjust goals. Freedom of political action is a determining factor in choosing an option and in its tactical expression. Thus, the ideal scenario for a political leader is to have absolute control over resources that offer complete reversibility. This partly explains the fascination with solutions purely based on technology. This illusion has to be regularly dispelled by the military commander.

In the conduct of operations, technological advances in communication systems have also strengthened the interaction between military concerns and political considerations. The development of modern means of communication leads to two observations. On the one hand, all military operations are now conducted in full view of the world. On the other hand, tools are now available to quickly evaluate the evolution of a crisis and to provide new directions in a very short time. This rapid flow of information helps to catch certain problems on the fly or to adjust political options. And corrective loops are all the shorter when the politico-military dialogue is direct. This situation is particularly well reflected in hostage rescue operations. Given the sensitivity of these missions, the political imperatives are permanently integrated in the preparation of the action, the authorization to trigger the intervention of forces being given a few hours before the attack, the political and military control being exerted down to a very low level of execution.

The increase in the speed of information has put an end, in France, to the existence of 'proconsuls.' The constraints related to communications that were experienced during the war in Indochina have now disappeared and the political and military control of

operations has been reinforced. The bandwidth now offered by satellites make real-time communication a reality, something the telegraph was just not able to achieve.

Organizing an Efficient Crisis Management System

To effectively play his role in accelerating the political and military tempo, the military commander must have purpose-designed tools. As we saw earlier when exploring the dialogue between the political and the military spheres, France has established a flexible and direct system which allows every key player to fully exercise his responsibilities. In the field of the preparation and conduct of commitments, we have witnessed a gradual maturation of the organization.

Today, the Chief of the Defence Staff has a centre dedicated to the planning and conduct of operations (CPCO for 'centre de planification et de conduite des operations' in French) to help define the military options that will then be submitted for approval to the President. In addition, the CPCO allows for the rapid transmission of strategic instructions to military commanders, while at the same time keeping the political and military leaders informed of ongoing developments.

Through the CPCO, the Chief of the Defence Staff also interacts with the crisis response cells of the various ministries. In so doing, the armed forces, which represent the main emergency response assets, can more easily coordinate their actions with the other players of crisis management.

Political and Military Spheres: Different Notions of Time

In France, like in all democracies, the military and the political spheres have different notions of time. The military commander must be aware of the friction that may arise between the length and consistency of effort required by the stabilization of a theatre and the demand to achieve quick results that the public places on the political leader. Unfortunately, if knowing when one commits to a military operation is easy, it is much more difficult to determine when and how one will eventually conclude it.

The military commander must thus provide the major decisions concerning the management of a crisis according to the political tempo.

Similarly, he must try to help the policy-makers in developing an information effort likely to maintain or even promote the support of the general public.

Adapting the Political Control to Multinational Commitments

The commitment of the armed forces can no longer be conceived outside a multinational framework. Interventions on a purely national basis are now smaller in scale and, even during evacuation operations of French nationals in troubled areas, it is now common to also take into consideration third-country nationals.

This reality presents a major challenge in terms of political and military control over the management of the crisis. The political objectives of a coalition inevitably result from a compromise between sovereign states that can set limits on the use of their forces depending on their own best interests—the caveats.

In the past, French military leaders have had to conduct operations within such a framework in Bosnia, Kosovo, Lebanon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The loss of effectiveness on the ground was significant and the consequences were sometimes tragic. Working with national contingents that are operating under restrictions requires the dedication of a considerable amount of energy to the internal functioning of the force and reduces its responsiveness.

In addition, when acting in a coalition, the type of political and military organization imposed by such operations proves sometimes disruptive to national operating procedures, especially French procedures. The French military leader must adapt to a much less direct relationship, which often leads to political decisions that are less firm.

However, it is unlikely that all nations will agree to provide a multinational defence organization established on a single political framework such as the supranational European Defence Community of the 1950s. Governments will insist on maintaining political control over their respective national forces and it is for that reason that caveats persist and pertain. It is therefore an inescapable reality for modern armed forces that they must integrate more closely and at the same time cope with national caveats over their use.

A multinational action may also impose other constraints that are likely to reduce the effectiveness of the military commander. The rules of engagement adopted for the operation rank among them. If they are too restrictive, it may result in the force being unable to fulfil its mission. It is therefore the responsibility of the military commanders to ensure that the units deployed on the ground have the necessary assets to fulfil their mandate.

It is in that frame of mind that in 2006, during the preparation of the reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Chief of Staff of the President worked with the political leaders in order to ensure that the rules of engagement would support the level of effectiveness expected of the troops on the ground.

How is the Military Commander Getting Involved in the Adjustment of the Ambitions of His Country in the Field of Defence?

Thanks to his experience and expertise and beyond his activity in the field of the preparation and conduct of operations, the military commander has a key role to play in the adjustment of the ambitions of his country in the field of defence.

Taking into Consideration the Realities of this World

The military commander is also fulfilling his role when he reminds political leaders that, unfortunately, violence and the use of force are part of the relationship between human beings and between states.

Indeed, armed forces embody the tragic dimension of this world. They are at the forefront of the evolution of the various forms of violence. They face the transformation of the forms of conflict as well as the emergence of new threats.

The commitment in Afghanistan highlights this change in the forms of conflict. It is plunging France's armed forces into a confrontation where population is the key to success. It is no longer a matter of breaking the will of a state by military action as during the Gulf War of 1991 or the operations in Kosovo in 1999. Securing the desired outcomes requires different capabilities, versatile equipment, and an innovative approach.

Meanwhile, counter-piracy operations off the coasts of Somalia point to the threats to strategic supply routes, as such threats highlight the potential for global disorder that failed states represent.

On another topic, soldiers are well aware that history is punctuated by a succession of strategic surprises, often accompanied by dramatic forms of myopia. The world was surprised by Pearl Harbor and by the attacks on the World Trade Center. France was surprised by Guderian's attack through the Ardennes when it had actually collected accurate intelligence on its preparation.

This real-world experience and the awareness of the changing balance of power currently taking shape are essential to inform the debates on the security of the nation.

It also helps combat some illusions related to our time. The technological illusion that I have highlighted is one of those fantasies that should be dispelled.

Technology is radically changing the conditions of military action and greatly increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces. However, recent operations have taught us that technology alone is no substitute for human beings. Ultimately, we will always need to get troops on the ground, even if only to obtain reliable information. War is a profoundly human act. Its foundation is still the clash of wills cherished by Clausewitz. Tomorrow, as today, France's opponents will seek to test its resolve on the battlefield. The courage and the will of the fighter are a necessary factor, and, to gain the moral high grounds in an operation, they cannot easily be substituted with technological solutions.

Similarly, the moral fibre of the nation is still one of the prerequisites of successful military operations. And the combatants cannot hope to achieve success if they are not supported by long-term commitments. This is a factor vital to military success, but which must remain the prerogative and responsibility of the political leadership.

Participating in the Revision of National Strategy in the Field of Defence

Geopolitical changes and changes in the environment of the nation, such as in the economic, social, and moral situations, regularly lead to a redefinition of national strategy. In France as in other countries, this results in the publication of Defence White Papers.

Imported from the United Kingdom, this fairly recent practice started in France in 1972. At that time, the idea was to write 'with black ink, on white paper, a body of already set doctrine adapted to the international context of a stable period',[5] a period dominated

by the confrontation of blocs. The strategy depicted in the White Papers was purely defensive and thus its main objective was to properly organize a defence centred on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence.

In 1994, the draft of a White Paper on National Defence sought to draw the first conclusions on the evolutions of defence during this period. The first strategic shift involved the conventional assets that could now be involved in the solving of regional crises. However, during this period of political 'cohabitation' the issue was also more political. The White Paper likewise aimed at establishing the framework for defence policy and to establish a basis of agreement acceptable by all, for the development of the French military programme bill. This in turn means that a number of arrangements were struck. In particular, the principle of conscription was reaffirmed, while the lesson drawn by the French from Operation Desert Storm was that there was a need for 'career soldiers, an emphasis on joint operations, and a reinforcement of power projection capabilities and intelligence'.[6]

In 2008, the situation was different. The issue is now to take into account the changing geopolitical environment, the emergence of new threats, the growing need for personal security, the changing perception of the concept of security, and the imperative of public deficit reduction.

The work of the French White Paper Commission committee is thus much more ambitious because it aims to transform the national strategy in a global perspective, including external and internal security issues, hence the production of a White Paper on Defence and National Security.

During these discussions, the different services were able to express their experience and expertise in the work of the committee and sub-committees, which were also attended by many representatives of the civilian world. The Chief of the Defence Staff, a key player in the committee, had a representative in each sub-committee. Similarly, a critical dialogue was established between the Committee Chairman and the Chief of the Defence Staff as ultimately, strategy had to translate into the required level of ambition and capacity. However, only a military commander well in tune with the reality of the armed forces can coherently align political goals and military assets.

A national strategy can only be properly defined by taking into account the constraints of the key defence players and by considering both the feasibility and the impact of the options considered. From this point of view, the military commander is hard to circumvent.

Establishing a Dialogue with Political Leaders for the Preparation of National Defence

Beyond the development of the national defence strategy, with which he is closely associated, the military commander has a vital role to play in the preparation of the armed forces in relation to the goals set by the nation.

Aligning National Ambitions and Defence Capability

There are two main reasons for which the construction of a military capability is a long process. On the one hand, because it is subjected to budgetary constraints, the development and acquisition of modern equipment always stretches over long periods of time. On the other hand, the use and maintenance of these increasingly sophisticated assets requires increasingly skilled servicemen. Thus, adapting the armed forces to renewed ambitions must overcome a certain level of inertia.

This reality thus requires the military leader to meet the following challenge in terms of capability: to prepare future commitments while conducting current operations. Long-term weapon systems acquisition programmes now coexist with urgent operational requirements. Preparing for the future is now subject to an interaction with the pressing demands of daily operations.

The Chief of the Defence Staff, who stands at the crossroads of these two necessities, has a role to play in the selection of capabilities. He ensures coherence between national strategies and military capabilities. And as such he answers for the preparation of the military programme bill to the Defence Minister. Just like him, he is heard by Members of Parliament during budget hearings. The dialogue which develops around the proposals he submits to the Minister of Defence leads, ultimately, to political choices.

On a different perspective, when major reforms, as part of a broader inter-ministries project, are determined, it is the military commander's responsibility to implement them within the armed forces and to raise the alarm at the political level if operational efficiency appears to be at risk. He then leads the adaptation of the format of the armed forces so as to meet the level of ambition set by the nation.

Challenges in the Preparation of a Defence Capability

The role of the military commander is not solely limited to the matching of military capabilities with national strategy. He also has to face some challenges that could threaten the effectiveness of the armed forces.

Keeping the Tool Sharp

Unnecessary fashions and routine may lead to a misuse of the armed forces and a loss of efficiency.

As an example, in the past, Special Forces were sometimes used in missions that did not fit exactly their recommended level of employment. Thus, from Afghanistan to Ivory Coast, they were sometimes tasked with infantry missions. Politically comfortable because it makes risk-taking more acceptable to public opinion, this situation can nevertheless have negative consequences. On the one hand, Special Forces gradually lose their primary qualities of low signature and intellectual agility. On the other hand, line infantry units feel marginalized, and this affects their morale. The politico-military dialogue allows the commander, if the political sensitivity of the time allows, to take into account this parameter in the selected option.

Based on the changing political context and following a similar approach, French military commanders have obtained a profound change in the political and military approach to the treatment of African crises. Indeed, years of almost automatic response by French forces to African crises led the different services to two conclusions. The first was that this type of reaction could not bring lasting solutions to situations with often deeply political roots. The second conclusion was that such operations contributed to the creation of a warped impression about the effectiveness of the country's forces. This analysis by the military commanders gradually made its way into the political sphere, to culminate in the initiative to strengthen African capacities in peacekeeping (RECAMP or 'renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix' in French) and to a greater involvement of African nations in the management of African crisis.

Multilateral Negotiations

International treaties may limit the effectiveness of the armed forces or create problems for some military assets. Given the implications they may have for national military capabilities, and given the time needed to adjust France's defence organization, it is essential that the military commander is involved in that type of discussions whenever they occur. Thus, whether the topic is international criminal courts, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the military commander must be able to input the essential elements of current thinking for the nation's resources to remain consistent with its national strategy.

The Attenuation of the Feeling of External Threat

The armies are faced with an increasing decoupling between the perception of war by society and actual threats. In this regard, the contrast between the feelings of French society, which thinks it is, in its strategic insularity, safe from any kind of war, and the continued commitment of forces outside the homeland is particularly striking. The reality is that we have seen, since the end of the Cold War, an increase in France's overseas commitments along with intensified military action. Paradoxically, war seems to have deserted the intellectual horizons of French society. This society expresses a greater need for personal safety and homeland security than external security. Consequently, the temptation is always strong for policy-makers to meet this expectation by devoting resources to it at the expense of national defence.

The dialogue between the political and the military sphere makes the consideration of external threats possible at the right level, preventing hasty decisions. For, as I pointed out before, an effective defence organization is built over time. The capabilities that are lost require both substantial financial investments and more importantly extended periods of time to be generated again.

As a result of this shift in perception, civil society fails to grasp the difficulties faced by military personnel when they have to reconcile strong operational experience with the daily reality of their garrisons. The transition from a world of violence to the policed normality of garrison life should be taken into account by the military chain of command in order to be understood in all its complexity. In addition, this situation must

be explained to a society which has lost sight of the purpose of the military and which is living in the denial of death.

Fighting Against a Trivialization of the Soldier

Faced with this social pressure, the military must defend its specificities. These characteristics result from the very purpose of military action and they are a condition for its effectiveness.

The army is the political instrument available to the state to deal with possible threats to its survival, even when most ordinary organizations cease to function normally. If armed forces exist, it is because they are first and foremost the instrument which remains when nothing else works; it is the tool to respond to the unthinkable.

This very purpose of the military tool is the source of specific requirements, skills, and values that are at the core of the effectiveness of the armed forces. These features should not be weakened by a trivialization of the profession of arms. For it is not possible to consider as trivial the fact that individuals are willing to bear arms for the nation, with the responsibility and duties that such a choice entails. Similarly, it cannot be considered as ordinary that men and women accept the prospect of killing to prevent others from being killed or to be killed so that others may live.

Preserving the characteristics of the profession of arms requires both an internal effort within the armed forces and a communication drive in respect of civil society and policy-makers.

Thus in the relationship between the political sphere and the military sphere, the military commander continuously replaces the use of the armed force in its finality. The military cannot be regarded as just another civil service if we want to maintain our effectiveness in the defence of the interests of the nation.

Beyond the educational efforts that the military commander directs towards the policy-makers, the political leaders must also address initiatives that would question the specificity of the profession of arms. Given the current and developing culture of litigation, it is essential that he gets the political support so that the conduct of operations is not ruled by courts of justice. The matter is not to place the armed forces above the rule of law or to conceal serious or intentional professional misconduct but to remember that in the 'fog of war', commanders can take decisions that can have tragic consequences. This is a fact that should be accepted. Although the loss of a loved one remains a painful event, there is nothing scandalous in reaffirming the risk to life inherent to the use of armed force. The principle, well accepted within military circles, that the military takes personal risks so that others are safe from harm should not be questioned.

Conclusion

The French politico-military relationship in the early twenty-first century places the Chief of the Defence Staff at the centre of its organization because its action is both upstream and downstream of the political decision. As an advisor to the President and

to the Government, he actively assists the President in his position as Chief of the Armed Forces, in the preparation and in the conduct of operations. He also participates in the adjustment of the country's ambitions and he is a key player in the preparation of the national defence instrument.

This French specificity, the result of both history and institutional practice, is sometimes criticized. The risk of seeing the Chief of the Defence Staff unable to cope with his many tasks is generally highlighted. But he is not alone. He relies on a staff whose prerogatives, responsiveness, and grip on the staffs of the different services have continuously grown in recent history. The General Staff thus allows the military commander to live to the full the politico-military relationship by providing solutions in areas as disparate as operations, capability-building, or international relations.

The very short politico-military loop which exists in France represents a major advantage when the course of events requires emergency decision-making. It also facilitates the development of coherent strategies and the building of a defence tool suited to the country's ambitions. To be effective, this relationship—which is more than just a technical link—should be based primarily on trust between men invested with heavy responsibilities. It relies on a frank and open dialogue between representatives of two worlds that do not have the same constraints or the same pace. And the role of French military leaders is to insure that those two spheres meet, understand each other, and agree.

Notes

1. Keegan, 1998.
2. Gautier, 2009: 256.
3. The decree of 16 July 2009 gives wide-ranging powers to the French Chief of the Defence Staff. Besides his role as advisor to the President in his role as chief of the armed forces and to the government, he is in command of military operations, responsible, *inter alia*, for the general organization of armed forces, the definition of their size, and their coherence in terms of capabilities, as well as being responsible for military international relationships. He has authority over the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as managers and heads of joint organizations.
4. Liddell Hart, 2007.
5. Gautier, 1999: 256.
6. Ibid. 267.

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CHAPTER 17

MANAGING WAR

WILLIAM HOPKINSON

To win a major war, men, materiel, military skills, and management are all essential. None suffices alone. Future wars will probably not call for management on the same scale as the industrial wars of the twentieth century. They are unlikely to require the mobilization of entire countries and economies for major industrial effort to wage wars of steel, coal, chemicals, and millions of men, but management will still be vital in the contribution that it has to make to complex, successful conflict, in providing special and dedicated means for the supreme leadership to focus on the issues, arrive at appropriate decisions, and have those decisions implemented.

The Second World War

The victories of the Red Army from 1943 were heavily dependent upon the removal to the east, and reorganization, of factories (and indeed industries) from the western lands about to be lost: a major task not of strategy but of management. For the Western Allies, the shift of the USA from a peacetime economy with small armed forces to a war footing, within a year, was the necessary first step to victory, and another management accomplishment. On the other hand, the tactical and operational excellence of the German army, supported by the great resources of the Reich, was frustrated not only by defective strategy but also by managerial chaos.[1]

Early on, and especially after the invasion of the USSR, German victories created the possibility of the Reich's becoming an economic superpower, producing twice the steel output of Russia and Britain combined. However, German efficiency in military planning and engineering did not carry through to running or mobilizing the economy. Partly that was because of the intervention of rival Nazi Party officials or appointees; partly because the military were unwilling to rationalize their demands; partly because of long-standing sclerotic practices. (Speer warned Hitler that posterity would judge

that Germany lost the struggle by clinging on to an arthritic organizational system.) The overall result was that neither did the economy attain its potential size, nor was the most productive use made of the size it did attain. In consequence, despite technical advances in, for example, rocketry the Germans' early comparative excellence in aviation was lost whist there were never sufficient technically simple trucks and transport for the needs of the war. This was the result of serial failures in management.

Tempora Mutantur

War means many different things in different times, places, and circumstances and management will differ accordingly and need not, of course, be perfect, to achieve victory. In 1914–18 there was much muddle and incompetence on all sides in managing the complex matters that affected the waging of war, but eventually one alliance emerged victorious. Much of what was required for the management of war in the twentieth century was unique to that period; it had not been done before and is unlikely to be necessary in quite the same way again. Future wars, as they will differ from the great wars of the twentieth century, will probably not call for management on the same scale as was required then. The future challenges may be very great but they are unlikely to require the mobilization of entire countries and economies for major industrial effort to wage wars of steel, coal, chemicals, and millions of men, but effective management will still be vital.

How governments manage war depends on why they are at war, how they came to be there, and what sort of conflict is in train. It also depends on the sort of government they are and the constitutional conventions within which they operate. Even one government, in the course of one war, may find its tools and modus operandi changing radically, as politics, economics, law, constitutional and military-technical developments impact upon it, and, indeed, as personalities change. Just as war is multifaceted and multilayered, so is its management. Opinion, resources, the application of those resources to pursuing objectives, the very setting of objectives and, increasingly in present conditions, the military engagements in their pursuit, require management. In short, managing war involves very different arrangements and processes depending upon who is at war with whom, when, and what the attendant circumstances are.

The Nature of War

In a rational world, governments, following Clausewitz, would manage war in pursuit of policy by other means. However, war may arise as the choice of a government, or be forced upon it; sometimes it may not be clear which has happened—a country may drift into war—or it may enter one war and end up fighting another. Very seldom is any

government a totally free agent. There are always constraints, and the essence of war is that one is not opposing inert matter but a thinking and responding actor who will seek to create and exploit weaknesses in one's position. Even if the opponent is unsuccessful in that, there will almost always be constraints from the available political and military skills, from resources, and from external pressures and internal politics, whether driven by public opinion, political parties, or, affecting all those, the media. For a complex industrial or post-industrial state the management of war therefore requires much more than managing the economy and financial and physical resources, great though the challenges are that those pose. It requires the handling of internal pressures to keep, at a minimum, some political cohesion in the government's inner circles—governments may be so driven by internal pressures that they are managing their reactions to them rather than the war and its physical demands. The government will usually also have to manage wider political opinion in the legislature and outside. Paradoxically, a major war, threatening national survival, may in this regard be easier to manage than some grumbling conflict over which extensive internal dissent may take hold (as Western reactions to twenty-first century conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown).

Propaganda has been a component of war throughout modern times. It rose to great prominence in 1914 and subsequent years and was important throughout the Cold War. Signs of difficulty with internal and external opinion were evident in the post-1945 colonial conflicts and in the Vietnam War. Since 1989, management of opinion, internal and external, has increased even more in importance, certainly for democracies but even for many more authoritarian regimes. Instant global communications have increased the impact of every happening: tides of opinion are readily generated and can have very great impact on international politics and external (including enemy) opinion. Ultimately, war is about changing the enemy's mind. Failure in presentation can all too easily lead to the loss of a war that in material, military, or strategic terms might be winnable. Even if the war is not lost in a military sense, winning the peace, which should be the strategic goal, and the real test of success, can be made very difficult (see, again, Iraq and Afghanistan). Presentation may not be a substitute for substance, but without it substance may easily be lost, and management of presentation requires dedicated and professional effort—as NATO discovered in its Balkan interventions.

What is Management?

No clear lines can be drawn between strategy, tactics, and logistics on the one hand and management on the other. Partly because of technical, and partly because of political developments, aspects of management have come to centre upon not just governments but even upon the very highest layers of government. A government at war, or a small group at its head, will have to formulate security policy and strategy as events develop; manage the agencies (armed forces, etc.) that will implement those; and, in modern circumstances, often assume a degree of detailed involvement in operational and even

tactical issues. At the same time, it will need to manage opinion at home and abroad and international and domestic economic and financial issues whilst physically safeguarding its home base. All that would pose formidable challenges to a well-organized body with fit and able actors. In fact, under the pressures of major war individuals buckle (e.g. the younger Moltke and Sir J. French in 1914/15) and organizations are often shown to be defective.

It is necessary to distinguish between managing general preparations for war, including procurement of materiel before conflict; managing the diplomacy that may or may not lead to or avoid war; creating the machinery to run the war; and running the war itself. Only the last two can be dealt with here. Moreover, there will be no examination of the preparations made for managing nuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Those covered not only the waging of war but the running, or rather attempting to save, whole societies. However, the arrangements were never put into effect; they were specific to particular circumstances; and have few lessons of general application.

The Importance of Resource Management

Most wars, and certainly all major ones, pose demanding problems in managing physical and economic resources, parallel to consideration of the undertaking and management of military operations. The machinery and processes for dealing with resource issues will obviously vary greatly with the nature of the war, the state and relative wealth of the society, and the constitutional arrangements able to support the application of society's resources to the war. Effective arrangements may enable a poorer state to mobilize greater resources than a richer one, as with the eighteenth-century wars between England (and then Great Britain) and France. The creation of the Bank of England, the invention of effective National Debt arrangements, and a taxation system that delivered, with general acquiescence, a stream of revenue without destroying the productive elements of society or arousing intolerable resentment enabled the smaller power to contend, generally successfully, against the greater and potentially richer. Management of financial policy helped win the wars; the aims of the wars generally included important economic and mercantile objectives, not least the acquisition of colonies and trade.

The United Kingdom was less successful in the twentieth century. Despite legislation introduced in 1914 that gave the Government, in principle, almost total control of the economy (and much else besides),[2] the management of the war effort in 1914–18, not to mention the actual conduct of the war, showed many weaknesses,[3] though matters did improve as time went on. The government did not make a success even of managing finance, in which Britain was the pre-eminent player in 1914. Although its performance in this respect was better than that of any other European participant, Britain effectively lost control of expenditure, and certainly Parliament did. This led to waste and profligacy as well as, on the other hand, boosting war production. More fundamentally, in the

early years of the War, there were serious tensions between the manpower needs of an army rapidly increasing in size, at first by voluntary enlistment, and the requirements of industrial production for the war effort. Already by December 1914 loss of skilled labour was the principal explanation for the failure of the arms producers to meet their contracts. By the middle of 1915 iron and steel, mining, engineering, chemicals and explosives, and shipbuilding had all lost significant proportions of their workforces. Moreover, in addition to the major problems in vastly increasing the supply of (land) munitions, there were severe difficulties in sorting out what was required and placing realistic orders. The muddles there contributed significantly to the fall of the Liberal Government.

The First World War exhausted a country very much richer than in 1714 or even 1814. (It exhausted or broke, of course, all the participants, victors and vanquished, except the USA.) Britain's economic and resource planning in the Second World War was more coherent but, again, very serious overstretch and economic exhaustion could not be avoided. The UK did rather better organizationally than in 1914–18, and careful management assuaged the problems but could not remove the dilemma that the country could neither win a short war nor afford a long one. Even though that was known before the war, it did not stop the declaration of war in September 1939. Then, in 1940, Churchill's new Government made a firm commitment to create an army of fifty-five Divisions and a vastly expanded air force, despite the fact that these would be crucially dependent on US steel, machine tools, and other imports and that there were clearly not the resources to pay for those for more than a very short period.[4]

Decision-Making

To manage war a government, however competent the individuals composing it, will need, though it may not always have, or use, coherent machinery to bring forward properly formulated options for decision, together with the information and analysis to make the decisions, especially at the strategic level. Stunning tactical victories that do not contribute to winning the peace are not effective steps to success—after Hannibal's repeated shattering victories over Rome in the Second Punic War that state still had the will to fight on and to make the necessary sacrifices, and Carthage went down to defeat with no major Roman victory before the last battle.

The policy-making machinery should ensure that there is impartially assessed intelligence, not only on the enemy but on what other actors, or potential actors, may have in mind, and their capacity for action. Moreover, increasingly, governments must be prepared to deal with the post-conflict situation, involving development, reconstruction, and the political state of the opponent, and have the ability to deal with those issues.

Different states will have different machinery and different balances between military and civilian parts and, certainly historically, different balances between different parts of the military, coordination between which may be as challenging as between military and civilian machinery. Different kinds of conflict will require different machinery and

balances, and the requirements will change with changing political or technical factors. Especially in the case of major war, but not only then, particular leaders may form special arrangements to manage the conflict in accordance with their own preferences. War may indeed give rise to constitutional or at least major institutional development.[5]

Once upon a time, a strong state might take on lesser actors without much prudent evaluation and planning. On numerous occasions European powers became involved in messy colonial skirmishes and worse because of forward pressures from the men on the ground or the need to distract public opinion. Nowadays such carefree or careless commitment is much less likely, though the way in which the British government conducted business at the highest levels in the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 shows that those earlier tendencies not to analyse the issues properly before acting had not been eliminated. More generally, a government's concern with short-term political gains may easily outweigh long-term strategic ends; it may count as success reaching a state of affairs that brings it political or media plaudits, even whilst not securing a viable long-term solution or even its own country's long-term interests. In democratic societies, and even some where only a limited public opinion may express itself, ministers will have a very strong temptation to react to media pressure or pursue the image in the media today rather than explain difficult and complex issues and why no simple solution is possible, and why a long-term good requires current sacrifice.

Fighting with Allies

On many occasions governments will not be fighting alone, but as a member of a coalition. That makes for complications in managing the war, getting into it, getting out of it, and accounting for its conduct. It can point up acute differences between what is good for a particular nation and what is good for the coalition; and between a country's short-term benefit and what it may need for the long term. Additionally, in coalition warfare, issues of command, from the highest political to the lowest tactical level, raise legal and practical difficulties. Machinery, national and international, to mitigate these and for managing or influencing the coalition, is necessary if a state's interests are not to be at risk of oblivion.

Necessary Machinery

Taking into account all the foregoing, a well-ordered state would plan in peacetime to provide machinery to deal with the following matters:

- to formulate national strategy and war aims;
- to direct different kinds of war, at the political level;
- to govern the country whilst the war is in progress;

- to direct and control the armed forces in appropriate coherence and detail;
- to handle finance, the economy, the needs of the population and of the armed forces in war;
- to handle opinion within and without the country.

In practice, of course, things are more complex than that. Wars creep up on a country; a slow-burning, half-domestic, conflict bursts into flame; or, a major war develops, demonstrating that things hitherto unthought-of need attention if it is to be prosecuted successfully. The resource implications of war and the complexities of dealing with them may be grossly underestimated, but even when a great deal of effort has been put into preparing for war, and effective machinery apparently created, what happens may reveal major shortcomings, not because the war that comes is greater than anticipated, but because it is a conflict of a different sort. The demands of managing industrial war, limited wars of choice, or counterinsurgency are very different and machinery adequate for handling one sort of conflict may be inappropriate for another, but changing it may be too difficult. Moreover, twentieth-century history frequently showed that, irrespective of the machinery and preparations, when war came, civilian or military leaders were not up to the strains.

For the future, management of war is more likely to be about political than economic issues. That said, while the management of armed forces in war is too important to be left to the generals, it is also far too important to be left simply to the politicians, even with a democratic mandate. What is required is machinery to manage politico-military issues in which the final political direction of ministers is informed and, to a degree, constrained by professional diplomatic, intelligence, and military judgement. Different countries strike different balances in different ways. In recent times, at any rate, the means of direction of a war have (unsurprisingly) varied according to whether it was a major conflict, perhaps requiring the rapid mobilization of national resources on a grand scale, or rather some low-level, grumbling affair that could drag on for years. There may or may not be a relationship with the potential impact on vital national interests. The UK merges civilian and military input in a relatively integrated way so that, in principle, judgements are informed at every level above the tactical by the range of relevant skills, whilst at the very top the heads of the armed forces have, and are expected to exercise, direct access to the head of government. Thus civilians sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military men have a voice in resource management; Cabinet Office Committees focus the interests of different departments and either resolve differences or bring them before senior ministers.

In principle, all that should make for effective management, and to a measure it does. Certainly in the 1990s London was more coherent than Washington or Paris or Bonn/Berlin in evolving national positions on politico-military issues. However, machinery can do only so much; Washington has the advantage that the President is, ultimately, able to bring all departments into line (and, in addition, is Commander in Chief). The same is true in Paris, in substance, though in neither case do departments work easily together if he is not directly engaged. In London, departmental coordination can be vitiated by

weak political leadership in a particular department, or, conversely, by political intransigence at the head of a department. UK involvement in Afghanistan has apparently suffered from both of those factors, which committee work has not been able to work around. At the same time, there were egregious failures of management and politics in the approach to the invasion of Iraq.

Strategy and Objectives

The strains were not reduced by the frequent inability to formulate coherent aims. Strategy is a rather slippery term that has changed its meaning significantly from the time of Clausewitz. The most recent changes have been to do with changes in the nature of war, from wars of the peoples, to industrial war, to threatened nuclear war, and on to the present mixed and multidimensional kinds of armed conflict. With such developments most governments have found difficulty in formulating strategies and war aims, particularly with the paradigm shift in security at the end of the twentieth century.

In both World Wars, the German army was excellent tactically, and had superb planning at the operational level, but those strengths were thrown away by defective strategy (and in the Second World War in particular by gross mismanagement in both military and civilian spheres). The same lack of clear connection between aims and implementing strategies was true of the UK in 1939: the objective of stopping Hitler's expansion was clear; the strategy necessary to get the invader out of Poland much less so. As events were to demonstrate in 1940, Britain and France together could scarcely hope for victory over Germany. Britain alone after the Fall of France could not rationally plan for victory. When Churchill's rhetoric declared that the aim was 'Victory, victory at all costs . . . victory however long and hard the road may be',[6] he was being inspirational rather than clear-headed on strategy. As noted above, the ultimate objective in war is to win the peace: when Churchill spoke there was no clear route to winning either the war or the peace.

Things changed after the entry into the war of the USSR and then Japan and the USA. The UK and the USA developed reasonable machinery at Chiefs of Staff level to manage strategy, and there was frequent contact at Heads of Government level. Scientific and intelligence cooperation was generally effective. The decision of the Western Powers to focus on 'Germany First' was an important and clearly correct decision at the highest strategic level but even then the range of options considered for achieving victory over Germany showed no very firm grasp of strategic planning, nor could any purely formal mechanism have remedied the deficiencies. Churchill always had a tendency to adopt quixotic schemes (as he had shown in the Dardanelles and his 1939 proposals for putting a force into the Baltic), whilst Roosevelt's attempted rapprochements with Stalin showed a sad lack of understanding of how to win the peace. Neither could have been effectively checked simply by institutional or managerial arrangements. Japan was capable of good operational planning and achieved stunning military successes but failed to judge correctly the consequences of war with the USA.

In short, for the major conflicts of the twentieth century, most main participants were either weak in formulating their aims or defective in working out strategies to achieve them, and frequently both. With the possible exceptions of Stalin in looking to the post-war settlement, and of the USA with its post-war strategy of containment of the USSR, no major state did very well at those in the twentieth century.[7]

The situation was little better for smaller wars. The Korean War certainly frustrated the aggression of North Korea and its backers but did not succeed, as it might have done, in freeing substantial territory from the grip of the regime. Most colonial wars went badly: those that succeeded best were those where, as in Malaya, the colonial power had already decided on a move to a new status. Vietnam, Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003) all demonstrated either confusion over initial aims, or a shift from those aims to more ambitious ones, followed by a falling back to something more modest. That confusion and those shifts might not have been avoided by better machinery to consider and decide upon war aims, and methods of pursuing those aims, but there does seem to have been a consistent lack both of such machinery and of successful decisions upon aims.

Post-Cold War

The picture is changed somewhat, though not necessarily for the better, if consideration is given to recent collective campaigns, not Iraq or Afghanistan where the USA is the real leader and actor, but the interventions in the Balkans after the break-up of Yugoslavia. There, there was anxious consideration bilaterally and in NATO and the EU of what intervention might be about and the desirable or desired end states and how to achieve them. The outcomes have been, on the whole, useful but at the end of difficult passages, and it would be difficult to say that the handling of the successive crises should be a model for modern security management and diplomacy.

Having planned for decades to deal with the prospect of a major war with the Soviet Union, likely to be greater in extent and resource consumption than either of the World Wars, when Yugoslavia broke up NATO members found themselves grossly unprepared, politically and militarily, to deal with what, in historical perspective, and military requirements, were small wars, analogous to those in Europe between 1815 and 1848 or between 1870 and 1914. The War Books, those comprehensive national guides to what to do when Armageddon came upon the world, were of limited relevance to faraway turmoil, not involving the fundamental existence of Western European countries. Those countries now had the option of intervention by expeditionary forces, if they could muster those, move, and command them, generating the while the necessary political will. Few could do any of those things, even on the comparatively small scale required.

The United Kingdom had had a foretaste of that sort of problem in 1982 with the Falklands conflict. On that occasion, since the struggle involved British territory and English-speaking 'kith and kin', the political will to act had been present; the enemy was a fourth-rate military power with its own political instabilities; and there was no

need to mobilize or organize national resources for a long existential struggle. Success, against the continuing background of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union, did not lead to fundamental changes in how the country prepared to manage war, though useful practical lessons were learned. Moreover, some of the special arrangements that had come to be associated with going to war were implemented.

A Historical Perspective

At an earlier period, the inception of major industrialized war in 1914 ultimately produced significant and enduring changes in the UK machinery of government at political and official levels. At the start, the Prime Minister, Asquith, created a war committee but insisted on its decisions being confirmed by the full Cabinet. By 1916, in the light of what was perceived as his ineffectual direction of the war, a proposal was put forward to create a more tightly focused committee from which he would be excluded. After equivocation Asquith rejected that and was replaced by Lloyd George, who created the first modern War Cabinet in December of that year. This was a relatively small body able to make speedy decisions over a wide range of business. It was dissolved in late 1919.

As a complement to the machinery at the highest levels, and beyond a natural intensification of political activity, and sharpening of political focus, to cope with the demands of war, there was a need for appropriate machinery of a bureaucratic and technical kind. The government was slow in 1914 (and the next two years) to make changes in its central machinery, and the enactment of the wide-ranging Defence of the Realm Act was not, for the most part, accompanied by useful machinery to implement it constructively.

Before 1916 there was no Cabinet Secretariat as such, nor even agreed minutes—the record was a letter from the Prime Minister to the sovereign. Each minister was supposed to know, if not note, what had been concluded: the scope for confusion is manifest. Management of twentieth-century warfare led to a systemization and organization of business which was a necessary counterpart of the political direction of an immensely complex set of operations. The Cabinet acquired a Secretary and, in due course, a large Secretariat. Further changes came with the Second World War but those were essentially modifying the existing structure, and the Cabinet Office system created by Lloyd George survived in Britain until the end of the twentieth century. (It still survives for the most part, though somewhat altered by the Blair years and his attempted shift to a more presidential style of government.)

Having learned lessons from the earlier conflict, when the Second World War broke out in September 1939 the Prime Minister, Chamberlain, appointed a War Cabinet which met at least daily during the first year of the war. At first, this body had eight members, all ministers, but those present increased to fifteen when certain other ministers, the Chiefs of Staff, and officials attended. It was again changed after Churchill's becoming Prime Minister to be the focus of a Coalition government though the ministerial numbers were kept low.

Churchill was not a natural manager: he was temperamental and petulant. Nevertheless, he made a significant contribution to the management of the war effort by the creation of a clear, centralized system, by which he could oversee the whole effort, military and civilian. The Chiefs of Staff Committee became the forum for the formulation of strategy—though Churchill himself certainly thought that he was the master strategist and constantly pressed his concepts forward. The War Cabinet considered the wider political issues. The system was not vitiated by the Prime Minister's tendency to interfere in operations and senior appointments and to intervene directly with ministers and generals by personal minutes. Despite Churchill's idiosyncrasies, and diminishing interest in civilian affairs, the system generally held together and made for effective management of the war effort, although increasingly in the last years the US influence on what was done, and how, became predominant.

No War Cabinet was established during the Korean War, nor the Suez crisis. However, when the Falklands conflict broke out, in April 1982, Margaret Thatcher formed one consisting of two operational ministers, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, and two political props, the deputy prime minister Willie Whitelaw and the Conservative Party Chairman Cecil Parkinson. They were joined by the Chief of Defence Staff. Perhaps rather surprisingly, given her reputation for counting the pennies, there was no Treasury representative. Similar institutional arrangements were made for interventions in Iraq (1991) and Afghanistan (2001) but not for the Northern Ireland conflict, arguably touching much more closely on vital interests, and grinding on for some thirty years. In that case, political rather than organizational or resource management was of the essence.

In 1991, for the first Gulf War, John Major's team, too, was small, consisting of the Foreign and Defence Secretaries and the Energy Secretary (John Wakeham), brought in as a fixer and information manager as well as for his strictly departmental responsibilities. Following the decision to move against Afghanistan in 2001 as part of the US-led coalition, Tony Blair established a War Cabinet of much the same sort, though slightly larger in ministerial membership.[8] Associated with it was a wider spread of non-ministers;[9] some, such as the Chief of the Defence Staff, were not unexpected; others, including political appointees to the Prime Minister's entourage, were present in greater numbers than might have been looked for.

The coalition actions against Afghanistan enjoyed, at first, general and Cabinet support; that was not to be the case for the 2003 intervention against Iraq. That led to the resignation of one Cabinet Minister at the time and another shortly afterwards. It also produced persistent criticism, political and professional, over the merits, necessity, and indeed legality of the invasion. The intervention saw no War Cabinet as such, and indeed less than full and proper consideration in Cabinet of what was done and the bases for it. The conduct of the conflict saw the distortion of not only intelligence but also of the intelligence machinery. The result has been more than one official inquiry and those have been revealing of Mr Blair's way of doing business, not through formal structures with proper briefing and notes taken but sitting comfortably with a few chosen advisors. In particular, a great deal of light has been thrown on the management of this intervention

by the evidence given in public to the Iraq Inquiry under Sir J. Chilcot, established to identify the lessons that could be learned from the conflict.[10]

Lessons Learned

In the management of war, as in peacetime activities, there needs to be a check to the circular reinforcement of discussions in a narrow group. In the USA the Congress, and to a lesser extent in war the Supreme Court, provide some of that, though they did not do so effectively in the decisions to invade Iraq. A key role in the working of Churchill's arrangements had been played by Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, who, with great effort, was able to contain the worst of Churchill's strategic and military idiosyncrasies. Some of the difficulties of British engagement in Iraq stemmed from the absence of machinery able to provide such a robust check in Blair's policy-making (though some also came from the need to follow US leads). To a degree, Blair's favoured way of doing (war) business, particularly in the early years—matters changed somewhat as the pressures of things going wrong on the ground was felt—mirrored Roosevelt's in the Second World War in its lax administrative habits and its failure to use the established machinery. A crucial difference was that Roosevelt perhaps reflected quite well what was required to manage the various elements required to pull together for the US war effort.

The conclusion from this brief analysis is that, at the highest levels, major, complex, successful modern war requires special and dedicated means for the supreme leadership to focus on the issues; arrive at appropriate decisions; and have those decisions implemented. Equally necessary is the feeling of political comfort—the assurance from a small group of trusted associates—that the decisions commend themselves to at least a number of players with their own political weight. (Weight as well as technical expertise is important: forceful national leaders in war will not be guided just by accurate analysis.) As Western societies become, in general, more averse to war, and as public opinion becomes a greater factor, so the need for such assurance in policy-making becomes manifest in lesser struggles, paralleling the highest leadership's greater involvement in operational and even tactical matters. Ultimately the form of a group to manage a war is to do with the leader's judgement—what the head of government wishes to focus on and the political support he (or she) needs in the particular circumstances.

The end of the twentieth century apparently involves for modern Western states a shift in warfare from major inter-state conflict to either expeditionary warfare (for a variety of purposes) or else countering the threats from terrorism (which may involve expeditionary warfare). Both have significant implications for the management of conflict. In either case there will need to be a focus on social, economic, and infrastructure issues, as well as on political and military ones. Expeditionary warfare is demanding, but not in the sense that world war against fellow industrial powers is demanding. The needs of management of resources, economies, and policy are very real but significantly less

than those needed in 1914 or 1939. Political and presentational issues may be as grave in terms of governmental but not national survival. Countering the threats from terrorism requires intelligence, police work, some military capability, and considerable efforts to ensure the resilience of society.

Resilience is in part attention to infrastructure, communications, hospitals, emergency services; in at least equal measure it is about reassuring populations. The damage likely to be wrought by a terrorist chemical-weapon or even biological-weapon attack is quite limited, in the former case very limited. However, the impact of fear and disorder on a population could have a devastating effect upon a society or economy. Management of counterterrorism activity has, therefore, high importance, involving measures to ensure essential services, including those needed to cope with an actual attack, as well as those needed by society for its everyday life. All that obviously involves a major effort of coordination between government departments and agencies, and of those with private- and public-sector providers of services such as transport and communications. That requires not only the establishment of coordinating machinery but also practice scenarios involving, in the UK case, the participation of ministers more widely than in the case of the conduct of actual war. The scope of coordination, and the complexity of the interlinked issues, though probably not their intrinsic importance for national survival, approach that of major twentieth-century war, and exceed that of any likely military action in the foreseeable future.

The twentieth century provides numerous examples of governance in different sorts of war and in different societies. There have been many studies, particularly of the two world wars, examining and comparing the performance—military, political, and economic—of the participants. There were certainly some spectacular successes of management but no state seems to have been able to earn anything like full marks for its performance. That is not surprising given the size and complexity of the problems and, in 1914–18, the unprecedented nature of the scale, intensity, and geographical spread of combat. The deficiencies then were partly of machinery, partly of men, and partly of the state of knowledge as to how complex systems, societies, and economies worked. Greed and ambition, individual and national, also played their part. Lack of formal powers was seldom the problem; governments took either by legislation or constitutional assumption extensive powers. What they did or failed to do with the powers was the problem. In the present era, machinery of complex sorts is available nationally (for modern states) and internationally to manage war. Ultimately, however, that management depends on men and political judgement and they have yet to be perfected.

Notes

1. Overy, 1995.
2. The Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) 1914 and subsequent amendments.
3. Ferguson, 1998: ch. 9; Strachan, 2001: chs 10, 11.
4. Barnett, 1984: 13.
5. Bobbitt, 2002.

6. House of Commons, 13 May 1940.
7. Possible exceptions are Japan in 1905, and India against Pakistan.
8. Tony Blair, John Prescott, Jack Straw, Gordon Brown Geoff Hoon, David Blunkett, Robin Cook, Clare Short.
9. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff; Anji Hunter, Blair's personal assistant; Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff; Sir John Kerr, Foreign Office; John Scarlett, Joint Intelligence Committee; Sir David Manning, Cabinet Office.
10. Iraq Inquiry: www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (accessed 3 May 2011).

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PART V

NON-WESTERN WAYS OF WAR

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CHAPTER 18

THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR: IN CRISIS?

ISABELLE FACON

Russia is unquestionably an interesting military object as a country with one of the most militarized strategic cultures in the world. Since the establishment of the ancient Russian state, 'the country has fought or been involved in over 700 wars and armed conflicts'.[1] The military factor was always the key element that Russian leaders emphasized in order to justify their country's claim for a great power status. The Red Army was one of the key pillars of the Soviet regime, and the largest military force in the world, if not, as we know now, the best organized, the most technologically advanced, or the most efficient. Also, Russia was a militarized society from Peter the Great until the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left a socio-psychological legacy which retains deep influence over Russian security and foreign policies.

Russia's military history has been marked by an aptitude to 'produce' able officers, who ensured Russia's response to foreign attacks while helping the country to extend its geographical reach. Also striking is the continuous interest of Russian military theoreticians in the contributions of foreign military thinkers to the art of warfare and military theory.

However, in the post-Cold War years, Russia seems to have retained little positive of its legacy of militarism. Its beleaguered military performed poorly in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and, though to a lesser extent, in Georgia. In all these circumstances, the Russian military appeared unable to act adequately, not only because of the acute moral and material crisis it was living through but also out of what appeared to be operational and conceptual inertia, if not disarray.

Russia's Strategic and Military Culture

Since very early in its existence, Russia has tended to prioritize military security in its grand strategy. Its initial aspiration for territorial expansion was dictated by a feeling of being threatened from every direction due to its location in a vast plain, with weak natural geographic defences. These vulnerabilities entailed an obsession with security which, in the Russian leaders' vision, could be appeased only through territorial expansion aimed both at pushing the national borders as far as possible to make them more protective and at controlling the potential instabilities coming from the immediate surroundings. The historical feeling of being encircled by enemies was far from absent from the Soviet Union's strategic posture, and was even reinforced by 'the Leninist notion of constant threats from abroad and within'.[2] Priority was always attached, among the Russian military's traditional missions, to the protection of the empire. Thus, when the latter attained what seemed to be its optimal size (the USSR plus its military and economic 'appendages' in Central and Eastern Europe), Moscow generally abstained from projecting its military power: although it several times contemplated military intervention abroad, '[o]nly once in thirty-eight years did the Soviet Union use force outside the Warsaw Pact—in Afghanistan in 1979'.[3] This posture was probably encouraged by the fact that Russia could practically live in autarky thanks to the magnitude of the resources contained on its huge territory, which in turn gave the Russian leadership an additional reason for concentrating its forces on the protection of the national borders.

Due to the fact that 'most of the major threats historically have come overland, whether in the form of the Mongols, Napoleon, Nazi Germany, or Mao's China',[4] and to the country's stature as *the* continental power *par excellence*, Russia's military construction has historically favoured large ground forces. Whatever the successive 'revolutions in military affairs' and changes in Russia's geopolitical situation, its military has always been driven by a 'landpower-centric approach' and 'the perception that wars are decided on land'.[5] Until the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Minister of Defence traditionally was a representative of the ground forces, which prevailed in top positions within the military leadership. Even the appearance of nuclear weapons did not convince Soviet strategists that numerous ground forces had become strategically less relevant, and only the deep crisis of the land forces in the 1990s started changing this. An obvious corollary of this 'landpower-centrism' resides in the fact that naval ambitions in high seas were always considered as a 'military luxury', the priority going, as far as the Navy's missions were concerned, to the defence of coasts. In difficult political and geopolitical times, Russia has always had the reflex of cutting back its naval effort—which has again clearly been the case since the collapse of the USSR.

During the Cold war, not all Western specialists were satisfied with the idea that Russia and the Soviet Union were motivated only by frontier defence, finding it too simplistic to explain Moscow's expansionist instincts by purely defensive motivations.[6] The

unrivalled territorial stature that Russia acquired over time, combined with its historical messianic instincts, has produced a constant desire to be recognized as a member of the select club of great powers. The combination of defensive (due mostly to the encirclement syndrome) and offensive (connected primarily to the desire to stabilize the peripheries by controlling them and to the claim for great power status) goals in Moscow's strategy, and the subsequent alternation of defensive and offensive wars in Russian history, found their reflection at the military conceptual level, with the well-known offence-defence pairing which marked the Soviet military doctrine. Its political-military dimension was defensive, but its military-technical sections provided for offensive military actions. In other words, until the Gorbachev era, the USSR aimed politically at preventing war, but in case of war, it should win, which supposed it should take the offensive and maintain a preponderance of forces.[7] The conviction that a world war between the Soviet and the capitalist camps was possible called for planning that included offensive actions both westwards and eastwards, which required a huge level of forces, not just a balance of power.[8] The Second World War, where both offence and defence had played a key role, had fixed this tendency.[9]

In any case, the two fundamental traits of Russian strategic culture—profound feeling of insecurity, great power aspirations—have, since quite early in Russian history, dictated the need for having massive standing armies and stood behind the 'Soviet affinity for size and quantity in defense planning', also confirmed by the Second World War, where 'numbers indeed served Moscow well'.[10] The Soviet Union's project was no less messianic than the Russian empire's, and no less inclined to rely on military power to achieve its goals: 'the standard of the communist model for restructuring the world was unlimited force', Russian military historians recall.[11] This determined the perceived necessity for the Russian military to be able to realize 'deliberate massing of soldiers and equipment on the main axis of attack, with a high density of men, tanks, artillery, and planes in the strike sectors, followed by envelopment and thrusts to the rear'.[12]

Russian leaders always tried to compensate for the country's technological, economic, and social backwardness, which a priori did not match its self-proclaimed status as a great power, by the ability to control as large a territory as possible and to mobilize mass armies in order to both achieve this control and protect the newly acquired lands. This was continued in Soviet times: 'The USSR had achieved superpower status largely by virtue of its military capabilities, being relatively deficient in other indicators of national power.'[13] As a corollary, Russian society was militarized starting under Peter the Great's rule: '[i]nstitutional and organizational arrangements that privileged military objectives over other aims were continually reproduced under both the czars and the [CPSU]'.[14] The Soviet concept of warfare was total, based on quantitative parameters—mass warfare, mass firepower, supported by the full mobilization of the state, which was made easier by the centralized command economy, which allowed gearing most human and economic forces towards the fulfilment of defence needs to a degree not equated anywhere else in the world.

The centrality of the military factor in Russia's historical path has, among other things, led to this country's constantly paying great attention to the evolution of warfare and of

military theory and developing a rather efficient system of military science. On the one hand, the Russian elite have always kept a strong determination to build a specific identity for their country in the military field (as in any domain of the state's life and activity, which can be explained by its traditional messianic impulses). But that did not prevent them from studying closely foreign operational art and theories about future warfare, if only to avoid being caught by bad surprises—this is characterized by some specialists as 'the unceasing Russian imperative to think through what changes in contemporary war mean, and how Russia can avoid being trapped into protracted wars that have historically put its entire political system at stake'.[15]

Such a pronounced interest in foreign 'war models' probably contributed to the relative creativity that Russian strategists used to display in thinking about the war of the future. The Soviet regime was fond of military forecasting (the 'science of future war').[16] This did not compensate for the Russian military's recurrent technological backwardness but nonetheless contributed to the country's prestige as a leading military player. US specialists remind us that 'Soviet military thinking was . . . the most profound of all military thinking during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s.'[17] Mikhail Tukhachevsky, chief of staff of the Red Army between 1925 and 1928, and the father of the concept of 'deep operations', called on his country to build a tank-based army before the latter was able to field the large armoured forces that later on constituted its backbone. Soviet theoreticians started thinking about the effects of ballistic missiles before they were capable of fielding a significant ICBM force. More recently, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov anticipated the 'revolution in military affairs', which was first conceptualized in the USSR as the 'military-technical revolution'. The chief of the Soviet General Staff (1977–84) was a pioneer in formalizing the possible impact on warfare of new information and communication technologies integrated into weapons systems. This was all the more impressive given that once again the USSR did not have the corresponding material and technological capacity.

An Immobile Military?

In recent years, however, any analysis of Russia's military situation—morale, professionalism, equipment, organization—carried primarily an image of crisis and rigidity. This was obvious in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Despite this painful experience,[18] the Russian troops, during the first Chechnya war, appeared 'unskilled in the techniques and nuances of counterinsurgency', 'massed artillery became substitute for infantry maneuver and the conventional principle of the offensive "came to be interpreted as the tons of ordnance dropped on target" '.[19] The air force was content with its traditional missions (destroying the enemy's air force, carrying out combat patrols) instead of trying to destroy selected enemy command and control and other strategic targets.[20] In the second Chechnya war, the army had drawn some lessons from the first conflict, especially at the level of planning and tactics,[21] but this did not prevent it from resorting to

massive and indiscriminate artillery and air strikes in the early stages of the conflict. This reminds us of the late nineteenth century, when Russia, having finally subjugated the Caucasus, 'made no systemic effort to capture and disseminate the lessons of that war' and 'remained preoccupied with continental Europe and the European model of war'; as a result, 'the events in the Caucasus did not become an essential part of the Russian Army's institutional memory'.[22]

More recently, Russia was criticized for its 'disproportionate use of force' in Georgia. This referred not only to the fact that Russian troops went far beyond the administrative borders of South Ossetia, but also to their using massive firepower, tanks, and armoured vehicles to respond to the Georgian military's strikes on Tskhinvali. Western military observers deplored the Russian soldiers' inability to resort to non-contact operations with high-precision strikes. A prominent specialist of Russian military affairs summed up the situation in expressive terms: this war seemed to be 'fought by a Soviet legacy force, desperately seeking to make do with dated equipment and a top-heavy command and control system more suited to conducting the kind of large-scale conventional warfare that had passed into the annals of military history'.[23] In all these cases, Soviet-era force employment concepts were still in effect.

Certainly, the two wars in Chechnya and the peacekeeping operations the Russian military conducted in the post-Soviet space have entailed thinking about new war-fighting skills, but this was not integrated into a new comprehensive system of thinking, organizing, and making war: this 'improved military efficiency in the short term, but these tactics have not led to new doctrine and the Russian army does not seem prepared to continuously learn from its mistakes and widely disseminate lessons learned at the lowest levels of combat'.[24] The lessons of combat operations in Afghanistan and Chechnya did not produce any substantial force restructuring. There have been only 'pockets' of reform here and there. From this perspective, a primary focus has been the North Caucasus Military District. Russia has also set up several units for peacekeeping. But in general, combat structures and capabilities have been left untouched, leaving the Russian military with an essentially Soviet-type organization, albeit in a much degraded version. The heavy division-based organizational structure was preserved, as well as the system of troop management: suited to large-scale conventional warfare, it is heavy and insufficiently flexible for most 'new' military contingencies. This starkly contrasts with what has happened in Western militaries, which have moved towards leaner and more mobile structures.

Since the early 1990s, all official documents mention the growing importance of local conflicts and non-traditional risks challenging Russia's security. However, these contingencies have cohabitated with other, more traditional threats. In the Russian view, NATO-connected security problems side with low-intensity and counterinsurgency warfare, and the Russian forces should prepare for all.[25] While the probability of a major war is deemed low, it is believed that large-scale wars can start as a result of the escalation of local wars. Russia considers to be particularly exposed to this risk, since its periphery is ridden with ethno-national conflicts which are likely to become local wars and because Western powers have shown an interest in competing with Russia in Eurasia.

In its view, what happened in Georgia in 2008 confirmed this view. Makhmut Gareev, former Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and now the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, is concerned that the expanded use of peacekeeping operations to resolve conflicts within states carries the danger of escalation into regional conflicts involving other states.[26]

Causes for Inertia in Military Thinking and Building

Experts offer several tracks of explanation for this apparent inertia in Russia's ways and tools of war. Many of them believe that Russia, despite (or because of) losing its empire, its superpower status, and substantial portions of its territory, continues to live with its strategic cultural habits. This must be true, in particular, of one of the most conservative bodies of society, i.e. the military. Russian specialists indicate that as early as the late 1980s, the Soviet military had become a passive bureaucracy, an 'immobile military organization', for which even planning an operation in Poland generated stress and disarray.[27]

Some Western specialists even suspect that 'Soviet military experts knew what to do to win in Afghanistan but did not do it because of a cultural reluctance, in other words, cultural inertia . . . [there was] no desire to change the doctrine, training and organization of an Army that was well adapted for a European war against its principal adversary.'[28] To these analysts, this is tied to the prevalence of 'the big, conventional war paradigm' which Russia has embraced for most of the past three centuries and which prescribes that the militaries of great powers, to which Russia still wants to belong, 'must maintain a central competence in symmetric warfare to preserve their great power status *vis-à-vis* other great powers; and their militaries must be large organizations. These two traits, as manifested in Russian military behavior, . . . did not produce institutions and cultures that were amenable to versatility and adaptation.'[29]

Former Soviet generals were all the more inclined to defend the status quo that, like other militaries, they tended to organize forces and interpret modern war through the light of the previous successful war. For the Soviet military, this was the 'Great Patriotic war', which has remained the dominant frame of reference as it is viewed in Russia as 'a war of survival',[30] but also as the major event which legitimized Moscow's claim to be a full-fledged participant of the concert of European great powers. With such a sensitive political and strategic background, Soviet officers, trained in the total war philosophy, paid insufficient, if any, interest to local wars or alternative force models.[31] When they did, they did not want to enforce the corresponding structural changes—for a former Soviet officer, a smaller force cannot be efficient. One may remember that initially General Ogarkov's predictions and doctrinal hypotheses about future 'high-tech' wars were not that welcome in Moscow because they were not in keeping with the tradition—indeed,

his 'military-technical revolution' favoured quality over quantity, high technology over tanks. This was simply too much to swallow for an institution which was already in the middle of a multifaceted crisis, as *glasnost'* brought to light. Faced with a brutal loss of sense (what ideology, what country, and what state are we supposed to serve?), Soviet/Russian generals, who, in addition, felt they were abandoned by the political leadership, tended to retreat into conservatism and insularism. These circumstances were not conducive to prolonging the experience launched by Gorbachev, who brought civilian experts into public discussions on military issues. This has continued in the post-Soviet era, which has fuelled military immobilism.

The nature of the post-Cold war strategic context has not been conducive either to overcoming the Russian military's conservatism. The Russians have not stopped studying Western models of making war, and what they realized when observing the 1991 Gulf war or NATO's 1999 Allied Force operation was that the technological gap with the West was widening at a considerable pace (as one military specialist rightly observes, Russia historically was often unable to obtain a decisive military-technical superiority over its adversaries[32]). This was considered as a strategic problem for Russia (conventional high-precision weapons acquiring strategic value), especially in a context where NATO decided to enlarge to the east and where the United States has shown a propensity to use force to promote its interests. This may have contributed to entrenching the desire to preserve the ways and means which the Russian military has traditionally relied on to respond to the Western threat; in any case, this was used by Russian generals to vindicate the status quo and resist restructuring plans for the armed forces. In this respect, Russian political leaders bear part of the blame, since they themselves, under both Yeltsin and Putin, have constantly emphasized the notion that the West remains threatening to Russia.

In this period of relative immobilism (late 1980s to early 2000s), Russian political leaders, aware of their impotence to get the army out of the profound crisis it was living through, did not dare challenge the institutional autonomy that the Russian/Soviet military had acquired back in the czarist era, allowing it to 'generally [monopolize] knowledge over military matters and [to conduct] its affairs with little outside interference'.[33] That meant that the military had complete latitude to sustain the status quo on warfare, doctrine, force organization, and to impede doctrinal evolution and reform of the armed forces. The civilian leadership all the more yielded to the military's pressure on this front since they knew that they did not have any financial capacity to fund structural military reform adequately. This was an additional factor leading the Russian military to resist change away from the Soviet model: in uncertainty, better preserve the existing rather than destroy and find yourself unable to build something better.

Finally, one should note that there was resistance to change also on the part of the politically powerful arms industry. The mass war on the model of 1941–5 had determined its development. Driven as it was 'by [its] previous heavy investments in assets unsuitable for computerized battlefields', it resented Ogarkov's ideas.[34] In Chechnya and Georgia, Russian forces, in the absence of a sufficient number of modern military systems, had no other choice than to rely on their usual strengths: massive firepower,

numerical advantage, heavy weapons, and dominance in the air without the ability for discriminate strikes.

On the Move Again: Is a Cultural Military Revolution in Sight?

Against this background, recent developments in Russian military affairs seem to constitute a serious evolution. It all started in October 2008, when Defence Minister Serdiukov announced a new military reform programme.[35] The war with Georgia served as the triggering factor for launching this plan. More importantly, this programme, contrary to most previous ones, has been carried out with determination by the Russian authorities, even in the context of the financial and economic crisis. Several of its elements come in clear rupture with Russian military tradition. A key step resides in the transition from a divisional to a brigade-based structure. All units must now be combat-ready formations, and replace the mobilization force structure, which was made up of mostly cadre units consisting primarily of officers and relying, in case of war, on reservists;[36] reserves are also undergoing decisive downsizing from several millions to 700–800,000.[37] The aim is to allow for much more rapid force deployment. The 'affinity with numbers' is being challenged as well: substantial cuts have been carried out in the bloated officers' corps, and the armed forces are now shelving a huge number of obsolete equipments and weapons (officially, only 10 per cent of the existing arsenal is made up of modern systems). Decentralization of command and control is also on the agenda. Chief of the General Staff Makarov linked this to previous experiences in Chechnya and Georgia, which in his view demonstrated the need to quicken decision-making in operations. As part of this goal, the general command structure is undergoing transformation—from a four-tier to a three-tier organization.[38] Even conscription might, over the longer term, be abandoned as Russia is trying—with difficulty, because of recruitment problems—to increase the quantity of professional personnel enrolled on a contract basis.[39] Mobility is supposed to be enhanced through the deployment of an airborne unit in every military district. Seventeen years after the collapse of the USSR, a key figure among the top military leadership, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov, then Chief of the Main Combat Training and Service Directorate, declared, just after the Georgia war, that '[t]raining programs for services and service arms are being reassessed with due account taken of the specifics of the operation [in Georgia], and of the experience gained in Chechnya. We are also bearing in mind the Soviet Army's experience in Afghanistan, the United States' operations in Iraq, and other armed conflicts.'[40] At last… At the level of training, combined arms action, where the Russian forces performed poorly both in Chechnya and Georgia, has been increasingly emphasized. If the reform programme is fully implemented, it will definitively give the Russian army a physiognomy much more adapted to meet the operational requirements of fighting local wars and countering terrorism and insurrections.

This radical evolution is not a total surprise. As was said before, the evolution of the characteristics of warfare in the post-Cold War environment has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. Mikhail Gorbachev had engaged in a thorough revision of the military doctrine and of force structure in keeping with his 'new thinking' in foreign policy—reasonable sufficiency 'instead of maximum insurance in meeting military requirements' and ' "defensive defense" instead of "offensive defense" '.[41] Believing the concepts of the 'revolution in military affairs' were validated by the 1991 Gulf war, the Soviets had envisioned changes in strategy, which 'included a modification of traditional massed attacks, to more mobile forces and greater reliance on maneuver, combining elements of deep advance, defense, and withdrawal with a continuing offensive'.[42] The interest of the Russian military in conceptualizing its experiments of irregular warfare in Afghanistan, then in Chechnya, has been heightened by the growing volatility in the south of the country. They also reckon on the importance of peacekeeping operations for twenty-first-century militaries, if only because 'Russia, in the early 1990s, was directly involved in managing more violent local conflicts than all the NATO member-states taken together,'[43] which generated a lot of analytical work (both in academic circles and within the General Staff) on the militaries' missions in peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. All of this was reflected in the various military reform blueprints which have been adopted since the early 1990s, all mentioning the need for leaner, more modern and mobile forces to face the new military challenges in the post-Cold War era. But this time, change is taking place for real and is embracing the whole army's structures.

This is because several conditions which had been missing in recent years are now present. First, the civilian leadership has finally decided to challenge the military's institutional autonomy in order to overcome its natural conservatism. This started in 2001, when President Putin named one of his closest political allies, Sergei Ivanov, a KGB officer, to head the Defence Ministry; even worse, from the generals' point of view, he was replaced in early 2007 by a real civilian: Anatoliy Serdiukov, who spent most of his professional career in the furniture industry before becoming the head of the Federal Tax Service. The downsizing of the officers' corps is meant to rid the top military leadership of its most conservative elements. In this endeavour, the political leadership has margins for manoeuvre which it did not have in the 1990s—money has returned to the armed forces since the early 2000s, which is supposed to allow for more appropriate funding of the reform process, thus making it more acceptable to the top brass. Also, the Kremlin may have perceived that the atmosphere in civil-military relations was more favourable to reform than it was in the 1990s: the army appreciated being revalorized by Vladimir Putin during the second Chechen conflict, and has grown more confident that the political leadership is serious when it stresses that Russia cannot be treated respectfully on the world stage while it is deprived of an army in good shape.

Concerning the hierarchy of possible conflicts, things have become a bit clearer. Russian specialists believe that in the foreseeable future, the two strategic missions for the national armed forces will be: to implement Russia's interests in low-intensity armed conflicts with irregular armed formations in the Caucasus and Central Asia;[44] and to

repel a 'Balkans-type' attack on Russia or its allies, which could be a high-intensity regional or trans-regional conflict with the use of high-tech weapons. However, they deem this second scenario as the less probable, and this is probably the vision of the political leadership now. Here, one can feel the influence of the 'Chechnya generals', which has grown as a result of the two wars, and because the whole northern Caucasus looks set to remain unstable for a long time, as well as the increasing security pressure created by the situation in 'AfPak', which has made Russia increasingly concerned about how to counter drug trafficking, organized crime, illegal migration, and political or religious extremism. This is obvious in Moscow's effort to strengthen the efficiency of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in tackling these problems.

While working to field more high-precision weapons within the armed forces, which so far has been a slow process, the Russians seem to assume now that they should not necessarily be obsessed with catching up with Western armies in what they see as 'over-technologization' of war. Russian military specialists now dare to emphasize that national military experience in the post-Soviet era—anti-guerrilla warfare, local conflicts—does not resemble the high-tech wars that the US military conducts. The realization that other great military powers are suffering when confronted with asymmetric threats and irregular warfare despite their technological superiority may well have 'relaxed' the Russian military leadership on this front.

Of course, this does not mean that Russia does not fear the West's high-tech weapons and the US ability to realize long-range precision strikes against its strategic sites. Asymmetric responses have been conceived. One resides in the consolidation of the national air defence system, combined with the joint CIS air defence system, for which Russia is trying to develop ever more highly efficient systems (S-400, S-500); Moscow also contemplates building an integrated airspace defence system. Another response is linked to the nuclear option. The role of nuclear weapons has clearly increased as a response to the decline in general-purpose forces, all the more so since they present the huge advantage, from a Russian point of view, of upholding Moscow's claim to great power status. The nuclear use threshold has lowered since the late 1980s. Reneging on the no-first-use pledge in the early 1990s, Russia, which is pursuing a steady effort to modernize the country's strategic capabilities, has made clear that its aim in this field is not only to preserve a robust deterrence, but also to develop options for use in case of a major conventional conflict where conventional forces fail to repel the aggressor, which was confirmed in the new military doctrine adopted in 2010. In particular, Russia has refined options for limited, 'demonstration' strikes, aimed at de-escalating a conventional conflict.

Russia remains inclined to limit power projection to its territory and immediate surroundings. In recent years, its military has made a lot of effort to consolidate its presence in many former Soviet countries (including Georgia's separatist entities, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and to confer more serious capabilities on the CSTO, a defence alliance made up of Russia and five other CIS states. The conflict in Georgia suggested that Russia is prepared to use force to protect its interests in a region which it still sees as a defensive buffer. In contrast, while always emphasizing the role of the UN Security

Council in regulating international peace and security as well as its own 'special responsibility' in world security affairs as a UNSC permanent member, Russia is one of the least 'generous' permanent members in terms of contributing troops to UN peacekeeping. However, this might be something Russia could work more actively on if its military tools are to recover from the past twenty years' crisis—after all, the Russian military participated in major peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, has supported EU troops in Chad, and has contributed on a permanent basis since the autumn of 2008 to the international fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Conclusion

Deeply embedded strategic visions and derived operational concepts in a centuries-long militarized society serving an insular military institution: all these factors combined with the crisis which paralysed the military system in the 1990s to favour the persistence, at various levels, of Russian/Soviet military strategy, thinking, and structures of war, which appeared totally inadequate in the endeavours the Russian army has been faced with since the collapse of the USSR. The military apparatus reflected on these experiments, but a majority of its members did not have the willingness, the intellectual (even moral) energy, and/or the material support to introduce systemic, institutionalized innovation at the operational level and comprehensive structural reform throughout the whole army. However, as some major obstacles (institutional autonomy of the military, financial crunch…) have vanished or been reduced, the country has moved towards adapting its force structures away from the preparation for another big land war. As a result, it is now embarked, in its military construction, on the same boat which the Western militaries jumped into more than ten years ago. The political leadership has absorbed the lessons of the excesses of militarism. Now aware that great power status cannot rely only on military resources, Moscow is trying to rebuild the armed forces without compromising other priorities of the development of the Russian state and society.

Major hurdles remain on the path chosen by the Kremlin and the new military leadership. Decisive steps have been taken, but nothing guarantees that the current process will create an efficient force. One obstacle is, traditionally enough, technology. The Russian military has not entered the information age yet, and this remains frustrating for any modernization effort. Even some nuclear modernization programmes have been in trouble due to industrial and technological problems. The industry remains unable not only to produce new equipment in large quantities but also to deliver the technologies needed to make the 'new' Russian forces more efficient. The Georgia war was quite illustrative from this point of view: communication systems and electronic warfare means were obsolete; the Russian global positioning system (GLONASS) did not function properly; the shortcomings of satellite-targeting support hampered the use of the rare precision-guided munitions, which resulted in untimely circulation of

information on Georgian troops and movements. Russia's persistent backwardness in computer technologies and radio-electronic warfare systems will continue to hamper the establishment of effective coordination between the various branches of the armed forces and of flexible command and control procedures.

Another problem, also traditional, is the human and cultural factor. The Russian army has still not found a way to overcome its recruitment crisis, which has affected both conscription and the attempt at professionalizing a greater number of formations. In Georgia, many of the officers from the 'cadre units' simply proved unable to lead troops or even refused to carry out the tasks ordered.[45] It is not clear yet whether Russia will find not only the human fabric to revitalize its officers' corps and build a professional NCO corps as planned by its new reform programme, but also the intellectual resources to profoundly reform the military education programme, which has faced only superficial changes over the past twenty years. This is a major issue since the decentralized command and control system Russia wants to build will require acceptance of delegation of top-to-bottom responsibility and the recognition of the merits of leadership at junior level.

On both fronts—technological backwardness, human resources—Russia no longer refuses to get some inspiration or inputs from abroad: imports of military systems and consultations with European governments on professionalization programmes are decisive steps which, a few years ago, would have been considered anathema. At the same time, these structural problems constitute an additional limitation to Russia's willingness to interact with Western armed forces because they are things the Russian government does not want to expose.

Notes

1. Kirillov, 2008: 2.
2. Blank and Weitz, 2010: 5.
3. Adelman, 1985.
4. Cigar, 2009: 463.
5. Ibid. 465.
6. Leebeart, 1981: 21. From 1700 until 1917, most wars that Russia fought were not on its own soil.
7. Garthoff, 1995: 46.
8. Odom, 1995: 13.
9. Adelman, 1985.
10. Leebaert, 1981: 21.
11. Larionov, 1994.
12. Adelman, 1985.
13. Leebaert, 1981: 4.
14. Goltz and Putnam, 2004: 123.
15. Blank and Weitz, 2010: 5.
16. This was the role of General Staff officers, who 'focused their attention upon military-technical issues, advising the Party leadership and state but deferring to them on political forecasts' (Kipp, 1995).

17. Blank and Weitz, 2010: 2.
18. For an analysis of the adaptations made by the Soviets to their conduct of war in Afghanistan, see Cassidy, 2003: 36f.
19. Ibid. 23–4.
20. Coffey, 2006.
21. Thomas, 2005; Coffey, 2006.
22. Cassidy, 2008: 44.
23. McDermott, 2009: 65, 78.
24. Coffey, 2006.
25. Clearly, the 'China factor' is also taken into account in the General Staff's planning; however, this is not formulated openly, because the two countries are supposed to be strategic partners since the mid-1990s. See Saradzhyan, 2010.
26. Quoted in Kipp, 1995.
27. Baev, 2002: 132. This is why the task of solving the problem was delegated to the Polish authorities, this author says, quoting Kramer, 1995.
28. Cassidy, 2003: 12.
29. Ibid. 38.
30. Kirillov, 2008: 1.
31. Donnelly, 2003: 303.
32. Kalistranov, 2009.
33. Goltz and Putnam, 2004: 123.
34. Baev, 2002: 131.
35. Barabanov, 2010.
36. In 2008 only 17 per cent of all units were combat-ready—i.e. fully staffed and fully equipped.
37. Russia is to retain a one-million-strong force.
38. From regiments–divisions–armies–military districts to brigades–operational commands–military districts.
39. The length of military service was cut from two years to one in 2008.
40. 'Combat Training to Be Adjusted to New Experience in Conflict Zones—General', Interfax-AVN, 30 October 2008.
41. Garthoff, 1995: 46.
42. Ibid. 46.
43. Baev, 2002: 135.
44. Arbatov and Romachkine, 2001. These authors stress that this function is compatible with another type of mission, i.e. peacekeeping operations in hot spots 'from the Balkans to Pamir'.
45. According to General Makarov, quoted in 'Russian Army Not Fit For Modern War—Top General', Reuters, 16 December 2008.

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CHAPTER 19

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WAR: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES

MAJOR-GENERAL PENG GUANG QIAN

The pattern of war is a reflection of the development of human society's production mode in the military field. The development of war is the inevitable result of war's inner contradictions. Generally speaking, war in its full sense has two basic attributes: the political-economic attribute and the military-technological attribute. These two attributes of war constitute the internal fundamental contradictions of war and push forward the evolution of the pattern of war. The political-economic attribute and the military-technological attribute of war kept on developing and finally broke out of their regional limits to stride over the threshold of world war in the twentieth century. It was a turning point in human war history when the traditional local war mode expanded to a world war pattern.

From about the 1860s to the middle of the twentieth century, two industrial revolutions took place in the capitalist world, which greatly promoted the development of production forces. The new technological achievements were applied to the military field and brought profound improvements of weapons and equipment. Among others, there were invention of new weapons such as tanks, submarines, airplanes, aircraft carriers, and chemical weapons; establishment of new arms and services such as air forces, armoured troops, paratroops, and chemical troops; development of railway transportation networks and navigation technology—all made it possible for the armed forces to carry out motorized and mechanized manoeuvres on the battlefield. A brand-new operational pattern (blitzkrieg) of quick assault in far-flung depth with coordination among the infantry, the tanks, and the artillery, as well as that among the army, the navy, and the air force was introduced. The battlefield was no longer planar but three-dimensional. The length and depth of the battle line extended to several hundred or even more than a thousand kilometres. As a result, the size and range of war was

enlarged greatly. Wire telephone, telegraph, and wireless telephone greatly improved military communication and transportation, promoting military command and control to a new stage. The development of productive forces, better material and technological conditions, and the great increase of population made it possible to enlist a more massive army. In the 1930s and1940s, major European powers had built armies of several millions or even over ten million soldiers, accounting for 10 or 20 per cent of their total population. The biggest organization of their armies had developed from the army to the group of armies (frontal army), even to the group of frontal armies.

All these elements made full preparation for human war to turn from local war to world war. To divide the spheres of influence, the imperialist powers could break out of regional restrictions and fight a worldwide war across the oceans and continents. These imperialist powers tried to expand their influence and to plunder colonies. During this period, they wove a net of worldwide vital interests and formed enormous, mutually threatening camps. They also planned to launch a war such as had never taken place in the world. Accordingly, two world wars of unprecedented size and intensity broke out in succession in the first half of the twentieth century. In the First World War, the political, economic, and technological elements of human society were closely combined with the military element. The war was characterized by unprecedented comprehensiveness. The Second World War made this characteristic more obvious.[1]

After the Second World War, the international strategic situation changed, and the pattern of world wars has given way to that of local wars gradually. In terms of the political-economic attribute, the development of local war could be classified as five succeeding periods: local war to scramble for the middle areas in the framework of the Yalta System; local war between the two confronting camps; proxy war during the time of the United States' and the Soviet Union's contending for hegemony; local war while Eastern Europe was falling apart pending the termination of the Cold War; and local war after the end of the Cold War. During this process, the interdependence between different countries and interest groups was further deepened with the development of international economic globalization. The political-economic content of war tended to be limited in scope. In terms of size of war, those local wars before the 1970s always had an obvious background of possible world war. In the 1970s and 1980s, that background gradually receded from the stage.

In the nearly half a century of confrontation between the Eastern and Western camps, both sides set the prevention of military confrontation escalating to generalized war as the basic requirement in the conduct of war. Hence, even if local wars involved a degree of confrontation between the East and West blocs, they were limited in character. Although most wars had the potential to develop into general wars or nuclear wars, they ultimately failed to do so.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the possibility of world war under the bipolar pattern was further lowered. The foundation for the global confrontation between the two military groups led by the United States and the Soviet Union did not exist anymore. Local wars after the Cold War spread over a limited area and their size and intensity were low. They were not of global significance.

Fundamental Causes for the Rise of High-Tech Local War

Since the 1970s, a series of new high technologies, with information technology as the core, have emerged and have been widely applied to the military field. This imposed more and more high-tech features on the local wars. And local war has been becoming more controllable, more small-sized, and more efficient.

Multipolarization of the International Strategic Pattern Makes the Strategic Powers Mutually Dependent and Restrained

With the disintegration of the bipolar pattern and the end of the Cold War, the international strategic powers divided and reorganized at a quicker speed, becoming multipolar and dispersed. The international strategic pattern imposes more and more restrictions on war. In the post-Cold War period, those past various contradictions covered under the bipolar pattern suddenly burst out, among which ethnic hostility, religious conflicts, and boundary disputes are most common. These elements lead to incessant armed conflicts and wars. However, as the background of big powers' striving for supremacy has disappeared, these armed conflicts and wars are fought only in one country or in one certain region. Even the war in which some big powers are involved is not likely to develop into high-intensity worldwide war because of the asymmetric contest. Moreover, the tendency towards global economic integration has deepened interdependence among countries. The UN and the regional security organizations are playing a more and more important role in restraining and controlling wars. The elements restraining war have been strengthened, and war is moving in the direction of limited purposes and controllable size.

Economic Changes in the Current World have Changed the Way of Pursuing National Interests so as to Lead War to Smaller Size

In the industrial era, in order to seize industrial resources and control the raw-materials markets, capitalist countries competed against each other to plunder and divide colonies through military hegemony. Their national power was rapidly expanded through plundering the fortune and resources of their colonies. This was the most important way for Western countries to pursue their national interests and carry out international competition.

The rising information-technological revolution since the mid-1970s has gradually changed the foundation of national power of the industrial era and radically changed the way to realize national interests. The global economic structure has undergone

significant adjustment and change. High-tech industries such as electronics, and new energy and space industries enjoy fast development. Under the new socio-economic circumstances, the foundation of national power is built upon economic and technological strength. To threaten or destroy the enemy country's economic and technological systems can achieve the same result as launching a war. Compared to the military means of war, sometimes science and technology wars, economic wars, and trade wars are more agile and more efficient in solving international contradictions and pursuing economic interests. As a result, in local wars after the 1980s, especially after the Cold War, the countries involved made efforts to achieve their goals with high efficiency by employing high-tech means and keeping military confrontations at low-to-mid intensity.

Current Science and Technology Permeate through the Field of War, Promote Breakthroughs in Weapons and Equipment as Well as Operational Modes at Different Phases, and Make the Pattern of War Change Profoundly

In the post-Second World War period, with the strong impact of two science and technology revolutions, a series of high technologies, such as precision-guidance technology, space technology, new materials technology, and stealth technology, with information technology as the core, developed quickly. These new technologies are widely applied in the military field. As a result, mechanized fire warfare is moving towards high-tech informational warfare.

In the 1980s, military information technology as well as the automatic command system was further developed. In the field of military detection technology, computer-controlled detection equipment and informationalization of single-combat platforms and weapon systems appeared.[2] These informationalized platforms could not only detect and track targets but also carry out over-the-horizon attacks by launching long-range missiles and guided torpedoes. In the field of military communication, the C3I (Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence) system was set up to process large amounts of data. It indicated that the traditional mode of battlefield command and control would undergo profound reforms following the informationalization of munitions and combat platforms. The C4ISR (Computerized Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) system has now permeated all the aspects of modern war to act as the brain and nerve centre that controls all the military elements and becomes a multiplier of an army's war-fighting capability. The attack on the enemy's informationalized command and control system has become a new combat mode. In this way, war is extended into the field of C4ISR confrontation. The electromagnetic confrontation once centred on missile attack and defence gives way to the command and control confrontation based on C4ISR systems. The introduction of informationalized weaponry as well as the information construction of the battlefield has fundamentally changed the pattern of war. Moreover, operational effectiveness and

efficiency have been greatly improved, which has provided the material and technological basis for war to become controllable and small-sized.

Contradiction Between War Ends and Operational Means Propels the Development of a War Mode of High Efficiency and Promotes a Qualitative Change in the Pattern of War

War is the ultimate tool to gain advantage. In the process of adaptation of the war mode to political objectives and interest requirements, a lot of new, cost-effective war modes come into being. Contradictions between the interest objectives and the means of war as well as the cost-effective principle of war determine the evolution and direction of war. Thereby, they propel the wars after the Second World War to be increasingly high-tech ones.

Paradoxically, the power of mass destruction of nuclear weapons prevented their employment in the post-Second World War period. The overwhelming destructive power of this tool of war came into great conflict with the embarrassing situation of the war-launcher who is eager to gain advantage on one hand and afraid of being destroyed on the other. This required both sides to restrain from the escalation of war and to avoid nuclear war. Hence, human beings had to choose conventional war in the face of the nuclear threat.

However, many of the conventional wars after the Second World War ended at very high political and military cost. The outcome makes clear that the forms of conventional war inherited from the past still face a strategic crisis. The strategy aimed at military occupation can hardly achieve the aims of war in a cost-effective way even by employing conventional means. In the current international circumstances, the focus of competition has increasingly shifted to the economic and technological fields. The contradiction between the high strategic cost of war means and the political aims which serve the global competition for national power becomes more prominent. Accordingly, cost-effectiveness in war is stressed and more attention is paid to achieving comprehensive strategic benefits in politics, diplomacy, economics, and psychology at the least cost. The new technological revolution represented by information technology has brought about the rapid development of military technologies and new breakthroughs in operational methods. High-tech striking operations based on informationalized weapons and equipment stepped onto the stage of war.

Features and Direction of Development of Modern War

The rise of high-tech local war is a historic leap in the development of current wars. It is a reflection in the military field of the change from the Industrial Era production mode to the Informational Era production mode.

War Objects are More Restricted by Political and Economic Elements, Which Makes High-Tech Local Wars More Controllable

The controllable feature of high-tech local wars originates from limited war objects and high-tech war means. In terms of limited war objects, military affairs are closely bound up with politics, economics, and diplomacy. If war takes place in any corner of the earth, it will arouse the attention and reaction of the whole world. Should regional crises and armed conflicts become out of control, it would lead to a complicated international situation. Then several limiting factors would influence the war. With the fast development of global economic integration, the interdependence of economic interests of all countries has been further enhanced. The international cooperation in manufacturing, the transnational flow of funds, and the global exchange of goods all promote the mutual infiltration and merger of economic interests among different countries. All the countries involved in the war have to consider the historic tendency of the international political, economic, and military situation. They also have to evaluate the increase and decrease of various strategic powers during and after the war. The high input, high risk, and high consumption do not allow the war to last endlessly or expand and escalate in its own way. No side is willing to see itself stuck in the mire of war for a long time. As far as the high-tech means of war are concerned, precision attacks on important targets have replaced the traditional operational mode of attacking cities and seizing territories or carpet-bombing. The primary target is not to impose high casualties on the enemy's effective strength but to seek information dominance on the battlefield. It is better to dominate the enemy's will than to deprive him of his military capability.

What is more, the system of international law is being perfected day by day. The international crisis-control mechanism is maturing so as to impose more and more restraint on war. Although some war-wagers use force against other countries of their own accord without United Nations' ratification, the use of sanction under international law, the dialogue function, the peace-keeping function, and the arms control function of UN still cannot be replaced by any other international organization. Furthermore, as modern media technologies develop by leaps and bounds, and the social transparency of war is greatly increased, the popular feelings of the people and international public opinion will impose more restrictions on any war.

Wide Employment of High-Tech Weapons and Equipment has Brought About and is Promoting a Series of Profound Changes in Operational Modes and Methods

The rapid development of emerging high technologies in the world has laid the material and technological foundation for the armed forces of countries to upgrade their weapons and technologies at a faster speed. Moreover, the all-round reconnaissance and

surveillance capability, long-distance three-dimensional mobility, long-range precision striking capability, high-efficiency overall protection capability, comprehensive quick support ability, and automatic command and control capability are all seeing great improvements. This progress promotes the renewal of operational modes and methods.

Since high-tech weapons and equipments are used in operations in large numbers, the tendency of the resulting transformation has become more and more clear: linear operations are changing to non-linear operations; the pattern of incrementally reaching final victory mainly by ground operations is changing to a pattern of quickly ending wars mainly by information attacks and air strikes; the stress on concentration of manpower to seek partial quantitative superiority is changing to a stress on concentration of firepower and energy to seek qualitative superiority and overall combat effectiveness; the emphasis on annihilating the enemy's effective strength in large numbers is changing to an emphasis on striking the enemy's key links to paralyse his whole operational system; the clear demarcation between tactical, operational, and strategic targets—the sequential three-level operational procedure—is changing to a blurred demarcation between or even overlapping of the three levels. All these tendencies are the results of widespread employment of high-tech weapons and equipment.[3]

As Informationalization of War Elements is Increasingly Growing, Informationalized War will Gradually Become the Fundamental Pattern of High-Tech Local War

Information technology is a comprehensive field that integrates computer technology, communication technology, and command technology. It is also the sum total of technological functions to acquire, change, process, and employ information. Compared to combat platforms, information plays a more and more important role in war as a kind of strategic resource.

The informationalization of the elements of high-tech local war, first of all, is reflected in the informationalization of weapons and equipment. Modern high-tech weapons and equipment all rely on computers to improve their controllability, reaction speed, precision, and destruction power.

Secondly, it is reflected in the informationalization of battlefields. Digital technology has transformed all kinds of information into digital information. Then wireless radios, optical-fibre communication, and satellites are used to weave the multidimensional battlefields into one information system.

Thirdly, it is reflected in the informationalization of command and control. The military information system, with computers at the core, fixes some human intelligence and store it in computer chips. Computers can collect and process various kinds of information at a high speed, automatically pass on orders and report situations, and make high-speed calculations. Moreover, computers can help commanders and staff members to work out combat plans, to simulate the process of battle, to choose the best design, to

automatically guide combat forces and striking systems for detecting, tracking, and targeting, and making damage assessments.

Fourthly, it is reflected in the informational forms of participation in war. The informationalization of war makes battlefield and non-battlefield integrated. Even non-professional soldiers can click a mouse and type on a keyboard to participate in the war from a computer office far away from the real battlefield.

The preparation and implementation of future high-tech local wars will be centred on the gathering, processing, disseminating, and protection of information. To win and maintain information dominance will become the focus of future war. Information will not only serve as the basis of command and decision but also the prerequisite to give full play to the performance of weapon systems. Information is an important resource for carrying out direct attacks on the enemy's informational targets and can play a major role in influencing the overall situation of war. Information superiority will become an important factor in determining victory or defeat in war. Hence, information war will be a major operational pattern instead of a supplementary operational means as before. The side that enjoys information superiority will also gain the initiative in operations, while the other side will find itself trampled upon. Informational warfare capability will become one of the core elements of military fighting capacity, and the level of digitalization of the military will have a decisive bearing on its combat effectiveness.

As Military Strength and the Development Level of Technological Equipment are Unbalanced Between Warring Parties, Asymmetric Operations are Becoming the Basic Pattern of Local Wars Under High-Tech Conditions

The gap between the developed and developing countries in science and technology, economics, and comprehensive national power is widening. The posture of asymmetric military strength will remain unchanged for a long time. The strength of some military powers will keep on expanding, so the strong will become stronger, while the weak will grow weaker. The gap between their military strength is growing so wide that it has become a 'generation gap' of the epoch.

In the asymmetric operations of high-tech war, the stronger side will attach more importance to giving full play to its advantages. It will mobilize and employ various asymmetric combat forces, technological tools, and operational modes to avoid being passive in the war and to reduce its own casualties and equipment loss to the lowest level. It will also try its best to wipe out the opponents at one fell swoop and realize its own strategic intentions quickly. The weaker side will maximize favourable factors and minimize unfavourable ones according to the particular situation so that it can make the most of its own unique advantages and gain battlefield initiative with asymmetric means and operational methods. Strong and weak, superior and inferior, advantageous and disadvantageous are all relative. Emerging high-tech weapons and equipment

have limitations in some aspects and the strong enemy has its own vulnerable points, while the weaker side may as well rely on its own advantages against the enemy's weakness and employ stratagems in changing operational methods to reduce its losses and achieve victory.

Integration of Fighting Power and Systematization of Battlefield Confrontation Make Joint Operations the Basic Operational Pattern

Under high-tech conditions, victory in war depends on the comprehensive confrontation capacity of the whole combat system. The composition of war-fighting capability is developing in the direction of systematization, and the emphasis is laid on the combination of various forces so as to find new ways to increase their combat effectiveness through the integrated composition and employment of combat forces. Single-service military operations are disappearing gradually, while the traditional division of labour among the army, navy, and air force is blurring. Various combat forces are more closely connected with each other, and their operations are highly integrated. Even a very small operation will have features of joint working. The enormous power of various combat forces can only be given full play in combined operations. Integrated and joint operation has become the basic pattern of high-tech local wars. The principles of 'systems confrontation' and 'overall strike' have become more important than that of 'independent operation'. Sometimes strategic means might be used to attack tactical targets, and sometimes tactical means might be employed to attack strategic targets. Supported by information technology, various arms and services, different functional formations, and various combat factors are woven into a unity. Hence, joint operation has become the inexorable operational pattern. Combined fighting capacity has become the fundamental symbol of combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

As the Cost of War Increases, War Depends Heavily on Solid Economic Foundations and Strong Comprehensive Support

Under high-tech conditions, military effectiveness keeps on increasing, while war costs rise by leaps and bounds to a surprising level. For example, the material consumption of the 1991 Gulf War was 20 times that of the Second World War, 10 times that of the Korean War, 7.5 times that of the Vietnam War, and 4.2 times that of the Yom Kippur War. According to calculations, if the main functions of airplanes are to be improved 1–2 times, the research cost will rise 4.4 times. Compared to the Second World War, the unit price of weapons used in the1991 Gulf War is extremely high. For example, the unit price of a tank has risen from US $50,000 to US $2 million or even $4.4 million. The unit price of a fighter has risen from US $100,000 to several hundred million.

The unit price of an aircraft carrier has risen from US $7 million to $3 billion or $3.5 billion. In terms of the deployment of combat forces, air transportation enjoys the highest speed, but the cost of it is ten times that of ocean shipping. Outer space is the best battlefield to make good use of multidimensional space. However, the cost will be astronomical if a space weapon system is to be developed.

China's Strategic Guidance for Possible Future War

China's strategic guidance for future local war under high-tech conditions must follow the general law of modern war, and more importantly the special laws of high-tech local war under the specific conditions of China and the Chinese Army.

You Fight in Your Way and We Fight in Ours and Strive for Full Initiative

You fight in your way and we fight in ours, and strive for full initiative. This principle is the soul and the quintessence of strategic guidance of China and the Chinese Army. Mao Zedong was the innovator and the first successful practitioner of this core thought. In 1947, he first put forward this strategic guiding principle in his telegraphs sent to the Shanxi-Chahaer-Hebei Field Army and the Eastern China Field Army: 'You fight in your way and we shall fight in ours (each fights in his own way).'[4] After the founding of new China, Mao Zedong clarified this profound thought on many occasions. He said, 'War is no mystery. Fight when we can win, manoeuvre when we can't; you fight in your way and we fight in ours. Strategy and tactics and so on are after all based on these four points.' The key point of this thought is to maintain freedom and initiative in war guidance and combat operations and to utilize our strong points to attack the enemy's weak points. This point will not be changed in the future no matter what kind of war we may fight and what kind of enemy we are confronted with at what time, in what place. To adhere to the guiding principle the following three points must be stressed.

First, 'dare to fight and have to win and don't be intimidated by any powerful enemy' is the pre-condition for implementing correct strategic guidance. The first important thing to the conductors of war, under whatever time and circumstances, is to keep a correct understanding of the situation and the posture of both sides. We should not be scared by the enemy's temporary superiority. We should not be influenced by the enemy's temporary initiative. We should fully assess our own superiorities and advantages. We should firmly believe that, on the basis of certain physical conditions of war resources, we are able to reverse the course of war and the balance of forces through our own Chinese efforts and eventually defeat the enemy.

Second, we should stress the initiative in strategic guidance and not allow the enemy to lead us by the nose. To gain freedom of action in military operations and the initiative on the battlefield, the first thing is to maintain the initiative in war guidance and strategic thinking throughout. Conductors of war, when considering the problems of strategic guidance, must take themselves as the dominant factor: hit whatever is most advantageous to hit; strike the enemy whenever and wherever it is appropriate to strike; fight in whichever way and style best meet the combat objectives. Never fight at a time and in a place that the enemy expects; never fight in a way or in a style that the enemy anticipates.

Third, we should utilize our own advantages to the maximum and attack the enemy's weak points with our strong points. War is a competition of strength and that of popular sentiment as well. Advantage and disadvantage, strength and weakness, substance and vacuity are always contradictory, complementary, and reversible. No matter how rapidly the technical conditions of war may change or how powerful the enemy is with its advanced equipment, there are always weak points with the enemy. The principle of 'you fight in your way and we fight in ours' demands that we take a dialectical approach in understanding advantages and disadvantages or strengths and weakness of both sides to seize, create, exploit, and utilize the enemy's weak points and mistakes; to overcome our own weaknesses; at the same time, to attack the enemy's weak points at the right time, in the right place, and the right way.

Give Full Play to the Total Power of the People's War Under Modern Conditions

The people's war is the foundation of our army's strategic guidance. The people's war is a form of organization of war, and its role has nothing to do with the level of military technology. The concept of people's war is not confined to low-technology wars only. What are closely related to the status and role of people's war are the political factors of the war and the leader's organizing abilities. No matter when in the past, at present, or in the future, the foundation of our army's victory in just wars always lies in the support of the masses of the people, the political consciousness and courage of officers and soldiers, up-to-date equipment, and flexible strategy and tactics. We firmly believe: 'The army and the people are the foundation of victory.'[5] And we never believe that technology and new weapons alone can decide the outcome of a war.

In the high-tech local war which we will face in the future, the role of the masses as the main body of the war is embodied by the country. The great power of the people's war is released through comprehensive national power, the combination of peacetime and wartime, the combination of the military and the civilian, and the combination of war actions and non-war actions. Besides direct participation and cooperation with the army's operations in the region where war happens, the masses will support the war mainly by political, economic, technical, cultural, and moral means. The strength of the people is substantially reflected in the process of war preparation, in the form

of the accumulation of fighting power, itself established on popular support and public resiliency. And in the process of the implementation of war, it is mainly reflected in the unity of the nation with its people and various supports to the war which are embodied by overall release of the sinews of war including political and organizing power, economic and technical power, the power of public opinion and culture, and necessary participation of manpower and material resources.

Conduct Active Strategic Counterattack to Achieve the Aim of Strategic Defence

Active defence is the essential feature of China's military strategy and is the keystone of the theory of China's strategic guidance. In future wars, the PLA (People's Liberation Army) will be always in a defensive status in general. Strategic defence means safeguarding national security, national unity, and territorial integrity and interests. Our aim is peace, not war. Our principle is: 'We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.'

We must be firm and constant in carrying out the defensive strategic principle consistently. But we must be active and flexible in the requirements for our strategic actions. It is the unity of deterring war and preparing for winning a war of self-defence in peacetime, and the unity of strategic defence and operational and tactical offensive in wartime.

During quite a long period after the founding of the new China, we were confronted with the threat of an all-out war. We implemented the strategy of active defence. We were to lure the enemy in deep and conduct the decisive battle in the heart of the interior. We would fight against the enemy at close quarters, where technology offered little advantage. Victory in war depended upon the result of hand-to-hand fighting. Now, due to the rapid development of high technologies and their wider applications to the military field, war gradually takes on non-contiguous and non-linear forms. Both sides try to launch strikes from a distance.

So, in order to implement the strategic guideline of active defence in the modern period, it is necessary to adjust our way of thinking and enrich the new contents of active defence on the basis of the characteristics and laws of the modern local war. While insisting on the defensive nature of the strategy, we should place stress on conducting active strategic counterattack to achieve the aim of strategic defence. It is not a component of an expansionist and aggressive offensive strategy, but a strategically defensive and active self-defence counterattack, and a component of the strategy of active defence.

Under the conditions of the high-tech local war, conducting counterattacks externally is the necessary choice of the country in carrying out its defensive strategy, is the maximum release and development of the activeness of the defensive strategy, and is the necessary choice and effective operational method used by the inferior army against the superior army.

Once the enemy invades our territory and offends our national interests, it means that the enemy has already fired the first shot strategically and crossed the border of our

strategic defence. Thus, we get the freedom to conduct self-defence operations. As far as the battlefield is concerned, we should not passively fight against the enemy in our border regions, coastal regions, and related airspace. On the contrary, after the beginning of the war, we should try our best to fight against the enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to the enemy's operational base, even to its source of war, and to actively strike all the effective strength forming the enemy's war system.

Correctly Handle the Relationship Between Prudence Towards War, Preparation for War, and Reaction to War; Shape the Situation and Create a Favourable Strategic Posture

Prudence towards war means taking a prudent attitude towards war, namely making a deliberate plan before taking action. The war always has a two-sided effect on the progress of human society. We have long advocated solving all disputes in a peaceful way and never using force rashly unless forced to. Being prudent towards war is not being afraid of war, but 'before launching a war making sure to win' as Sun Zi said.[6]

Active preparation for war means making continued and thorough preparation for war according to the proper judgement of war threats. The reason for the existence of the army is to prevent and win a war. The basic law for army-building and administration is to prepare and win a war. We may not launch a war in a hundred years but we can never be unprepared for war for even one day. As long as there is war in the world, there is no end to the preparation for war.

Reacting to a war moderately demands that we employ forces with a full assessment of the enemy situation and contain war actions strictly within the scope permitted by the political aim. This is a general law of modern local war.

Carry Out Preventive Operations, Dominative Operations, and Decisive Operations in Due Time According to Different Situations

A preventive strategic action or operation is a military deterrence action or operation to prevent the situation from deteriorating in the strategic scenario where war or a critical moment in a war is about to emerge. It is, in nature, military action short of war, or a small-scaled, low-intensity operation. It consists of military rehearsal, frontier alertness, emergent combat readiness, setting up of no-fly (non-navigation) zones, special operations, small-scale joint operations, etc.

A dominative operation is an operation the army carries out to restore and stabilize the situation, effectively control and improve the present situation in the strategic scenario where aims that threaten war have already appeared and are expanding. It is, in nature, a medium-scale and medium/low-intensity operation. It consists of regional blockading,

bomb assault, air attack, island defence, frontier counterattack, and medium-scale joint operation or large-scale joint operation in special situations, etc.

A decisive operation is an operation the army carries out to safeguard the fundamental interests of our country in the strategic scenario where war threats that jeopardize our national security appear. It is, in nature, a medium/large-scale and medium/high-intensity operation next to general war. This kind of operation is usually decisive and therefore one must be sure to win.

Fight Well Military-Political War and Political-Military War

War is the continuation of politics. The possible high-tech local war we might launch in the future will be another means for continuation of the fundamental political requirements to ensure the sovereignty and security and safeguard the fundamental interests of our country. It will also be another means for continuation of our peaceful diplomatic policy. The aim and means of a war as well as the process and outcome of a war are further conditioned by politics. It is by no means a purely military action, but a military-political war or a political-military war.

The future high-tech local war is not just a competition of military forces, but an overall contest of political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and other forces. Endeavours in non-military fields such as politics, economy, diplomacy, and culture coordinate directly or indirectly with military operations. During wartime, these endeavours would lose their pillar and conditions to develop without a military victory. In the same way, purely military operations cannot achieve final victory without the powerful cooperation and support of the endeavours in every non-military field. To coordinate closely military operations with non-military endeavours is the objective requirement for achieving the goal of complete victory and is of inherent significance in developing an overall people's war.

Notes

1. Zhu Gui-sheng, 1982.
2. 'Informationalization' concerns adaptation of both weapons platforms and systems to enable them to receive large data flows of command and intelligence information.
3. The first Gulf War marks the important turning point from conventional war to high-tech war. See US Department of Defense, 1992.
4. Mao Zedong, 1992.
5. Mao Zedong, 'On Protracted War' (1938). See also Mao Zedong, 1992, vol. 2, p. 338.
6. Sun Zi, 1993.

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CHAPTER 20

THE JAPANESE WAY OF WAR

VICE-ADMIRAL FUMIO OTA

Historic Review

Japan's first international battle was in the seventh century. Japan supported the former Korean kingdom of Baekje and fought against Silla, which allied with the Tang Dynasty. Japan was completely defeated by the alliance at the Battle of Baekgang (western Korean peninsula) in 663. After the defeat, Japan prepared for an attack by the Tang and established many fortresses at key geo-points. Simultaneously, however, Japanese leaders reviewed why they were defeated, then eagerly learned Chinese systems such as the city, bureaucracy, examinations, tax, and military strategy. The Japanese DNA came from here. Examples are: Japanese people eagerly learned from Western cultures after the visit of Commodore Perry's fleet, and also learned American democracy after the surrender of 1945.

Kibi Makibi (695–775) was one of the scholars who was dispatched to learn about the Chinese cultures. He brought Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* to Japan. Most Japanese military strategies, including Kusunoki (fourteenth century), Hōjō, Kōshu, and Yamaga (seventeenth century), are mainly derived from Sun Tzu. One Sun Tzu specialist and great educator, Yoshida Shōin, taught Sun Tzu to his feudal lords at the age of ten in the nineteenth century. The first Prime Minister, Itō Hirobumi, Imperial Advisor Kido Takayoshi, and Field Marshal Prince Yamagata Aritomo were Yoshida Shōin's pupils and they were required to learn Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu stated 'we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged'[1] The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were fought on this principle by the above Japanese leaders, who gave splendid war guidance.

After the Russo-Japanese War, however, Japanese leaders became more arrogant than other Asian nations, symbolized by the Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915. Many military officers learned Western military strategy, including the Prussian Clausewitz after Prussia's victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Japanese military leaders started prolonged war with the Siberian Intervention in 1918.

Another lesson learned from Japanese history is that an island country must ally with maritime nations and involvement in continental issues brings unhappy results. Not only the Battle of Baekgang and the miserable involvement in the continent after the Russo-Japanese War, but also Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Korean Invasion in the sixteenth century failed. On the other hand, alliance with maritime nations, such as the United Kingdom at the beginning of the twentieth century and the United States after the Second World War brings prosperity. Geopolitically, island and peninsular countries must ally with maritime nations with especially strong naval power. Italy, a peninsular country, allied with continental powers such as German and Austria at the beginning of the First World War; however, she dropped out of the continental alliance, then later allied with naval powers, like France and the UK because Italy could not import energy, namely coal, by the sea route. The longest alliance in the world is between the UK, an island country, and Portugal, a peninsular country.

Security Environment at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century: Coalition vs Non-State Actors or Rogue Nations

Now, I will consider Japan's future security environment at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In order to do so, let me review the history of war back to roughly five hundred years ago. Prior to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, wars were fought among feudal lords or religious groups. After the Treaty of Westphalia, however, wars were mainly fought between nation-states, examples of which include the Mexican-American War (1846) in the Western Hemisphere, the Franco-Prussian War (1870) in Europe, and the Sino-Japanese War (1894) in Asia.

Owing to the development of diplomatic, trade, and military lines of communication, which enhanced inter-state relations, most wars during the twentieth century were fought between alliances, such as the First and Second World Wars. This phenomenon is due in part to the industrial revolution that created modern weapons. Their requirement for vast amounts of ammunition and energy encouraged many countries to pool their efforts.

In the twenty-first century, however, we no longer envision another Franco-Prussian War or US-Japanese War. Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, wars have been fought primarily between coalitions and non-state actors such as in Afghanistan and in Iraq after the coalition defeated the Iraqi Army, on 1 May 2003. The Iraq War before 1 May and the potential for a future war on the Korean peninsula or in Iran would be considered to be wars between coalitions and rogue nations. Usually, states desire to maintain the status quo, whereas non-state actors or rogue nations want to achieve their desired end state by means of promoting turmoil and disturbance.

Another aspect of war in the twenty-first century is that after 9/11 wars must be termed asymmetric warfare. It is true that not only the actors but also the methods employed are

unconventional versus conventional. Sun Tzu defined asymmetric warfare as warfare where the 'army avoids strength and strikes at weakness'.[2] That does not match the present situation only. For example, the USA adopted a 'competitive strategy' during the Cold War era. This strategy sought to deny the Soviet Union political, economic, and military leverage by exploiting their inherent weakness and emphasizing enduring US strengths across the spectrum of potential conflict.[3] Therefore, owing to this spectrum of conflict, asymmetric warfare appears even in war between states. Given this background and taking into account historical aspects of war, the current war against terrorism must be characterized as warfare between coalition and non-state actors or rogue nations.

American leadership coupled with widely different threat perceptions of other countries created the current 'coalition of the willing'. A typical coalition that is currently in effect in the world falls within the US Central Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR): Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against Al Qaeda. An anti-piracy operation at the Gulf of Aden is another example. Other typical examples of US-led coalition efforts are the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) network, in which countries that have shared national interests get together for a common and specific purpose. In Southeast Asia, the US and Philippine Army coalition has been battling against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and an ASEAN coalition has been combating Jamaa Islamiya (JI) terrorists.

Why has this phenomenon occurred? Realist theory explains that having won the Cold War, the USA has achieved hegemony, and therefore can form coalitions. However, the coalition among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines against transnational threats formed in May 2002 does not include the USA. Therefore, hegemony theory cannot explain this phenomenon. Liberal theory explains that advanced nations are naturally interdependent and form coalitions when challenged by non-state actors or rogue nations. However, countries which are forming these coalitions are not necessarily advanced nations. So, liberal theory also has some limitations. I would explain these phenomena in terms of the ongoing information revolution. Non-state actors and rogue nations have easily access to WMD technology through the internet, and modern computer networks enable countries to form coalitions easily.

The Possible Causes of Future War

The Changing Nature of War

Up until the nineteenth century, total available manpower was the decisive factor in determining military strength. In the twentieth century, industrial power determined military strength. Today, the power afforded by information is decisive in combat operations. Just before the year 2000, US Navy Admiral Jay L. Johnson, who was then Chief of Naval Operations, stated that 'it's a fundamental shift from what we call platform centric

warfare to something we call network centric warfare'. Of course, this 'information power' ranges from the strategic to the tactical, as information includes target data installed on Precise Guided Munitions (PGM) warheads.

In war between state actors, territory has traditionally been the first objective. During the Mexican-American war in 1846, the American war objectives were to obtain California and Arizona. During the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the Prussian war objectives were to obtain the Ardennes and Lorraine. After the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, Japan obtained Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula, which were eventually returned to China due to German, France, and Russian intervention. In alliance warfare, however, war objectives have had more to do with ideology or system than territory, as evidenced by the democratic countries during the Second World War and the Western Camp during the Cold War. Similarly, in the war between coalition and non-state actors (the 'war on terrorism'), the objectives are human security and freedom from tyranny.

In order to fight non-state actors, the forces cannot be limited to soldiers but must also include policemen, firefighters, customs/transportation officers, and sometimes financial institutions as well. Therefore, inter-agency efforts assume a much greater importance than during the period of inter-state war. The mission of the armed forces has become not simply to destroy the enemy but to do it in the context of the more limited means encompassed in the term Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW). Therefore, key words for future war must be *coalition* and *inter-agency* in addition to *joint*.

War between coalition and non-state actors tends to mean long wars,[4] while wars between states are often of shorter duration. Inter-state wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries lasted several months. In the twentieth century, both the First and Second World Wars lasted several years. The war against terrorism is expected to take more than ten years. The key difference is that opponents in conventional war are state actors, and hence, capable of conducting and honouring negotiations. Non-state actors, however, are diplomatically invisible, and by their nature cannot negotiate. They are also highly resistant to manoeuvre and other 'conventional' methods of diplomatic manipulation. Conducting anti-terrorism warfare is like trying to control traffic accidents: we cannot eliminate them completely but can reduce them to only a certain level by making continuous efforts.

In the wars between nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, casualties usually amounted to several thousands, though it depended on the size of the conflict. In wars fought among alliances during the twentieth century, millions of people were killed. In the current war against terrorism, casualties have been a few thousand so far; however, that could be expanded several-fold if the terrorists obtain and use WMD.

Shifting Strategy

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued in September 2001 stated that a central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defence planning from a 'threat-based' model that had dominated thinking

in the past to a 'capabilities-based' model for the future. The capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where a war might occur.[5] A typical example is cyberattack.

Now it is also apparent that a deterrent strategy is not effective against non-state threats like suicide bombers. Therefore, the concept of pre-emptive action is emerging. The National Security Strategy of the USA issued in September 2002, stated: 'To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.'[6] The concept of pre-emption is not uniquely American: Israel made a pre-emptive attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in 1981. A French government document issued in January 2003 for its 2003–8 military programme addressed pre-emption as well: 'We must . . . be prepared to identify and forestall threats as soon as possible. In this context, the possibility of pre-emptive action might be considered, from the time that an explicit and confirmed threatening situation is identified.'[7] Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated that he would launch a pre-emptive strike against terrorists in another country if he had evidence they were about to attack Australia.[8] Right after the school hostage crisis of North Ossetia in September 2004, Russian Chief of General Staff General Yury Baluyevsky stated that 'As for making pre-emptive strikes at terrorist bases, we will make every effort to liquidate bases in any region of the world.'[9] Even People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Lieutenant General Zheng Shenxia has noted that without adopting a pre-emptive doctrine, the chances of a PLA victory are limited.[10]

Military Requirements are Changing

Military transformation is ongoing. Massive single-purpose weapons are being replaced by smaller, faster, more mobile, flexible, quick-responsive and multi-purposed weapons. Many countries, including many NATO members, have created quick response forces. Not restricted to weapon systems, military transformation has included reviewing overseas basing postures. The basic idea of the US Global Posture Review, issued in November 2003, was the notion of flexibility to deal with uncertainty, including expeditionary aspects, by focusing on qualitative military power versus mere quantitative orders of battle.[11]

Before the Treaty of Westphalia warriors were recruited through a mercenary system; however, during the Napoleonic Wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, nations developed national armies and conscription. Worldwide, the draft system has become unpopular. Of the fifteen NATO countries in 1988, there were only four volunteer system countries (US, Canada, Luxembourg, and UK). By 2003 the number had grown to eight (now including Belgium, France, Netherlands, and Spain), and is currently ten, with Italy and Portugal joining the trend in 2010. Use of Special Forces has been expanding. The Australian Defense Review in 2003 stated: 'The Government has already decided to implement a number of measures as a result of Australia's new strategic environment. These measures include increasing the size of our Special Forces including the establishment of a Special Operations Command.'[12]

Finally, reliable and multi-sourced intelligence is critical. In the article '21st Century War', Lieutenant General Bruce Carlson, 8th Air Force Commander, said, 'We've fought several successful coalition wars, but we've not successfully demonstrated that we can share information with a coalition partner the way we need to.'[13] However, progress is being made. Now, the OEF coalition group is sharing intelligence through secure networks. Human intelligence, considered to be of lesser importance by some during the Cold War, has now again been recognized as important in order to cope with terrorist attacks. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report, *Japan's Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities*, issued in October 2004, stated: 'There is also a growing need to counter the new, externally unrecognizable threats posed by non-state actors through first-hand human intelligence. Consequently, the government should promptly take steps to fully exploit human intelligence resources, including area study specialists and overseas intelligence experts.'[14] The 9/11 Commission Report, issued in October 2004, recommended that the CIA Director should emphasize transforming its clandestine service by building its human intelligence capabilities.[15]

Changing Command and Control Structure

During the inter-state war period before the twentieth century, it was inconceivable to imagine that foreigners could be involved in each nation's military command and control structures. During the First World War, however, allied headquarters under the command of French General Ferdinand Foch were established at the western front in 1918. Though the war was almost over and this headquarters structure was both incomplete and limited, it was a good start on establishing international cooperation through combined military organization. One month after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with their military advisors at the Arcadia Conference in Washington to plan a coordinated effort against the Axis powers. At that time, the two Allied leaders established the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the supreme military body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort.[16]

Then, after the Second World War, NATO was established and exists to this day. Today, in the Information Revolution age, technological and communications breakthroughs cross national borders so fast that those military institutions themselves become virtually borderless. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, OEF and OIF (Operation Iraq Freedom) coalition villages were created. These phenomena demonstrate that to be effective in today's world, military forces must be able and willing to work with other militaries and that means command and control must be integrated.

Japan and Western Countries' Side-by-Side Operations

Japan has cooperated with other democratic nations beyond the purview of the USA. Whereas Western countries have been expanding their operational area outwards towards the east, into areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Gulf of Aden, Japan has

been expanding its activities beyond its normal operational area towards the west into the Arabian Sea, Iraq, and the Gulf of Aden. Previously, Western countries' issues were beyond the purview of Japan. However, the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force contingent in Iraq coordinated with Dutch forces in Samawah and with British and Australian military forces in the south-east region of Iraq. Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) ships had supplied oil to many NATO countries and non-NATO countries that are participating in Operation Enduring Freedom, such as Pakistan and New Zealand. Moreover, the JMSDF ships and aircraft are coordinating with NATO as well as non-NATO countries regarding anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Security Environment in Areas Surrounding Japan

It is noteworthy that the north Asian region seems to be an exception to the pattern of twenty-first-century security environments. The most likely security problems continue to hinge on the actions of state actors, such as North Korean ballistic missile developments with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the Chinese maritime expansion. Therefore, the north Asian security environment is a hybrid phenomenon between concerned states and transnational threats. Transnational threats include international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, cyberattacks, piracy, environmental disruption causing energy/food/water shortage, and new types of influenza. The reason why I call these 'transnational threats' and not 'non-state threats' is that many transnational threats, namely proliferation of WMD and cyberattacks, are backed by states.

The only major populated region in which transnational Islamist terrorists have not appeared heavily active is east Asia. Radical Islamic terrorists, however, executed simultaneous bombings in downtown Tokyo in March 1988. Japan had already suffered biological and chemical terrorism in the past. Aum Shinrikyo intended to spread botulinum in Tokyo in April 1990 and actually spread anthrax in eastern Tokyo as well as Yokohama in 1993. Fortunately, nobody was killed by this incident. It was Aum Shinrikyo's infamous sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 that brought the group to the attention of the world's media. A few Japanese citizens who were involved in 9/11 and in Bali Island in Indonesia or in Iraq have been killed. By the end of 2004, however, on six occasions Islamic radicals have announced that Japan would be the subject of a terrorist attack.[17]

North Korea

Since North Korea does not have economic power, Pyongyang cannot develop modern weapons by adapting to the information age, so the focus is on specific areas such as ballistic missiles with WMD and Special Forces. North Korea has tested ballistic missiles, such as Rodong in 1993, and Taepodong in 1998, 2006, and 2009. Pyongyang also

conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Current North Korean ballistic missiles are of the liquid-fuel type, whereas Chinese modern ballistic missiles are solid-fuel type. With liquid-fuel missiles it takes time to insert fuel and oxidizer, therefore there is normally sufficient warning to prepare against attacks if their preparation can be detected by spy satellite. Solid-fuel missiles, however, can be fire immediately after being pulled out of their silos. Iran conducted tests of solid-fuel ballistic missiles called Sejil-2 in November 2008 and May 2009. Considering the military-technology relationship between Iran and North Korea, it is only a matter of time until Pyongyang possesses solid-fuel long-range ballistic missiles.

Japan's Government executed its first Maritime Security Action in March 1999 when North Korean Special Forces' spy ships approached the Noto peninsula. In December 2001, Japanese Coast Guard cutters sunk a North Korean spy ship near Amami Island.

However, history shows thata dictatorship will collapse sooner or later. While the US nuclear deterrence is in effect, North Korea will not attack Japan. In conclusion, North Korea is an imminent and short-term threat. Pyongyang's war planners must prefer a short-term war because they cannot sustain their logistics and will be defeated by the USA if the USA intervenes in the war. Therefore, the key question for Pyongyang is how to achieve their goals without US intervention. This is also a key to the Japanese war thinkers.

China

Chinese economic power has been enormous and her military expenditure has been growing in double digits since 1989. Therefore, China is a state of mid- to long-term concern. China has published a Defence White Paper every two years since 1998. However, the transparency of the People's Liberation Army is not clear so far, especially its military expenditures. Then Chinese Ambassador in Japan, Wang Yi, stated that the Chinese defence budget is not as large as the US estimates. However, large estimates are not the sole preserve of the United States. Not only US intelligence organizations, but also think tanks in other countries estimate that the Chinese defence budget must be two to three times that officially announced by China.[18]

Chinese defence budgets show only development costs, personnel, commodity, maintenance, and administrative expenses. The weapons production and purchasing costs are counted under national fundamental construction costs. Defence research and weapon developments are counted under the education and science research budgets. Armed police administration costs are counted under the administrative management budgets. All the above are counted under central government finance. Conscription and civilian support costs are counted under regional finance. Foreign weapons purchases such as the Su-27/-30 and Kilo class submarines are counted under the foreign currencies foundations. Food and self-sustenance costs are counted as military production activities. The above two items are part of the non-military budgets.[19]

Why does China fake its defence budget? I believe that China has been enacting Deng Xiaoping's 24 Character Strategy, especially 'Hide our capabilities and bide our time.'[20]

China wants to deny the theory of China as a threat, to project an image of itself to other countries as a peaceful rising power, and to have the advantage in information and psychological warfare. Chinese defence budgets have been increasing at a rate in the double digits since 1989, just when every country started enjoying 'peace dividends'.

Maritime Expansion

Regarding Chinese maritime expansion, I observe that there are two similar patterns.

The first pattern is that China always fills the power vacuum which is created when the superpower retreats. After the USA retreated from Vietnam in 1973, China advanced to the Paracel Islands from 1974. A few years later, after the Soviet Navy's ships started to decrease in number from Cam Ranh Bay from 1984, China advanced to west of the Spratly Islands during 1987 to 1988. Right after the US closure of the Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines, China advanced east of the Spratly Islands from 1994 and occupied Mischief Reef, which is claimed by the Philippines. In the same way, China will invade the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands if the USA retreats from Okinawa. As for the Senkaku Islands, the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) in the United Nations announced the possibility of submerged energy resources near the Senkaku Islands in 1969. Then, the People's Republic of China claimed territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands in December 1970 and the Republic of China also claimed them in June 1971.[21]

China also follows a set pattern in respect of territorial claims. First, China declares territorial rights. Some examples are the Territorial Water Law in 1992 by which China claimed the Senkaku Islands as her territory; the Anti-Secession Law over Taiwan in 2005; and the Island Protection Act in 2009. Second, China usually conducts maritime surveillance and fishing activities in the area where she has declared her territorial rights. In December 2008, two Chinese Ocean Surveillance ships sailed around Senkaku in nine and a half hours. A Chinese spokesman stated against the Japanese protest: 'When China dispatch ships to patrol around Senkaku islands is a Chinese internal matter and this is a normal patrol without any criticism.' A Chinese fishing boat was illegally fishing in Japanese territorial waters and intentionally collided with Japan Coast Guard ships in September 2010. Third, China makes its presence known by dispatching naval forces/combatants. For example, ten Chinese naval vessels including two submarines demonstrated their presence around Okinotorishima and passed between Okinawa and Miyako Island in April 2010. And fourth, China makes the final de facto occupation. China has occupied many islands in the South China Sea. As for the East China Sea, the Chinese have advanced to the third step already.

My analysis is that recent Chinese maritime expansion has mainly arisen for two reasons. The first reason is that Chinese maritime strategy had shifted from coastal defence to offshore defence during the early 1980s, after Admiral Liu Huaqing became the head of the PLA Navy at Deng Xiaoping's initiative.[22] Furthermore, more recently it has been shifting to blue-water defence based upon Hu Jintao's directive in 2009.[23] The second reason is that of increasing Chinese energy demands. China became an oil importer after 1993 and has been the second largest oil consumer after the USA since

2003. Chinese maritime transports of crude oil used to be almost one-tenth of Japanese imports in 1998, became one-half in 2007, and will exceed those of Japan in 2011.

Major conflicts between Japan and China have occurred in the East China Sea. China insists that the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone extends to the Okinawa Trough because her continental shelf reaches there. The Japanese position is that the Chinese continental shelf extends to the Ryukyu Trench due to the soil survey, but there are some islands in the south-east that are Japanese territory on the Chinese continental shelf, and therefore we should draw a middle line between both sides' territory. There are submerged energy resources in the contested area. The middle-line concept has been adopted when dealing with international conflicts by the international courts since the mid-1980s. Ultimately, China insists that the middle line is the Gulf of Tong King against Vietnam, meaning that China uses a double standard. The current issue is the Chunxiao oil rig, which is about 5 km on the Chinese side from the middle line. It may seem that there is no problem if the Chinese oil rig is located on the Chinese side of the middle line. However, China has developed a so-called slant digging method off the coast of Hong Kong. Therefore, China may suck up gas from the Japanese side of the middle line.

China has been conducting ocean surveillance and already has data regarding submerged energy resources in the East China Sea, whereas Japan did not because Chinese ocean surveillance vessels outnumber the Japanese almost ten to one. Then, the Japanese government requested the submerged energy data but China declined. Therefore, the Japanese government stated that it would conduct ocean surveillance on the Japanese side of the middle line. Then, China dispatched naval forces/combatants in September 2005. Even after 2005, China has threatened Japan by saying that it will dispatch naval combatants if Japan conducts ocean surveillance.

Not only in the East China Sea, but beyond that, China has conducted ocean surveillance in the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zones. In 2001, the governments of both Japan and China made an agreement that China would give pre-notification to Japan when China conducts ocean surveillance in the Japanese EEZ. During 2001, there were no violations. However, violations have been increasing: one in 2002, six in 2003, and eighteen in 2004. There are two kinds of violations. One is that a Chinese ocean surveillance vessel operates outside of the pre-notified area. Another is that China conducts ocean surveillance without any pre-notification. Chinese ocean surveillance spots are concentrated east of Taiwan and around Japanese Okinotorishima. I will analyse why China is doing so as a former naval officer.

When China fired ballistic missiles near Taiwan in March 1996, the US Navy dispatched two aircraft carriers, the USS *Independence* from Yokosuka and the USS *Nimitz* from the south. The two aircraft carriers were stationed on the east side of Taiwan Island. Should cross-strait conflicts occur in the future, Chinese submarines will chase US aircraft carriers so that the naval battle area will be on the east side of Taiwan.

Three US nuclear attack submarines, the USS *Buffalo* (replaced after running aground by the USS *San Francisco*), the USS *Corpus Christi*, and the USS *Houston*, are stationed on Guam Island.[24] Additionally, the cruise missile submarine USS *Ohio* (SSGN-726), which was converted from SSBN (ballistic missile status), will operate in the region

from its base on Guam. Furthermore, the US Congress discussed the possibilities of eleven nuclear submarines being home-ported on Guam.[25] These American submarines will deploy to the Taiwan Strait during a cross-strait conflict. Now, Okinotorishima is the midway point from Guam to the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, once China detects American submarines getting under way from Guam by her spy satellite, Chinese attack submarines will also get under way, and both sides' submarines will meet around Okinotorishima.

Whereas electromagnetic waves go straight into the air, sound, used for underwater detection, bends due to three factors, which are temperature, salinity, and pressure. Because of these three factors, a submarine's undetected area, a so-called shadow zone, is created. Temperature, salinity, and pressure are different depending on the time of year. Therefore, China has conducted ocean surveillance in every season and in many places. This ocean surveillance data is used for conducting effective anti-submarine as well as anti-mine operations, because there is a kind of mine which searches for its target by sound. That is why China is conducting ocean surveillance around Okinotorishima.

Most Chinese ocean surveillance vessels belong to the State Oceanic Administration. The director of the State Oceanic Administration, Wang Shuguang stated in July 2000: 'Ocean resource war is just beginning. Who controls the ocean will survive, be prosperous and construct a strong modern maritime nation.' His perceptions of the ocean are first, international struggle, and second, treasure of resources, and so on. His number one target of the twenty-first century is establishing a strong navy to secure Chinese interests. Two scholars under his organization stated in May 2004 that Okinotorishima is a rock and not an island. I believe that the background for this is: China does not need to make pre-notification to conduct ocean surveillance if Okinotorishima is a rock, because there is then no EEZ around Okinotorishima.

China wants not only to obtain Taiwan but also to become the regional hegemon and finally the world power beyond Taiwan. Evidence of this was seen when the US Pacific Commander, Admiral Keating, visited China in June 2007, and the Chinese counterpart remarked with a serious face, 'You (the US) take care of the Eastern Pacific; we (China) will take care of the Western Pacific.'[26]

Potential Conflict Scenarios Between China and Japan

Having analysed the potential for conflict between Japan and China above, I consider that there are three potential conflict scenarios. First, is the widening of a Cross-Strait conflict, which is high intensity but low probability. The cross-strait balance shifted in 2008 in China's favour in terms of numbers of major naval combatants as well as fourth-generation fighter jets. Second, the conflict over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which is middle intensity and middle probability, and third, the conflict over maritime interests including oil resources in the East China Sea and Chinese surveillance activity in the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone, which is low intensity but high probability. All three potential scenarios are mainly maritime conflicts.

In this context, Japan has been concerned at the build-up pace of Chinese submarine forces and their activities. During the five years from 2001 to 2005, China built sixteen

submarines, which is the same number as Japan's total submarine force, and they are going to build more than twenty submarines in the next five years.

Submarines are usually invisible so we cannot observe, but sometimes they show up on the surface due to accidents such as fire. I have plotted those sightings of Chinese submarines since 2003. In 2003, a Chinese Ming class submarine had an accident and all crew were killed in the Bohai Sea. In November of the same year, a Ming class submarine passed through the Strait of Osumi (south of Kyushu Island). A Chinese Han class nuclear submarine encroached upon Japanese territorial waters in November 2004. This was the second time that the Japanese Government executed a Maritime Security Action. In May 2005, a Ming class submarine surfaced due to an accidental fire in the South China Sea. In October 2006, a Song class submarine raised its periscope within torpedo-firing range in front of the American aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*. In November 2007, the newest Chinese Jin class SSBNs were stationed at Hainan Island. At the end of 2007, all Chinese nuclear submarines were stationed at the North Sea Fleet Base. Therefore, they had to pass through the Japanese south-east island chains when they are to be deployed in the open ocean. It is desirable for the Chinese SSBNs to be based at Hainan Island because they are able to access deep water without any obstacles.

Since the new SSBNs, Jin class with JL-2 ballistic missiles, were stationed at Hainan Island, attack submarines, SSNs, Shang class, were also stationed in order to protect the SSBNs. Those SSNs will be a direct security concern for the sea lines of communication in the South China Sea because those submarines are not a protective tool for sea lines of communication, but a destructive tool. The Chinese Navy had already created a nuclear submarine organization in the South Sea Fleet.[27] In October 2008, an unknown submerged object was detected by a Japanese destroyer at Bungo Channel (between Shikoku and Kyushu Island). I believe this was a Chinese Song class submarine. In June 2009, the USS *John McCain*'s sonar array was hit by a Chinese submarine. Finally, two Chinese Kilo class submarines surfaced through the Ryukyu Islands in April 2010. To summarize the above facts, Chinese submarines are regularly penetrating the important Japanese sea lines of communication.

Two Chinese colonels wrote a book named 'unrestricted war' in 1999. 'Unrestricted' indicates not only cross-border measures such as cyberattack, but also using non-military means including disguised fishing boats.

Sun Tzu stated 'an army avoids strength and strikes weakness'.[28] The weakness of the Western countries, especially the USA, is heavily relying on information technology such as spy satellites and computer networks. China has been intensively developing cyber-attack (soft kill) and satellite attack (hard kill) capabilities. Followed by the Chinese demonstration of its anti-satellite weapon in January 2007, China conducted many cyberattacks on several Western countries from the end of August to the beginning of September 2007,[29] whereas it is illegal to have a cyberattack capability in Japan. I am sure that China will conduct cyberattacks simultaneously if the PLA invades Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands. In general, future conflicts will always be accompanied by cyberattacks.

Sun Tzu also stated, 'War is based on deception.'[30] And Chinese Military schools are teaching the Deception Strategy.[31] For example, China will use the disguised maritime

militia as military resources. As evidence to prove that, disguised Chinese fishing boats are conducting training exercises in laying mines. When China took Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974, China used such disguised fishing boats. In 1978, three Chinese armed fishing boats surrounded the Japanese Senkaku Islands. When the Philippines' Mischief Reef was occupied by China at the beginning of 1990s, China used disguised maritime militia by saying that they needed bases for rescuing fishing boat crews. If Japanese naval vessels attack those maritime militias, China will announce to the international community as propaganda that the JMSDF killed many innocent civilians. Should China invade the Japanese Senkaku Islands, she will use those maritime militias as a spearhead.

British Army General Rupert Smith predicted in his book *The Utility of Force* that industrial war will give way to 'war amongst the people'.[32] This is also true in the maritime domain as well.

Do Confidence-Building Measures Work?

Confidence-building measures through defence exchange programmes constitute one solution for the potential conflicts. There is, however, a perception gap regarding the defence exchange programme between China and Japan. The purposes of defence exchange programmes for China are as follows: first, to develop and strengthen their own military; second, to strengthen their relationship with a rival nation to include preventing hostility, selling weapons as well as military technology and planting Chinese influence; third, to introduce the newest military technology; fourth, external propaganda concerning the Chinese security stance, which means denial of the view of China as a threat, propaganda for the Chinese stance over the Taiwan issue, and criticism of American arms sales to Taiwan; and fifth, gathering foreign military information. China will also grasp other countries' modernization processes, their present situation, and development trends, and they want to lay the groundwork for mutual development if there is a common benefit and study countermeasures if the rival will be a threat.[33]

The Japanese view of defence exchange is purely for the purpose of confidence-building measures. Therefore, there is an intention gap between China and Japan. The first Chinese naval ship visited Tokyo in 2007, and a JMSDF ship visited Zhanjiang in 2008. In August 2009, however, China cancelled the Japanese Training Squadron's visit to Hong Kong at the last moment. It was reported the reason must be that Japan had accepted the female leader of the World Uighur Congress, Rebiya Kadeer. But Japan accepted a Chinese naval ship's visit at Etajima in November of the same year.

Russia

Russian military activities had been negligible since the collapse of the Soviet Union but have been revitalized since the beginning of the twenty-first century due to an economic recovery. Russia will not, however, be a direct threat to Japan as it was in the Cold War era. The first reason is Russian security concerns. During the Cold War era, the Soviets

had to prepare in all directions, against NATO, the eastern front, China, and the North Pole (American ballistic missiles). The current major concern for Russia must be east and south, including NATO expansion and Chechnya or Georgia, which contains racial, religious, and resource conflicts. Of course Russia is concerned at Chinese ambitions to expand into Siberia. It is, however, very unlikely that Russia will attack Japan directly. Another reason is Russian demography. Russia will not be able to sustain more than one million troops after 2007.

Conclusion

In order to cope with these states of concern and transnational threats, Japan must maintain its strong alliance with the USA, the strongest naval power. Japan has to rely on the nuclear umbrella, offensive capabilities, sea lines of communication protection, military technology, and intelligence of the USA. Fighting against terrorism as part of an international coalition, the US-Japan alliance fostered in the last fifty years should be the basis for these coalitions. Moreover, it is time to transform the US-Japan alliance from one based on only 'defence of Japan' or 'situations in areas surrounding Japan' into one focused more on Japan's global role. On this occasion, we must cooperate with other democratic countries as well.

Notes

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2. Griffith, 1963: 101.
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6. The White House, 2002: 9.
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10. US Department of Defense, 2002: 14.
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12. Australian Department of Defense, 2003: 24.
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33. Matsuda, 2005: 5–6.

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PART VI

THE MILITARY CONDUCT OF WAR

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CHAPTER 21

MILITARY COALITIONS IN WAR

LT. GENERAL ANDREW GRAHAM

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War the stand-off between two alliances—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact—has defined to a greater or lesser extent the political and military history of Europe. Events since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War show that for the smaller military nations operations on all but the most limited scale and at the lowest scales of intensity will almost certainly be conducted on a joint and coalition basis.

There are a number of reasons for this. First, is the fact that in this increasingly interdependent world a nation's strategic priorities and policy objectives are more often than not best served by operating with others. Second, and more pragmatically, is the issue of operational endurance and the fact that the very few nations possess the depth and scale of military capacity and capability to go it alone. Third, the legitimacy that can be derived from being a member of a coalition (especially one operating under a UN mandate or the umbrella of NATO), as compared to going it alone, is an important factor in steeling politicians to commit military forces in the first place; on the modern global stage 'strength in numbers' applies even for the biggest players. Finally, the reasons why politicians might first wish to become involved nationally, and the objectives in support of which they might wish to commit military force, have broadened from the purely military—deter, defend, defeat, occupy—to the more open-ended and multifaceted: stabilization, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and state-building—where the participation of local and multinational non-military actors is a fact of life and the employment of conventional military forces working entirely on their own could be counter-productive.[1]

Small nations are not alone in making the deduction that operating outside the framework of a coalition will be the exception. Even the United States anticipates that,

notwithstanding its unique ability to raise, prepare, deploy, sustain, and recover forces of sufficient capability, capacity, and size to 'go it alone', all future operations will be conducted in coalition.[2] This is a significant shift in United States foreign and defence policy since the Declaration of Independence. Speaking in 1798 George Washington—''Tis our policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world'—established a principle for US foreign policy which was taken up by Thomas Jefferson in his inauguration speech: 'Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all—entangling alliances with none.'

Advance 150 years and consider the Second World War, where it is arguable that the USA saw themselves as entering the war for a specific purpose—the defeat of the Axis nations in Europe and the Pacific and the survival of Western democratic and cultural values against potential tyranny and dictatorship—and not as entering the conflict to honour a treaty obligation. Advance again through the more than fifty years of NATO's existence and we see the evidence that the United States seems to anticipate making a significant contribution to any alliance or coalition whose objectives are relevant to the pursuit, or protection, of US national interests. In sum, for even the most powerful nations an understanding of the dynamics and nuances of working in partnership with other nations and militaries, whether in alliance or in coalition, is essential.

Alliances and Coalitions

Alliances and coalitions share some similarities, not least that each requires the partners to scratch each other's backs. However 'the difference is that with an alliance you enjoy scratching the other person's back; with a coalition you scratch it because you decide you have to'.[3] Alliances are considered political responses to strategic circumstances affecting two or more nations. They are fundamentally a 'partnership of equals'; whatever the disparity in political, economic, and military clout. Each member has an identical vote because each member has committed the identical level of long-term national political capital to the alliance and its goals. Taken to its extreme this equality of influence means that in war action by one nation could be vetoed by another whose burden of commitment, risk, and cost is negligible by comparison. Alliances therefore are not entered into lightly and are intended to endure rather than to be set aside when difficulties arise. They are designed to optimize the benefits over time of collaborative, integrated action to achieve collective goals.

Alliances tend not to be time- or conditions-based and can, and often do, outlast the situation for which they were originally devised. They may spawn bespoke political, command, and force structures with the potential for developing common doctrine, standard operating procedures and equipment standards, etc. There is also an element of contract implicit in the position of being an ally so, while common interests and a shared sense of purpose may underpin the alliance, an element of conditionality and reciprocity is likely to be built into the alliance agreement from the start.

NATO is perhaps the exemplar alliance for the twentieth century. For NATO the requirement for consensus in decision-making is an example of conditionality and reciprocity in action: on the one hand, neither the Alliance nor any member nation is likely to be dragged down a dark policy alleyway unwittingly; on the other hand, the picture painted of a decision-making process involving more than three hundred committees and sub-committees is more Pollock than Pre-Raphaelite. The flip-side of consensus is that shared goals tend to be very broad and open to interpretation, while once shared agreement to a policy, approach, or course of action is achieved then it is very difficult to change direction as circumstances change. That said, getting out of an alliance is as or more difficult than getting into one, so alliances such as NATO do have the potential both to survive strategic success, or the early achievement of the national goals of individual members which could lead to a fracturing of commitment, and to be more resilient than coalitions to strategic or operational setback.

While coalitions can also be pragmatic and considered political responses to strategic circumstances affecting the national interests of two or more nations, they are, by their nature, more ad hoc and less settled. Coalitions have tended to be temporary combinations directed at short-term goals or relatively impromptu responses to emerging situations of threat, instability, or natural disaster. What unites a cast list of participant nations, not all of whom might necessarily be expected to make common cause with the principal protagonists, are the imperative of a shared cause or objective, often limited by time, space, or condition, the umbrella of legitimacy provided by international support, and ideally a UN Security Council Resolution, and an acceptable plan or agenda for achieving an objective that is broadly acceptable to all participants.

Coalitions are most potent and effective when they are formed to deal with shared adversity. When the situation is more opaque and the objectives more tenuous their ability to endure setbacks or hold together can be fragile, particularly once success is in sight or when a partner becomes increasingly parochial in terms of their perspective. Effective coalitions will almost certainly have a lead nation, with selection for command and high office based on the scale of effort offered in financial and military terms, political clout, and the relative level of risk that each contributing nation will tolerate. By contrast to alliances, coalitions are what might be termed 'partnerships of unequals'[4] since comparative political, economic, and military might, or more particularly the extent to which a nation is prepared to commit and 'put some skin in the game', dictates who will lead, who is in the inner circle, and who will have influence. However, it is also clear that the scale of a nation's political, military, and financial commitment does bring the concomitant authority within the coalition to shape goals and influence the manner in which the coalition will conduct its affairs to achieve its ends.

In terms of participation coalitions are, by their nature, more of a 'come as you are, wear what you want, leave when you want party'.[5] They are fluid in terms of membership—not only do you not have to have been a traditional ally to join a coalition, but nations can join, vary their contributions and caveats, withdraw, and be replaced by new members as the situation changes or national agendas change. Nor do coalitions demand common levels of commitment from their members—it is the fact of participating that really matters. The

ability to work together effectively then relies on provisional or ad-hoc policy, decision-making mechanisms, command and headquarters arrangements, and the procedures, tactics, and doctrine tend to reflect the practice of the kingpin nations in the coalition.

What Near History Shows Us: The 'Grand Alliance'

The Second World War was a war of competing and evolving alliances and coalitions. For the British the defeat of the French Army in May 1940 signalled not just the imminent fall of France to invading German armed forces but the collapse of an alliance. The Anglo-French alliance was one of the closest achieved by two sovereign powers before and during war to that date, exemplified by the commitment of the British Expeditionary Force to the Continent.[6] The factor uniting the two parties to the alliance was the rise of Nazi Germany and the need to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion of France by Germany through the Low Countries, repeating what had happened in 1870 and 1914. From the British perspective the strategic requirement was to prevent Germany establishing a foothold on the Channel coast from which to launch an invasion across the Channel; the political action required to achieve that strategic end was to stiffen the resolve and determination of the French Government first to prepare its forces for the defence of its territory and then to fight to defend that territory; the military action in support of that strategic goal was to deploy land and air forces to the Continent to fight alongside the French Army in defence of France.[7]

The United States' declaration of war against the Japanese in response to the attack at Pearl Harbor aligned them with Great Britain and the Soviet Union against the Axis coalition. An analysis of what Churchill called the 'Grand Alliance' in the Second World War offers some instructive ideas for considering the nature of alliances and coalitions in war. The relationship between the United States and Great Britain is described as 'not an either/or "zero-sum game" ' but something that was underpinned by the fact that ideology, values, and two hundred years of 'special relationship inclined' the two nations towards one another.[8] That Churchill and Roosevelt disagreed bitterly on key issues is without doubt; that they compromised, rationalized, and then realized that they could work things out is also without doubt.

By contrast, the Anglo-American-Soviet alliance created to defeat Hitler (but not to win the war in the Far East and too late to assist Great Britain in the spring of 1940 to defeat Germany's ability to invade England) proved to be a 'temporary combination directed at short-term goals—properly termed a coalition'.[9] The relationship did not survive the defeat of the Axis Forces, as an alliance built on something more than an immediate, shared objective might have done. It did not evolve to become the foundation of post-war 'coexistence' as President Roosevelt hoped. The ultimately short-term nature of the relationship reinforces the point that what matters for coalitions is that the right partner is there, with what you need, when you need it.[10]

The Evolving Character of Conflict

A number of commentators have sought to define the characteristics of the twenty-first-century scurity environment. No characteristic is new but it is the fact that they appear to have a tendency to converge in terms of time, space, style, and range of participation that gives the evolving international security environment and the conflicts it spawns their peculiar flavour.[11] The United Kingdom's analysis of the 'Future Character of Conflict' proposes an environment that is congested, cluttered, contexted, and connected; to which alliterative list might be added complex and coalition in nature.[12] For most nations defence is no longer purely about 'Defence of the Realm'. One deduction might be that state-on-state wars using the full panoply of a nation's 'industrial' war-fighting capability and capacity are less likely, while not impossible.[13] At the same time, the timeless fact that the battlefield has never been solely the province of organized military forces[14] is reinforced by the proliferation of non-state actors ranging from the supra-national, supra-governmental institutions like NATO and the UN to splinter groups, terrorist factions, contractors, tribal militias, and organized crime. Add the downdraught from globalization and the reach and immediacy of modern communications,[15] and not only is the impact of any conflict almost certainly global but military intervention—in the sense of a quick and clean war-fighting intervention—is likely to be one short phase in a much longer-lasting involvement, whose demands will evolve over time as conditions and perceptions change. The opening words of the mission for the Joint Campaign Plan of the Multinational Force-Iraq/United States Mission-Iraq in November 2007 signposts the future: 'The Coalition, in partnership with the Government of Iraq, employs integrated political, security, economic and diplomatic means to…'.[16] That is not the language of most seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century generals!

For any nation intending to play an effective part in meeting the multifaceted, complex demands of the contemporary and future international operating environment the development of an effective, collaborative, and coordinated national military-civilian approach, from policy level to 'boots on the ground', is a prerequisite for being an effective contributor to future coalition operations, military or otherwise. And every national approach must be set within a broader international framework, bespoke for each case but recognizing that international resolve to deal with a problem on a collective, coalition basis is the *sine qua non* for effective, legitimate action.

Learning from Recent History: Iraq 2003–9

Analysis of the evolution of the coalition engaged in Iraq since 2003 bears out a number of these observations. The initial military invasion was the work of a relatively small group of nations led by the United States but supported by a number of nations whose

political support was to be supplemented by the deployment of military forces as part of the Multinational Force-Iraq (known after the invasion in 2003 until May 2004 as Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF 7)) and civilian elements into what was to become the Coalition Provisional Authority. The toppling of the regime was a startling military success, but the absence of an alternative Iraqi government gave the United States and Britain the legal obligations required of (Joint) Occupying Powers from late March 2003 until the Interim Iraqi Government was set up under Dr Allawi on 28 June 2004.[17] Significantly the initial euphoria that the defeat of the Iraqi armed forces and liberation of the country (in military terms a classic 'shaping' rather than 'decisive' operation) had engendered quickly faded both locally and internationally. The difficult business of running a country in the absence of a government or an effective security apparatus soon showed its claws.[18]

From a United Kingdom perspective the domestic political objectives that participation in the Coalition was designed to serve evolved, and ultimately changed significantly in the period between 2004 and 2009 when British forces withdrew from Basra Province having handed authority for security to the Iraqi Army and Police. In that same period not only had the Coalition's working relationship with the Iraqi Government altered radically but the composition of the military forces within the Coalition had fluctuated as national postures changed in the face of domestic pressure and perception. Even in the first year of operations the challenges for the Coalition were readily apparent. By the time Multinational Corps Iraq stood up alongside Headquarters Multinational Force-Iraq, in May 2004, thirty-one nations were contributing military forces to the Coalition but not to the same degree. Two nations were offering development support using military capability in a passive capacity only (self-protection), one major troop contributor was on the point of withdrawing its forces following a domestic election in the wake of terrorist attacks in its capital, while others were tailoring their contributions or imposing restrictions on employment and posture which were to stymie the development of a coherent Coalition campaign plan and to turn difficult situations in the centre and south of the country in places such as Najaf, Kerbala, and Kut-al-Amara into dangerous ones for the Coalition.[19]

Unity, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness

From the point of view of learning lessons from recent and current campaigns for building effective coalitions in future one important dialectic needs to be resolved: that between the necessity for legitimacy and unit of effort and the desirability for military effectiveness underpinned by unity of command. Legal and geopolitical considerations demand international recognition of the threat or problem to be resolved, and agreement to the necessity for action, so as to underpin the legitimacy of the work in hand. This entails generating and then maintaining broad international, political support and a willingness to participate and commit forces from as many nations as possible offering

as broad a range of capabilities as possible. On the other hand, rational military thinking suggests that the fewer partners there are the more effective the coalition will be and the more likely that some form of 'unity of command' will be achieved.

The dialectic and the need for pragmatic accommodation if not for fussy compromise is clear: a coalition that lacks the necessary international resolve, perhaps defined as a combination of collective vision, determination, patience, resilience to setback, and an ability to accept the gamut of political risk over the long term, and the legitimacy that mass involvement under an internationally recognized mandate implies is likely to look increasingly fragile, however effective it may appear in military terms and however successfully it may perform initially. Managing the implications of the dialectic in theatre requires compromise from military commanders, who have to understand that the key to managing the dichotomy lies in positive relationships, the building of trust, and recognition that working through the skein of national caveats and potential faultlines becomes a, and potentially the, principal task of commanders at all levels in pursuit of achieving unity of operational effort, which is as or more important than unity of command.[20]

An eminent, very experienced coalition military practitioner proposes that unity of purpose has to be *the* vital ingredient in the success of coalition war at the grand strategic level.[21] Unity of purpose is seldom easy to achieve; achieving binding unity means that coalitions will tend to be defensive, aimed at achieving something concrete and easily defined such as restoring the *status quo ante bellum*. This makes the current situation of coalitions appearing to be on the strategic offensive, albeit with a defensive twist in terms of the assertion that threats need to be neutralized both at home and away, all the more remarkable in terms of the number of participants who have elected to be drawn in (in late 2010 there were more than forty nations contributing forces to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan). It may also go some way to explaining why the development and articulation of a clear narrative for Afghanistan that is appropriate and satisfactory for all target audiences has proved to be so difficult.

> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking: neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something which is alien to its nature.[22]

The implications of Clausewitz's statement—understand the situation you are in, not the one you wish you were in—for political leaders and military commanders engaged in the planning and conduct of future coalition enterprises are profound. The more so when the nature of the issue around whose resolution a coalition has mustered is likely in future to be less about dealing with a specific threat, which encourages a pure military response and plan, and more about remedying a fragile or deteriorating security situation or establishing and then shoring up a fledgling government in a so-called 'failed state' where the security line of operation enables and supports the activity and development in the political, economic, and social arenas that will, eventually, carry the day. If unity of purpose is the vital ingredient in, and international resolve the strategic

'vital ground' for successful coalition action, then the importance of ensuring that the political leaders of all coalition partners, including the 'host nation' government, address together the key issues and set the framework and the narrative for the activity to which they are committing national 'blood and treasure', as well as national and international political capital, must not be underestimated.

There is a risk that without a unifying threat or requirement to concentrate attention and override political or bureaucratic scruple, the ends around which nations will try to coalesce will tend to be more diffuse, less immediately urgent, and more open to national or partisan interpretation. This inevitably generates a spectrum of political and military commitment—whole-hearted/lead nation to lukewarm/tokenism—which cascades, in turn, to a spectrum of practical collaboration on the ground ranging from full integration to 'wall flower' isolation.

It is axiomatic that every country has its own view of what constitutes its core security interests and will decide the extent to which it is prepared to commit political capital, blood, and treasure to securing those interests. While some of those interests may be shared with neighbours and ideological, historical, or cultural 'friends' they lack the unifying, mind-concentrating directness of a shared threat, a clear and present danger upon which everyone is agreed. For coalitions to be effective in principle, let alone in action, participating nations have tended to require a single overpowering threat—perhaps to freedom or a way of life or a crucial national interest—or the presence of a single despotic figure or regime whose continued existence is considered not only abhorrent to the generality of nations but also destabilizing to the region or world order.[23] On the other hand, the less immediate and extreme the problem or threat and the less clear-cut the common cause the broader the choice of options open to individual nations considering making a commitment. And having committed, the more tempting it will be for contributing nations to limit that commitment, probably by reference to their national interests, and to extend the caveats on the use of their military forces and other capabilities.

Civil/Military Collaboration in Complex Missions

The size, shape, posture, and approach of the military contributions to coalitions must be relevant to the shape, character, demands, and dynamics of the situation in which they find themselves working. That will more likely than not mean working in an integrated and mutually supportive fashion alongside others to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. The longest-lasting, most complex situations will demand the most of the coalition, its force commander, and those making a contribution, not the least of which will be:

- the need to argue for a long-term political view to be taken;

- a pragmatic acceptance that the situation will evolve;
- an emphasis on building and sustaining relationships between nations and between national contingents based on trust, mutual confidence, a willingness to communicate, and complete understanding of national 'red lines/cards' and capabilities;
- a clear-sighted recognition that the size/shape and make-up of the coalition must evolve to meet changing circumstances and that host nation participation, however sketchy at first, must be an integral part of the coalition plan from the outset;
- a robust argument and plan to mitigate the inevitability that international and domestic endurance and patience is likely to be tried to the point of exhaustion.[24]

Open-ended missions such as 'stabilization', 'peacekeeping', and 'humanitarian assistance' pose particular challenges for military forces working as part of a multinational coalition, especially when local capacity is at best fragile, at worst non-existent, and where coalition civil capacity is insufficient. Once the fighting is done, success relies on the integrated civilian and military contribution and participation of other nations, other government departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations, non-state actors such as the UN, private enterprise, and, most importantly, the authorities and institutions of the nation upon whose territory and amongst whose people the campaign is being conducted, and for whose benefit the coalition campaign is, or should be, designed.[25] Corralling disparate, international civilian governmental and non-governmental effort into something approaching a loose collaborative construct should be the minimum aspiration; melding that effort with whatever form of local government either exists or is growing, using a coalition manner of thinking and operating, is essential. It is perhaps surprising how rarely the 'host nation' is one of the first national names on the coalition team sheet.

The complexity and extended duration of pre- and post-conflict operations—'conflict prevention', 'stabilization', 'peacekeeping', etc.—demands combined and complimentary military and civilian action, with an integrated, mutual supporting set of missions and tasks that capitalizes on the strengths of each, then optimizes and develops the contribution, however small initially, of the local authority. For military commanders the relatively clear-cut goals, objectives, and missions that characterize a 'traditional' military war-fighting intervention will be rare; likely tasks for the military contribution to the coalition effort include:

- providing and maintaining a secure environment to allow other development and stabilization activity to take place;
- protecting population centres, key and vulnerable points, deployed civilians, local government leaders and offices;
- pre-emptive action to deter, disrupt, or defeat dissident and insurgent activity;
- providing humanitarian assistance in non-permissive environments;
- conducting limited reconstruction and development activity in advance of the deployment of appropriate civil capability;
- rebuilding, training, and supporting host nation armed and security forces.[26]

Civilian activity, whether integrated, supporting, or independent, may require intimate military support—logistics, protection, communications, etc.—as they work with the host nation to establish some or all of a 'rule of law'; appropriate local, regional, and national governance; economic, banking, and commercial systems and activity; education, health, public services, and other underpinning social activity; effective and appropriate infrastructure. Except where local government has totally broken down or large numbers of refugees have concentrated, the majority of basic human needs—distribution of food and water, healthcare, etc.—are provided by existing local systems, however rudimentary. Supplementing, rather than replacing or duplicating, local capacity and activity should be a binding principle for stabilization operations.[27] As soon as is practicable all activity, whether civil or military, must be conducted with and alongside the local authority organizations and individuals to whom, eventually, the responsibility for action will be passed.

'The Coin of the Realm in Coalition Operations is Trust'[28]

Whilst there should be no such thing as independent command for subordinate contributing nations to a coalition, the intrinsic lack of unity of command and dispersed authority over resources, actions, and accountability threatens the military commander's all-important responsibility to achieve unity of effort. The national caveats imposed by contributing nations on the deployment and employment of the capabilities they contribute can further hamstring the efforts of the coalition commander, especially when the caveat takes the form of withholding unique or vital enabling support capabilities which they control, such as helicopters. This can lead to sub-groups or cliques of 'like-minded' contingents (e.g. those prepared to engage in peacekeeping but not in counterinsurgency) emerging within a broader coalition. Culture too is a factor for a coalition commander: 'you tend to turn to those who speak, think, talk like you . . . but everyone has a role on the battlefield not just those who look, walk and speak like you'.[29] It is salutary to remember that there were few shared values when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin sat down in Tehran and Yalta yet the coalition was able to move forward to a common purpose.

It follows that for commanders of forces working in coalition the keys to moving the enterprise forward are establishing positive, cooperative relationships with partners, host nation authorities and personalities, and international civilian capability at every level, and then generating a desire to collaborate, however clumsy the work-arounds required. The principle of 'no surprises' must be applied ruthlessly; this means doing the research to ensure that no question is asked of a coalition partner to which the answer will be 'no'. The art of using the appropriate political, diplomatic, and military channels to probe the flexibility and logic behind nationally imposed caveats so as to retain coalition trust and integrity on the ground while having the issue addressed in the right place needs to be developed.

Conclusion

For reasons of capacity, legitimacy, and, crucially, capability most democratic nations are unlikely to countenance a decision to deploy their armed forces except as part of a coalition involving one or more nations and combining military and civilian capability in a blend whose proportions are, or should be, decided by the situation prevailing on the ground at the time. Recent experience shows that that situation is likely to be fluid, evolutionary, complex, and multidimensional rather than static, predictable, and straightforward. For smaller nations the option of 'going it alone' in pursuit of national interests is increasingly unlikely for reasons of capacity, capability, or endurance. For more powerful nations the utility of coalitions as an instrument of policy depends on a willingness to accept the limitations of coalitions, in terms of lack of standardization, absence of unity of command, ponderous decision-making, and imbalance in financial commitment and capability as a reasonable price to pay for the benefit of gaining legitimacy and international support and the shared responsibility for achieving national and international good.

Military forces aspire to be relevant and effective instruments of national power in a world where uncertainty is inevitable, the pace of change is accelerating, and the combination of competitiveness and decentralization will blend in devastating fashion to outwit and outmanoeuvre centralized or monolithic organizations. The prevailing trend for military operations, whether conducted as part of an international coalition or not, is that the weight of military effort over time will fall less on the war-fighting side of the scale. Counterinsurgency, stabilization activity, and conflict prevention, termination, and resolution efforts in pre- and post-conflict situations or failing states require military forces to work alongside, and often in support of, civil actors to achieve non-military outcomes.

The fact that coalitions are the 'sum of parts' and each part reflects the political and national mood of the contributing nation is a prima facie weakness for achieving unity of effort in support of a single, agreed coalition campaign plan. On the other hand, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate that where the situations on the ground are fluid and evolutionary then stabilization and state-building take time. It is crucial to recognize and understand that centres of gravity alter as changes to temporal, political, economic, natural, and other factors affect perceptions, behaviour, and activity, and that those shifts and changes demand different capability requirements and balance of effort from the coalition. There is a case to be made that the adaptable, loose-leaf, relatively unconstrained, 'come as you are' nature of coalitions could create the sort of agile construct that suits the fluid, evolutionary nature of what military forces and civilian assets, working in collaboration with host nation authorities, are likely to face once the task of fighting the war is superseded by the complex and taxing business of winning the peace.

Exploiting the potential for coalition action to be, if not the instrument of choice, then the instrument of necessity in the future international security landscape demands

that the requirement to generate international resolve and support and foster unity of purpose must not be limited to the pre-deployment and force generation stage and then left to the leaders of the diplomatic, political, and military effort operating in-theatre to develop and maintain relationships, build trust, and engage with partners. The framework for generating an agreement to operate in coalition and then support coalition activity must encompass the forging of relationships from the grand strategic to tactical levels, underpinned by shared analysis of the evolving situation and a willingness to adapt to revised objectives. To be successful that framework for engagement must be active, inclusive, and conducted simultaneously and continuously at the appropriate planning levels—political, strategic, operational, tactical—to ensure clarity of purpose across the international dimension, with the home nation, and throughout the force.

War is an instrument of policy, so it is states, not armed forces, which forge alliances and enter into coalitions as a matter of policy and in pursuit of national interests.[30] Coalitions have been and will remain expedient relationships between states which entail sharing of risk and effort in pursuit of a common goal. An understanding and feel for coalition working and of how to optimize the dynamics and strengths of coalitions, including what it means to be an effective 'contributing nation', is essential for the successful conduct of war as an instrument of national policy in the twenty-first-century world.

Notes

1. Ferris, 2007.
2. Mitchell, 2009.
3. Ibid.
4. Senior UK Commander, 2009.
5. Barnett, 2004.
6. Horne, 1969.
7. Ibid.
8. Kimball, 1998.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Hoffman, 2007.
12. Ministry of Defence UK, 2010.
13. Smith, 2005.
14. Keegan, 1993.
15. Gowing, 2009.
16. Petraeus, 2009.
17. Codner, 2003.
18. Bremer, 2005.
19. Ibid.
20. Senior US Commander, 2009.
21. Ibid.
22. Clausewitz, 2007.

23. Barnett, 2004.
24. Ashdown, 2007.
25. UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3–40: 'Security and Stabilisation—The Military Contribution', April 2010.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Senior US Commander, 2009.
29. Ibid.
30. Garnett, 2007; Senior US Commander, 2009.

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CHAPTER 22

MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD

GENERAL P. J. M. VAN UHM
AND DR B. SCHOENMAKER

The imposing figure of Major Dick Lonsdale, one arm in a blood-stained sling and a bandage around his head, seemed to be everywhere on that 20th of September in 1944. Commanding an ad hoc force on the east side of the Oosterbeek perimeter, he was constantly on the move, exhorting his men to stave off the German attacks. Things had gone from bad to worse over the past days. The British 1st Airborne Division had not been able to capture the Arnhem road bridge, the ultimate objective of Operation Market Garden, and was now trying to set up a perimeter defence in the town of Oosterbeek. Many of the men who had fallen back from Arnhem were exhausted. Major Lonsdale decided to round them up in the village church, and from the pulpit, he delivered a stirring speech boosting their morale. The men left the church with renewed spirit. With their support, Major Lonsdale organized a sufficiently solid line of defence in his sector of the front, thus making a vital contribution to the stabilization of the perimeter and the successful evacuation of the division a few days later.[1]

The Indispensable Leader

Major Lonsdale's achievement is a textbook example of the importance of leadership in war. A military operation, whatever its nature, cannot succeed without good and effective leadership. An official US Army publication makes this point clearly: 'The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership.'[2] This statement is just as valid for armed forces fighting regular or conventional war as it is for military organizations engaged in other types of operations, such as peacekeeping,

peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency missions. Good leaders are indispensable at all levels of command and under all circumstances. The sergeant who is in charge of an isolated observation post in one of the world's trouble spots where UN peacekeepers are deployed; the lieutenant who takes his platoon out on a three-day patrol in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan; the captain who, at the head of his company, is hurriedly sent on a humanitarian relief mission to a crisis area on the African continent. In each of these situations, determined leadership is required. And this is just as true for the officers higher up in the chain of command, for they must also be, above anything else, motivators of men and women.

Leadership is of course not an exclusively military phenomenon. Leaders manifest themselves in many areas of human activity. They are found at the forefront of the worlds of politics, religion, and sports. Regardless of their platform, political parties usually lack electoral appeal without an inspiring leader at the helm. In the business world, good leadership is a highly sought-after commodity, with the most successful managers often acquiring an almost guru-like status. Whether in business, politics, or the military, leaders face highly similar challenges. There is one striking difference, however, that sets the military leader apart from his civilian counterparts. In deciding on the use of force, the military leader may decide on the lives of other human beings. He may even order his subordinates to put their lives on the line, in order to accomplish the assigned mission. A supervisor in a department store may demand a lot from his staff, but he will never expect them to kill or risk being killed. Military leadership, however, literally involves matters of life and death, giving it a strong ethical dimension.

Military leadership is a timeless subject, which over the centuries has intrigued many thinkers. Attention traditionally focused on the highest levels of command. Success in war was mostly attributed to brilliant admirals and generals. Countless books have been written on the famous commanders of the past, their campaigns, battles, and victories, but also their defeats and failures. The best authors in this category try to pinpoint what it was in their character, upbringing, and behaviour that made these 'great' men such outstanding leaders. They attempt, as the military historian John Keegan phrased it, 'to penetrate the mask of command'.[3] Another traditional but still instructive category in the literature on leadership consists of vignette-like accounts of leadership by Corporals, NCOs, or junior officers. These practical examples, often found in military manuals, are meant to educate and inspire the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of today and tomorrow. Many underline the close relationship between good leadership and the so-called traditional military values, such as courage and self-denial. Such vignettes often vividly demonstrate the stuff good military leaders are made of. Preferably without portraying the leader as some sort of demigod, but rather as a human being who, by applying his professional skills, performs exceptionally well.

After the Second World War, the body of knowledge on the subject of military leadership expanded enormously. All over the world, psychologists and social scientists, many of them employed by the armed forces, carried out research, collected data, and devised theories on the subject. Military organizations were particularly interested in translating these scientific findings into practical programmes for selecting and training

leaders. Military schools and academies—the breeding grounds of future leaders—took and continue to take an active part in all these academic efforts. Another development in many armed forces has been the formulation of an official vision on the theory and practice of leadership. These visions, which should promote unity of thought, are published in periodically updated regulations, handbooks, or field manuals. In order to be effective, such a prescription of a certain leadership style should be integrated into a larger conceptual framework, comprising, among other things, the operational doctrines of the military organization in question. In other words, the ideas about how leaders need to operate should be congruent with an organization's culture. Thus, one cannot expect independent leadership in an army, navy, or air force that fails to appreciate initiative and that stimulates risk-avoiding ('zero-defect') behaviour.

Leading Questions

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the total harvest of ideas that the study of military leadership has yielded. We will focus instead on the most important aspects, from a Western point of view, surrounding the question of what it takes to be an effective leader. Firstly, we will argue that good military leadership is based on fundamental, unchanging qualities, such as competence, character, and a profound sense of responsibility. Styles of leadership may vary over time or may evolve with changing circumstances, but these bedrock qualities should always be part and parcel of our leaders' intellectual substance. As most definitions tell us, leadership is the art of influencing and directing personnel—one's subordinates—in such a way as to obtain their obedience and loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the mission. Therefore the relationship between the leader and his followers is of pivotal importance, and we will argue that in this relationship mutual trust and respect are the keywords. The modern corporal, NCO, or officer cannot usually adopt a predominantly negative or punitive style of leadership. He must apply other, more positive means to win the hearts and minds of the men and women under his command and to have them fulfil possibly life-threatening assignments.

The requirements of good military leadership are subject to constant change. New challenges can come from many directions. Upheavals in society can force an army to rethink its internal system of rules and regulations. In most Western nations the cultural revolution of the 1960s, for instance, did not leave the military untouched. To cite the Dutch experience during that stormy period: it was quite a challenge for the corporals, NCOs, and officers to adjust their style of leadership to a new generation of well-educated, long-haired, critical conscripts, who did not always accept authority gladly. Doctrinal changes can also have a forceful impact on the way leaders are supposed to operate. In the 1980s and 1990s, most NATO countries implemented doctrine that embraced the concepts of 'mission command' and the 'manoeuvrist approach'. As we shall discuss below, these changes made the burden of leadership even heavier. On the

subject of changes, the transformation of the Western armed forces from primarily Cold War institutions into expeditionary organizations, capable of—and actually executing—a vast array of missions, has again confronted our leaders with new challenges. We will conclude this chapter by contending that these missions, especially when they follow a comprehensive 3D approach (defence, diplomacy, and development), call for a versatile and flexible form of leadership.

Competence and Character

Countless treatises on leadership include lists of traits and skills that a military leader should have. Although there is not one general recipe for leadership, consisting of a number of well-defined ingredients, the compilation of such a list is still a good way to start unveiling the 'secret' of leadership. On such a list, competence usually figures prominently, and rightly so, for a leader must first and foremost be an expert at his profession. As General Omar N. Bradley once put it: 'First, he [the leader] must know his job, without necessarily being a specialist in every phase of it.'[4] A leader will only be accepted by his followers if he is technically and tactically proficient and able to give practical evidence of his expertise. For every commander—high or low in the hierarchy—it is an irrefutable fact that proven competence is a *sine qua non* for winning the trust of his subordinates. Soldiers, sailors, and airmen must know for certain that their lives will not be jeopardized as a result of incompetent leadership. On the eve of the ground attack in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the conviction that he was indeed in good hands was well epitomized by one American soldier in a remark to Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, commander of VII Corps: 'Don't worry, General. We trust you.'[5]

Another highly rated item in the catalogue of leadership qualities is character, a slippery notion that is difficult to catch in a sound definition. It is often understood to be the sum total of an impressive number of virtues. Ranking high on this list are moral and physical courage, sense of duty, resilience, mental and physical toughness, decisiveness, ingenuity, flexibility, honesty, integrity, tact, humility, loyalty, self-discipline, enthusiasm, self-control, selflessness, etc. Ideally, these principles of behaviour are shared by all military personnel, but it is the leader who should set and enforce the standards. As he is a role model for the men and women under his command, his conduct should be exemplary in every respect. S. W. Roskill, a Captain of the British Royal Navy, remarked in his book on the art of leadership that a leader is constantly under the acute observation of his subordinates, 'and they will, perhaps instinctively, model themselves on him.'[6] And from observing him, they must gain full confidence not only in his competence but also in his character. It is not our intention to elaborate on all the virtues listed above, so as to avoid the risk of portraying the ideal leader too starkly as a saintly figure. Instead, we will devote a few more words to some of the crucial aspects of leadership that relate closely to the character of the leader.

A company commander blowing his whistle, climbing over the parapet, entering no man's land, and resolutely exhorting his men to follow him towards the enemy trenches is an almost iconic image, reminding us of the ferocious battles of the First World War. It is a dramatic example of a quality that a military leader must have at all times. Under strenuous and hazardous circumstances he must have the courage to lead by example, take all the necessary risks and make sure that his subordinates overcome their natural fear. The wars and conflicts of the past are full of examples of determined leaders who lived up to this obligation and thereby made a major contribution to the fulfilment of their unit's task.[7] Many of them have remained anonymous, some of them became famous paragons of military conduct, often thanks to writers and film-makers who depicted their brave actions. Such inspiring examples demonstrate that courage under fire is a basic tenet of military leadership.[8] A leader must lead and act from the front, in the conviction that the force of his personal example often has a decisive influence on the performance of his unit. He simply cannot ask of his men what he is unwilling to do himself. In all types of conflicts moments occur in which the leader, with courage, calmness, and clear-headedness, has to steer his unit through a crisis situation.

Perhaps the most essential requirement of a military leader is that he must never shirk his responsibility to lead. This is exactly what his subordinates expect from him. As General Colin Powell once said to a gathering of West Point officers and cadets: 'They [the troops] want to follow you, not be your buddy or your equal. . . . They want someone in charge who they can trust—trust with their lives.'[9] And they will not put trust in their leader unless that person makes it perfectly clear that he is responsible and that this responsibility is all-encompassing. This means that he can be held accountable for everything his unit does or does not do, for lack of action can be just as reprehensible as acting in the wrong way. The leader is responsible, even if he himself is not physically present and if he is not the direct cause of the outcome, for he can delegate tasks and authority, but he can never delegate responsibility. General Robert E. Lee meant exactly this, when, at the time of the defeat of his troops at Gettysburg, he said to one of his subordinate commanders: 'Never mind, General, all this has been *my* fault.'[10] To always take responsibility and to always be candid about what his unit has (not) achieved, requires a great deal of moral courage on the part of the leader.

The responsibility of the military leader works in three directions.[11] First, he is responsible *upward* to his superiors, who expect him to accomplish his mission. The chain goes all the way up to the Commander-in-Chief, and from him to the government and to parliament. For the top military leaders, who have to answer directly to the political chiefs, honesty is the most important asset. They should always be honest about what military force can and cannot achieve, and about the results of current operations. Second, the military leader is responsible *downward* to the men and women under his command. He has to attend to their material and spiritual needs, and above all he has to educate, train, and prepare them for their tasks as best he can. His commitment to the well-being of his troops does not imply that he should be soft on them. On the contrary, through strenuous training he must equip them with the skills and the mental and physical hardness needed to be job- and combat-effective and to optimize their chances of survival. Third, the military leader has an *outward* responsibility to the civilians and to his opponents

who are affected by his unit's (violent) actions. What matters most in this respect is that the leader has a moral obligation to make sure that the force of arms his unit applies stays clearly within the limits of what is morally and legally acceptable. Altogether, a leader has to walk a fine line between getting his job done and getting his subordinates home safely, while at the same avoiding the abuse of force.[12] This is a tremendous responsibility that weighs heavily on the shoulders of often still young men and women.

The Leader as Team Builder

The phenomenon of military leadership needs to be tackled from more than one angle. So far, we have highlighted the personal qualities a leader should have. That individual, however, is not an isolated figure. Leadership is a social activity, aimed at developing a relationship with a group of human beings. Creative Corporals, NCOs, or officers will always adjust their style of leadership to the characteristics of the group under their command. Their attitude will vary from strictly directive to more laissez-faire, depending on the level of knowledge, experience, discipline, or—in one word—maturity within their unit. Leadership is also to a large extent situational, meaning that the success or failure of a particular style of leadership is contingent on the culture and policies of the organization and the society at large in which it is exercised. Before we consider these—constantly changing—external factors, as well as the challenges they impose upon military leadership, let us first turn to the timeless requisites for a productive relationship between the leader and his unit. This subject is worth our attention, since it is not the leader himself but always the team that accomplishes the mission. We should always remember, General Sir John Hackett wrote, 'that military practice is group practice'.[13]

A military leader must have the ability to turn his unit into a cohesive team that will continue to function, even when under the extreme pressure of combat or equally stressful situations. He has to make sure that his subordinates are able to overcome fear, to deal with uncertainty, and to cope with the shock of suffering casualties. The invisible cement that holds the team together is mutual trust. As we saw, the leader must enjoy the full confidence of the group, but this is a two-way street, so the leader also has to put his trust in his subordinates. He must have faith in them, he must exploit their talents, and he must instil pride and self-confidence in them, making sure they are convinced that they are equal to their tasks. He should devote special attention to coaching and mentoring the (young) leaders under his command, in accordance with the motto 'a good leader leads, and a great leader develops other leaders'.[14] In addition to vertical lines of trust (between leader and the led), group cohesion also requires horizontal lines of trust. The members of the group must have confidence in each other, so that they will not hesitate to rely on the capabilities, commitment, and courage of their comrades.[15] With regard to cohesiveness a leader must do the hard work in peacetime.

Mutual trust, the cement of group cohesion, will only be strong enough if respect is its core component. Just like trust, respect has to be mutual and can be imagined as a grid of vertical and horizontal lines. A military leader should make high demands on

his subordinates, he should be strict and tough on them and, if necessary, criticize or punish them, but he must never treat them with disrespect. There can be no place for abuse, discrimination, harassment, humiliation, contempt, or mockery. The leader must see to it that his subordinates also treat each other with dignity, for if he fails to do so and tolerates disrespectful behaviour, his unit will very likely fall apart under pressure. As one writer remarked: 'Respect for others is a combat-readiness imperative, because it forms a critical foundation for establishing an effective organizational culture.'[16] The importance of this imperative has increased over the years, because the social composition of the Western armed forces has gradually become more diverse, and this trend will certainly continue in the future. Many military units are now a mixture of men and women with sometimes very different cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. The leader of such a unit may find it harder to bring about and maintain mutual respect than the leader of a more homogeneous unit.

The twin values of trust and respect are necessary conditions for a group to perform well under stressful circumstances, but these values, by themselves, do not suffice. Something else is needed, a leadership quality commonly described as 'vision'.[17] Whatever kind of operation a unit is carrying out, its commander should always have a clear idea about its goals. He must know where he wants his unit to go and how to get there. There is nothing vague or mystical about this direction-setting aspect of leadership. A leader's vision, which should be developed within the framework of his superiors' intent, has to be precise and concrete, so that there can be no doubt about what exactly he wants to achieve. The leader must put a lot of effort into communicating his vision to his subordinates, articulating it in such a way that they fully understand it and will accept it as their own. If he does this right, he will give his troops a clear sense of purpose and a strong drive to focus their energy on what needs to be done.[18]

The leader must be the embodiment of the determination to translate his vision into action and to materialize it. Physical presence is therefore very important: commanders, including those at the brigade, divisional, or corps level, should visit their troops frequently, talk and listen to them, inspire them and motivate them in person. After being appointed Commander Naval Forces in Vietnam in 1968, Vice-Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt of the US Navy decided to join the men of his brown-water flotilla for a number of days on their patrols of the rivers and coastal waters of Vietnam, because he wanted to learn first-hand what his young officers were experiencing. In order to lead them effectively, 'I had to get out and be with them', he said.[19] The Dutch Major General M. C. de Kruif, when serving as Regional Commander South (ISAF) in 2008–9, paid visits to his troops in the field on a very regular basis, even making it to the patrol bases in the most remote parts of southern Afghanistan. He knew the importance of giving the men and women under his command his personal attention, and so did his Divisional Sergeant Major, Adjutant E. W. P. Brust, who usually accompanied him and also made these kind of trips by himself. 'I want to be able to look my men in the eye', De Kruif once said to a reporter.[20]

In the professional literature on the subject of military leadership, the inspirational style of leadership has lately received much attention and acclaim. The leader as a

person is back in the spotlight. One reason for this is that the great doctrinal reforms, which started in the 1970s and which resulted—among other things—in the adoption of mission command, led to a reappraisal of the so-called human factors in war. A second reason has to do with the rapid technological developments, especially in the field of C4ISR (Computerized Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), which greatly accelerated the tempo of operations. A third reason—and in our view the most important one—is that since the end of the Cold War, the Western armed forces have undergone a dramatic transformation. They shrank in size and grew in flexibility, enabling them to take on a wide range of expeditionary tasks. During the last two decades, they have participated—and continue to participate—in numerous international operations under the auspices of the UN, EU, or NATO. These operations have confronted our military leaders with a whole new set of challenges. It is to those recent developments and the impact they have on the theory and practice of military leadership that we must turn.

Versatile Leaders

To put things into perspective, let us first take a few steps back in time. Traditionally, military organizations were notorious for their harsh regimes. They utilized rigid methods of training and draconian forms of discipline. Drill was everything. Soldiers were treated like puppets on a string. They were discouraged from thinking and acting independently, and this applied to the NCOs and subaltern officers as well. Already in the nineteenth century, reform-minded officers began to argue in favour of a more enlightened form of leadership, for two reasons in particular. Their first consideration was that armies and navies, in order to remain vigorous national institutions, could not deviate too much from their parent societies, and since these societies were gradually becoming more democratic and egalitarian, the armies and navies also had to adopt less authoritarian regimes. They needed to treat their soldiers and sailors humanely, or the military would alienate itself from its own people. Their second consideration was closely connected with the tremendous rise in firepower that started around 1850. This development called for fundamental changes in tactics. The troops would have to fight in small groups in a more dispersed fashion. NCOs and subaltern officers would have to learn to rely on themselves more, take the initiative, and seize opportunities. The soldiers also had to learn to think for themselves, to aim and fire independently and to make clever use of every possibility for cover in the terrain. On the dispersed and increasingly lethal battlefield soldiers had to be individuals. Their discipline should be based on an inner motivation.

Around 1900, most Western armed forces had more or less accepted these reformist ideas. It proved to be a lot more difficult, however, to put these into practice and to implement a style of leadership that truly stimulated initiative, delegated authority, and was tolerant of mistakes. As was still the case during the Second World War, most armies

clung to a more rigid style that forced NCOs and subaltern officers into a straightjacket of orders telling them precisely what to do and how to do it. The exception to the rule was the German army, which had developed an efficient system of command and control that emphasized a decentralized execution of operations within the framework of the commander's intent. This system, referred to as *Auftragstaktik*, was rooted in a comprehensive philosophy with respect to the way military operations ought to be conducted. In the 1970s, the NATO countries began to take a serious interest in this concept of *Auftragstaktik*, because it could provide part of the answer to the dilemma of how to fight a potential enemy (the Warsaw Pact), which had the advantage in numbers, without quickly resorting to nuclear weapons. In order to enhance the credibility of NATO, the member states embarked on a programme of improvement to gain a qualitative edge on the Soviet Union and its allies.[21]

The results of the programme were impressive, the most visible being the procurement of sophisticated military hardware. The intangible aspects, however, were just as important. Many NATO countries enforced doctrinal reforms, introducing a more manoeuvrist approach to warfare. Another part of this renewal was the NATO-wide acceptance of *Auftragstaktik*, usually translated as mission-oriented tactics or simply mission command. What matters most in the context of this chapter is that these concepts focused greatly on the human factor on the battlefield, identifying it as a potentially decisive force multiplier.[22] Leadership became a hot topic. Mission command stipulated that the leader would only receive general directions from his commander of *what* was to be done, allowing him the freedom to determine *how* to do it. But that was not all. The general assumption was that modern mechanized warfare would be very intense—with the tactical situation changing rapidly—and this meant that leaders should have the ability to 'thrive in chaos'. When confronted with unexpected events, they should have the versatility of mind to quickly improvise an appropriate response, without the support of detailed instructions from above. They should be able to think and act faster than their opponents.[23] Given that versatility had become so important, former US Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan concluded that the skills and talent required of the military leader were in many ways akin to those of a jazz musician, since both had to be masters of improvization.[24]

In the multilayered hierarchy of a military organization a commander is both on the giving and receiving end of leadership. The challenges of mission command are therefore twofold. A commander must be an independent actor, operating within the framework of his superior's intent. At the same time he must plainly communicate his own intent to his subordinates and especially to the leaders who come directly under him. He must make it very clear what he wants from them and why. He must, in other words, paint them a lucid picture of the desired end state and convince them that the mission he is putting them in charge of is worth the effort and the risks. He must motivate them and make them the owners of the mission. Effective mission command also requires leaders who have the moral courage to delegate—without walking away from their own responsibilities—and to rely on the competence of their subordinates. They will only be inclined to do so, if they trust the leaders under their command. They must therefore

coach them intensively and see to it that they acquire the self-confidence and readiness to carry out their tasks and to exercise initiative. If a commander and his immediate subordinates work together closely, they will get to know each other well and they will develop a good sense of how the other thinks, acts, and responds to a particular challenge. They will reach a high level of implicit coordination.

The Challenges of Today and Tomorrow

The end of the Cold War in 1989 heralded a new era in international relations. In the 1990s the Western democracies utilized their armed forces mainly to buttress their diplomatic efforts to solve or at least contain the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. This military involvement developed from a more or less classic UN peacekeeping mission (the UNPROFOR period) into a number of NATO-led peace-enforcing operations with more robust mandates. After the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001, the struggle against this terrorist network and its supporters, primarily the Taliban, came to the fore. Consequently, NATO focused its attention on Afghanistan, where it is presently waging a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The armed forces that participate in this campaign, or in the one in Iraq for that matter, had to adjust themselves to yet another type of operation, very different from their endeavours in the Balkans or elsewhere in the world. And it is impossible to predict what will be in store for them in the near future. Where will they be, for example, five years from now? What kind of missions will they be carrying out? Since nobody knows, the military must be ready for whatever comes. They must be flexible, most of all conceptually and mentally.

Each and every mission undertaken since 1989 has reaffirmed the paramount importance of effective leadership at all levels. Many of these missions, in Bosnia for instance, were carried out under highly complex circumstances, among a multitude of armed factions and among a population with mixed affiliations and loyalties. These missions had complicated mandates and even more complicated rules of engagement; there was no clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants, very different from regular war. Such missions demand inspirational leaders who, despite the confusing and sometimes frustrating conditions, are capable of giving their subordinates a sense of purpose. Leaders who have enough situational awareness to comprehend the intricacies of the mission and to clarify these to the men and women under their command; leaders who can give a convincing answer to the question: 'What are we doing here?' An inspirational leader brings about a strong identification of his unit with the mission, not by telling his subordinates that things will be easy but by motivating them to try their hardest.

After the Cold War, mission command and the particular style of leadership that goes with it have not become obsolete, despite the drastic changes in the way the Western armed forces need to operate. On the contrary, in today's unstable world the military must be ready to execute missions in the entire spectrum of violence—from humanitarian operations to traditional war-fighting or a hybrid combination of any of these—and

therefore the need for flexible and versatile leaders has never been bigger. Peace-support operations require, as do COIN campaigns, a large measure of delegation to the lower level of command, because the leaders on the spot (the lieutenants and sergeants) must have the authority to respond quickly to local crises and thus prevent escalation. In this kind of operation the military force is usually spread out over a relatively large area where small units carry out relatively independent tasks, such as patrolling, manning a forward operating base, or escorting a convoy. This dispersal adds to the need for decentralization of command.[25]

In reality, however, during peace-support or COIN operations commanders have sometimes been reluctant to delegate authority, precisely because decisions made and actions taken at a low tactical level can have serious political repercussions and even endanger the success of the mission. A short exchange of fire at a UN checkpoint, in which the son of an influential warlord is killed, is a random example of a local incident with possibly serious consequences, with the media quickly turning the event into world news. The answer to this problem, often called the dilemma of the 'strategic corporal',[26] should not be to return to a more rigid system of command and control, however tempting this may be. Communication technology nowadays enables the higher levels of command, even if they are not in theatre, to look over the shoulders of the leaders in the field and to interfere when they think it necessary. Such strict scrutiny, harming the fabric of mutual trust, would quickly undermine the efficacy of the force. It would severely hamper the leaders in the field in their freedom to deal with crises quickly. They—and they alone—are in a position to acquire an intimate knowledge of the local situation, and to act in timely fashion on that information.

The answer to the problem of the 'strategic corporal' should therefore be to train young leaders and their soldiers in such a way that they are up to the challenges of the complex 'battlefield' of the twenty-first century. Today's and tomorrow's conflicts tend to be highly amorphous, in the sense that their nature can vary widely in time and place. In one city block the force may be providing humanitarian aid, while in the next one it is trying to control a riot and in the third one it has to fight a hostile group. This problem of the so-called Three Block War calls for 'thinking' leaders who are able to quickly identify the key characteristics of the situation they and their units are in, and to act accordingly. They have to be adaptable, sometimes showing the traditional aggressiveness of the warrior but more often showing patience and restraint, while acting as mediators who do their utmost to solve problems peacefully. Giving our leaders in the field this kind of independence does not imply, however, that they should be left to their own devices. The senior leadership must send them on their mission well-prepared, with the right tools and with a clear mandate, workable rules of engagement, and unequivocal instructions.

The present operation in Afghanistan has only strengthened the need for inspirational and adaptable leaders. In a COIN campaign it is extremely important that all soldiers fully understand the purpose of the mission, which is not to defeat the enemy with military means only, but to promote the interests of the population, to separate them from the insurgents and to win their hearts and minds through a broad, comprehensive approach. At all levels the leaders must convey this message in the form of a positive,

challenging vision. They must make sure that their units are capable of performing a multitude of tasks: fighting, collecting intelligence, controlling crowds, assisting in development projects, and searching private houses in a respectful manner. Most of these tasks require a fair amount of cultural awareness, a strong emphasis on a discriminate use of force, and a constructive attitude towards the media. In all these respects the leader should set the example. Another leadership task in Afghanistan—and this is typical of COIN campaigns in general—is the training of units of the Afghan National Army. The NCOs and officers who are charged with this task have to adapt their style of leadership to the customs and traditions of the Afghans. For them personally this is a new experience, but the Western military, as institutions, already have a long history of instructing and directing indigenous forces.[27]

Leadership is a timeless subject. Military scholars will never stop writing about it. But what about the soldiers themselves? What are their ideas on the subject? To conclude this chapter, we will quote a number of Dutch soldiers. They belong to the same squad of an infantry platoon that was deployed in Uruzgan province in 2007. On 19 January they were in a firefight with an opposing military force. In the debriefing after the event they made some comments on their leader, a sergeant whom they held in high regard. They emphasized how much they appreciated his natural authority over the group, his competency and calmness. One of the soldiers said: 'If we go out on a patrol, our sarge is always fully prepared, he knows what goes on in the area.' The sergeant was always there for his men, and he showed an interest in their personal ups and downs. What the soldiers liked as well was that the sergeant trusted them and wasn't constantly on their backs: 'he is usually very laid back, but when things need to be done, he has them done at once. That's real leadership.' And when the going got tough, the sergeant would always be there to lead from the front, radiating confidence. Another soldier remarked admiringly: 'our Sergeant is more than thirty years old already, but physically he is just as strong and fast as any of us'.[28] Such leaders are worth their weight in gold.

Notes

1. Middlebrook, 1994: 335–6; Ryan, 1974: 397.
2. *US Army Field Manual 100–5: Operations* (5 May 1986).
3. Keegan, 1987: 11.
4. Bradley, 1981: 4.
5. Franks, 1996: 4.
6. Roskill, 1964: 29.
7. See for example Holmes, 2003: 340–52.
8. See for example Ambrose, 2001: 78–87, 95–109.
9. 'Remarks by General Colin Powell upon receiving the Sylvanus Thayer award West Point September 15, 1998', http://docs.westpoint.org/index.pl?action=browse&diff=2&id=General_Colin_Powell's_Acceptance_Speech_At_The_Thayer_Award_Ceremony
10. Freeman, 1934, vol. 3: 130.
11. Walzer, 1989: 67–8.

12. Catignani, 2006: 173.
13. Hackett, 1983: 215.
14. *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, D.C., 2007): 52.
15. Downes, 1998: 70–2.
16. Christmane, 2001: 256.
17. Montor, 1998: 9.
18. Dimma, 1992: 55–6; McAlister, 1998: 24–9.
19. Montor, 1998: 121.
20. 'Ik wil de mannen in de ogen kijken', *Nederlands Dagblad*, 9 September 2009.
21. Citino, 2004: 245–66.
22. Dupuy, 1992: 259–60.
23. Schubert, 1995: 28.
24. Sullivan, 1994: 5–13.
25. Vogelaar, 2004: 411.
26. The term was coined by General Charles C. Krulak. See Krulak, 1999: 28.
27. See for example: Cassidy 2006: 47–62; Corum, 2006.
28. The official After Action Report is kept by the Netherlands Institute of Military History in The Hague.

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CHAPTER 23

THE ART OF COMMAND IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: REFLECTIONS ON THREE COMMANDS

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Typically, twenty-first-century military operations are asymmetric; that is to say, they do not involve clashes with similarly armed opponents. They can be stabilization, counterinsurgency, or humanitarian operations, where the adversaries or trouble-makers can include insurgents, terrorists, sectarian or tribal militias, warlords, criminals, or a mixture of all of these. Such operations are different from either conventional war between symmetric opponents or traditional peacekeeping where the aim is to separate the sides and act as a neutral arbiter. They are different from conventional warfare because they are asymmetric; they do not involve set-piece battles and they require a range of non-military instruments. On the other hand they are much more robust than traditional peacekeeping and troops have to be ready to engage in hard military action at the tactical level where necessary.

The nature of command has also changed in the twenty-first century. As is the case in all contemporary large organizations like corporations or governments, the person at the top can no longer take it for granted that orders will be automatically transmitted down through a vertical chain of command. Nowadays command is much more complicated and the commander has to deal horizontally with a range of actors—governments both at home and in theatre, international agencies, coalition partners, NGOs, and so on. Instead of giving orders, the commander has to influence, cajole, and coordinate.

* Written with the assistance of Mary Kaldor.

He (or she) has to be an entrepreneurial networker and communicator rather than a dictator. The counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan is often compared to Malaya. But there is one very important difference and that is in the nature of command. When General Templer said 'turn right' everybody turned right. Nowadays, if a commander says 'turn right', subordinates, partners, allies, or collaborators might take no notice, might question the order, or might even turn left.

Even though much that soldiers learn from past experience is still valid, especially the principles of manoeuvre theory, these differences in the nature of operations and the nature of command do affect the art of command. In this chapter, I describe three operations that I have commanded and then reflect on the lessons learned for the art of command in the twenty-first century.

East Timor: Operation Langar

East Timor was occupied by Indonesia from 1976, one year after it had declared independence from Portugal following the Portuguese revolution. Resistance to the occupation was suppressed with varying degrees of brutality but finally, in 1999, a UN-sponsored agreement was reached on holding a referendum on independence. Unfortunately, the United Nations made the tragic mistake of leaving the Indonesian government to provide security. When the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence, militia groups supported by the Indonesian army went on an organized rampage, killing and burning homes. It was not until the Indonesian government agreed to a United Nations military presence, under American pressure, that an Australian-led force was able to restore order, although by then much of the damage had been done.

I became the Commander of the British national contingent of INTERFET (International Force for East Timor). At that time I was Chief Joint Force Operations. My job was to command an HQ that had very few permanently assigned troops—a few signallers and engineers. Our task was to be ready to go off anywhere in the world at twenty-four hours' notice to recce and liaise in warring nations and deteriorating situations and to be prepared to command any subsequent operation.

On 2 September 1999, I went out to Canberra with an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT)[1] and liaised with the Australians about contributing to the East Timor mission. Robin Cook, the foreign secretary, happened to be in Sydney so I met with him and he gave us the green light. (I was also able to use this opportunity to talk about Sierra Leone, which was very important later.)

A small force was put together in ten days. It included a frigate, HMS *Liverpool*, that fortunately happened to be in the area, two C130s, a small battalion of about three hundred infantrymen drawn from 1st Battalion Royal Ghurkha Rifles based in Brunei, and, very usefully, some special forces. It was quite a powerful little task force, certainly enough to buy us some strategic influence.

The force was deployed on the same day as the Australians deployed. This was very important because it made it clear that this was an international force and not just an Australian force. The Australians worried that the mission might be painted by the Indonesians as an Australian attack on Indonesia; the British presence helped to make that claim impossible.

The mission also demonstrated the importance of understanding the implications of strategic distances. Initially, people in London thought the operation could be commanded from Darwin; it was expensive to deploy an HQ. But Darwin to Dili is a very long way, as far as London to Moscow. One cannot exercise command on the ground unless one is there, sharing the dangers with one's troops and developing an understanding of the people involved, good and bad.

Perhaps the most important influence of the British role was on overall priorities. Whilst they learned quickly, at first the excellent Australian Commander and others within the Australian contingent had a rather traditional view of their role—they had not, like the British, been involved in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, or Africa. Some thought they were going to refight the Vietnam War and were sceptical about the new language of humanitarianism. The British offered to organize a humanitarian convoy to the east of the country, where there was a desperate need. It was crucial to respond to that need if the people of East Timor were to have confidence in the mission as a whole. Some Australians were resistant. In the end, with important support from the UN and the NGOs, as well as crucially from Major General Cosgrove, the British view prevailed.

Some lessons from this experience include:

- It is very important to devolve responsibility to people in the theatre of operations. Where the mission is not a national command, it is important to have an empowered national commander sitting alongside the international or alliance commander. The operation cannot be run from London, Washington, or Canberra.
- The role of the media was crucial. We had a symbiotic relationship with the media that allowed us to beam messages back to Britain, a very limited degree to East Timor, and to Australia. (My remark on ABC TV that our contribution to this Australian-led mission was a very small payback for the Australian contribution to two world wars is said to have had some influence in the Australian referendum on retaining the monarchy!)
- Force protection is risk management not elimination. You cannot allow force protection to dominate what you are going to do.
- Civilian military cooperation was very important, in this case with the United Nations mission and the NGOs.
- Perhaps the most important lesson is that commanders have to accept differences. There are always going to be differences—cultural, political, personal, or institutional—you have to accept them and work with them or around them.

Sierra Leone: Operation Palliser

The war in Sierra Leone began on 23 March 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Saybana Sankoh invaded Sierra Leone with a group of dissident Sierra Leoneans, Liberians, and mercenaries. The rebels, the RUF, were led by a group of radical student leaders trained in Libya and backed by Charles Taylor of Liberia. According to one view, they were angry about the corrupt character of the patrimonial state and their exclusion from power. They mobilized poor, unemployed, rural young people through a combination of fear, material inducements, and the offer of adventure. Whatever the original motivations of the rebels, the conflict increasingly became a war about 'pillage not politics' and about control of the lucrative diamond trade.

Some 75,000 people were killed in the war and around half the population of 4.5 million was displaced. The RUF and some pro-government militias recruited children; often the RUF child soldiers were given drugs, particularly cocaine and marijuana. Terrible atrocities were committed including amputation of limbs, ears, and lips with machetes, decapitation, branding, and the gang rape of women and children. I remember visiting a hospital when I first went to Sierra Leone in January 1999; the horror of the war came home to me when adults and children tried to shake my hand and I did not at first realize they only had stumps. That experience was very important in stiffening my resolve to do something.

In 1996, as a result of pressure from civil society, elections were held and were won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party; this was followed by the Abidjan peace agreement. However, the following year Kabbah was overthrown in a coup by parts of the Sierra Leonean army led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. He formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and invited the RUF to join it. Then in February 1998, the AFRC, in turn, was overthrown by the Nigerian-led West African force ECOMOG. This paved the way for the return of Kabbah. A renewed brutal attack on Freetown by the rebels in January 1999 led to my first visit there at the head of an OLRT. Our recommendations resulted in UK and international assistance to Kabbah's government and ECOMOG. This in turn helped persuade the RUF to agree to a peace agreement with the government, underwritten by the UN, in July 1999—The Lome Peace Accord.

In October 1999 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). At that time, up to 6,000 troops were authorized. UNAMSIL's mission was to assist the implementation of the agreement and it included an explicit mandate, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to 'protect' civilians under 'imminent threat of physical violence'. In February 2000 UNAMSIL's troops were increased to 11,100 and its mandate further extended to include the provision of security at key locations in and near Freetown and at all disarmament sites. Despite the mandate, UNAMSIL was very slow to implement the disarmament and demobilization provisions of the agreement and failed to be robust in protecting civilians. In late April and early May, the RUF attacked UN personnel; a number of troops were killed and some 500 taken hostage.

The UN appeared powerless to stop the RUF and indeed started to evacuate their civilian staff from the country. The government and UNAMSIL seemed, and indeed believed themselves to be, on the verge of collapse. Into this deteriorating situation, on 5 May 2000, I was ordered to lead an OLRT, many of whom had deployed with me to East Timor eight months earlier, to assess the situation and to recommend whether or not to respond to an urgent request by Kofi Annan for assistance. Within twenty-four hours, we arrived in Sierra Leone. I advised in favour of intervention, initially so that we could at a minimum execute an anticipated non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). But I insisted that we required the whole Spearhead battalion group with significant helicopter support: in my judgement such a force was necessary given the geography and the strength of the approaching RUF force and the UN's inability to stop it.

Within thirty-six hours a sizeable British military force, which at its height grew to 5,000 people, started to arrive. It became clear to me that such a force could achieve much more than an NEO if we were able to stiffen the resolve of the better UN contingents and exploit in some way the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans still loyal to President Kabbah and his government. So I gave orders to secure Lunge Airport and much of the Freetown Peninsula, including the site of UNAMSIL's HQ. With their vital ground secured for them, UNAMSIL was given a chance to regroup and reorganize.[2] Although dysfunctional for weeks, it was an opportunity to which, under great pressure from UN HQ in New York, they started to respond. Their evacuation was curtailed and confidence slowly started to return. Through the judicious use of what we had available we succeeded in stabilizing the situation within six weeks. Basically, we were a rock of stability and quiet confidence amidst a panicking government and UN. This gave me a lot of authority for the crucial first few weeks of the operation.

Commanders in theatre do have to be ready to push the envelope. My initial mission was just to do an NEO. After some pressure (from me) I got a second lot of orders:

> Whilst continuing to evacuate Entitled Personnel (EPs) and remaining ready to recover any UK detainees or hostages, you are to assist in the continuing security of Lunge Airport in order to enable UNAMSIL reinforcements to be deployed to bring the force to adequate strength.

I was formally appointed Joint Task Commander.

My intent was to use UK forces to gain vital ground—the Aberdeen peninsula, where the UN was based, and the airport. Without those, you could not function. To defend the airport, you had to defend a radius of twenty miles and to do that we needed additional forces. So we adopted a twin-track approach involving both the Sierra Leonean forces and the United Nations.

The UN forces were confused about their mandate and were unwilling to fight, even though they were mandated under Chapter VII. They believed that they were just separating the sides. They had to be persuaded that they were soldiers and that their job was to protect civilians, using, if necessary, force. My aim was to get them to do conventional defence on the vital horseshoe road that runs from the airport to Freetown. My soldiers helped UN units develop the necessary self-confidence by deploying amongst

them. I deployed planners and intelligence and logistic specialists into UNAMSIL HQ to ensure the core operation developed in the right direction.

At the same time, while the UN were reinforced and came to terms with the need to fight, I made what we called an 'unholy alliance' with government forces, the West Side Boys (a dissident rebel group), and the Kamajors (militias loyal to President Kabbah), turning them into a basic manoeuvre force. Actually at that time, the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) did not really exist. They had given up a lot of their arms under the 1999 agreement, whereas the RUF had not. The RUF went along publicly with the agreement but they hid their weapons, only revealing their true intentions in April 2000. It was clear to me that rapidly building up government forces was crucial for the long term as well as a necessary immediate substitute for a UN force that was temporarily neutralized.

There was nervousness in London about what I was doing for fear we would be dragged into an open-ended conflict. It was a risk but you have to be prepared to take risks and it worked.

The central part of my plan was the information operation. Here my widely shared belief that psychological impact will determine success or failure in modern conflict proved to be key. We had to create the impression in the minds of everyone in Sierra Leone that we would fight and take the battle into the interior if necessary; that we were much stronger than we actually were; and that we could be trusted and were ready to be there for the long haul. We were very clear that we were in Sierra Leone for the people of Sierra Leone and not for us. We also used the international media to ensure that HMG better understood our reasoning, responsibilities, and opportunities.

We used a lot of radio and what limited television existed. We created local radio shows, sitcoms a bit like the Archers. We would do it subtly. One night, for example, one of the characters would ask 'So what do you think of the Brits?' The answer would be equivocal, a bit suspicious. And then a couple of nights later, one of the characters would say: 'These Brits are doing good stuff.' We also had public discussions about the British role, comparing their selfless efficiency with the RUF's brutality and greed.

On one occasion, we had a major firefight, at a place called Lungi Lol twenty miles from the airport. A platoon of British paratroopers was attacked by a large column of RUF. It was part of their attempt to retake the airport. The paratroopers responded aggressively. We killed a number of RUF and the rest fled. Rather sadly many were drowned crossing a river. The psychological impact on the RUF was immense. They realized we were in a different league from the UN.

So what were the main lessons to take away from the Sierra Leonean experience?

- We had sufficient military power to do what we had to do, combined with some clever tactics and perhaps some luck. But, one can create conditions for some 'luck'.
- The information operation was the key component of our success. The media played an important role.
- The concept of the UK's Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF)[3] was vindicated. The Americans, in particular, were impressed at the speed with which we deployed and were able to dominate what was otherwise a very messy situation.

- We had the people and the logistics. We had trained hard and in my HQ, and its advance element the OLRT, we had a group of experienced Joint officers ready to go at the drop of a hat.
- Moral underpinning was important. We knew we were doing a good thing and that enabled me, in particular, to be ready to act even without clear guidance from London.

Afghanistan: Operation Herrick

After the Bonn Conference of December 2001, which brought together all the non-Taliban political actors in Afghanistan, it was decided to establish a UN-mandated international force to provide security in and around Kabul in order to hold elections and establish a government. NATO assumed command of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan) in August 2003; before that it had depended on rotated national commands. ISAF's mission was extended to the whole country in stages: Stage 1 was the North in December 2003; Stage 2 was the West on 10 February 2005; Stage 3 was the South on 31 July 2006; and Stage 4 was the East when ISAF assumed control of the whole country on 5 October 2006.

Arriving in Kabul as COMISAF in May 2006, I subsequently assumed responsibility from my US counterpart, Lt Gen Karl Eikenberry, for the South and then East. In the process I became the first overall, or 'theatre', non-US commander of a NATO force that now included a substantial number of American troops. The Americans were initially nervous about a non-American taking overall command—they accepted my role in the South because they didn't have anyone else but I did have to persuade the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, largely through my actions, that I could be trusted.

There was, of course a separate American command, Operation Enduing Freedom (OEF), which was focused on counter-terror. Our mission was people-centric. Until ISAF took over the South and East, NATO's mission was not primarily military but—and this remained the case—the role of the military was crucial to enable others. OEF was more kinetic, i.e. used more force, than we would have wanted it to be. Even American commanders of ISAF, up until General McChrystal, did not have OEF, especially Special Forces, under their command. ISAF owned the ground but OEF could come in and out. This was a problem. OEF might, for example, mistakenly cause civilian casualties but ISAF troops would have to deal with the consequences. That said, during my time, OEF did clear targets with me and, with their cooperation, I did stop one or two on the grounds that they would cause collateral damage or jeopardize Afghan support for our cause. Good people can make this sort of arrangement work. But it is an illustration of the importance of unity of command. There needs to be one commander in any theatre—otherwise there will be schisms, which will be exploited, wittingly or not. Even under General Petraeus, true unity of command has not yet been achieved in that individual nations still, in practice, dial in and out of the details of the operation as they see fit.

My self-written mission was 'to extend and deepen the areas in which the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and International Agencies/NGOs can safely operate in the interests of the people of Afghanistan, enabling the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) increasingly to take the lead in achieving this aim'. The close similarities with today's ISAF mission will be immediately apparent. Now, of course, the campaign is being resourced much better; I could only set conditions for when such a point might be reached. There were five main goals—Reconstruction, Development, Governance, Pakistan (dealing with the influx of insurgents across the border), and Security. Note that security came last—whilst physical security is a vital part of the correct formula, you had to be able to do all the other things in order to achieve security in the full sense. Security was the overall aim. Most Afghans simply want to live their lives securely.

Numerous actors were involved in implementing these goals—Afghan actors (the Government, civil society, local tribes) and international actors (the United Nations, the European Union, other nations, NGOs). Our task was to integrate all this, which could not be done as General Templer did in Malaya, simply by pulling the relevant economic or political or military levers. I came up with the inelegant phrase 'the LIC (Listen, Influence, Coordinate) process' to help explain our role. I spent a long time talking to Afghans, Americans, and national ambassadors. The great strength of the military is our ability to analyse, plan, and implement, often under pressure, and then to coordinate—we have the people, the resources, and the training, which civilian agencies often lack. Before I took over the East, as I had done in the case of the South, I talked to all the relevant tribal elders. It took hours; everything had to be translated. And then, two weeks later, the tribes requested another meeting. It turned out I had only talked to tribes on one side of the Durand line. Their cousins insisted that I should talk to them too. Some of them were brave and criticized the government. But their message was basically one of security.

Whatever our ultimate aims, we had to establish military dominance. That's why the Battle of Medusa in September 2006 was so important. It was the battle for Kandahar and it enabled us psychologically to dominate the South. We had to demonstrate to Afghans that we could fight the Taliban and win. Until we did that, they were just not going to trust us. That's why we fought a Second World War-style battle for Kandahar. There were virtually no civilian casualties because we told them in advance that we were going to fight the battle. The Taliban were, fortunately for us, hugely over-confident. They had mistaken apparent political equivocation in some NATO capitals for a lack of resolve. I and my troops had no such doubts and knew we had to win this fight or effectively be beaten, with all its implications for Afghanistan and strategically. Instead of adopting hit-and-run tactics, the Taliban stayed in place. They had three lines of trenches, some overhead cover, and a small field hospital. They were sure they could hold out and defeat us. It was a close-run thing. We fought it and won. This allowed us to establish what I termed 'psychological dominance'. The Taliban realized that NATO had to be taken seriously and could not be defeated conventionally. The Afghan government and people realized this too, giving them much greater confidence that together we could attain our joint goals. I have never been hugged by so many bearded men in my life.

Security is all about psychology. You must be prepared to fight and you need 'boots on the ground'. Too few troops means more dependence on air power. This leads, in turn, to more collateral damage and a rise in civilian casualties, with its implications for in-country as well as international support. Too few troops means slow progress with the securing of vital economic development, with the attendant gift this presents to your enemy's propaganda machine, and the risk of losing the support of a war-weary population.

You also need to be able to exploit any advantage rapidly. What Afghans wanted most and still want is irrigation, electricity, roads, and thus jobs. But there were many obstacles to reconstruction and development. One was the fact that development agencies were unwilling to venture outside Kabul because of security concerns. Another was the lack of coordination among NGOs, international agencies, and the Government. Yet another was the fact that development agencies did not always respond to Afghan priorities, insisting on education and health rather than infrastructure and jobs. It was clear that some kind of mechanism was needed to bring about what NATO calls the comprehensive approach. The government of Afghanistan was failing to do this and was not being helped by an international community that had imposed a heavily centralized system on them and signally failed to train Afghans to run it. President Karzai ruled from his mobile phone. What we came up with eventually, with President Karzai's strong support, was the Policy Action Group (PAG). Some people wanted to call it the policy analysis group or the policy discussion group but I insisted we need to be decisive. Action, not more talk, was the key thing.

The PAG involved, on one side of the table, all the key government ministers: not just security but foreign affairs, finance, education—anyone who could influence a counter-insurgency. And on the other side were all the key international participants: the EU Special representative, the US and other ambassadors, the OEF and NATO commanders, the UN, the World Bank, and so on. It had a secretariat and four pillars (intelligence, security, strategic communications, governance reconstruction and development), all chaired by the relevant Afghan minister but with a NATO or UN person beside him. The four pillars met a few days before a plenary session which sat roughly every fortnight. The pillars took direction, made their plans, and then reported progress back to the plenary, which then ensured coordination and wider understanding. The plenary was chaired by the President or the National Security Advisor. President Karzai was uncomfortable at first but soon he flourished. I sat beside him and helped him with his notes and his agenda. It is necessary to have someone coordinating all this; it doesn't have to be a soldier. Soldiers have to be prepared to play a political role, outside their military mandate, if no one else is doing it.

The PAG represented the early and tentative signs of collective government and gave the Executive the opportunity to determine the direction it wished to move but, without a competent civil service, this could not be easily translated into change on the ground, either in Kabul or the Regions. As a by-product, by developing committee techniques, agenda-setting, and minute-taking, the PAG provided an exemplar of practice for Afghan civil servants. Regrettably, the PAG was effectively discontinued some months

after I left, as new people with new ideas decided that smaller, more exclusive fora would be more effective. A RAND study on COIN[4] published in 2008 stated that a structure such as a PAG was a *sine qua non* of effective multinational COIN operations.

Whilst it is possible to create structures that lay the foundation for collective governance and the dissemination of Executive direction, if it does not exist the supporting machinery must be created. The Government started to replicate the PAG function at provincial level, to develop the framework necessary to prosecute a successful COIN strategy, but it needed much greater emphasis. It will take much time and effort to create the effective and stable bureaucracy necessary to extend the writ of government efficiently at, as well as below, the strategic level.

Because ISAF was frequently unable to exploit tactical success and maintain the initiative through the timely delivery of reconstruction and development, hard won tactical success proved temporary. The overarching concept for delivering progress was the PAG-endorsed Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) concept. ADZs were designed to provide areas of concentrated effect, relatively small but expandable, where reconstruction, development, and governance could interact with each other, in an area of increased security. This focused security was designed to encourage the international agencies and NGOs to become involved, with the aim of restoring confidence among the people in the area and the potential for increased local governance. Most of the ADZs were along Route 1, the principal highway and artery of economic development around the base of the Hindu Kush. Without development in these areas, it is unlikely there will be sustained economic improvement.

Actually that is exactly what General Petraeus is trying to do now. Since we did not have enough troops to provide security everywhere, the idea was to establish areas of greater security around population centres in which synergistically you bring together development, governance, and security. The military task is to keep the Taliban out of those areas and to take the initiative so that the Taliban do not try to return. You need concepts that everyone understands and shares. Some development agencies and nations, especially the Germans, were reluctant about this concept because they felt that the military should keep out of development. But you cannot do development without some security.

Finally, of course, the media were very important. Every modern commander has to take the information operation very seriously. If you do not, the Taliban will occupy that space and they are adept at doing this. It is very wearing, there is so much else to do. But it is absolutely crucial to dominate the whole information spectrum.

In all of this, the key is the confidence of the people. This is the centre of gravity in all contemporary operations. Every situation will vary in terms of population, terrain, politics, and culture, but there are common principles that can be applied—restoring confidence so that people give the operation their long-term support is central, whether this is done through visible military dominance, through strategic messaging, or through improved development and governance. Achieving what I termed an 'upward trajectory of progress' is vital, whether one is targeting the support of the local population or domestic audiences in the UK or elsewhere. People will put up with much temporary

hardship or setback as long as they sense success can be achieved. There is a relationship between perceptions of success and perceptions of cost. High cost, whether in casualties or cash, and poor progress leads to loss of resolve and vice versa. The military needs to understand this and ensure its campaign design and its tactics sensibly reflect it.

Reflections on Command

General Bradley is famous for saying that 'amateurs talk tactics and professionals talk logistics.' I would rephrase that for the twenty-first century. Professionals talk first about C2 (command and control), then logistics, and then tactics. So what are the implications for command and control that we can glean from these three operations?

First of all, the operational level is critical. Command has to be devolved to the theatre. The commander has to have a degree of flexibility and autonomy. He has to spend time listening and understanding the situation. He has to be able to write his own theatre intent and to be ready to interpret the strategic mission so that it fits with that intent. In all three cases, I had to establish the interim goals myself and, except possibly in Afghanistan, they were not what I had initially been asked to do. And someone, whether it's a military commander or a civilian leader, has to have overall command, something that also was lacking in Afghanistan.

Secondly, the operation has to be properly resourced. It is what our armed forces are all about and yet theatre commanders are rarely provided with what they need. In Sierra Leone and East Timor, although our forces were small, we had enough to implement the mission. In Afghanistan, the military and civilian commitment has never been sufficient.

Thirdly, commanders nowadays have to manage complex inter-component and inter-agency operations. Coalitions have to be nurtured; they are always vulnerable to schisms and pressures. You have to be ready to try and sell an overall concept; this is something General McChrystal succeeded in so well in Afghanistan. And you have to be ready to compromise.

Finally, it is crucial to achieve psychological dominance. As Richard Simkin, the theorist of manoeuvre theory put it, you have to create 'a picture of defeat in the mind of the enemy'. This is where we succeeded in Sierra Leone—the RUF thought we were superhuman. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are close to doing this to us. To do this, you have to use clever tactics, to be unpredictable, to control the tempo, and to seize the initiative. The method might be military. The firefight at Lungi Lol was decisive in Sierra Leone. The battle of Medusa in Afghanistan South was also of critical importance. It can also be through the information operation; that is why information, through the media, the internet, and everyday communication is so important. It can also be through a variety of responses.

In asymmetric conflicts, the strategy has to be asymmetric. You are not going to defeat the enemy through conventional military force, even though sadly you may have

to act robustly sometimes. On the contrary, conventional military force is often what the enemy is hoping for as he can outflank those who do not understand its limitations, especially in the 'communications revolution' era, through asymmetric tactics. In East Timor, our asymmetric response was humanitarian. In Sierra Leone, it was the information campaign. We were operating in a different dimension from the RUF and exploiting their fundamental weakness, which was their unpopularity. Unlike the Taliban, they didn't understand the importance of information. Fighting was part of the information operation. We didn't just want the people of Sierra Leone to think we were not bad; we wanted them to think that we were 'very good'. And in Afghanistan, it was the Afghan Development Zones, which aimed to make the Taliban think twice before invading our space, while persuading the population that life could really be better under their own government assisted by ISAF.

No situation is the same and you have to adapt approaches in every case. As Field Marshal Wavell put it:

> There is nothing fixed in war, except a few elementary rules of common sense, and study of history should be directed not to evolving any theory or formula, but to observing what strange situations arise in war, what varying problems face a commander, how all rules may sometimes be broken with successful results, and especially the influence of human nature and the moral factor.

So what are the qualities needed in order to command in these complex contemporary operations? You have to have intuition, an eye for the situation—something Clausewitz stressed. You have to be a listener, a communicator, and a persuader. You have to have moral courage, to believe what you are doing is right, and to be ready to take military, political, and personal risks. Above all, you have to stay cool and you have to enjoy the job, which I do.

Notes

1. OLRT—a small Joint team of experienced officers ready to deploy at very short notice, trained to assess a deteriorating situation and rapidly draw up recommendations and plans. If HMG orders military action or support, the OLRT rapidly becomes the core of the necessary HQ.
2. By chance Bernard Miyet, the head of the UN's Department of Peace Keeping Operations, was in Freetown when the British arrived. There is no doubt that his presence and pragmatism eased the way for what potentially could have been a very difficult relationship between the UN and UK forces. 'The arrival of the British is good for us', said a UN spokesman, despite initial problems.
3. JRRF: a 'golf bag' of appropriately maritime, land, and air forces with relevant logistic support held at high readiness with a honed C2 (command and control) element ready to deploy at 24 hours' notice, from which a tailored Joint Force can be deployed and sustained in a very short timeframe.
4. 'Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence'. RAND Corporation, 2008.

CHAPTER 24

HYBRID CONFLICT AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF ACTORS

ROB DE WIJK

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, hybrid warfare has been the best concept by which to understand contemporary wars. In hybrid warfare, the distinction between large, regular wars and small, irregular wars has become blurred. In such wars, actors use a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures that fit their goals and help to decide a conflict successfully. State actors used to apply mostly regular forms of warfare, consisting of combined arms operations and standoff weaponry, with conventional forces of 'manned arms', while armed groups, usually non-state actors, rely on irregular hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare tactics with 'armed men'. But in hybrid war these distinctions are blurred.

Asymmetry is the key concept for understanding hybrid warfare. Irregular warfare has always been the tool of the weak and a method of offsetting imbalances between forces and capabilities. At the strategic level, the actor using asymmetrical tactics exploits the fears of the populace, thereby undermining the government, compromising its alliances, and affecting its economy. To achieve this, the actor uses tactics like guerrilla warfare, hit-and-run attacks, sabotage, terrorism, and psychological warfare. By these means, the weak seeks to deny victory to the strong.

This chapter argues that advances in technology triggered an evolution in the art of war and contributed to the effectiveness of combat forces, both conventional and irregular. But technology has not become the great equalizer, because of the way asymmetrical responses can offset technological superiority. Since the end of the Cold War the conventional armed forces of the West have mainly fought against armed groups who use irregular warfare tactics to neutralize Western superiority. However, miscalculations in a multipolar world and scarce resources increase the risk of inter-state conflict. This could mean that the focus of the West will gradually shift back from non-state

actors to state actors. But as long as weak actors confront stronger ones, hybrid warfare will remain the norm.

Old Wine in New Casks?

An example of a hybrid war is the regime removal phase of the Iraq War (2003). American forces fought classical regular battles against Saddam Hussein's conventional army on their way to Baghdad. At the same time, they were attacked by pro-Saddam militias who were using irregular warfare tactics. In Basra, British troops fought an urban guerrilla force. In rural parts of the country, Australian and American troops carried out counter-insurgency operations against local pro-Saddam fighters. During the stabilization phase following the successful removal of the regime, an insurgency against foreign 'occupying forces' came into full swing. Insurgents, including former members of Iraq's conventional armed forces, started using irregular warfare tactics to fight a superior adversary.

Has anything changed at all? In 1898, in *Lockhart's Advance Through Tirah*, Captain L. J. Shadwell wrote about 'savage warfare', or non-European warfare, 'that differs from that of civilized people':

> A frontier tribesman can live for days on the grain he carries with him, and other savages on a few dates; consequently no necessity exists for them to cover a line of communications. So nimble of foot, too, are they in their grass shoes, and so conversant with every goat-track in their mountains that they can retreat in any direction. This extraordinary mobility enables them to attack from any direction quite unexpectedly, and to disperse and disappear as rapidly as they came. For this reason the rear of a European force is as much exposed to attack as its front or flanks.[1]

Compare this to former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's observations in 2002:

> From the moment they [US special forces] landed in Afghanistan, these troops began adapting to the circumstances on the ground. They sported beards and traditional scarves and rode horses trained to run into machine gun fire. They used pack mules to transport equipment across some of the roughest terrain in the world, riding at night, in darkness, near minefields, and along narrow mountain trails with drops so sheer that, as one soldier put it, 'it took me a week to ease the death-grip on my horse.' Many had never been on horseback before.[2]

Rumsfeld concluded that the lesson from the Afghan campaign is not that the US Army should start stockpiling saddles, but that preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking, and the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and circumstances. In other words, he argued that conventional forces again had to acquire irregular warfare techniques and merge them with regular warfare techniques. This insight ultimately has led to doctrinal innovations, such as the US counterinsurgency manual FM 3–24 on Counterinsurgency Operations. The manual was designed to fill a doctrinal gap, because it had been twenty years since the Army

published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it had been twenty-five years.[3]

Doctrinal innovations were seen as crucial for achieving success in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the end of the Cold War, the armed forces of Western democracies were ill-prepared for irregular warfare or counterinsurgency operations. Following the highly successful regime removals in Afghanistan and Iraq, the armed forces of the West were unable to prevail over the insurgents during the subsequent stabilization phases, despite their numerical and technological advantages. How can this be explained? First, as in Shadwell's day, most Western countries still considered irregular warfare as savage warfare, for which there is no preparation. For that reason, they were not able to shift quickly from regular to irregular warfare. Historically, only colonial powers like Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands were on occasion able to combat insurgents quite successfully. They knew that adversaries had no other choice but to use irregular warfare and asymmetrical tactics, which, if applied smartly, could render the military might of the colonial powers all but irrelevant. Already in the days of colonial warfare, imperial policing was aimed at winning the support of the populace and separating insurgents from their base. Colonial powers realized that the local insurgents fought for the hearts and minds of the people as well. Thus, colonial warfare as well as modern counterinsurgency wars are essentially political battles.

Second, history shows that when vital interests are not at stake, Western democracies, especially those in Western Europe, are unlikely to use force decisively, because they are risk-averse. In early 2010, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that public and political opposition to the military was so great in Europe that it was affecting NATO operations in Afghanistan. Gates argued that 'The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.'[4]

Third, Western armed forces have always been obsessed with high-tech conventional wars fought by standing armies. The information revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s was considered as a breakthrough that allowed the West to transform its armed forces into true full-spectrum forces. The microelectronics revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s made this revolution possible. In the West, technology has always been seen to compensate for the disadvantages mentioned above.

Asymmetrical reactions are key to offsetting this technological superiority. At the same time, insurgents cannot win against a superior adversary with irregular warfare techniques. Mao Zedong was the first to stress the importance of shifting between regular and irregular warfare techniques. The Chinese communist leader provided the first coherent theory of revolutionary struggle using a mix of warfare techniques in *Guerrilla Warfare* (1937) and *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* (1938). Mao argued that the struggle is primarily a political one and not military, that the first phase of the struggle would always involve irregular warfare techniques, but that victory would only be possible through regular warfare with conventional forces. Thus, without coining the term, hybrid warfare as a concept was born.

The West and the Information Revolution

Until 1990, there was lack of hard evidence as to how new technologies might work in practice. Due to the experiences in Vietnam, there was little confidence that US armed forces could fight and win wars quickly and decisively without too many losses, but the Gulf War demonstrated the virtues of modern technology. Soon after the Gulf War, the US and its allies started to restructure their armed forces. The debate largely centred on a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) and the virtues of air power. Reinforced by the information revolution of the 1990s, the RMA depended on the interaction between systems that collect, process, fuse, and communicate information and those that apply military force. To be successful on the battlefield, dominant battle-space knowledge was achieved through superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). C4ISR was a true force multiplier, defined as a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.[5] It not only contributed to improved situational awareness and control over operations, but made more precise weapons systems possible as well. This is what Alvin and Heidi Toffler called third-wave war.[6] The 1991 Gulf War was the first example of a new kind of high-tech, computerized warfare. Destroying the enemy's command and control facilities, now possible because of the high accuracy of weapons systems, became an immediate objective during the initial stages of the war. It allowed the American-led coalition to take the initiative, destroy all exposed forces within a short period of time, and gain victories with few losses, fewer munitions, and lower levels of collateral damage. In short, advances in technology revolutionized the combat effectiveness of Western forces.

Armed Groups and the Information Revolution

The wars in Afghanistan (2001–current) and Iraq (2003–10) demonstrated that the merger of traditional techniques and tactics with modern information and communication technology (ICT) could enhance the combat power of irregular forces or armed groups as well. Could the information revolution bring weak insurgents onto an equal footing with high-tech forces trained and equipped for regular warfare? As armed groups usually cannot obtain precision guided munitions and other advanced weapons, the answer depends on their use of ICT.

Few comprehensive studies have been conducted on how insurgencies use ICT for enhancing their combat capabilities. First, it is safe to assume that insurgents use the internet how people generally use the internet. Like all other internet users, insurgents find and share information, send emails, and discuss topics with others. For non-state actors without extensive intelligence-gathering capabilities, the internet is the most important source of information. Especially non-state actors can benefit from the information revolution. Learning from others and exchanging information through the internet will quickly enhance the efficacy of insurgents because it saves them a time-consuming learning process on weapons use, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), guerrilla tactics, and physical training. Thus, the availability of the internet for low-tech armed groups can enhance the efficacy of asymmetrical tactics considerably. One author described the internet's main function for such groups as a library.[7]

Furthermore, the internet, together with other means of communication such as cell phone networks, serves as the armed groups' command, control, and communications (C3) network. As messages could be intercepted and internet access is not always available in remote locations, the internet is not useful for the tactical command of operations. Rather, it is more useful for strategic guidance and issuing mission orders. Cell phones and satellite communication are more useful means for operational control and tactical command, but could also reveal the position of combatants. Another example of modern ICT use by armed groups for tactical command purposes is the use of mobile phones to activate IEDs.

Finally, armed groups may use ICT for purely political purposes. For example, insurgents can use the internet for information operations in order to gain support for their struggle, or to deter the adversary's actions. As insurgencies are essentially political struggles for winning hearts and minds at home and weakening public support for the 'occupying force' both at home and abroad, such operations are key to victory. During the 2009 elections in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters threatened to cut off fingers, ears, and noses of the local population if they dared to vote. Similarly, excessive levels of collateral damage will weaken the domestic support of the 'occupying forces'. Footage sent around the world is instrumental to this objective. In other words, it is a smart strategy to infiltrate insurgents into population centres as this will make precision guided weaponry useless. Increasing collateral damage will decrease domestic support for the interventionist force.

In summary, technology improves the combat effectiveness of armed groups in irregular warfare, but by itself it plays a supporting role at best. C4ISR and precision strike made Western forces vastly superior over weak conventional forces, but they failed to improve their performance over non-state actors. Creating success in irregular warfare mainly depends on fighting skills using small calibre arms or knives in search-and-destroy operations. Moreover, irregular warfare is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, to which no technical solution can contribute. Nevertheless, experience with regular and irregular operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that it could be possible to conduct both kinds of combat operations with the same set of forces. Small units, the size of a company or battalion, conducting a swarming type of warfare, could indeed fight a regular and an irregular opponent at the same time.

Structural Disadvantages of the West

The reasons why technology and innovations such as swarming cannot compensate for the asymmetric tactics of the weak actor are the structural disadvantages of the West. As argued before, for historical and cultural reasons, the armed forces of Western countries, especially European, have been disinclined to prepare for military action that was considered uncivilized warfare. Thus, policy-makers, the military, and the public are psychologically ill-prepared for war-fighting if no vital interests are at stake.[8] As they are fundamental to the West's strategic culture, these weaknesses are unlikely to change in the future. The most important weak spots are:

- zero tolerance of casualties if no interests are at stake;
- the desire to minimize collateral damage;
- the necessity to abide by the law of war and other internationally accepted norms;
- an emphasis on technological solutions;
- the tendency to be very confident of one's own capabilities while underestimating the opponent's motivations and capabilities to resist;
- the economic and social vulnerability of contemporary Western societies;
- the political aspiration to operate within a coalition.

Weak actors can easily exploit these structural disadvantages through asymmetrical actions. First, they can seek to increase the suffering of their own population at the hands of Western forces. Western forces make a strict distinction between combatants and non-combatants. By increasing the suffering of their own population, the opponent can depict Western forces as brutal invaders and gain the advantage of being perceived as the underdog. For example, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Serbian colleague Slobodan Milosevic placed military installations in and around hospitals in populated areas so that the population would become the unintentional target of Allied bombings. This tactic neutralized the technological superiority of Western forces.

Second, weak actors can target the population of the interventionist. This strategy is aimed at causing terror in the countries providing troops. Vigilance was high for terrorist attacks against, for instance, politicians or high-ranking militaries, but also nuclear power plants and oil refineries, during the Gulf War and the different crises surrounding former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. During Operation Enduring Freedom and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, fear grew that Al Qaeda would carry out attacks against troop-contributing countries.

Third, weak actors can increase the number of casualties amongst the intervening forces. After NATO started enforcing a no-fly zone above Bosnia in April 1993, the Serbs responded by keeping United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992–5) peacekeepers hostage, and using them as human shields. Hostage-taking can be especially effective if the intervener's populace does not wholeheartedly support the intervention. Supreme NATO commander General Clark wrote that he continuously argued with his

superiors in Washington to deploy ground forces during the Kosovo war of 1999.[9] While preparations for such an effort did take place, risk-averse Washington tried to prevent it at all costs.

Fourth, the weak can be (selectively) passive. This strategy was practised by the Serb President Milosevic in 1999. NATO's calculations indicated that if he employed his air force and air defences, he could be defeated within days. But Milosevic hid his fighter planes and air defences and used them only occasionally. As a result, threats to NATO forces persisted during the entire air campaign, preventing the alliance from obtaining complete air supremacy and forcing them to bomb from high altitudes. This considerably delayed the air campaign and increased the chances of collateral damage.

Fifth, weak actors can opt for horizontal escalation to create chaos. In reaction to an intervention, the struggle can be escalated to another front. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched missiles at Tel Aviv and threatened to initiate a second front against Turkey.

Finally, the intervener can be denied the use of critical installations, raw materials, and other strategic assets. Scorched-earth tactics are the most likely method. This is what Saddam Hussein did during the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. To deny coalition forces access to Iraq's oil reserves, he set fire to oil wells.

By employing these strategies, the interventionist might have to pay a high price for achieving his political objectives. Furthermore, the opponent can attempt to undermine public support for a Western intervention. The Western public is unlikely to accept high levels of collateral damage, especially in the case of a humanitarian intervention. The strategy of the weak is not directed at achieving a military victory, but at avoiding military defeat by retreating in time, by undermining the willingness of the interventionist to persist, and by weakening the coalition.

Coalition Warfare

The culminating effect of the asymmetrical actions mentioned above is weakening of the coalition. A coalition is defined as a collection of players cooperating to achieve a common objective. For political reasons, there is no other choice but to form coalitions. Coalitions enhance two principles of military operations: credibility and legitimacy. Coalitions shore up the intervener's domestic and international support. For example, if a UN Security Council mandate is lacking, coalitions could help to legitimize interventions. This happened during the Kosovo war. On the one hand, NATO could not obtain a UN mandate for the intervention and was aware that from a legal perspective, an intervention in Kosovo would be *illegal*. On the other hand, it argued that an intervention would be *legitimate* because of the humanitarian disaster taking place in Kosovo and the threat to regional stability. Gaining support from other countries was important for communicating the objective of the intervention. States intervening unilaterally will be

accused of waging a war of conquest, trying to get control over land or scarce resources. The 'just cause' of an intervention will be more credible if many countries support it.

Asymmetrical actions cause friction within coalitions. But Western coalitions have other specific weaknesses as well. If the coalition lacks technical, doctrinal, and organizational *interoperability*, a key principle of military operations, *unity of effort* will be put in jeopardy. *Technical interoperability* refers to critical items such as C4ISR, the calibre of ammunition, and logistics. *Doctrinal interoperability* relates to common operational concepts. *Organizational interoperability* addresses regulations, procedures, and command structures. Due to differences in national procurement schemes, industrial policies, and doctrinal preferences, only a certain level of interoperability can be achieved.

The main challenge of coalition warfare is that due to the lack of interoperability and unity in command, the synchronization of all means and all efforts to reach an objective is unlikely. For that reason, former US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld argued that the mission should define the coalition. As US forces deemed their vital interests at stake, they took the lead during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Coalition partners were welcome, but only in a supportive role.

The challenge of interoperability was painfully described by former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Clark. He suggested in his memoirs on the 1999 Kosovo war that it was prolonged because he was not able to achieve a military victory with air power alone. According to Clark, a military victory was not possible because all the founding principles of modern-day warfare were neglected: there was no unity of effort because there was no singular command; the operational plans were not simple; concentrating the combat force into central points proved impossible; the use of economic means was not coordinated; and the decisive turn could not be forced on the enemy through offensive action and manoeuvres. For example, the new NATO members (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland) were not allowed to contribute directly to the military operations of other NATO members because they did not use similar procedures and doctrines. Moreover, most of their aircraft were not equipped with NATO-compatible Friend or Foe systems, causing a considerable risk that their NATO colleagues would identify them as the enemy. To demonstrate solidarity with NATO, new member states got permission to separately carry out small-scale operations that would not put the entire operation at risk.

Coalition warfare is further complicated by political interference with the operational process and confusing command arrangements. A case in point is UNPROFOR. During the operation there was considerable political interference in all aspects of its execution. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr Akashi, and the countries contributing troops all tried to influence the force commander and his subordinates. Moreover, the operation suffered from unclear command procedures. In fact, there was a political command structure, which centred on the Special Representative, and a NATO command structure. Air support and air strikes could only be delivered once the military was given the green light from the Special Representative. This dual-key procedure was very lengthy and ineffective. In particular, the air support structure of the UN command was burdensome, leading to frequent delays. Air support usually came too late, if there

was any air support at all. In many cases, the Serbs had already achieved their objectives by the time air support had been authorized.

Thus, for political reasons, state actors may find it extremely difficult to achieve unity of effort.

Strategic Culture

Unity of effort will further be weakened when a coalition is composed of unequal partners with different strategic cultures and different opinions about the objectives to be achieved. Strategic culture is defined as a set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour that shape collective identity and determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives. Differences in strategic cultures are expressed through caveats. Issuing caveats is the sovereign right of each coalition member, but it also reveals a key structural weakness of coalition operations. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan coalition members issued numerous caveats reflecting their respective strategic cultures. In Afghanistan, Germany's caveats were the most restrictive and Bundeswehr soldiers could fire their weapons only in self-defence. Moreover, they were only allowed to describe their actions as 'use of appropriate force'.

Defence planners in the West use different paradigms for defence planning, reflecting different strategic cultures as well. Over the past two decades, defence planners have gone from one paradigm to another. Since the Second World War, roughly three defence-planning paradigms have emerged: the 'two-bloc paradigm', the 'force for good paradigm', and the 'defence of interests paradigm'.

During the Cold War, planners on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean used the two-block paradigm. The focus was on regular, conventional-force warfare. In those days, the dominant characteristics of modern Western militaries were large standing armies with mechanized units, innovative tactical doctrines such as mobile warfare, and dependence on technology to increase firepower.

While American and West European armed forces were rapidly transformed into expeditionary armed forces to suit the post-Cold War requirements, defence planners in Central and Eastern Europe continued to use the two-block paradigm. In contrast to Central and Eastern Europe, the need to defend the homeland against a large-scale attack had disappeared in Western countries. Consequently, most West European capitals now focused on the defence of values and the promotion of political, social, and economic stability. The new mission would require crisis management and peace support operations in far-off places. Most West European states abolished conscription and transformed their tactically mobile armed forces into strategically mobile expeditionary armed forces. This is reflected in a 'force for good' paradigm. This force-planning paradigm emerged from traditional peacekeeping operations, which evolved after the end of the Cold War into second-generation or wider peacekeeping and during the first decade of the new century into stabilization and reconstruction. The key difference to older

forms of peacekeeping is the application of force: while force in classical peacekeeping could only be used for self-defence, new forms of peacekeeping involve elements of peace enforcement.

The new paradigm was also influenced by a report by the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, which introduced the notion of a 'responsibility to protect' in December 2001.[10] The Commission was a response to Kofi Annan's question of when the international community must intervene to protect humanity. The Commission concluded that sovereignty must yield to the protection against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. As the UN debated the merits of major reforms to its humanitarian rights system and how it is managed, the concept of Responsibility to Protect gained support from many governments. At the World Summit in September 2005, UN member states adopted the concept and agreed that the international community has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to help protect populations threatened by war crimes.

Parallel to this development, an alternative 'defence of interests' paradigm emerged in the USA after the 9/11 attacks. During the twentieth century, the defence of interests has always been key to America's foreign policy. But despite interventions in Vietnam and other countries, US forces remained largely organized for conventional warfare. Only after 9/11 were both defence planning and doctrine adapted to dealing with hybrid wars. Some European allies followed the American example and further transformed their armed forces for sustained, expeditionary combat operations and hybrid warfare.

Thus, while the USA adopted the defence of interests paradigm, most West European member states, except for the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent France, used the force for good paradigm, and most some Central and Eastern European states continued to use the two-block paradigm. As each paradigm guides force restructuring differently, NATO member states have developed divergent force structures, with the Americans putting emphasis on expeditionary combat operations, most West Europeans on wider peacekeeping, and the Central and East Europeans on territorial defence. Due to these differences, it was hardly possible to carry out sustained combat operations and to act collectively against a wide variety of actors during the 1990s and early 2000s. Does this matter? New security challenges and the changing nature of actors suggest that collective efforts will become more important.

Future Challenges and the Changing Nature of Actors

There is a high likelihood that the nature of actors will change and that the focus of the West will shift back from non-state actors to state actors. As weak state actors could apply the same asymmetric tactics as weak non-state actors this will not be the end of asymmetry and hybrid wars. Two colonels in China's People's Liberation Army,

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, wrote that the Gulf War of the early 1990s was the turning point in the modern history of warfare. They concluded that the Americans could use military force at their own convenience. For that reason, China had no other choice but to use asymmetrical tactics to counter this military superiority.[11]

Statistics reveal that inter-state conflict has been on the decline for a very long time. SIPRI figures show that over the last decades, less than 10 percent of all wars were inter-state conflicts.[12] An explanation for the demise of inter-state conflict is that most disputes over territory, the traditional reason to go to war, have been resolved. Indeed, the era of state formation is over. Moreover, residual territorial disputes are being dealt with by international organizations such as the UN and the International Court of Justice. Phillip Bobbitt argued that the traditional nation-state is being replaced by the market-state. While the nation-state is legitimized by the protection of the state itself, the market-state finds its legitimacy in the material welfare of its citizens.[13] This suggests that economic interests will increase the risk of inter-state conflict. This assumption is supported by the emergence of new security challenges.

First, for the first time in centuries the geopolitics of power are shifting away from Western countries, as US hegemony gives way to a multipolar world where the USA and Europe compete with China, India, and Russia as centres of military, political, and economic power. International Relations scholars maintain that a multipolar system is inherently less stable than a unipolar or bipolar one. We must therefore expect the world to become less stable than it is today. In a multipolar world there is an increased risk of misperceptions, which undermines trust and stability. Moreover, emerging powers will reshape the geopolitical landscape because they are likely to be more assertive, casting a larger shadow on the region and the world. A power struggle among the new centres of power could have important repercussions for international security, the efficacy of international law, and the functioning of international institutions. Examples are the difficulties of creating consensus within the UN Security Council on Iran's nuclear programme or Sudan's violations of human rights in Darfur. Finally, due to the relative decline of the West, its shaping power will decrease. This trend is reinforced by the difficulties encountered by hybrid warfare in general and asymmetrical action in particular. As the shaping power of the West is weakened, it will be increasingly difficult to use force to protect values. This suggests that the West is likely to become reluctant to use its armed forces if vital interests are *not* affected.

Second, industrialized and industrializing nations demand unrestricted access to resources, particularly energy supplies and scarce minerals, as a prerequisite for continued economic growth and socio-political stability. As resources become increasingly scarce, this has become the key driver for China's and India's foreign policies and increasingly so for that of Europe and of the USA. Increasing scarcity could affect the security of NATO member states in a number of ways. In resource-rich countries, resource nationalism and nationalistic appeals could, if they take hold of the populace, lead to emotional and irrational confrontational policies.

Resources are often seen as zero-sum games causing instability. For the sake of domestic stability, resource-poor countries have no other choice but to defend their economic

interests. Resource-rich countries and big consumers like China could form blocks to advance shared geopolitical interests. The formation of new blocs would increase the negative effects of multipolarity. Michael T. Klare warned about the destabilizing effects of proto-blocs led by the USA and Japan, and Russia and China.[14] For example, Russian warships sailed into a Venezuelan port in November 2008, in the first deployment of its kind in the Caribbean since the end of the Cold War. Gunboat diplomacy linked to boundary disputes, such as in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the North-Polar region and elsewhere, become more likely. In May 2008, US Defense Secretary Gates issued a set of warnings to China. Mr Gates said that China could risk its share of further gains in Asia's economic prosperity, if it bullied its neighbours over natural resources in contested areas like the South China Sea.

In addition, the World Bank found that countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the exploitation of natural resources and agriculture are prone to internal conflict.[15] From this vantage point, conflict is explained by greed and grievances. Greed fuelled conflict in the coltan-rich eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Grievances played a role in Nigeria, where local groups want access to the region's oil wealth. Indeed, scarce resources play an important role in local conflicts. As most commodities become increasingly scarce and drive up prices, the likelihood of resource conflicts will increase. A report of the UN Environmental Programme revealed that since 1990 at least sixteen violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources.[16] Looking back over the past sixty years, at least 40 per cent of all intrastate conflicts can be associated with natural resources. Civil wars, such as those in Liberia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have centred on high-value resources like timber, diamonds, gold, minerals, and oil. Other conflicts, including those in Darfur and the Middle East, have involved control of scarce resources such as fertile land and water.

Closely related to this is the issue of transit countries, the vulnerability of pipelines, and the stability of the providers of energy and raw materials. The world's largest oil reserves, together with transnational pipelines and major shipping routes, all lie within a 'zone of instability'. This zone of fragile states and ungoverned territories stretches from Central America to the Sahel in Africa, across the Middle East, through central Asia to the archipelagos of south-east Asia and North Korea. In this zone of instability, weapons of mass destruction are proliferating, along with their means of delivery, and the risk of terrorism and organized crime, including piracy, is high. Instability is compounded in some parts by the destabilizing effect of youth bulges, competition for scarce drinking water, and conflicts for regional domination.

Third, climate change is a threat catalyst. The conflict in Darfur is seen by some experts as the first 'climate war'. Climate change could lead to migration, which might consequently undermine the social and political stability of industrialized liberal democracies. US war games and intelligence studies concluded that over the next twenty to thirty years, vulnerable regions—particularly sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and south and south-east Asia—will face the prospect of food shortages, water crises, and catastrophic flooding, which could demand humanitarian relief or a military response.[17]

Oxfam International estimated that of the 250 million people who are annually affected by natural disasters, 98 per cent become victim to climate-related disasters, such as droughts and floods. By 2015, the number of people affected by such disasters could grow by more than 50 per cent, to an average of 375 million people affected by climate-related disasters each year. An estimated forty-six countries will face a 'high risk of violent conflict'.[18] Projected climate change will put serious pressure on already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states.[19] Furthermore, Oxfam observed that 'economic and environmental conditions in already fragile areas will further erode as food production declines, diseases increase, clean water becomes increasingly scarce, and large populations move in search of resources. Weakened and failing governments, with an already thin margin for survival, foster the conditions for internal conflicts, extremism, and movement toward increased authoritarianism and radical ideologies.'

Climate change could also lead to new resource conflicts. It is estimated that the Arctic region contains 13 per cent of the world's unproven oil reserves and 30 per cent of the world's unproven gas reserves. Melting ice-caps make these reserves more accessible.

Conclusion

New global developments and the changing nature of the art of war-fighting have important implications for Western security. First, in a multipolar world the build-up of tensions could more easily escalate into armed conflict than in a bipolar or a unipolar world. As scarcity is likely to play a crucial role, inter-state conflict must therefore be considered in the context of multipolarity and rising new powers, which are either massive consumers or producers of scarce critical resources. Conflicts could occur when states deny (other) industrialized states access to the resources needed for their own economic survival. This situation could occur when a state embarks on a course of resource nationalism or imposes export restrictions on vital commodities, or when a third state controls the resource base of another state.

Second, the risk of intra-state conflict is unlikely to decrease. As local clans, rebels, or criminals could try to control scarce resources, scarcity could also fuel conflicts within states. Furthermore, as the Darfur crisis has demonstrated, climate change also increases the risk of local conflict.

In addition, as the West is unlikely to overcome its structural weaknesses for coalition warfare and its reluctance to fight wars when its vital interests are *not* at stake it will increasingly shift its focus to the defence of economic interests. For that reason, the defence of interests paradigm is likely to become the dominant Western defence-planning paradigm. For now, hybrid warfare is likely to remain the dominant concept as long as vast differences in strength are likely to characterize current conflicts.

Notes

1. Shadwell, 1898: 100–5.
2. Rumsfeld, 2002: 20.
3. US Army Field Manual 3–24. This is the so called Petraeus Manual, after General David Petraeus, who commanded the multilateral forces in Iraq in 2007 and 2008.
4. Gates, 2010.
5. *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 2005.
6. Toffler and Toffler, 1993.
7. Sternersen, 2008: 215–33.
8. De Wijk, 2004: 104–13.
9. Clark, 2001: 417.
10. International Commission on State Sovereignty, 2005.
11. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, 1999.
12. *SIPRI Yearbook,* 2010: 61.
13. Bobbit, 2002: xxii.
14. Klare, 2008: 227.
15. Collier and Hoeffner, 2004.
16. UN Environmental Programme, 2009: 8.
17. Mazo, 2010: 87–118.
18. Oxfam International, 2009: 4.
19. Sullivan et al., 2007: 6.

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CHAPTER 25

CONDUCTING JOINT OPERATIONS

GENERAL SIR RICHARD SHIRREFF

Introduction

> The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.
>
> (Clausewitz, 2007)

As Clausewitz put it, at the heart of the challenge faced in the conduct of war is the importance of understanding the character of conflict, that ever-enduring feature of the human condition. The experience of both Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the inherent difficulties in identifying the character of current conflict before committing to fight. Even more difficult is the challenge of identifying what the future holds. As Professor Sir Michael Howard warns: 'No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.'[1] Maintaining balance against the unpredictable is the most obvious measure to avoid being more surprised than one's adversary. However, it is also the most expensive and a truly balanced capability is a luxury few can afford, so hard choices need to be made. This places a premium on analysing what is faced on the battlefield today in order to identify enduring

trends. All conflict is unique, yet the indications are that conflict of the future is likely to share many of the same characteristics as that of today. The implications are significant and far-reaching, particularly in terms of structure and equipment. However, these are strategic matters for politicians and national Ministries of Defence, so this chapter will focus on the implications for the conduct of joint operations in terms of the mechanics of command, fighting the battle, training and educating the commanders who fight, and the exercise of high command.

What Are We Facing Now?

> The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war. The new one is the paradigm of war amongst the people . . .[2]

In essence, what is seen now on the battlefield is a situation in which the enemy, whether state-sponsored or non-state actors (or both), are using a range of irregular or asymmetric techniques and capabilities to exploit our vulnerabilities, amongst which the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is the most obvious and, for increasingly casualty-averse Western nations, strategically far-reaching example. Rather than a neat linear spectrum of conflict, with state-on-state war-fighting at one end and peacekeeping at the other, what is seen today, and is likely to be seen in future, is a kaleidoscope in which conventional and irregular war-fighting, together with terrorism, insurgency, and criminal activity, is all part of a dynamic and hybrid combination, hence the shorthand term 'hybrid conflict'. This amounts to a combination of 'high-tech' combat operations, and more protracted stabilization operations, in some cases involving fighting of an intensity not seen for over sixty years. It is enduring, physically and psychologically relentless, and fought under intense scrutiny—from the media and from information-hungry and well-connected local populations. And there are common themes: operations are multinational; political support from domestic populations has been in short supply; national policies and understanding of operations undertaken have diverged, so diluting international effort; operations have been undertaken on another sovereign nation's territory so that that nation's political agendas or whims have been the driver; there has not been a clear or consistent view of the agreed end state and how to get there either internationally or regionally; there has not been the essential and necessarily sophisticated understanding of local dynamics and culture; unrealistic assumptions have been made about the ease with which adequate security could be achieved and security has been as dependent on reconstruction, development, and governance as on the application of purely military force; precision and proportionality have been key and legally essential; and the development of competent indigenous local army and police has quickly become axiomatic to success.

What Does the Future Hold?

> Simply put, much of what we see in the cities of Iraq, the mountains of Afghanistan, and the foothills of southern Lebanon, I believe we will see again in the future.[3]

While there can be no certainty about what the future will hold, it is a fair assumption to make that the fundamental nature of war will not change, nor will the reasons for going to war. As Colin Gray highlights, this is a history-based assertion, rather than a matter of prediction.[4] Similarly, there is timelessness in the assertion by Thucydides' Athenian delegates in 432 BC, quoted in his history of the Peloponnesian war, that future war, as with past war, will be about fear, honour, and interest.[5] Add the words of the master, Clausewitz, describing the climate of war as unchanging and remaining the province of danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance,[6] and this all reinforces the enduring nature of war, a fundamental part of the human condition, which once embarked on all too often demonstrates a relentless logic of its own.

But as for the character of war, the complex hybrid kaleidoscope seen today in Afghanistan, and previously in Iraq, is likely to remain a defining characteristic of warfare, even in state-on-state conflict. So Iraq and Afghanistan are not aberrations but represent the future and the present, as did Lebanon 2006 and Georgia 2008. And because such operations take place amid the clutter of the land environment, in areas and amongst populations of great developmental need, the minds of the people become the vital ground. So all operations should be subjected to one overriding criterion: what impact is this operation likely to have on the minds of the people? Securing the minds and support of the people among whom operations take place is therefore the key activity. If, by the way operations are conducted, the people are alienated, the advantage is gifted to the enemy. As Mao made clear: 'the deepest source of the immense power of war lies in the masses of the people'.[7] Protection of the people means people-centric campaign design.

Command

> What we can do alone is not as important as what we can do together.[8]

So if future conflict is, as is present conflict, hybrid and among the people, what are the implications for the conduct of operations? First is the imperative of getting command right, without which failure is guaranteed. Thus putting in place the right command becomes a strategic imperative, if not the centre of gravity. On the face of it, the essence of command and control is timeless: command requires leadership and the ability to make and implement the right decision, while control is the management required in order to support that decision. This means getting the right capability to the right place

at the right time to deliver the right effect; understanding the problem, mission, and constraints; planning, prioritizing, resourcing, directing, and executing—and aiming off for the unexpected. It also means having the endurance, the will, and the resources to last the course, whatever siren voices urge otherwise. So not only does this require clarity of strategic direction, but at the theatre and tactical level it means getting the operational design right and executing that design.

What has changed is that this is now a joint civil/military venture, top to bottom. The character of contemporary conflict demands a different approach to command at all levels of war. Hybrid conflict means hybrid solutions, hence the importance of putting influence at the heart of the design of operations: who must be influenced and how is that influence communicated? What is the relative effect in terms of influence of kinetic operations or non-kinetic operations, coercion and/or persuasion, and how should they be synchronized and sequenced? Command requires a culture and philosophy underpinned by a fundamental principle at every level: there can be no separate planning and execution of kinetic or combat operations without simultaneous and concurrent planning and execution of supporting stabilization operations, and vice versa. This in turn places a premium on the ability to conduct integrated planning with those civilian agencies on which much of the stabilization capability depends. It also means, rather more prosaically, money—a weapon system in its own right, and spending it wisely depends on true integration of military and civil planning. Additionally, fundamental to influence is the relationship between mass, presence, and precision: mass to provide the necessary force ratios on the ground; presence to protect the people and to secure the necessary reconstruction and development; and precision because any strike must avoid the collateral damage which alienates the people.

There can be no purely military solutions in this complex hybrid world; security cannot be achieved solely through the application of military force. Military force may be a key part of building security physically but security must be perceived by the people among whom operations are conducted, so there is a moral aspect too. Thus security is just as dependent on good governance, adequately trained and relatively incorrupt indigenous security forces, both army and police, and reconstruction and economic development. So success depends on the closest possible integration between the military and the non-military actors on the stage if unity of purpose is to be achieved. And unity of purpose depends on the right command and control. To adapt General of the Army Omar Bradley's aphorism, 'amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics', and to quote General Sir David Richards, British Chief of the Defence Staff: 'amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics and command and control'.

It starts at the strategic level, with international and regional agreement, however limited, on the political end state, and pivotal to this is political legitimacy. From this can be derived strong leadership from a big-beast international coordinator with the political authority to pull things together in-country between key players: indigenous government (on whom certain conditions must be laid and to whom no blank cheque given), civilian agencies, and the military. Strategic design must take account of hybridity and uncertainty.

At the operational or theatre level, as Svechin the Soviet thinker and strategist highlighted in the 1930s, it is for the theatre commander to determine the operational leaps along the path set by strategy and for subordinate tactical commanders to execute the tactical steps required. This means a nested hierarchy of headquarters with clear and separate functions. The theatre headquarters must be joint and capable of designing, resourcing, and executing the campaign. However, it cannot do this alone and must reach outwards regionally and internally to the indigenous government and integrate efforts with civilian agencies. Hybrid conflict needs hybrid partnerships.

Joint and Multinational

> There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them![9]

At the tactical level, it is the task of a land component headquarters well versed in the art and science of designing those tactical steps to provide the support, leadership, and clarity of intent to subordinate formations in order to tee them up to achieve success. Minimizing national caveats requires a headquarters with multinationality deep in its DNA, ethos and training capable of achieving genuine buy-in from all contributing nations.

Axiomatic at every level is the requirement for joint effort between land, sea, and air because the application of military force, particularly in the land environment, requires support from air and often maritime forces. This means the closest integration of maritime and air planning into land operations. It is not good enough for land planners to produce a plan in isolation and expect it to be blessed and initiated by air or maritime forces, so to avoid this air and maritime planners must be integrated within a land component headquarters from the initial conception of a plan, through its refinement and synchronization to ultimate execution. In the twenty-first century, just as during Operation OVERLORD in the last, a good plan is a joint plan.[10] There will still be a requirement for single-service components for specific operations, for example a maritime component in an anti-piracy or embargo operation or the air component policing a no-fly zone. However, where decisive effect is required, almost invariably in the land environment, the land component commander owns the consequences of operations because of their impact on the minds of the people. He must therefore be the supported commander.

Equally axiomatic is multinationality because even the most powerful nation requires the political authority conferred by international support for an operation. And effective multinational command and control needs to be worked for. It requires the right people, ethos, and training; above all, it depends on mutual trust. The commander on the ground has to balance national, multinational, and coalition intent and appreciate that different nations think differently. In particular, he cannot allow any member of a coalition to be unsuccessful if the strategic purpose of a coalition is not to be lost. This means careful tasking, taking good account of individual national contingent strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, goodwill, mutual understanding, patience, rapport,

sensitivity, and above all trust are essential and can generate the freedom to overcome national constraints and cement relationships. Clearly there remain challenges in terms of language, national caveats, and limitations on capabilities. However, the advantages of a coalition outweigh the disadvantages in terms of campaign authority and international buy-in to the operational design.

A well-established, credible land component headquarters built on strong foundations of multinationality, operational experience, and rigorous training, led by a framework nation with strong and capable contributions from as many other partner nations from within the NATO alliance as possible, offers a usable and relevant command and control capability. Certainly it is preferable to an ad hoc creation based on individual augmentees from across a coalition with no strong spine of collective ethos, training, or experience; preferable also to one based largely on one dominant nation with little feel for multinationality. The ideal is a headquarters (exemplified by certain NATO High Readiness Force land headquarters) that has adapted conceptually, culturally, and structurally to the demands of hybrid conflict, but which also offers the opportunity to bind allies in to mutually agreed and supported operational design, so potentially watering down the impact of national caveats and red cards and implementing the theatre commander's intent and scheme of manoeuvre with the vigour required. Quite simply, without strong, operationally proven, and capable multinational command and control it is difficult to see how the national fiefdoms and cantonments fighting a largely tactical battle so prevalent in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan (certainly in the initial stages of the campaign) can be welded together into a coherent theatre-level operational design to achieve success. The key is to build on well-proven and capable multinational capabilities.

In addition to multinationality and integration of joint actions, there are four other things it must get right if a headquarters is to be optimized for hybrid conflict. First, it must understand the problem culturally, historically, and politically—perhaps through the establishment of a commander's initiative group to think laterally, challenge, advise, and influence. Without this understanding it is impossible to derive the right tools, structures, and proficiencies required to succeed. Next, it must put influence at the heart of its design and execution of operations. Third, it must have the philosophy and structures to be able to conduct integrated planning and execution with both joint and nonmilitary partners. Last, assistance to indigenous security forces must be fundamental to its operational design and execution.

But There Will Always be a Need to Fight

> It's nice, you can pretend that you fight the war and yet it's not really a dangerous war . . . I remember talking to five brigade commanders . . . I asked them if they had an idea . . . what it meant to go into battle against a Syrian division? Did they have in mind what a barrage of 10 Syrian artillery battalions looked like?[11]

But none of this means that there is not still a need to fight and it is worth reflecting on a couple of gypsy's warnings. The first is the Hezbollah-Israeli War of 2006, in which the Israelis sought to achieve their military objectives by the silver bullet of air power without ground manoeuvre in the belief that a combination of precision and proportionality would yield operational objectives without the risk of both casualties and collateral damage. They rapidly found themselves proved wrong, and the initiative was lost.

Hezbollah proved to be highly dedicated and professional, armed with some of the most advanced weapon systems in the world, and there can be no doubt that the IDF greatly underestimated its opponent. From 2000 to 2006, it successfully embraced a new doctrine, transforming itself from a predominantly guerrilla force into a formidable quasi-conventional force. (The same may be said for the Taliban fighting in Waziristan in early 2010. The Pakistani Army found itself engaged in ground manoeuvre against a quasi-conventional fighting force that took and held ground and that had the both the will and capability to counterattack conventional force when terrain was lost.)

Tactically, Hezbollah proved a worthy adversary for IDF ground forces. Its use of carefully planned, innovative combined arms ambushes, clever use of both direct and indirect fire, together with the application of other sophisticated state of the art technology, was both shrewd and inventive. Meanwhile, the Israelis failed to grasp the opportunity to employ manoeuvre to isolate and destroy Hezbollah and, as a result, ran into serious problems against a highly capable and well-organized non-state military force. An army which was once seen as the exemplar of bold manoeuvre but which had adapted for enduring counterinsurgency operations in the occupied territories had lost its collective understanding of the art of manoeuvre, particularly armoured manoeuvre, at formation level.[12]

The second warning is the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Whatever the misjudgements of the Georgians or the tactical weaknesses the Russians demonstrated in execution, the latter have not lost their long-held talent for ruthless decision-making, deception, and rapid manoeuvre of conventional forces. Clausewitz would have recognized this as a classic example of the extension of politics by other means, which poses far-reaching questions for NATO and the credibility of its Article 5 capability. Whether Russia poses a conventional threat to NATO is not the point. What is important is that, in purely professional military terms, the Russians have held up a mirror and highlighted the extent to which almost every NATO army has lost the capability for formation manoeuvre at divisional level.

The British Army illustrates the paradox well. On the one hand, the demands of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced it to adapt its training to reflect theatre realities—hybrid conflict. On top of this, it is an army with levels of combat experience unrivalled since the Second World War. Despite this, with the exception of HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, guardian of the higher command capability, the British Army has effectively lost its capability at divisional level because it has given up the structures, training, logistic support, and sustainability required to manoeuvre in the way the Russians did during their invasion of Georgia—and continue to practise. Fundamental tactics, techniques, and procedures, just as relevant in hybrid conflict, together with

the operational art to give them purpose, have been lost; for example, at brigade and divisional level, march drills, movement, and deliberate obstacle crossing, once core business and second nature to the 1st British Armoured Division in the First Gulf War, are lost techniques because they remain unpractised. A combination of the post-Cold War peace dividend, long years of peace support operations in the Balkans, and the recent focus on stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in the loss of a capability for major combat operations at divisional level. While this is, most emphatically, not a call for a return to Cold War-style mass manoeuvre, whose apogee was seen in the First Gulf War of 1991, the fact remains that certain tactical techniques in major combat operations will remain relevant in twenty-first-century warfare. Thus, 'whether one is fighting non-state actors in Afghanistan or proxies sponsored by a disgruntled major power there or somewhere else, the skill sets and weapon systems required will look usefully similar … a virtuous congruence between non-state and inter-state war'.[13]

And a divisional-level capability (whether nationally led or as a contribution to a multinational force) is fundamental. Indeed, going back to command, the additional demands of hybrid conflict mean the division is the lowest level of command which can cope effectively with the complexity of conducting integrated planning for both major combat operations and stabilization operations simultaneously. If a brigade is to be committed to battle properly, it will depend on the assets, support, and planning muscle provided by a divisional headquarters to tee up the assets, both military and non-military, in order to allow the brigade commander to concentrate on winning the tactical battle; and the same principle applies between the corps and divisional level. On top of this, future conflict will continue to demand the techniques required for major combat operations.[14] 'While hybrid warfare may not take a traditional, easily recognizable form, future security requirements may still require the preparation, assembly, movement and employment of significant ground manoeuvre forces—supported by air and maritime power—in a manner we no longer typically consider, let alone practise regularly.'[15]

There are other enduring requirements and capabilities. While society may change, the human dimension remains the same and there remains a need for tough, well-trained, highly motivated soldiers prepared to close with, and defeat or destroy, the enemy. Traditional combined arms skills at battlegroup, brigade, and divisional level and much of the equipment procured against a Cold War imperative, such as tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery, remain fundamental because of their capability for firepower and protected mobility—as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But hybrid conflict and the imperative for precision require more than this and those engaged in the conduct of operations have learned and come to take for granted new capabilities. Indeed tactical commanders from brigade commander down to company level are now routinely integrating assets hitherto held at the strategic level in their tactical battles. This is the new combined arms warfare and includes national strategic intelligence assets, air, aviation, Special Forces, ISTAR, EW, and cyber capabilities to achieve the sort of precision find, track, strike, exploit sequence that is increasingly our modus operandi. Furthermore, the absolute imperative of precision in war among the people places a premium on acquiring those state of the art technologies most suited

to accurate targeting with minimal collateral damage. Additionally, the strategic impact of casualties on domestic public opinion highlights the critical importance of protection in the land environment, particularly against the ubiquitous IED. In this respect there is much to learn from the Israeli experience and their development of groundbreaking technologies.

Training and Educating for Complexity

> Train. 1. v.t. & i. Bring (person, animal, etc) to desired state or standard by instruction and practice. . . . Educate v.t. (-able): Bring up (child) so as to form habits, manners etc.; train intellectually and morally.[16]

The complexity of hybrid conflict will continue to demand more of those who fight, for the realities faced are contradictory narratives, blurred end states, uncertainty, and lack of clarity. This means commanders must be equipped intellectually and conceptually for operations in the complex kaleidoscope of hybrid conflict. As fighters they must be just as capable of synchronizing traditional combined arms capabilities at divisional, brigade, and battlegroup level and applying force with a precision previously the preserve of Special Forces. In addition, they need to be capable of orchestrating capabilities hitherto held at strategic or theatre level, the new combined arms warfare, now routinely done by battlegroups and brigades in a way in which very recently would not have been done below division or possibly corps level. Furthermore, on this battleground for the minds of the people, they must also be able to interact with the indigenous population and understand local dynamics and culture in a manner unseen since colonial days, achieved then with men and women who spent their lives among the people and societies amongst whom they operated. Commanders must be trained to navigate through chaos and have the agility to operate alongside civilian agencies of all types, coalition partners, and a host nation with sovereign authority, all of whom will be running different agendas. The ethos must be to expect chaos and be unfazed by it, which means training for certainty and equipping commanders with the understanding of techniques necessary for the science of war, while also educating them to cope with the uncertainty implicit in the art of war. This relationship is perhaps best summarized by T. E. Lawrence, Oxford historian and archaeologist, who, despite (or perhaps because of) his lack of any formal military training demonstrated a masterly insight into the complexity of hybrid conflict:

> The greatest commander of men was he whose intuitions most nearly happened. Nine tenths of tactics was certain enough to be teachable in schools, but the irrational tenth was like a kingfisher flashing across the pool, and in it lay the test of generals. It could be ensured only by instinct (sharpened by thought practising the stroke) until at the crisis it came naturally, a reflex.[17]

The quality of an army is the product of the education of its officer corps, so it is imperative that the very best are selected and educated, the few who need to make the really

key decisions. The best of these should be stretched intellectually as far as possible with higher-level academic degrees in order to develop the degree of innovative and lateral thought required to cope with the complexity of conflict. For example, the British Army should relearn the lesson demonstrated by previous generations of soldier scholars, which included officers like General Sir Frank Kitson and Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall, both of whom spent formative years as Oxford Defence Fellows during which they were able to develop their thinking on counterinsurgency doctrine and the operational level of war respectively. Officers need time and space to think, particularly at the postgraduate level of study. It would also do well to reconstitute an Army capability for the study of history, for the institution which forgets its history loses its soul. The American army is particularly impressive in this and in the way it has embraced the need for continuous career education; increasingly rare is the US general without a number of master's or postgraduate degrees to his or her name.

As for specific training, influence cannot be achieved without understanding the political and cultural context within which influence is sought. It therefore follows that not only should commanders be educated about the politics and culture within which they will operate but that they must be capable of speaking to key leaders in their own tongue. Thus, young officers should be required to pass a colloquial test in a relevant language in order to qualify for promotion and extra pay (as in the days of the British-led Imperial Indian Army)—and maintain it thereafter. Next, success in hybrid conflict requires the necessary culture, understanding, language, and doctrine needed to establish unity of effort with the civil agencies and other key players, which again requires appropriate training and education. Finally, the techniques of higher-level formation manoeuvre must be relearned and practised to avoid falling into the trap the Israelis fell into in Lebanon 2006. This means not only re-energizing training at divisional level and above, but also staff rides and battlefield studies to get people to think big and think theatre rather than low-level and tactical. Here much can be learned from the principles applied by von Seekt in the Reichswehr in the 1920s.

And Generalship Matters

> In the profoundest sense, battles are lost and won in the mind of the commander, and the results are merely registered in his men.[18]

So much for the implications for the mechanics of command and control, fighting the battle, and training and educating the commanders who will conduct operations, but what of the exercise of high command, in other words, generalship? Here there is a simple truth: there can be no high command without leadership. In essence leadership boils down to getting people to do willingly what they would otherwise not necessarily want to do through a combination of personality, competence, and being able to connect psychologically with them. So high command requires much the same sort of leadership required in a regiment, battalion, ship, or squadron. It is

about personal example, being seen at the sharp end, and acceptance of danger and discomfort. But where it differs is that it is also about thinking at the right level and providing direct and focused energy through the staff, a clear overview of the immediate battle, and direction about what is likely to follow. And as in any command, it is about trust: between commander and subordinates, between commander and staff, as well as upwards and outwards. And trust takes time to build. It comes partly from living, working, thinking, training, and conducting operations together. But it also comes from competence and the confidence that people have in a commander's ability, and this is based on experience, training, education, and thinking, always underpinned by character and flair.

Hence the importance of command-led operations. Montgomery, who personally rejected the original, staff-driven, plan for Operation OVERLORD when he was appointed to command for D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, was quite clear on the subject: 'The plan for all battle ventures or operations of war must be made by the commander who is to carry it out. He must make the original outline plan on which detailed planning will begin. Nothing else is any good.'[19] Field Marshal Viscount Slim was very much of the same mind too when he said that the one part of the operation order he wrote was the intent paragraph. So it is up to the commander to decide how he wants to do things, not the staff. It is for the commander to think and to do the mission analysis, albeit assisted by his command team, and to give direction to the staff before deciding on a course of action. Certainly, a free interplay of ideas is the best way to ensure that the brain power of the staff is harnessed. But, at the end of the day, it is dependent on the commander to design his operation and for the staff to make it happen. Rank has no privilege in discussion—until the end when a decision has to be made. Thus decision-making is the essence of high command and depends on judgement and the balance between risk mitigation and being bold. Certainly, it is for the staff to provide much of the information on which the decision is based and the staff is fundamental in identifying when a decision has to be made. But it is up to the commander to make the decision and this is a product of training, knowledge, experience, and observation, all amounting to intuition and feel.

Fundamental to formation command is therefore the right relationship between the commander and his staff, and in particular, his principal staff officers. Just as it is up to the commander to make the key decisions, so the staff must sort out the detail and make things happen. It is the commander's responsibility to write his intent and it is up to the chief of staff and his staff to really think through the scheme of manoeuvre and coordinating instructions and get them right. Commanders cannot afford to get bogged down in detail and should avoid the long screwdriver at all costs. A commander is much better out on the ground, visiting units and subordinate formations, being seen, listening, communicating, thinking about what he observes outwith his own HQ, forming his own judgement about the situation—and commanding.

So it all comes down to judgement, but if this sounds as if formation commanders must be, like the Pope, infallible, then some comfort can be taken from Frederick the Great's comment that: 'a perfect general, like Plato's republic, is a figment of the

imagination'.[20] Some do it better than others. Wellington, a man of 'transcendent common sense and the rare power of seeing things as they are',[21] as Sir John Fortescue described him, was such an individual. Napoleon just asked for 'lucky' generals, that is generals capable of making their own luck. Professor Richard Holmes puts his finger on it when he said: 'Save in a few brilliant exceptions, generalship is not acquired by osmosis, but by a mixture of formal training and the practical exercise of command.'[22] Generals need training just as much as platoon commanders if they are to get it right on the day. High command entails the willingness to educate and train oneself before one can presume to make decisions which may have a profound impact on the lives of others.

Conclusion

La guerre! C'est une chose trop importante la confier á des militaires.[23]

Throughout history, success in battle has gone to the general who can best adapt to the circumstances and fog of war, is quickest to out-think his enemy, capable of the inspirational leadership which the demands of war require if men are to overcome their natural fears, and who can best manage scarce assets when 'even the simplest things are very difficult'.[24] The conduct of operations today and in the future requires no less. What has changed is that generalship now requires more than the ability to command and control purely military capabilities in a straightforward military context. Success in war, today and in the future, depends on the achievement of unity of purpose and effort with other non-military players in the theatre of conflict, for there can be no purely military solutions. Hybrid conflict needs hybrid solutions. Command and campaign design must be adapted if the challenge of achieving truly integrated planning and execution with other government departments, NGOs, and international organizations is to be achieved. Joint and multinational operations underpinned by trust, training, and appropriate doctrine are axiomatic. The division is the lowest level at which manoeuvre and stabilization operations in hybrid conflict can effectively be planned and executed and any army loses that capability at its peril. At brigade level, combined arms manoeuvre remains fundamental, as does the ability to integrate assets hitherto held at the strategic level, the new combined arms warfare, in the tactical battle. But the command of joint operations, now and in the future, will depend as much on the attributes of the great generals of history as on an understanding of and a willingness to work alongside the critical non-military actors on the stage. Nevertheless, when it comes to fighting, as it surely will, only through 'thought practising the stroke', as T. E. Lawrence put it, through training in those techniques which will certainly be required and educating for the inevitable uncertainty, will Lawrence's 'irrational tenth, the test of generals' flash across the pool like a kingfisher. War may be too important to be left to generals, but only with the right generalship can wars be won.

Notes

1. Howard, 1983: 194–5.
2. Smith, 2005: 3.
3. Mattis, 2009.
4. Gray, 2005: 185.
5. Ibid. 178.
6. Clausewitz, 2007.
7. McCuen, 1969: 19.
8. Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hampden GCMG KBE PC Ex ARRCADE FUSION, 2008.
9. Roberts, 2008: 573.
10. Operation OVERLORD was the operational name given to the Allied invasion of France on 6 June 1944.
11. Matthews, 2007: 63.
12. Kober, 2008: 16.
13. Richards, 2009.
14. Enabling activities such as forward and rearward passage of lines, movement, and obstacle crossing.
15. Melvin, 2009.
16. *The Popular Oxford Dictionary*, 1978.
17. Lawrence, 1973: 199.
18. Liddell Hart, 1934.
19. Hamilton, 1983: 267.
20. Phillips, 1940.
21. Fortescue, 2004.
22. Holmes, Professor Richard (1999), Address to HCSC.
23. Clemenceau, 1909, quoted by Suarez, 1932: 119.
24. Clausewitz, 2007.

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CHAPTER 26

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND WAR

COLONEL GIAN P. GENTILE

It is more important today, with recent experience in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to know how to think about counterinsurgency, how to understand what it means in its popular connotation, where it came from in history, and where it points for the future than simply to describe its activities.

To be sure, the countering of insurgencies is not exclusive to the United States and western European powers. The Russian government, for example, has been battling an insurgency in Chechnya off and on for the last twenty years. The Sri Lankan government recently defeated a separatist Tamil insurgency within its borders and Pakistan continues to deal with a Pashtun insurgency. Moreover, this chapter will show that insurgency and the countering of it as forms of warfare spans the ages of history. But the global jihadist insurgency that hit the world stage in full force on 9/11 and the response to it by Western powers has since dominated war and conflict and promises to continue into the future and thus warrants a focus on the Western approach to counterinsurgency.[1]

The term counterinsurgency (COIN) today means many things to many people: soldiers and civilians alike. In its most simple definition counterinsurgency refers to a government that is attempting to use its powers and resources to counter an insurgent force bent on its overthrow. But the term implies much more. Counterinsurgency also has come to mean a foreign government's occupation of another land and its attempt to rebuild or build from scratch that land into a nation. Modern counterinsurgency at its heart is nation-building. This has especially become the case with current American and British operations in Iraq starting in 2003 and Afghanistan starting in 2002. As counterinsurgency has evolved over the years, the current thinking is that in order to counter an insurgency or rebellion against a government that very government oftentimes is in need of institutional and societal reform, hence the notion of building a new nation. Leading American counterinsurgency expert John Nagl said in 2008 that in the future the US Government and its military will be able to conduct nation-building in order to

'change entire societies'.[2] To think of modern counterinsurgency as the major Western powers currently practise it as anything other than nation-building at its core is not to understand its true nature.

Usually the insurgent or rebel attempting to stop this nation building-process and possibly even overthrow the government or foreign occupying power operates from a position of military weakness and uses guerrilla tactics involving hit-and-run attacks, though not always. Because of the general military weakness of the insurgent relative to the more powerful government and its supporting forces, counterinsurgency wars have often been referred to as asymmetrical.

Scholars, analysts, and soldiers writing about insurgencies over the last 150 years have tended—wrongly—to characterize conventional warfare between like armies as symmetrical because both armies were organized and equipped along similar lines. Small wars against insurgencies and rebellions, however, have often been characterized as asymmetrical because the conventional armies of major powers like Britain, France, and the United States fought insurgent and rebel guerrillas that were not organized and equipped like them, hence their asymmetry. But *all* warfare by its nature is asymmetrical. A given side in war is never really just like the other in terms of organization, equipment, intent, tactical disposition, etc.[3]

Linked to this notion of asymmetry in war, an intellectual treatment of war began to emerge in the latter half of the nineteenth century that bifurcated war into two discrete and near-unrelated halves: conventional wars fought on the European continent and wars of empire. This intellectual bifurcation of war continued well into the twentieth century and beyond and has had a pernicious effect on how historians, analysts, and soldiers think about war. A better understanding of the history of the interaction between conventional wars, wars of empire, and counterinsurgency might act, hopefully, as a corrective.

The term counterinsurgency itself was first developed by US Army soldiers in the late 1950s as a formalized term of military operations to counter an insurgency or rebellion. The US Army came up with the term because they were uncomfortable with the term of the day used in French and British Armies: counter-revolutionary warfare. Since American democracy was founded on the American Revolution it became a matter of political and social sensitivity to reframe these kinds of military operations and call them counterinsurgency.[4]

Yet the historical period of the 1950s and 1960s is crucial to understanding what counterinsurgency means contemporarily in today's and tomorrow's world. It was those two decades immediately following the end of the Second World War that witnessed many wars of communist revolution and nationalism against the weakening European imperial powers of France and Britain. The French in Algeria from 1956 to 1962, the French again in Indochina (Vietnam) from 1948 to 1954, the British in Malaya from 1948 to 1962, and the United States in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972 all fought major wars against insurgent forces—inspired by communist revolution and national independence from Western imperial control. The British were successful in Malaya, the United States and France both failed at their attempts in Vietnam, and the French ultimately failed in

Algeria. But it was during these years following the end of the Second World War that the doctrine, methods, and tactics for conducting modern counterinsurgency warfare were shaped. Those methods derived in the 1950s and 1960s still dominate today the doctrine of the armies of France, Britain, Canada, and the United States. The US Army's vaunted counterinsurgency doctrinal manual, Field Manual 3–24 (FM 3–24) is really nothing more than a rehash of the doctrines that the British, Americans, and French created in the 1950s and 1960s to counter Maoist revolutionary movements.[5]

As a result much of the current literature by journalists, experts, and military specialists gives the impression that counterinsurgency as a military form for the most part started in the immediate years following the end of the Second World War. But this is not the right way to understand counterinsurgency. In fact, to understand modern counterinsurgency as it has evolved since the end of the Second World War and especially since the terrorist attack of 9/11 is to understand it in its greater historical context going back to ancient times, through the early modern and modern periods up to today. With this broader historical sweep in mind it will then be clear that there really isn't much new or revolutionary about today's counterinsurgency warfare, even though its aficionados are fond of referring to it in such ways. For instance, the US Army's FM 3–24 pompously asserts that counterinsurgency is the 'graduate level of war', thereby implying that conventional wars fought by large armies on battlefields are the undergraduate level of war.[6]

In many ways, modern counterinsurgency is the same old wine but in different skins. Some historical examples come to mind. Alexander the Great was countering rebellious indigenous peoples as he cut a swath through the Near and Middle East in the third century BC while at the same time fighting opposing armies that were similar to his own. Henry V had to worry about angry French peasants sniping at the trails of his army as he moved around northern France in 1415 prior to and after the battle of Agincourt. Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke faced the prospect of a French people's war against his army as it laid siege to Paris during the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. In short, rebellion, guerrilla attacks, and insurgency, and their interactions with conventional wars, are nothing new in war.

It is also important to point out that counterinsurgency warfare is not a separate and special form of war fundamentally different from conventional warfare between major armies of like kind. The two are not distinct and separate and are in fact inextricably linked. The characteristics of counterinsurgency warfare may be different from conventional war, but the nature of war stays the same: essentially warfare is about fighting, death, and destruction. As the Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, said: if you don't have fighting, you don't have war. Combat or the threat of it is the essential element of war.

Yet the idea of the insurgent, guerrilla, or rebel, who challenges larger conventional forces, has captivated some soldiers and analysts especially in modern times as the true innovators in war. There has come to be seen by some military writers the notion that large military organizations are resistant to change (which is not in history always the case) and therefore the guerrillas and insurgents because they often operate under looser

control and organizations offer up examples of innovation to the larger conventional military forces.[7]

Unfortunately this infatuation with the guerrilla since the end of the Cold War has produced a focus on insurgencies and guerrilla warfare to the point where some policymakers and analysts have convinced themselves that war in the future, as the retired British General Rupert Smith has argued, will be fought primarily if not only 'amongst the people', using military operations such as counterinsurgency. Currently within the defence establishment of the United States the dominant view is that the future holds more wars of the type being currently fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet this is a fundamentally narrow and flawed view of the future of war. The future does hold more wars against insurgencies and instability in the troubled areas of the world, but it also holds the possibility for fighting at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. History allows for an appreciation of the nature of war and to see that guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare have been around for a long time and are both embedded within the broader fabric of war.

For example, as noted above, Alexander the Great confronted armies that resembled his and also insurgent threats as he conquered the Near and Middle East on his way to India between 356 and 323 BC. In fact, guerrilla action proved to be a prickly thorn in Alexander's side in the areas of present-day eastern Afghanistan. Alexander, however, did not split war into guerrilla or conventional, where two armies squared off against each other, but instead saw both types as parts of the whole fabric of war.

So too did the Prussian King Frederick the Great in his first and second wars against Silesia in 1741 and 1744 respectively, during the War of Austrian Succession. In addition to conventional or regular engagements against his Austrian foes at battles such as Molwitz in 1741 Frederick had to contend with bands of Silesian and Hungarian guerrillas that made life difficult for his army as it moved through the Bohemian and Silesian countryside. Frederick was impressed with the guerrillas' ability and tactics and in response organized special light cavalry units of his own to disrupt their activities. In his second Silesia campaign in 1744, while moving through Bohemia the King was struck by the level of resistance by the local people to his army, as they were strongly attached to the House of Austria. The locals refused to offer provisions to the Prussian Army and used guerrilla attacks to prevent scouting parties from obtaining food and other provisions. But Frederick learned from his nasty experience deep inside Bohemia and in 1744, after his decisive victory at the Battle of Hohenfriedberg, decided against pursuing the defeated Austrian Army into Bohemia for fear of irregular action against him.

During the American Revolution American General Nathaniel Greene and his key lieutenant Brigadier General Daniel Morgan were quite effective at combining guerrillas with regular Continental forces against the British Army under General Cornwallis in the Southern Colonies from 1780 to 1781. The American militia, using guerrilla hit-and-run tactics, would wear down the British Army with attacks against supply lines and outposts. The patriot militia were also used to counter British loyalist militia in the southern colonies and helped to gain control over the southern population. The small Continental Army of regulars under Greene would be patient and fight Cornwallis when

the time was right. It was a masterly strategy by Greene. And it was carried through on the battlefield by his able lieutenant Daniel Morgan at the Battle of Cowpens in the southern state of South Carolina in October 1780. There, on that chilly October morning, Morgan combined a small detachment of Continental soldiers with a larger group of patriot militia fighting as regulars in a way that tricked the attacking force of British regulars under Banastre Tarleton into believing that the American line was breaking when in fact it was holding fast. Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens led to a number of other British defeats in the south in 1781, ultimately leading them to Yorktown, Virginia, where the war was eventually lost for them.

Years later another British army under Arthur Wellesley, later to become known as the Duke of Wellington, found itself on the rebel side against Napoleon's army in Spain during the Peninsular War. Wellington, like Nathaniel Greene before him, proved quite adept at combining the activities of his own regular troops with Spanish rebels. Napoleon's army in Spain, on the other hand, could do quite well at crushing in open battle any opposing army that confronted it, but had a much more difficult time pacifying the Spanish population under French rule. It is important to appreciate the critical links between Wellington's use of conventional forces—his own, Spanish, and Portuguese—and of local Spanish guerrilla forces.

One can see, in the strategies of Wellington in Spain, or Greene in the southern states during the American Revolution, or Frederick in Silesia, or even Alexander, a connection between irregular and regular warfare. The two in terms of form and character to be sure had different qualities and had to be treated differently but they were still seen as connected parts in the whole of war.

It was with the writings that started to emerge especially with British and French imperial officers in their wars of empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century that the bifurcation of war into two distinct parts—conventional wars fought between European armies and small wars of empire—began to emerge. Certainly these two forms of war were (and are) quite different in character, or how they are fought, the former requiring generally large and tightly organized and controlled military organizations with sophisticated systems of command, logistics, communications, fire support, etc. that allow them to fight major battles and campaigns. Irregular warfare, or what many Europeans started referring to in the nineteenth century as wars of empire or small wars generally, involves an imperative to move away from the tighter centralization of regular armies. Since in small wars oftentimes the insurgent or rebel fights in small groups using guerrilla tactics of hit and run, it makes sense for the imperial or occupying army confronting it to also loosen its centralized organization and operate more freely in smaller units. Critical to operating in these smaller units is also the commensurate need to allow lesser officers like lieutenants and sergeants to operate independently and with initiative.

A review of the literature written by British and French officers in the latter half of the nineteenth century as they fought their wars of empire in places like Afghanistan, the north-west Indian mountain country, the Sudan, Algeria, etc., shows much intellectual effort devoted to adapting their armies to the challenges of imperial warfare against local elements who generally speaking did not fight them along traditional lines.

Yet in so trying to present the necessity of regular armies adapting and adjusting their organizations, weaponry, doctrine, and methods to small wars these officers created a very damaging and inaccurate caricature of conventional warfare. The caricature that they created of conventional warfare was one of simplicity and relative ease and the notion that armies in conventional wars do not need to learn and adapt. Instead, in modern warfare it was the small wars where innovation and learning were required due to their purported complexities and relative difficulties as compared to conventional war. This intellectual approach to the treatment of small wars by European officers started the ball rolling, so to speak, of the bifurcation of these two forms of war into discrete, different, and separate categories. As will be shown later this bifurcation of war with its roots in the intellectual history of European military officers in the nineteenth century has helped to shape a skewed vision of today's and tomorrow's conflict.

British Army officer and historian C. E. Callwell wrote in 1896 what many scholars consider to be a minor military classic. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* falls into the trap of reducing conventional war to a rather simple, straightforward affair. Callwell notes that fighting conventional wars can be reduced to following a simple set of 'rules' which are 'universally accepted'. Major conventional campaigns by modern armies, argued Callwell, are beholden to a 'code' of 'strategy and tactics' from which one would 'depart' at peril. His implied point was that the rules and codes of regular war made it a rather simple affair with success possible as long as those rules were adhered to.[8]

To be fair to Colonel Callwell he was writing at a time when the British Army had become somewhat ossified in its conception of war and its dismissive attitude among some officers towards small wars and the importance of learning from them. But then, to be fair too to British officers focused on preparing for major wars on the European continent and the requirements for it, there was an understandable suspicion of too much focus on imperial warfare and how such a focus might affect tactics, weaponry, and organization for fighting a major European War. For example, fighting the mountain Pashtun tribes in the North West Frontier in India (present-day Pakistan) in an ideal sense would require a loosening of tactical organizations and placing greater emphasis on small units like squads that operate with relative independence in tracking down tribal warriors in the rough and steep mountains. But those kinds of adjustments might not at all be right for European conflict: hence the conundrum.

In making their case, though, for changes in organizational structure, tactics, and weaponry imperial British officers often characterized conventional warfare as a monolithic block that purportedly adhered to a fixed set of rules and principles, whereas wars against 'savages' out in the empire, as the thinking went among many imperial officers, were where true innovation for the British Army would occur. Dispatches, articles in journals like the *Royal United Services Institution (RUSI)*, reports, etc. generally point to the assumption by imperial army officers that European types of combat between regular armies required less innovation because of their fixed set of rules and principles. One British imperial officer commenting on Indian mountain warfare lamented that 'the lines of our military education has been laid down too much by those whose eyes are dazzled by the great wars of the Continent'.[9] This is a reasonable criticism, to be sure,

since imperial wars were quite different, but it is this attitude of difference that hardened eventually into one of condescension and ridicule of the character of conventional warfare and the European armies that fought them.

In 1904 a British engineer officer named E. D. Swinton wrote an excellent book on tactical innovation at the small-unit level in the Second Boer War. *The Defense of Duffer's Drift*, as Swinton titled it, was a fictional account of how a young infantry lieutenant did away with constraints and restrictions of the principles of conventional war and learned through adaptation how to deal effectively with Boer commando attacks.[10] *Duffer's Drift* had a substantial effect on many British officers who would later fight the Germans on the western front in the trenches of the First World War. Even though the book was about the Second Boer war, in a sense it offered an intellectual solution of tactical flexibility and creativity to the perceived rigidity of conventional thinking about warfare. *Duffer's Drift* carried on the intellectual tradition that viewed conventional armies as rules- and principles-bound, whereas small wars fought out in the empire offered the possibility of innovation to the straitjacketed conventional armies of Europe.

So when Britain, France, the United States, and the other major powers who fought the First World War looked back on the carnage of millions and millions killed in trench warfare, the writings of T. E. Lawrence on insurgency and the Arab revolt offered up a seeming alternative to the slaughter of conventional warfare. This became the genesis of the idea of the 'indirect approach'. Lawrence's written work after the First World War, especially his book *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, elevated the notion that insurgent warfare, and the countering of it, was a higher form of war than conventional warfare fought between like armies. Lawrence arrogantly proclaimed that 'irregular warfare is more intellectual than a bayonet charge'. His aim, of course, was to elevate himself and his actions as part of the Arab revolt to a higher, more enlightened level of warfare than what occurred in the trenches on the western front. Lawrence, along with another British public intellectual named B. H. Liddell Hart, in the years after the First World War went to mighty efforts to portray the British and other Western armies as bunglers, as non-innovators who succumbed to a mindless slaughter of men in the trenches. Hart and Lawrence through their writings offered a better, more indirect way to do warfare in the future. But as British historian Paddy Smith has argued, Liddell Hart did not offer anything new or creative in the years following the war that wasn't already tried by British infantry in the trenches between 1914 and 1918.[11]

Neither did Lawrence. Insurgency and rebellion had been around for a long time, there was nothing essentially new to it. Granted, the rise of Arab nationalism provided a cohesive element that Lawrence tapped into when assisting with the uniting of the disparate tribes in the Hejaz against the Ottoman Turk Army in 1916 and 1917, yet his writings elevated a theory of irregular warfare to an alternative to conventional warfare. Combined with Liddell Hart's writings during the interwar years, the notion of an indirect approach to conventional war became dominant among many soldiers and defence thinkers.[12] Tightly embedded in the notion of the indirect approach was the idea that irregular warfare—be it guerrilla war, small war, or insurgency—was a higher and distinct form of war, which furthered war's overall bifurcation into two separate and distinct halves.

Writing in the years following the end of the Cold War in 2005, British General Rupert Smith in his book *The Utility of Force* would take the bifurcation of war to its logical, but still deeply flawed, conclusion. According to Smith 'war no longer exists'. For Smith, the war that no longer existed was what he characterized as 'industrial war', which ended, as he said, with the two atomic bombings of Japan in 1945. At that point a new kind of war took over, what he called 'wars amongst the people', which he largely put in a direct line with irregular, small wars, and counterinsurgency warfare in the past. Smith argues that no longer will it be possible for industrial wars to be fought in the way that they had been in history: essentially devoid of people and isolated, with only the armies in battle fighting them. Here is war's bifurcation in Smith's telling: conventional war ends in 1945 but irregular war or war amongst the people continues past 1945 and defines conflict in the Cold War, and more importantly defines the nature of conflict in the present and future.[13]

For the US Army and many parts of the US defense establishment this acceptance of irregular and counterinsurgency warfare have become its New Way of War. Counterinsurgency since the publication of FM 3–24 has moved beyond simple doctrine and has become transcendent in the US Army; it defines and directs how the US Army thinks about war and conflict in the future. And it has also created a distorted historical sensibility about past counterinsurgencies and rebellions.[14]

Within the new counterinsurgency framework of today, the history of counterinsurgency starts essentially at the end of the Second World War with the rise of communist and national wars of liberation coming with the breakup of Western European empires. It bypasses, unfortunately, a critical period of imperial policing by the British, French, and other European armies, when they sought to establish a system of control over colonial possessions that they had conquered with brute military force in the nineteenth century. A collection of post-Second World War counterinsurgency historical case studies has turned into a unified block, an overall history of counterinsurgency that unfortunately omits previous histories of other forms of countering insurgencies.

In fact, a narrative of sorts using these historical cases determines how many contemporary analysts, soldiers, and others define and explain the history of counterinsurgency. The case studies that help form the narrative of counterinsurgency generally start with the French in Indochina, the British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the United States in El Salvador in the 1980s.

What has emerged from these cases and certain associated texts written by practitioners is a theory referred to as population-centric counterinsurgency or 'hearts and minds'. The theory posits that the counterinsurgent force can inject energy and resources into a local population by building schools and roads, establishing local governments and security forces, and improving the economies, and thus can win the hearts and minds of the people, thereby making it a fairly easy process to then separate the insurgents from the people because they no longer have their support.[15]

The case that stands out as the exemplar of how to correctly perform in practice this theory of population-centric counterinsurgency is the British in Malaya after the Second World War.[16] The truth, however, as has been shown by contemporary historical

scholarship, suggests a very different interpretation. It was not a better hearts-and-minds campaign that defeated the Malayan insurgency but brute military force combined with resettlement of millions of Malayans. The back of the Malayan insurgency was broken not in 1952 when General Sir Gerald Templer was putting into place his hearts-and-minds campaign, as the stock historical interpretation explains it. Instead the insurgency was broken during the years from 1950 to 1952 under Templer's predecessor, General Briggs, primarily through forced resettlement of millions of Malayans and the hard use of military force to kill insurgents. In short, it was force combined with resettlement that broke the back of the insurgency and not a happier and seemingly more pleasant hearts-and-minds campaign.[17]

With the US Army in Vietnam the truth is that the army did not lose the war due to its inability to adjust its tactics and operations toward better hearts-and-minds methods as a number of analysts over the years have argued. Instead the United States and its Army lost the war because of failed strategy, and more importantly because the other side wanted victory more and were willing to commit unlimited resources to achieve it. Nor is it correct to argue that the US Army turned around on a dime and had started to finally carry out correct counterinsurgency tactics once a new general, Creighton Abrams, had replaced the failing Westmoreland. Instead there was much more continuity than discontinuity between Westmoreland and Abrams. In short, there was not a 'better war', as some writers have argued, to be found in Vietnam through the practice of hearts-and-minds methods.[18]

Yet this flawed historical understanding of the history of modern counterinsurgency persists and it can be seen in the explanations emerging from the pens of American journalists and pundits over the Iraq War and recommendations for the way ahead for the United States in Afghanistan.

The two cases of Malaya and Vietnam have become tropes for explaining a perceived triumph of arms under General Petraeus and 'the surge' in Iraq in 2007. The notion that there was a radical shift between Petraeus' predecessor General George Casey and him, along with substantial differences in tactics and operational methods between surge forces and what came before, fits the Vietnam and Malaya models. In fact this notion of difference is central to the surge triumph narrative. The idea that because the US Army prior to 2003 did not train on counterinsurgency and because of that it did not learn and adapt and was thus the cause of the way things turned out in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 is a central pillar to the narrative. With the surge of five additional combat brigades armed with new counterinsurgency doctrine and with inspired leadership Iraq turned around on a dime, just like Vietnam did when Abrams took over, or so the story goes.

The surge as primary causative factor for the reduction in violence in Iraq that began in summer 2007 is central to the Iraq War narrative. But at its core it is nothing more than a simplistic scheme of cause and effect that has American military power as the primary cause that produces the effect of reduced violence. In many Iraq War memoirs and accounts it is described as a simple process of American forces moving off their large bases, where they were purportedly hunkered down and comfortable, and into Iraqi neighbourhoods. Once in the neighbourhoods and armed with the new

counterinsurgency principle of 'protecting the people' things began to change for the better and new allies like the Sons of Iraq were brought over to the American cause.

This simplistic cause-and-effect scheme which so dominates Iraq War memoirs and accounts is fanciful and does not consider other conditions on the ground that wrapped around the surge and were the decisive reasons for the reduction in violence. Conditions such as US forces paying large sums of money to former insurgents to stop attacking US forces and to become allies against al Qaeda; Shia leader Moqtada al Sadr's related decision to stand down attacks by Shia militia; and the fact that in Baghdad the civil war in 2006 and the first half of 2007 had separated the city into sectarian districts.[19]

Still, the COIN narrative persists in the face of the actual facts and it has carried over to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. In his initial assessment of the situation in Afghanistan shortly after taking command, General Stanley McChrystal produced an assessment of the situation in Afghanistan that argued that the American military in Afghanistan, including its NATO allies, for the preceding seven years had pretty much failed at doing population-centric counterinsurgency correctly. According to the general in the assessment, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had failed to apply the proper techniques, tactics, and methods of classic counterinsurgency. ISAF forces had failed to secure the population in order to separate the insurgents from them and had instead focused wrongly on killing the Taliban enemy instead of winning the hearts and minds of local Afghanis. In short, his assessment was a stinging rebuke of the conduct of COIN operations of ISAF combat outfits prior to his taking command.[20]

McChrystal's assessment fits perfectly into the COIN narrative structure and it easily projects a conception of warfare into the future. McChrystal and many other American and British military officers have convinced themselves that in present and future wars the focus, or centre of gravity, will always be the people. General McChrystal was often quoted as saying that success in Afghanistan was not counted by the number of enemy killed but by how many people have been 'shielded'. It is Rupert Smith's notion of 'wars amongst the people' run amok. And it has its roots in the intellectual bifurcation of war into irregular and conventional that began in the mid-nineteenth century.

One of the immediate problems of this bifurcation of war is that in so elevating counterinsurgency to a New Way of War it puts other alternatives to countering insurgencies into a lesser category. For instance, one could argue that currently in Afghanistan the United States and its allies do not need to do nation-building there but instead use the method called 'counterterrorism', which prescribes a use of precision military attacks relying on intelligence to strike enemy activity to accomplish President Obama's political objectives. Yet the method of 'counterterror' is not viewed as an operation but instead a set of tactics that supports population-centric counterinsurgency. It can therefore never really be seen as a tool of strategy in the same light as population-centric counterinsurgency because it does not rise to the same operational level.[21]

Other states not trapped in the straitjacket of Western population-centric counterinsurgency have dealt with insurgencies in a flexible manner using various military methods that suited their strategies and national interests. The Israeli Army, for example, countered Palestinian insurgents in the second intifada between 2000 and 2006 with

precise military strikes; they did not apply a hearts-and-minds approach. The Sri Lankan government devised a strategy to counter a Tamil insurgency that had developed conventional capabilities and thus become exposed to Sri Lankan firepower and manoeuvre and through naval action severed the Tamils' base from sea-borne logistical support. And the Columbian government, in its recently revised strategy, has actually applied a hearts-and-minds approach combined with other elements of national power to seriously disrupt to the point of defeat the FARC insurgency. In all of these examples it was a strategy that considered feasible sets of alternatives that produced relatively successful results.

The bigger problem that confronts many western militaries is that the bifurcation of war into two separate and distinct categories with Smith's conception of 'wars amongst the people' is that is has eclipsed strategy. Nowadays seemingly the only possible way of dealing with piracy in Somalia or Al Qaeda activity in Yemen or Nigeria is to send in ground combat brigades to live amongst the people and win their hearts and minds through better counterinsurgency operations. In a sense, strategy is now determined by such counterinsurgency tactics and methods as establishing small outposts in neighbourhoods, clear, hold and build, etc. Put more bluntly, the United States and its Western allies no longer do strategy, only operations and tactics. The European officers of nineteenth-century empire, followed by T. E. Lawrence, then Rupert Smith, and the COIN experts of FM 3–24, have ironically gotten their way. There is no longer the bogey-man of conventional war and its concomitant armies to keep them down and suppress their innovation and adjustment. War nowadays and projected into the future is counterinsurgency or wars amongst the people and other forms of conflict are subsumed within it.

But there are risks involved with counterinsurgency becoming the New Western Way of War. History, including the recent past, shows what happens when armies trained and organized for counterinsurgencies and small wars have to quickly step in a different direction to fight at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. The French Army's failure in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 was partly due to the influence from colonial warfare, as was the British Army's in the Second Boer War. The Israelis' recent experience in Lebanon in 2006 is another good example. There were many reasons for the Israeli Army's failure there, but one which has been shown by scholars and analysts is that it had done almost nothing but counterinsurgency in the Palestinian territories and had lost the ability to fight against an enemy who fought using more sophisticated methods than laying bombs on the roads then scurrying away.[22]

The counterinsurgency zeitgeist has had the further damaging effect of convincing many people that conventionally trained and conventionally minded armies cannot do counterinsurgency warfare. This belief is not supported by history. There are many historical examples of conventional armies making quick transitions to counterinsurgency: the US Army in the Philippines; the British Army in Malaya; the US Army in Vietnam; and the US Army in Iraq, starting in 2003 and not 2007. However, it is dangerous to think that this principle operates in reverse, as the example of the Israelis in Lebanon shows. Or imagine how well the march up to Baghdad would have gone in 2003 if the US Army had spent the majority of its training time in the year prior preparing to talk to sheiks, rebuilding schools, and learning how to conduct negotiations.

The ancient Chinese philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, had this to say about the conduct of war and implicitly about the relationship and relative worth of tactics and strategy:

> Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory… Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat… There is no instance of a nation benefitting from prolonged warfare… Speed is the essence of war.[23]

Sun Tzu's point was simple but profound: in war if a state is going to get anything right, it had better be strategy.

But the new Way of Counterinsurgency Warfare has turned Sun Tzu's maxim on its head. Now for the United States and other Western powers there is only one way of war—tactical counterinsurgency. The perils of this non-strategic thinking, which has its roots in the intellectual history of COIN and the conceptual bifurcation of war, can be seen in the recent book by Bob Woodward, *Obama's War*. In the book President Obama is screaming out for strategic alternatives to long-term nation-building—counterinsurgency—in Afghanistan. Unfortunately he was burdened with an American military establishment that could provide only one course of action in Afghanistan—COIN.[24] Strategy is therefore dead. In its wake comes only the promise of never ending 'long wars' conducted by the tacticians of counterinsurgency. Sun Tzu's 'noise' becomes deafening.

Notes

1. On the global insurgency, see Mackinlay, 2009.
2. Nagl, 2008.
3. Citino, 2005: 52–60.
4. On terms and definitions of counterinsurgency, see Birtle, 2006: 4–6.
5. Kalyvas and Brown, 2008.
6. US Army Field Manual 3–24 'Counterinsurgency', Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army (2006), 1–1.
7. A good example of this is Max Boot's *The Savage Wars of Peace* (2002).
8. Callwell, 1996: 23.
9. Quoted in Moreman, 1998: 48.
10. Swinton, 1986 (originally published in 1904).
11. Griffith, 1994.
12. For a good example of Hart's thinking on irregular war and the indirect approach, see his foreword to Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (Sun Tzu, 1963).
13. Smith, 2005: 3–28.
14. Gentile, 2009: 5–16.
15. For the clearest expression of population-centric COIN by one of its strongest advocates, see Kilcullen, 2010.
16. See Nagl, 2005.
17. Hack, 2009: 383–414.
18. Birtle, 2008: 1213–47.

19. Gentile, 2008: 57–64.
20. COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified), 21 September 2009, *Washington Post*: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html (accessed 7 May 2011).
21. See Long, 2009.
22. For an argument on the effects of nine years of COIN on the US Army, see MacFarland, Shields, and Snow, 2008.
23. Sun Tzu, 1963.
24. Woodward, 2010.

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CHAPTER 27

THE ROLE OF LOGISTICS IN WAR

MATTHEW UTTLEY AND CHRISTOPHER KINSEY

Introduction

In his seminal work, *Supplying War,* Martin van Creveld correctly applies equal importance to logistics and strategy. As Lynn explains, this intellectual *tour de force* 'shifted logistics from a supporting role to centre stage, convincing soldiers and scholars alike that throughout modern history, strategy has rested upon logistics' (Lynn, 1993: 9). The idea that strategy is ultimately shaped by logistics is encapsulated in van Creveld's observation that: 'Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is possible is determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrines, intelligence, arms and tactics, but in the first place, by the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of communication' (van Creveld, 1977: 1).

Defence logistics is 'the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of [air, sea, and land] forces' (NATO, 1997: 1). It entails the conduct of strategic and tactical endeavours, thereby comprising 'the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops' (Jomini, 1996: 69).

None of this is new; indeed, 'the practice of logistics, as understood in its modern form, has been around for as long as there have been organised armed forces' (Moore, Bradford, and Antill, 2000: 1).

Defence logistics is a critical element of fighting power because it determines what military forces can be delivered to an operational theatre, the time it will take to deliver that force, the scale and scope of forces that can be supported once there, and the tempo of operations. Logistic considerations extend beyond the immediate equipping,

deployment, and sustainment of armed forces in wartime to include the ability of the defence industrial infrastructure and civilian supply base to meet potential future requirements as new contingencies emerge. The military logistician's pivotal role in the preparation for and conduct of warfare is reflected in the maxim that 'Amateurs study strategy and tactics. Professionals study logistics' (Dunnigan, 2003: 499).

This chapter surveys the issues and challenges confronting the logistician preparing for and engaging in support of contemporary military operations. The first section outlines the inherent *nature* of defence logistics, or the considerations, choices, trade-offs, and logistics principles that perennially confront and guide military planners. The second section reviews the *character* of contemporary logistics. This refers to those particular issues that have confronted Western militaries in adapting from Cold War defence postures and the modes of transformation they have adopted.[1] The third section evaluates the success and residual challenges for post-Cold War defence planners as they have sought to optimize transformation under the *principles of logistics*, which are (a) foresight; (b) efficiency; (c) cooperation and simplicity; and (d) agility.

The Nature and Scope of Defence Logistics

As Lonsdale points out, 'Despite the seeming novelty of warfare in the modern period, the very essence of war has remained the same. Across time and place, although the character of war has altered, its nature has remained constant' (2008: 16).

This observation applies equally to defence logistics as a key enabler of the execution of campaign plans for military operations. The inherent *nature* of defence logistics—namely the movement of forces (force projection) and the sustainment of personnel, weapons systems, and other support requirements to achieve tactical operational and strategic objectives—has remained constant since the era of ancient warfare (Tuttle, 2005: 1–2).

Defence logistics also has an enduring nature because it reflects the inherent dilemma confronting strategy formulation and execution in microcosm. On the one hand, defence strategy involves 'the art of using military force against an intelligent foe(s) towards the attainment of policy objectives' (Lonsdale, 2008: 23). The application of strategy against an intelligent, reactive, and adaptive adversary means that 'strategy is complex and does not tolerate simple formulas or principles for success' (Lonsdale, 2008: 16). As Michael Handel observes, a fundamental methodological assumption is that 'War is an art, not a science—that each military problem has many potentially correct solutions (not just a single, optimal solution) which are arrived at through the military leader's imagination, creativity and intuition' (Handel, 1995: 24–5).

On the other hand, defence decision-makers have perennially confronted the practical imperative to reduce strategy-making down to norms, rules, and principles of war

and codify them in policies, processes, and doctrine. This is because military organizations require 'routines and standard operating procedures, and depend on stability for functional integrity' (Farrell, 2008: 777).

Another inherent feature of defence logistics is a set of choices that decision-makers are required to resolve in reducing strategy to a practical logistics system that involve inferences about two matters: contingencies where military force might be employed in support of policy goals; and further inferences concerning the logistics capabilities necessary to achieve a requisite tempo and power of operation if such contingencies arise. Defence policy-makers are required to make a cascading set of choices in an environment of incomplete knowledge and uncertainty that convert their assessment of the prevailing strategic milieu into judgement on what is necessary in the pursuit of the national interest. First, they are required to identify and rank national interests and assess actual or potential threats to those national interests. This conceptual stage involves an estimation of the risk (probability and potential impact) if national interests are threatened. Second, decision-makers must assess those potential contingencies that might necessitate a military response if national interests are threatened, and identify the resources required to provide the requisite defence capability. Third, decisions and choices are made that are intended to ensure efficiency in the conversion of defence budget resources into a defence strategy, policy, force posture, and associated military capabilities. These decisions will be influenced, *inter alia*, by policy-makers' perceptions concerning the international system, national strategic and military cultures, agencies involved in the decision-making process, and levels of economic prosperity. However, each conceptual step is an inherent feature of strategy and policy formulation in a context where inferences link national interests, threat perception, and requisite military capabilities.

These choices then inform decisions concerning the logistics system intended to meet the demands of military operations as they are executed (Foster, 1998: 220). At the most general level, policy-makers will seek to achieve the optimal interface between the operational commander and a logistics system that provides force projection and sustainment. The inherent challenge here, as Figure 27.1 shows, is to identify an interface between the logistics system and the operational system that optimizes the exchange of new and exhausted materiel (referred to by logisticians as 'good stuff' and 'broken stuff'), and creates a continuous flow of information and understanding between the two systems on the status and availability of assets for the campaign requirement (Foster, 1998: 223). A critical element of information flow is continuous assessment of the potential vulnerability of the logistics system to enemy interdiction. Similarly, an important variable in the commander's campaign planning will be to identify the adversary's logistics vulnerabilities so that these might be exploited.

Within the logistics system, Figure 27.2 shows that a more specific set of choices will be required (Foster, 1998: 221). First, decisions are necessary about what new capability must be acquired by the logistics system to enable and sustain a campaign plan. Purchase decisions involve two conceptually distinct components: the acquisition of new capabilities to move and sustain forces in connection with whatever mission is to be



Figure 27.1 Logistics/operations interface



Figure 27.2 Logistical planning process

accomplished; and assumptions within the logistics system itself about how to optimize the processes by which materiel is stored, built, and replenished when broken.

Consequently, the nature of defence logistics has remained constant in the sense that decision-makers confront a perennial and cascading set of questions which reduce strategy to a logistics system through a process of induction. The steps required to construct and operate a logistics system have remained conceptually simple and timeless, from the period of ancient warfare to today's complex multinational interventions.

The constant nature of these considerations has led to the emergence of the five principles of logistics, which are considered a subset of the principles of war (JDP 4-00).[2] The first principle is *foresight*, or the ability to predict and manage critical logistics constraints in support of the operational commander's freedom of action. This requires logistics planners at all levels to analyse the probable course of future operations and to forecast likely requirements for personnel, materiel, services, and equipment consistent with the provision and movement of resources into and out of the operational theatre. The second is *efficiency*, or achieving the maximum level of support for the least logistics effort, thereby making best use of finite resources. The third is *cooperation*, or ensuring a coordinated approach between armed services and with coalitions and other parties in logistics planning and execution. The fourth is *simplicity*, or the notion that logistics arrangements should be simple in both concept and execution. Simplicity presupposes the creation of a robust command and control framework and a readily understood logistics plan, doctrine, and organization. The final principle is *agility*, or the ability of the logistics system to provide the commander with the opportunity to respond to unexpected operational developments and adjust rapidly.

The Character of Contemporary Defence Logistics

The nature and principles of logistics remain the same today as they were during the Cold War and warfare during the times of the Assyrians and Romans. However, the contemporary *character* of defence logistics, as evidenced by the post-2001 US-led coalition operations in Iraq and NATO operations in Afghanistan, has significant differences in terms of the political and military milieu in which it is applied. This reflects challenges presented by post-Cold War changes in the operating environment.

A Cold War Legacy

During the Cold War the principal concern for defence planners was the stand-off between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. Defence policy in Western Europe was guided by the intentions of the Soviet Union towards the West and the capability of the

Warsaw Pact to achieve those intentions in terms of its military hardware (Johnson, 1994: 2). Since the threat was identifiable and calculable, so were the means required by NATO to address the threat. Defence logistics supported a policy of *reactive containment* by attempting to guarantee sufficient supplies to NATO forces in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack. In the case of the US Army, for example, equipment was pre-positioned and configured in unit sets. The system was called *Pre-positioning of Material Configured in Unit Sets* (POMCUS). The Cold War became a predictable strategic scenario for operational and logistics planning, reducing logistics to threat-based preparation centred on calculations and technical problem-solving surrounding the large-scale movement of troops and materiel in western Europe.

By the 1980s, the NATO logistics system was based on the concepts of *flexible response* and *forward defence* (Carver, 1998: 786). The aim of the former was to deter war while providing NATO with military capabilities necessary to respond to an act of Warsaw Pact aggression (Pfaltzgraff and Davis, 1990: 155). In the event of a conventional attack the three stages of response were *direct defence* (defeating the enemy attack with available forces); *deliberate escalation* (escalating the fighting to a level at which the enemy would be convinced of NATO's determination and ability to resist and thereby persuading them to withdraw); and finally *strategic nuclear response* (Moore, Bradford, and Antill, 2000: 13). The *forward defence* concept involved seizing the initiative by pushing NATO forces into East Germany to establish its front line on the river Elbe (Pfaltzgraff and Davis, 1990: 155).

The NATO logistical requirement needed to support manoeuvre elements of the *forward defence* strategy would have been considerable had the Cold War turned hot. Replenishing fuel and ammunition between the Channel ports and the Elbe defensive line would have been challenging and it is questionable whether the extended supply lines would have worked. Differing national variants of tank ammunition, artillery pieces, and fuel supply methods further militated against logistics interoperability across the NATO member states. These factors made supplying NATO forces a complicated task, demanding plain hard work and cold calculations (van Creveld, 1986: 1). Nevertheless, the Cold War produced a relatively straightforward logistics picture for Western militaries in terms of the *principles of logistics* as NATO prepared for conventional defence and offensive manoeuvre against a known adversary, employing established alliance structures and drawing on pre-deployed stockpiles of material.

Post-Cold War Logistics Transformation

Since the Cold War, Western states have sought systematically to transform their militaries from Cold War threat-based defensive postures into capability-based expeditionary forces configured for power projection and mission types ranging from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping in Indonesia and Bosnia to stabilization operations and high-intensity conventional war-fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dorman, Smith, and

Uttley, 1998: 3). This defence transformation process has been catalysed by two factors. One was the decline of the existential threat to the West from the Soviet Union, thereby reducing the scale of the perceived requirement for territorial defence to Western Europe. The other factor has been the creation of expeditionary military forces capable of small- or large-scale power projection and intervention against state and non-state adversaries in the so-called *wars of choice* ranging from Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia, to Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The consequence is that the certainty and predictability in defence planning during the Cold War has been replaced by difficult questions for the military logistician concerning the type of capabilities needed to tackle more nebulous state and non-state threats, and how to sustain such capabilities, in the new *wars of choice*.

These developments are reflected in the changed character of post-Cold War defence logistics. As Dandeker (2007) points out, the shift away from territorial defence to multiple simultaneous international deployments across a range of mission types presents a particular set of logistics challenges. Moreover, defence logisticians now operate in complex socio-political environments, like Afghanistan, involving an array of state and non-state actors in a congested battle space. Thus logistics has become an exercise in managing the supply and movement of armed forces in dynamic, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and volatile settings, creating a range of 'what if' scenarios (Williams, 2009: 52). Indeed, for logisticians the main difference between territorial defence associated with the Cold War and post-Cold War intervention is the level of certainty associated with each. Territorial defence usually involved a high level of certainty, while internationalism and intervention involves high levels of uncertainty about where, how, and how long deployed forces might require logistic support.

Since the Cold War, defence logistics has experienced change that has been bound up with political and technological developments. The challenge has been to adapt and respond to the demands of expeditionary warfare and mitigate the possibility of current or future failure in the military supply chain. The remaining sections will examine the principles of logistics in the context of the changing character of conflict characterizing the transition from territorial defence to internationalism and intervention.

Challenges to Logistics Transformation

The 'Foresight' Principle

Post-Cold War transformation has created new challenges for logisticians, the most obvious of which is the vagueness of the threat and the uncertainty that dominates the logistician's environment. Contemporary logistics systems are now required to adapt to a range of mission types made up of differing force composition, duration, and level of host nation support. All of these variables are determined by the type of threat facing

the force. In addition, existing and potential mission types could range from state-on-state confrontation of the sort encountered in the liberation of Kuwait during Operation GRANBY through to stabilization operations and operations that evolve through various phases very quickly, thus imposing overlapping requirements on the military supply chain, such as Krulak's 'Three Block War' (Krulak, 1999). These factors have conspired to make adequate *foresight* even more important in terms of identifying where and how military force might be applied, but at the same time more difficult to achieve.

For defence logistics to be effective logisticians require an intellectual and material capacity to anticipate and respond to logistical constraints that might impact on the commander's operational plan. Without the ability to gather what is referred to as *logistics intelligence*, bringing *foresight* to bear on forward planning is constrained (Thompson, 1994: 7). Logisticians require information to anticipate and analyse likely future operations and predict the necessary requirements in terms of manpower, equipment, and services to avoid the constraints under which the logistics systems work. Thought also needs to be given to how resources might be provided and then transported into and around the theatre of operation (JDP 4-00). All of this occurs in an environment dominated by limited information, thus making it extremely difficult to produce a plan of action. For this reason alone, logistical foresight is often referred to as an art instead of a science. Post-Cold War operations show that to be effective, logistical foresight requires logisticians to work closely with all stakeholders to ensure the provision of the right resources at the right time and in the right place to meet the operation's needs. However, to achieve this logisticians need access to all available information about the commander's intentions so that they might fully integrate those intentions with any future logistical plans being prepared. Importantly, only full integration is likely to have the desired effect on strategic, operational, and tactical activity.

Logisticians have attempted to gain foresight and mitigate the challenges that face the military supply chain through the introduction of a range of logistical transformation programmes intended to respond to state-on-state war scenarios and to support force projection/expeditionary operations. The United Kingdom approach, indicative of initiatives in other states, contains programmes including 'Streamlining End to End Air and Land Logistics' (SEEALL), the use of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs), and reliance on private-sector capability that can be harnessed at short notice to meet specific operational needs. Importantly, all three approaches are intended to assist the logistician in overcoming the information gap over which foresight needs to prevail if logistical support is to be effective.

The SEEALL review was launched to deliver more cost-effective support to the military by optimizing land and air processes across theatre logistical boundaries and between the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and industry. This *end-to-end* approach is intended to establish a strategy for logistical support to enhance the effectiveness of the individual processes that make up the military supply chain, thereby enhancing responsiveness, asset visibility, and confidence. The objective for air and land logistical support is to enable the end user to achieve the required operational effect(s). This approach minimizes the logistical footprint by drawing resources back to the point

where they can be used flexibly within the theatre of operation at the logistical centre of gravity.

Logisticians can never foresee and thus plan for every conceivable contingency prior to or during an operation. To ameliorate this constraint the UK government has introduced UORs, which allow the military to purchase equipment/services in response to an unforeseen event. Operation TELIC in Iraq, for example, involved the military using UORs to support and upgrade equipment in theatre in relation to changes to the operational plan (Kinsey, 2009a: 103). UORs were also used to bring forward the introduction of new equipment or capability already in the pipeline; to make good shortfalls in operational stocks; and to undertake measures previously considered unaffordable to fill long-standing capability gaps such as medical equipment (National Audit Office, 2003: 14). In the case of Afghanistan, the British Army has turned to UORs to purchase new armoured vehicles able to withstand roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by the Taliban. Indeed, UORs have allowed the logisticians to anticipate and then respond to changes in the Taliban's strategy more rapidly than the MOD's procurement system would usually allow. Furthermore, if counterinsurgency operations become the norm for Western interventions, then UORs may play a crucial role in enabling operational commanders to adapt rapidly to changes in the insurgency's strategy.

It is also quite clear that the challenges associated with the delivery of logistical support cannot be addressed solely, or even partly, by military capability alone. Logisticians in all states have therefore endeavoured to acquire foresight to mitigate challenges through the use of private-sector capability. This has led to the need for greater cooperation between armed forces and industry to achieve greater flexibility in logistical support, as in the case of purchasing shipping capacity for Operation TELIC: the Defence Transport and Movement Agency secured over 50,000 linear metres of capacity at an early stage in the preparation for the operation at a lower than expected cost, while being able to ship the entire force in one movement and thereby achieving greater operational flexibility (National Audit Office, 2003: 17). It has also resulted in a more effective use of manpower in the delivery of military capability by creating a more efficient balance between operational output and support activity. Ultimately, though, it is contractors' innovative ideas and foresight in the operational space which might have the greatest impact on military capability and mitigate unforeseen events.

Achieving adequate foresight and a truly adaptive and responsive logistical system remains complicated and challenging. The use of SEEALL, UORs, and private-sector capability all place unique demands on defence logistics. SEEALL can only be truly effective if the new systems approach is coordinated as a whole. Similarly, UORs are an expensive way of responding to changes in the enemy's strategy, while the risk with contractors is that they may abandon the operation at a critical moment, particularly if the level of danger to their civilian workforce becomes unacceptable. Other practical problems have occurred where UORs have not been delivered in time, leaving temporary gaps in the military's capability, highlighted by the case of the AS 90 self-propelled gun that was upgraded too late for the war-fighting phase of Operation TELIC (Kinsey,

2009b: 40). In the end, foresight requires analysis of the probable cause of future operations and forecasting the likely requirements in terms of manpower, equipment, and services (JDP 4-00). For this to happen successfully, the contemporary operating environment is such that logisticians will need access to all available support regardless of whether it is from other public agencies or private-sector markets.

The 'Efficiency' Principle

A key feature of contemporary military logistics is the requirement to achieve greater efficiency in delivery. To realize this, Western militaries in particular have implemented a number of changes to how they organize logistical support, of which one of the most significant has been the application of concepts developed in the commercial sector and the use of contractors to sustain the military supply chain supporting operations. These changes have led to efficiency gains. For example, 'Lean Logistics' and 'Focused Logistics', as developed by the US Department of Defense, recognize the importance of logistics within a cradle-to-grave perspective. 'This means relying less on the total integral stockholding and transportation systems, and increasing the extent to which contractorised logistical support to military operations is farmed out to civilian contractors' (Moore, Bradford, and Antill, 2000: 19).

Similarly, contractor support has also offered efficiency improvements. Since the Cold War, the use of contractors to support deployed military operations has increased in scale and scope. Private industry's expanded role is evident in the headline statistic that the ratio of military personnel to logistics contractors was 10:1 in Iraq during 2003, compared to a ratio of 100:1 in the 1991 Gulf War (Dobbs, 2003). In the case of the United States, the broadening scope of logistics outsourcing is reflected in the extension of contracts from domestic training and base maintenance functions to include logistical and operational support needs during combat operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance missions. These have ranged from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

The employment of contractors on the battlefield remains a controversial issue in contemporary defence logistics debates. On the one hand, the orthodoxy in policy-making circles is that outsourcing functions to contractors increases logistics efficiency by reducing defence costs and providing a crucial *force multiplier* to meet the needs of contemporary military deployments.

This orthodoxy rests on four main premises (Uttley, 2005: 11–29). The first is that private firms can provide certain military support functions more cost-effectively than the armed forces because transferring activities to the commercial sector allows 'innovative thinking and adjustments, especially about the use of technology and labour, to maximise the chances of success, which are not available to the fixed hierarchies of militaries' (Kinsey, 2003: 182). The second premise is that resources released by outsourcing can be reinvested in the form of additional front-line military personnel or extra equipment, thereby enhancing overall operational capability. The third premise is that contractors

can provide deployed support functions with no adverse result on operational effectiveness. This rests on the assumptions that there will be readily identifiable safe and secure areas behind a *benign edge* on any operational deployment where private contractors can operate (Tripp, 2001: 94); that contractors can enhance significantly the armed forces' logistics and equipment support capabilities up to the benign edge of deployed operations; that contractors providing deployed support can be integrated into military operational planning, and command and control (C2) arrangements without disruption; and that contractor support can be harnessed to *augment* rather than *replace* core military manpower in the Order of Battle. The fourth premise is that outsourcing of some logistics functions can enhance the morale, cohesion, combat effectiveness, and ethos of the armed forces themselves, by enabling military logisticians to focus on mission-critical activities rather than ancillary activities (Fortner, 2000: 14). On these assumptions contemporary US policy-makers have concluded that: 'The use of contractors to support military operations is no longer a *nice to have*. Their support is no longer an adjunct *ad hoc* add-on to supplement a capability. Contractor support is an essential, vital part of our force projection capability—and increasing in its importance' (cited in Spearin, 2003: 32).

On the other hand, critics have claimed that extensive reliance on contractors for deployed operations fails to reduce logistic support costs and risks degrading combat capability by placing armed forces 'at the mercy of private agent[s]' (Singer, 2003: 158). This *too far* perspective raises concerns about each of the premises underpinning government orthodoxies (Uttley, 2005: 17–26). The challenge to the assumption that outsourcing is necessarily more financially efficient than in-house military logistics provision rests on two concerns. The first is that profit-motivated private firms will exploit opportunities to increase the price of service delivery in ways not originally envisaged by the armed forces at the contracting stage, thereby increasing the overall cost of service delivery (Fredland and Kendry, 1999). The second is the *transaction costs* of planning, bargaining, modifying, and enforcing contracts with external suppliers, as well as the *hidden* costs of contractor protection and other military support to contractor personnel during deployments (Pausch, 2000: 10). These perspectives have led to the claim there is no systematic evidence to prove logistics outsourcing is cheaper than military provision (Orsini and Bublitz, 1999: 1), and that internalized military provision might actually be more cost-effective.

Three major conclusions can be drawn from the use of contractors to deliver efficiency savings for the military. First, that the use of contractors on deployed operations will remain a controversial issue regarding defence transformation unless action is taken to address a range of unanswered questions relating to the type of mechanisms needed to evaluate the relative financial and operational implications of in-house provision verses outsourcing and to ensure contractors do not make excessive profits on defence support contracts (Uttley, 2005: 54). Second, the military needs to improve the way it engages with industry to exploit the potential advantages it offers. Third, the military and industry need to learn from each other's innovative mechanisms for harnessing private and military capability.

The 'Cooperation' and 'Simplicity' Principles

Military operations have historically involved forms of logistical cooperation between land, air, and maritime forces as well as allies and other agencies, the extent and significance of which has been determined by the type of operation conducted. Contemporary expeditionary operations are characterized by a requirement for extensive cooperation between a complex array of state and non-state actors including multinational coalition forces, other government departments—usually from those countries contributing troops—private actors, and non-governmental organizations providing aid and humanitarian assistance. This diversity of actors reflects the inter-agency demands of complex interventions and the perceived need for intervening states to achieve legitimacy through collective action—a factor that has been significant in post-Cold War US-led military deployments. Contemporary expeditionary operations therefore necessitate a cooperative approach from planning to execution among coalition and other public and private actors (JDP 4-00); at the same time, political and military imperatives demand that leadership of the logistics system supporting the operation is provided by a single actor, for example NATO. This requirement to centralize logistics support is intended to reduce the complexities of coordinating the delivery of general services and commodities, for instance fuel, across coalition forces, in accordance with national logistical requirements, and other public/private actors.

Core challenges for contemporary logisticians are to achieve efficient and coherent forms of cooperation between the diverse range of actors that now support operations and to create a simple and universally applicable logistics plan (Thompson, 1994: 8). At one level, the absorption and sharing of relevant information about the condition/availability of logistical resources is critical for effective organization and coordination of support to expeditionary operations. At another level, the production of a comprehensive logistics plan detailing specific information about manpower, equipment, and command and control arrangements responsible for sustaining the operation is a vital success factor. Other assets that are essential to the execution process of the plan are communications and information technology, which also need to be included in the logistical plan. Furthermore, simplicity is a guiding principle in achieving cooperation to ensure logistical arrangements are robust and easily understood in terms of ideas and execution (JDP 4-00). To achieve this, the command and control framework requires delegated authority to commanders (mission command) to resolve logistical complexity. Additionally, simplicity can be achieved through the use of a common logistical process among the different actors that make up the coalition force, while further improving cooperation (JDP 4-00). These factors have informed post-Cold War evolutions in doctrine and logistics planning across the NATO states.

Expeditionary operations therefore involve a complex myriad of actors whose activities require coordinating if operations are to have any chance of succeeding, and current doctrine presupposes that this is best achieved through the establishment of a single lead component responsible for overall command of the logistical supply chain. Effective

cooperation and simplicity also depend on all the actors involved in expeditionary operations sharing all relevant information about the status of logistical assets available to the operation.

The 'Agility' Principle

There is no certainty about war other than its uncertain nature. This statement applies to every aspect of war including how war is supplied. Combat troops are vulnerable to asymmetric adversaries and so is the supply chain that supports deployed forces. And yet, 'timeliness demands that logistical support must be provided in the proper quantity at the right place and time to enable the unit or formation to carry out the mission' (Thompson, 1994: 8) whatever asymmetric threat it faces. To achieve this in a contemporary environment dominated by nebulous threats, logistical support must be agile enough to adapt to the challenges this poses. Agility is generally considered to be a state of mind that adapts plans to fit the requirements of the operation. Ensuring logistical support is agile enables the commander to respond quickly to unforeseen events while allowing his force to remain effective, but also flexible in surmounting the unexpected.

Current logistics doctrine stresses the need to educate logistical staff to be resourceful and not simply to resort to established logistical methods, even if they have been tried and tested. Such doctrine and associated education programmes emphasize that no two logistical operations are the same, so the varied demands placed on the military supply chain in differing expeditionary interventions mean that logisticians need to think innovatively about ways of supplying troops on the ground. Moreover, current doctrine assumes that agility is enhanced where the logistical commander is able to act on his own authority to alter the organizational structure of the supply chain as the situation on the ground changes. Indeed, the lack of flexibility in adapting plans to take account of changes in the operational theatre can quickly constrain the military supply chain (Moore, Bradford, and Antill, 2000: 39). To overcome this, logistics doctrine emphasizes the need to think holistically regarding the provision of logistical support, thus allowing for the optimum use of all available resources in a well-planned and logical manner.

However, agility also requires that the logistical commander be provided with the appropriate equipment and resources to be able to react to changes in the operational plan (JDP 4-00, 1–8). Here, foresight plays an important role in informing the logistical commander of the likelihood that the plan will change and how. Such a change then entails the need to redirect equipment and resources from one part of the operation to another area, depending on where the operational commander's priorities lie once the change has taken effect. It could also mean changing the organizational structure of that part of the military supply chain in theatre, along with the communication network, to ensure both are in a position to support the main effort.

The physical aspects of logistical support are the methods and means employed by the logistical commander to sustain prolonged military operations. The challenge here is to ensure these are as flexible as possible, thus giving the operational commander as many

possibilities as is feasible to maximize support to the operation's main effort. But flexibility is only possible if the military personnel responsible for delivering logistical support have the mental agility, training, and education to adapt plans to suit the needs of the operational commander's campaign plan. This lends greater weight to the requirement to educate logisticians to be more resourceful in utilization of resources and equipment (Paparone, 2008: 1).

Conclusions

Defence logistics is about moving armed forces and keeping them supplied. Consequently, it is a critical component of war-fighting power since it determines what military force can be delivered to the theatre of operations. The nature and principles of defence logistics have remained the same throughout the history of warfare. What has changed is the contemporary character of defence logistics. During the Cold War defence logistics needed to support a policy of *reactive containment*. For the logistician, this necessitated complicated analysis of the movement and sustainment required for large-scale military formations. Moreover, because the Warsaw Pact threat was identifiable, NATO was able to calculate the size of the force needed to repel the threat, including all conceivable logistical requirements. Defence logistics was reduced to threat-based calculations and solving technical problems relating to the movement of large numbers of troops with their equipment in Western Europe.

This situation changed with the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, expeditionary operations have produced 'what if' scenarios for the logistician to contemplate. This is the result of nebulous threats and the volatility, ambiguity, complexity, and uncertainty associated with the operational environment. Moreover, the change from a territorial-based war for national survival to expeditionary warfare to promote democracy and human rights has meant the principles of logistics have had to adapt to a new set of challenges. The demands placed upon achieving foresight, efficiency, cooperation, simplicity, and agility have changed in an era of operational complexity. Transformation has been necessary for the military supply chain to meet the challenges of delivering and sustaining expeditionary forces. Indeed, it is doubtful whether a Cold War military supply chain would have been able to meet the challenges that expeditionary warfare would have placed on it, and a measure of the transformation effort is the performance of the current coalition logistics system in Afghanistan.

Notes

1. This chapter focuses on logistics issues that confront Western militaries. The themes developed highlight generic factors affecting all forms of military logistics for state and non-state actors. For treatments of how logistics in war is seen beyond the Western world, see, for example, Metz and Johnson, 2001; US Department of Defense, 2007; and Jones, 2008.

2. JDP 4-00 is a single UK military doctrinal document that discusses national and multinational logistics. Moreover, unlike the *NATO Logistics Handbook*, it specifically explains the five principles of logistics discussed in this chapter.

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CHAPTER 28

LAND WARFARE

†GENERAL ANTOINE LECERF

What is Land Warfare?

Land warfare is a permanent feature of human experience and probably embodies the ultimate form of state activity. For nearly two thousand years, organized societies have defined themselves based on values derived from their territorial awareness, making the terrestrial environment the focus of confrontations. The strategic significance of land warfare has constituted a key factor in the history of conflicts for two reasons. The first is that the use of land forces is an unequivocal action demonstrating the determination of a society or state to achieve a decisive political objective. The second is that land forces are the only ones capable of capturing, occupying, and holding a position, in an essentially complex environment, by maintaining a presence on the ground for as long as necessary.

Land combat is characterized by complexity: ground complexity, heterogeneous by design; environmental complexity, unpredictable by essence; human complexity, versatile by nature. It takes place in an area the components of which, including psychological, must be taken into account. This area is first and foremost physical; its command is essential for controlling the ongoing actions. It is also human, as it depends on the presence and culture of local populations. In addition, the human area is linked to notions of power and interest expressed in terms of political, administrative, and economic structure. Land manoeuvre therefore always requires the sustainable control of the environment, a prerequisite for success. Ultimately, the soldier makes the difference.

Manoeuvres being dependent on the environment, controlling this environment involves significant permanent constraints for the constitution and capacity of land forces, which must adapt to all physical areas—desert, jungle, open or complex terrain, urban area, mountains, or glacial areas—and all types of human environment, urban or otherwise, with varying population densities. Land combat is essentially a combined arms effort. It consists of the synchronized or simultaneous use of several operational functions (armoured, infantry, engineers, etc.) to have a greater effect upon the enemy

than the independent implementation of each of these functions. Land forces therefore manoeuvre by combining the action of the different arms and services.

Even if manoeuvres are most often multidimensional, the terrestrial area remains the principal focus of engagements, as ground combat takes place among the population. Furthermore, nerve centres are on the ground, where institutions have their headquarters and the stakeholders of the different national, international, or non-governmental organizations operate. This is why land superiority is a concrete expression of success and marks the achievement of strategic objectives in the field in a sustainable manner.

Finally, land combat, more than just managing complexity, is primarily a physical and carnal confrontation. Technical superiority will never replace combatants who ultimately embody the essential element of 'victory'. Direct confrontation always constitutes the only concrete evaluation of each side's determination. And determination combined with force defines the outcome. Thus the soldier, the ultimate and number one element of land combat, must embody this determination in order to definitively dominate the enemy. Engagement on the ground, with the inherent issues involved, land forces to act in an area in direct contact with the adversary, in order to constantly and durably control the diversified, heterogeneous, and complex physical and human environments epitomized by terrains, populations, warring factions, and their activities.

The land environment is characterized by its absence of fluidity compared with other physical environments. Ground combat takes place on a terrain which is always marked by the nature of landscape and vegetation, the presence of more or less significant barriers and constructions, which constitute a demanding environment from a tactical perspective that is not conducive to mobility. There are often numerous barriers, including in a desert environment, which only allow for short- to medium-range observation and limit the propagation of radio waves. Weather conditions are also likely to very considerably affect the course of operations, due to their direct or indirect effects on human stamina as well as equipment operation and how the reality of the battlefield situation is perceived.

These characteristics of the land environment mean that the constraints must be mastered and the effects limited or better still one should seek to take advantage of the environment to the benefit of one's own manoeuvring. The engagement of land forces consequently requires versatile equipment that might meet the requirements of different areas of commitment and weather conditions and, above all, seasoned troops who can endure physical effort, lack of sleep, and fatigue and are capable of handling a perception of danger which can vary in terms of time and space, ranging from direct contact with death to killing in combat. These characteristics highlight the essential role of mental-preparedness training and unit-operational training of soldiers.

Current conflicts vary in terms of intensity and are hybrid by nature. Providing a vast scope of action, they combine symmetric and asymmetric combat, weapons of mass destruction and guerrilla warfare, cyber-technologies and media, with one constant: the resulting issue of the population often being taken hostage. Often manipulated, the population directly or indirectly affects the course of operations. It can act, consciously or otherwise, by impeding a force's action, offering concealment and protection options to the adversary, and passing on intelligence to either side. A potential hazard for the force, it must, however, often be rescued, protected, or supported, because its support is

necessary to achieve the desired final effect. The population indeed constitutes a crucial stake; it must therefore be isolated from the adversary's influence by gaining its trust. Its support is a prerequisite for strategic success. This crucial control over the human environment results in land forces taking specific actions which either target or benefit the population, such as media-related, psychological, or civilian-military actions.

More generally, land forces must take into account all stakeholders with whom they are in close contact—populations, political authorities, organizations, warring factions, or enemies—by developing the necessary openness at all levels in order to understand this complex and fluctuating environment. Therefore land combat cannot be limited to the mere knowledge of the adversary and their methods. It requires the comprehension and assimilation of a complex environment in which numerous actors are involved.

Ground manoeuvre has always been difficult and is becoming increasingly so, due to the nature of the resources as well as the extent and variety of the different environment-related parameters involved. This complexity of manoeuvre requires the permanent adaptability of the force commitment to:

- the evolution of the geostrategic context of the time or period considered;
- the means implemented, the evolution of which depends on technological advances;
- the emergence of innovative tactical concepts;
- the environment and local constraints.

There are two imperatives to be added to the complexity of the ground manoeuvre. The first consists of committing a sufficient number of combatants in the long term. Mastering the environment requires the allocation of a large amount of soldiers, so as to have sufficient manoeuvring capacity and a favourable balance of power as well as to safeguard and protect the force. The engagement of these combatants is most often a long-term commitment as any premature withdrawal of military capability from the theatre can result in a return to the previous crisis situation. The second imperative concerns the adversary. Land manoeuvre makes it possible to prevail by the definitive destruction or neutralization of the enemy. Victory, or the end state, can only be guaranteed if the adversary's will to win or cause harm is annihilated: the adversary is either tactically destroyed (as is the case in so-called conventional wars which end when of one of the protagonists is disabled) or rendered ineffective (as is the case in subversive or counter-rebellion wars). Prevailing over the adversary must last and as a consequence be combined with enduring control over the physical and human environment, otherwise the desire to fight could re-emerge.

To sum up, the action of land forces is most often designed and implemented according to the three following tactical objectives:

- Restrain the adversary: this has always been the primary and minimum objective of military action.
- Control the physical and human environment: controlling and mastering the terrestrial area requires many varied resources, as well as coordination with the other military and civilian stakeholders.
- Influence perceptions: an increasingly predominant action which consists of taking into account the psychological aspect of conflicts.

The Theory and Practice of Land Warfare

From ancient to modern times, land combat has been fought battle line against battle line and manoeuvres were often limited to encircling the wings, illustrated by Hannibal in the battle of Cannae in 216 BC. In this 'parallel order' configuration, the leader's value and the courage of the soldiers made all the difference. It was only in the late eighteenth century that the modern notions of effort and initiative emerged, in the sense of the leader's decision to impose his manoeuvre upon the enemy. This adoption of an 'oblique order', as formalized by Guibert, results in a manoeuvre 'where the elite part of one's troops is directed towards the enemy, while the rest are kept out of reach, where one advantageously attacks one or several points while misleading the enemy at other points' (Guibert, [1772] 1781). After analysing Napoleon's battles, Jomini focused on the principle of the 'combined effort on the decisive point and at the opportune moment' (Jomini, [1838] 1996). This subsequently led to the development of the three major war principles defined by Marshal Foch in the early twentieth century (Foch, 1903).

War is the confrontation of wills via armed action. Three major principles can lead to success: freedom of action, concentration of effort, and economy of means. The main field of application of these principles is the air-land area which combines duration and variety of engagements with a large number and variety of capabilities. Furthermore, when used discerningly, these principles are complementary. Economy of means facilitates the concentration of effort while freedom of action promotes the economy of means and the convergence of effects.

As war is fundamentally a fight for freedom of action, this freedom can be established as the primary principle of war. This freedom enables military leaders to act in spite of the adversary and the various constraints imposed by the milieu and circumstances. Its achievement depends on the ability to understand the adversary and the environment. This ability subsequently makes it possible to guarantee one's own safety and protection against surprises, to foresee and anticipate the adversary's events and actions as well as prevail over them and impose one's will upon them.

Freedom of action therefore consists of retaining the initiative in order to 'control the next move' and seize opportunities. This is characterized by the necessity to combine actions and optimize their effects so as to increase efficiency for the relevant objective. The efficiency of this concentration of effort leads to a relative superiority applied to the breaking point of the balance of power. It can even be achieved at the risk of weakening secondary points. The breaking point is established by the notion of balance of power, which assesses the time and places of relative superiority or inferiority of friendly forces. Relative superiority is however the consequence of a moral battle of wills more than the physical clash between two entities. Napoleon is said to have stated that 'moral factors account for three quarters of the final result while relative material strength only accounts for one quarter. The moral element and public opinion are half the battle.' Concentration is therefore all the more efficient as it is applied against a disoriented and weakened enemy.

This principle is based on a judicious allocation and application of means, with a view to obtaining the best possible effects on the determined objective. However, this economy must also accept the risks associated with the achievement of the above-mentioned relative superiority. It is primarily achieved by the constitution of joint units adapted to the mission to be accomplished. Secondly, the management of the areas occupied by these units must provide the resources to gain relative superiority, seize opportunities, and avoid surprises. Two tactical units can be constituted: one designed for the main action (gaining relative superiority) and one guaranteeing freedom of action, notably including the reserved element (exploitation and safety).

The application of these three principles must favour surprise in all domains as this ensures that the adversary is constantly behind in terms of action. Surprise can result from innovation in a specific domain, in particular the technical, or from the application of tactical processes that the adversary cannot foresee, or from the choice of an unusual time-space framework. Surprise is also enhanced by factors such as deception, communication, and mobility.

The application of the three principles of warfare requires the combination of the movement of land forces, their effective or potential firepower, and immaterial effects via tactical manoeuvres, which aim at gaining a favourable position to achieve the determined military objective, taking time, the environment, and the adversary into account. Complementary capabilities and combined action are required to achieve this goal. This requires designing and implementing the manoeuvre by guaranteeing two success factors aimed at 'dominating' and then 'producing the effects'. They facilitate compliance with the above-mentioned principles with a view to weakening the adversary and exploiting the situation to help achieve the tactical objectives desired.

The performance of the manoeuvre is divided into three successive phases of variable duration: preparation (modelling the adversary and the environment), effort, and consolidation (processing the results obtained). These different phases cannot be conceived without the permanent consideration of the environment in which they are involved. This is why acquiring intelligence is a prerequisite for the efficiency of subsequent action, the foundation of the leader's decision. Beyond the description of a system and its location, the purpose of intelligence acquisition is to understand the adversary's structure and intention, having knowledge of the environment and assessing the initial balance of power as well as the enemy's potential. This analysis must also help comprehend the adversary's shortcomings so as to seize the opportunities to create an element of surprise.

Freedom of action must also be preserved. To do this**,** the manoeuvring element must not be required to defend its lines of communication and must have the reserves to seize an opportunity or be prepared for any contingency.[1] These reserves are always at the disposal of the military leader and constitute the best response to uncertainties. They make it possible to exploit a particular occasion to deal a decisive blow to the enemy or handle a major change of situation. The need to dominate is the major contribution to the principle of freedom of action, as its purpose is to master the environment, restrain and destabilize the adversary in order to launch one's own decisive action, and take advantage of the results. The idea is to remove any capacity for initiative and restrict the

enemy's potential to coordinate the engagement of their forces. This action is exerted in physical and conceptual domains:

- Actions on capabilities must result in the compartmentalization of opposing elements, by means of traditional coercive processes or indirectly via a manoeuvre designed to disperse their forces, distracting them from their objectives or exposing their vulnerabilities. The objective is to gain relative superiority and prepare the manoeuvre area.
- Actions on willpower must facilitate the adversary's loss of initiative or reaction. The processes relate to the state of uncertainty which must be fuelled in the enemy via deception, decoy manoeuvres, or the incentive to follow fruitless lines of operation. Controlling information can destroy the adversary's cohesion while at the same time denying them any command or execution capacity. It also makes it possible to manipulate the enemy's understanding of the manoeuvre.

Once domination has been achieved, the application of the 'concentration of effort' principle must lead to direct and massive action on the adversary or the environment. Three successive stages are required to achieve this objective. The purpose of the tactical movement is to deploy the forces in advantageous positions, selected to strike at the adversary over a decisive point or to elude the enemy's aggression. It must help create an element of surprise by focusing on access via the flanks or the rear and concentrating on rapidity. This requires controlling the environment as it is the environment that imposes the timeframe, determines safety, and affects morale. Failure of the movement can single-handedly cause failure of the entire mission. Capturing a hostile environment can however help create the element of surprise. Shock combined with movement must result in the breaking of the adversary's will and the undermining of their vital elements. Therefore the idea is to undermine the enemy's essential capabilities, whether material or moral. Physical shock is obtained by a brief and sudden violent action, as well as by a concentration and accumulation of successive effects. Capability coordination must be organized to ensure optimal complementarity of effects and gain local supremacy at the right time and in the right place. Finally, the objective of exploitation is to take advantage of the effects generated by the shock to increase its impact. The idea is to exceed the initial objective to exploit the opportunities provided by changed circumstances resulting from the previous stage. This ultimate action is not necessarily coercive but can contribute to the final success by results achieved in psychological or media-related domains.

How is Land Warfare Evolving?

Two ancient types of conflict are still relevant today: 'imperial' war and 'pacification' war. The operations in which Western forces have been involved for several decades tend to fall within the latter's province. Land combat is therefore evolving together with the type of conflict, stabilization operations comparable with ancient 'pacification' wars.

In all ongoing conflicts, civilian populations are at the heart of military concerns. Thus, switching from an operational context in which the population constituted the 'rear'—as opposed to the front, a military zone by essence—armed forces are now acting within the populations and in reference to them. The links between the manoeuvre and the area have therefore become more complex due to the population's involvement. Direct action upon the adversary is only one aspect of the above-mentioned manoeuvre. Land combat is now fought over a geographical area involving all its components, including human, and extended to the entire theatre of operations. The expected results of military action are therefore modified by this involvement of the environment's predominance. Above all, its thorough control enables strategic success.

The other major evolution is the end of strict power confrontation between armed forces of similar nature and objectives, replaced by a disparity of engaged capabilities, which quickly evolves into a clash against irregular adversaries.[2] These adversaries then adopt bypass tactics, combining adaptability and innovation and control of the population so as to avoid conventional power and only to strike at the adversary's vulnerabilities. The notion of battle—the epitome of the clash between opposing forces, limited in time and space, creating a new balance of power—therefore tends to lose its relevance.

War within populations therefore will constitute, for a long time, the general framework of engagements. This predominance of the human environment, combined with a threat which no longer has physical contours, modifies the expected strategic and tactical results of land warfare. In this type of war, the boundary between strategy and tactics is blurred because decisive military action is most often led by the tactical echelons who are in the field and therefore capable of seizing opportunities. The manoeuvre is consequently extended to the combination of not only coercive or kinetic capabilities, but also non-kinetic capabilities acting upon the physical and human environment. It provides land-based military action with the global capacity to restrain all types of adversary, control all types of area, and influence all types of perception to achieve a strategic objective.

The new importance of tactics exceeds the strict scope of the theatre of operations. When facing an irregular adversary, the idea is no longer to combine destruction capabilities according to a prioritization method but to focus on their decentralized usage to support the tactical action on the ground. When dealing with destabilized populations, any re-emergence of violence must be prevented and trust must be restored with a view to reviving social, economic, and civic life and reinstating security while preserving the support of public opinion.

The manoeuvre becomes global so as to harmonize all types of action directed at the adversary and the environment. It establishes land-based action as part of the broader domain of overall crisis management, associating politics, diplomacy, economy, and information with the military- and security-related aspects. By no longer limiting themselves to mere coercive action against an identified enemy, tactical leaders strive to act against their adversaries while controlling and protecting the environment and influencing perceptions. This is what reinforces the mutual links between tactics and military strategy, between tactical and political fields, mainly through operations based on required effects.

The consequences of all the above-mentioned evolutions are to add constraints which restrict freedom of action as the population is emerging as a major issue and destruction capacity is giving way to the ability to influence**.** To paraphrase Clausewitz, war is less and less 'a trial of strength' and more and more a 'battle of wills'. The use of destruction therefore comes up against three essential constraints: the preponderance of information immediately places any act of destruction in the public arena; the forces are often engaged based on interests which are not perceived as vital by national opinion; and the use of force must be firm but measured and accurate because it is always a source of popular resentment and frustration.

Thus, land engagement must take new imperatives into account to preserve the command's freedom of action, namely the legitimacy of the action, which is based on the principle of necessity, i.e. a just sufficiency of the application of the force to the desired objectives. As a result, the damage inflicted must be proportional to the harm suffered, which can be described as the principle of moderation. This must be linked to action-reversibility, which aims at organizing the forces with a view to limiting human casualties and material damage and focusing on the adversary's defeat rather than the crushing of the adversary. It is also based on the logic of non-escalation.

How Joint is Land Warfare?

According to a traditional pattern, characteristic of inter-state wars which prevailed until the middle of last century, armed forces each acted within their specific environment (land, sea, or air) with clearly defined military objectives for each of the corresponding regular forces. This pattern restricted the environment to its physical element, rarely taking into account military action as a whole or the complexity of this environment. This pattern primarily focused on one of the components depending on the defined objectives, manoeuvre phase, and capabilities to be implemented. Ground actions were most often preceded by a powerful preparation based on air strikes aimed at reducing opposing capabilities by means of firepower: this was the case for the Second World War before landing operations on the Normandy coast or for NATO forces' entry into Kosovo in 1999. Nowadays, the strict separation of the different milieus is becoming blurred. The notions of air-land, air-sea, or even air-space combat attest to this evolution.

The complexity and variety of engagements in the past decades have inevitably established land combat as part of a permanent joint framework which transcends the exclusive competences of each of the regular forces. While the control of maritime and air space is a constant, a prerequisite to enable land forces to lead their action in an environment with the lowest possible threat, crises more than ever begin and end on the ground, placing the forces deployed in the field at the heart of the action and putting joint power at the service of land warfare.

> The sum of tactical actions, no longer remote centralised maritime or air actions, will make it possible to achieve the desired final effect. Our soldiers are now, individually and collectively, the guardians of the strategic effect. The land environment

> is and will be even more so in the future the hub of joint campaigns because this is where the population is. The intervention of land forces therefore represents the best proof of political commitment.[3]

This support covers a variety of domains ranging from power projection to mobility support, and from intelligence to general force support.

To achieve the end state, synergy must constantly be sought. However, synergy is only possible if the military impact of the joint forces is greater than the sum of individual impacts of each of the regular forces. This effect is reinforced by the integrated design of command and control. This synergy is reflected in the field by the ability of a regular force to support another, in accordance with the notions of 'supporting command' and 'supported command'. For a given phase of an operation, if the action of one regular force prevails, the other regular forces support its action. From an operational and tactical perspective, land combat prevails more often than not.

Land combat is led by combined units sharing the same culture and the same training and operational preparation level, initially leaving little room for joint operations. The result of tactical engagement validates or invalidates the efforts of the strategic level. Thus, joint power must be available at the commitment level where land combat takes place. The potential resulting benefits must therefore facilitate the achievement of determined effects in relation to specific objectives, regardless of the commitment level.

This is where the effects manoeuvre is most effective, where the person leading the principal action under consideration retains full responsibility for defining the desired effect and controls the triggering, with implementation remaining the responsibility of the regular forces engaged as 'supporting command'. Thus, the acculturation of small combined echelons in joint combat is becoming a reality. In a context where air superiority is generally achieved, these small echelons (up to company group size), are trained in the natural use of the support provided by another regular force (air support, navy fire support, or gendarmerie) for targeted actions within tight deadlines. The routine deployment in Iraqi or Afghan theatres of operations of JTACs[4] within ground units illustrates this evolution.

This joint integration of manoeuvre, essential as well as irreversible, results in the application of new procedures and coordination measures the implementation of which is increasingly complicated for lower tactical levels. To preserve the freedom of action of their leaders, who must stay concentrated on leading their soldiers, it is essential that these low tactical levels should not be affected by these constraints, otherwise the manoeuvrability of these echelons will be limited to mere compliance with procedures.

The sole objective of joint integration for the benefit of land combat is to facilitate the outcome of ground troops' missions. The three purposes of land warfare—restrain the adversary, control the environment, and influence perceptions—make it possible to identify the areas in which this integration should be applied. From intelligence support to deterrent or coercive actions, the use of air capabilities helps restrain the adversaries and control the environment. Ground troops can be confronted with an extreme resurgence of violence at any time; to protect against this violence or control its effects, the capabilities of the other components must be available in a flexible and reactive manner.

The definition of the effect adapted to the ground situation must imperatively remain the responsibility of the land force commander acting on the authority of the joint commander, who must be aware of and control the capabilities of air assets, from simple presence to the destruction of targets.[5] It is now possible to strike more moderately and above all more accurately, which allows support to ground troops in increasingly populated areas. Ultimately, effects required to benefit increasingly small ground units can be envisaged, provided that top-to-bottom integration is facilitated.

The preparation, execution, and above all exploitation of land combat must help influence the perceptions of the different players, primarily the population. For coercion or stabilization purposes, environmental functions, such as civilian-military cooperation and operational information, are not specific to one combat domain in particular but are joint by nature. The use of these environment, intelligence, or immediate response capabilities cannot be improvised. In addition to adapted planning, coordination, and control structures, this requires the development in advance of joint procedures and training.

The Future Shape of Land Warfare

Looking forward ten or twenty years, according to 'reasonable' visibility in light of foreseeable geostrategic evolution, land combat is likely to present a subtle mix of intangible factors and continued technological and organizational evolution, the beginnings of which can already be observed. The action of a land force remains naturally linked to the initial factors which have led to its engagement: the nature of the desired political objectives, initially national but also increasingly multinational, resulting from a consensus among nations, if not international; plus the price (in human, material, and financial terms) that the contributing nation agrees to pay and the limitations it sets for achieving this objective. All this initial data generates the framework of engagement for all the forces deployed and, more specifically, those normally in charge of the major action: land forces. Tomorrow, like today, everything will begin and end where man's action persists: on land and in minds. Within this timeframe, a commitment in the framework of a major confrontation between regional powers armed with traditional weapons, possibly with a nuclear, biological, and chemical capacity, can obviously not be excluded. These powers already exist. Risks exist as well in several areas of the world. These options are however very unlikely in the short and medium term.

The major issue of an intervention concerns and will always concern the population. As an actor, vector, and spectator of a conflict, the population is the ultimate target of actions because the stability of the political solution implemented and therefore its success depends on its commitment to the values embodied by the force's intervention. Thus, land combat plays a specific role within the global plan of operations, a complex and more or less organized arrangement of civilian actions and military lines of operation. This specific position is essentially linked to the fact that it constantly

combines actions designed to facilitate the performance of tasks which are part of the intervention's long-term process (state reconstruction assistance, population support, etc.) with resolutely short-term tasks (combat action). The key success factor of military action will therefore always primarily revolve around the individual and collective quality, based on the soldier's basic skills and know-how. Tomorrow more than today, soldiers must be capable of using legitimate and suitably controlled violence against identified adversaries to impose their will according to a recognized general objective.

As dictated by the situation in the field, land forces may switch from a posture of supporting the population to combat action followed by stabilization, constantly having to perform a balancing act. In this context, endurance depends on sustained collective action. Cementing operational efficiency, this human and professional 'cohesion' is most effective at company group level. Evolution in know-how barely affects the skill sets which make up the combatants. They have remained virtually unchanged in the past hundred years and should persist, although civil society is undergoing in-depth transformation. Patient and lifelong education should make it possible to better prepare personnel for acting effectively in complex social and political environments.

To sum up, the troop's ability to blend in with the population and instantaneously adapt its position to the circumstances will remain the individual and collective norm. Operations will follow the same courses of action as today, subtly combining human empathy and military efficiency so as not to be cut off from the population. Finally, the principles of war—concentration of effort, economy of means, and preserved freedom of action—will remain valid regardless of the type of engagement.

Organized around men and their units, land combat will however be deeply affected by the combined effects of the growing complexity of the general framework of action, increasing number of stakeholders in the crisis, and dilution of the circles of power upon which land forces can act. The general framework of ground action is evolving. A complex and shifting milieu, involving key thrusts based on virtual and physical networks, the human fabric is the major combat area, conditioned by the physical environment and shaped by history. The adversary will be able to blend in with this environment, use it for protection, logistical support, back-up, and strike capability in both physical and virtual domains. The accurate perception and thorough comprehension of this environment will generate the ability to choose the right manoeuvre, firstly within the theatre of operations and, by delegation, within lower tactical echelons, the action of which could have a strategic impact over the limits of the theatre.

All combat, support, and logistics components must be re-examined in light of the global action. More than just the integration of components, the integration of effects in terms of support or logistics will be sought down to the lowest echelons. Furthermore, multinationality will involve the continued search for exchange standards and the creation of common operational reference systems and procedures, providing the military coalition with an efficient administration. This approach, currently limited to the military sector, must extend to different government departments and agencies in order to get global action better defined.

Long-term vision, short-term decisions: the characteristics of future land combat will be marked by the intimate comprehension of long-term engagement and its global nature, as well as by the absolute need for the responsiveness and reversibility of combat actions.

The use and, more importantly, control of information and communication technologies must enable the dispersal of land units to guarantee presence and proximity to the populations, while concentrating the effects to guarantee military efficiency. The limitations of this dispersion will mostly be linked to security and protection issues of the force. Tomorrow's combat will also be characterized by the ability to deliver the military effect at the right moment, in the right place, with the specified level of violence required to achieve the desired operational effect. Whether desired or not, the engagement will always be potentially violent and a source of casualties, innocent victims or members of the force. In this context, combatants will constantly have to control their action in the long term and the force will accurately assess the effects of its application of force (kinetic targeting or otherwise). All physical and virtual effects must contribute to the success of the combat action, in terms of preparation, implementation, and exploitation. Each combat action, brutal and 'instantaneous', will be followed by a systematic exploitation of information in order to shape conflict termination.

The quest for effectiveness will however require the mastered exploitation of new information and communication technologies which must preserve at all costs the responsibility and freedom of action of the field commander vis-à-vis his local and national leaders, thereby protecting him as much as possible against the effects of 'strategic compression'. The intelligence function will confirm its crucial role. Knowledge and understanding must be even more important for deciding on the right action and avoiding strategic or tactical surprises. That cannot be achieved by a compartmentalized function. Intelligence will increasingly depend on a global, multinational, joint manoeuvre, based on the notion of service (the right information at the right time for the right person) and the need to gain the initiative. In this domain, the nature of intelligence, whether desired or tentative, will without any doubt lead to a restructuring of intelligence skills: those making it possible to grasp moral aspects (access to the human source) and those making it possible to understand the physical supports underpinning this human aspect (access to technical support). In this context, although the forces' action is only one aspect of the whole, the intelligence function cannot be limited to the strict support of a combat action, otherwise the threats, risks, and opportunities likely to affect the manoeuvre will not be correctly identified.

Land forces combat will always be characterized by its global nature, which is the very feature of stabilization operations: global manoeuvre, search for a global effect, under the constraint of a global cost accepted by contributing nations. Land forces will act to support state reconstruction and provide assistance to the population, while conducting occasional, and in the longer term potentially lethal, armed engagements, always keeping the level of violence under control, in compliance with the laws and treaties recognized by states. Supported by the development of new technological capabilities which should primarily affect procedures, the fundamentals of land combat should endure.

Tomorrow, like today, performance will first and foremost rely on the intrinsic quality of combatants: their spirit and readiness, taking into account that mental and physical stamina cannot be trained nor hardened within a few months. They need time.

Beyond these foundations, land combat will experience the combined effects of some armaments with high technological value, whether or not delivered by land forces, and the continuation of 'traditional' land-based military capabilities. In particular, it will be necessary to conserve what constitutes our exclusive domain: contact with the human environment where the final engagement will always unfold. As part of a manoeuvre which must be clearly coordinated with other military and civilian components, the force on the ground must therefore develop resilience, i.e. their ability to withstand the rigours of a long-term engagement, their controlled aggression, flexibility, and their innate ability to change both direction and posture. Finally, combat on the ground will always be a story of men, that is to say a sacred alliance between a chief and his unit.

Notes

1. According to Clausewitz [1780–1831] 1886: 'a reserve has two clearly marked functions: firstly to prolong and renew combat and secondly to serve in case of unforeseen circumstances'.
2. These notions respectively correspond with symmetric, dissymmetric, and asymmetric conflicts.
3. Army General (FR) Cuche, former Chief of the French General Staff (source uncertain, probably statement made in a speech to a military audience).
4. Joint Tactical Air Controller.
5. From the surveillance of a logistics convoy to route lighting, from 'show of presence' (medium altitude) to 'show of force' (very low altitude) and the use of the entire range of munitions, while ensuring effects escalation and the reduction in collateral damage.

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CHAPTER 29

MARITIME WARFARE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SEA CONTROL

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In the popular imagination, 'warfare at sea' conjures up a range of images from large-scale, decisive sea battles such as Trafalgar, Navarino, Jutland, and Midway to the sort of cat-and-mouse warfare that characterized the Battle of the Atlantic and the Cold War. These images tend to reinforce the misconception that the effects of warfare at sea are confined to the sea.

Similarly, while the term 'sea warfare' is necessary to delineate and define the scope of contributions to a wide-ranging publication such as this, the term tends to condition and constrain the reader's understanding and expectation of what warfare at, under, above, and from the sea involves.

The majority of human activity on the planet, economic and political, occurs within 200 miles of the coast because that is where most people live. To seaward, such human maritime activity as exists is generally confined to within 200 miles from the coast. If you accept Clausewitz's proposition that 'war is the continuation of policy by other means' it follows that this 400-mile zone (which is where the land, sea, and air meet) will usually be the focus of effort in war. With that in mind, I believe it is helpful to talk in terms of a more strategic notion of warfare that better reflects the contemporary reality: that of 'maritime' warfare.

Significance of Maritime Warfare

When considering maritime warfare, there are two points to bear in mind from the outset. The first is that the object of maritime warfare is ultimately to affect outcomes on the land. The second point is that success in maritime warfare requires the ability to operate at sea, in the air, and on the land.

Maritime warfare can best be understood through an appreciation of the strategy it is intended to serve. It might in the first instance be helpful to illustrate the point by reference to the British experience. Professor Colin Gray set the context well when he wrote:[1]

> Britain is a maritime medium power whose security and prosperity requires unimpeded maritime access and transit. As a maritime trading country, Britain requires good order at sea. Britain's maritime geography, indeed insularity, mandates primary economic and strategic significance for the country's ability to use the seas. This is not discretionary. It is not an issue open for policy choice.

In Professor Gray's analysis, there are two immediate conclusions to be drawn from this geostrategic reality. The first is that island, archipelagic, or peninsula nations need a broadly maritime strategy: one that has sea control at its core, but which enables power and influence to be projected inland. That calls for maritime forces, the composition of which will dictate the nature and degree of power and influence you can project. The second is the recognition that an island nation can only really do expeditionary warfare; 'All British military behaviour abroad must be enabled by secure enough overseas access.'[2]

The benefits of a maritime strategy are not confined to island nations. The ability to use the sea for its own purposes is vital to any nation that relies on maritime trade for its existence and similarly, for those with exposed seaboards, to ensure they cannot be invaded. In fact, any nation that has a desire for security, wealth, and power needs to be able to use the seas freely and assert their right to do so when necessary. Even a major land power can find itself exposed and vulnerable if it ignores the maritime. A classic example is China, which was a major maritime power in the fifteenth century but turned inwards in the sixteenth century, eschewing a navy. The result was depredations by pirates initially but it opened the way for foreign intervention in the eighteenth century and then invasion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

England (later Great Britain/the United Kingdom) followed a different route. In the words of N. A. M. Rodger (2004): 'Naval dominance of European waters was the longest, most complex and expensive project ever undertaken by the British state society. Few aspects of national life were unaffected by it.' As a result, a small, weak offshore island was able to develop into the world's greatest power.

The strategic and economic benefits of a maritime strategy remain relevant today, together with the need for a maritime arm capable of waging warfare in support of that strategy. The significance of the sea has had a military dimension to it for well over 2,500 years, and this shows no sign of changing. Navies range from the one remaining superpower navy (the US Navy) at one end of the spectrum to tiny coastal policing forces of the developing world at the other. Between those two extremes there is a variety of expertise and ability. The United States has the most powerful military in history but, with friendly states on its northern and southern borders, it has a limited continental defence requirement, instead building powerful maritime forces to protect its considerable seaboards and to project force overseas. Meanwhile, the importance of maritime power is increasing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. China has learnt the lessons of history and over the next decade its navy will have more ships

than the United States. China is producing and acquiring submarines five times as fast as is the USA and developing a carrier force. This naval expansion is being supported by the establishment of port facilities across the Indian Ocean including a naval base in Pakistan, a fuelling station in Sri Lanka, and a container facility with extensive naval and commercial access in Chittagong. At the same time India is expanding its sphere of influence, building up numbers of ships (now including a nuclear submarine capability) and beefing up their naval presence on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands near the Straits of Malacca. Australia has recently announced an ambitious naval building programme too. This recalibration of national influence is nothing new but simply reflects an ongoing adjustment to the balance of power across the Indian and Pacific Oceans as economic power vests strongly in the maritime nations in those regions.

Implementation/How to Succeed

Sea Control

Success in maritime warfare depends upon being able to exploit the sea for one's own military advantage while denying its use to a potential rival or enemy. Historical theorists of maritime strategy such as Sir Julian Corbett and Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan USN described this as 'command of the sea'. Modern strategists generally accept that achieving total command of the sea is unlikely and that it will more likely be limited in both time and space to what is actually necessary for a given operation. This limited form of command of the sea is known as 'sea control'.

Maritime warfare involves the conduct of operations by maritime forces,[3] which seek first to establish sea control. Secondly, by exploiting that control and the freedom of action it bestows in delivering combat power ashore, it seeks to shape and ultimately determine outcomes on land. Sea control is not an end in itself; its object is the delivery of combat power against the land because that is where people live and they are the source of an adversary's critical strengths and weaknesses. That is where 'great issues between nations at war' have always been finally decided, as Corbett declared.

The degree and duration of sea control is dictated by many factors: among them topography, distance, weather, and the forces and capabilities at your disposal relative to those of your opponent(s). Whichever theorist you subscribe to, whatever the geostrategic context in which maritime warfare is waged, and regardless of developments in technology and tactics, the object of maritime warfare does not change. It has two dimensions: first, to ensure freedom of access for trade to allow the state to function and survive, particularly if an island nation; second, to establish sea control in order to project combat power ashore and/or to cut an enemy's vital supply lines.

Before combat power can be delivered from the sea—through ship-based aircraft, ship/submarine-launched cruise missiles, or amphibious and land forces—the requisite

degree of sea control must be established in order to deliver it within an acceptable level of risk. The riskier, more complex, or time-consuming are the means by which combat power is to be delivered, the greater the degree of sea control that may be required. For example, sea control may have to extend over a wide area of the sea, land, and air above it before a major amphibious force can be landed.

In 1940 the Germans were never in a position to conduct Operation Sea Lion (the invasion of the United Kingdom). They had not neutralized the Royal Navy and had little prospect of doing so in anything other than a prolonged campaign of years not months. Their failure in the Battle of Britain meant that they could not achieve even limited air superiority over southern England for short periods of time. The Germans required maritime and air superiority of the Channel area from the Thames estuary to Plymouth to ensure a successful landing with constant resupply. Even if the Luftwaffe had been successful in the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force only needed to keep its remaining fighters outside German monoplane fighter range, thereby having them available in the event of an attempted invasion. In the final analysis, it was the maritime strength of the Royal Navy that made invasion impossible in 1940. That is not to diminish the significance of the Battle of Britain, which, being the first defeat of the German war machine, was of immense importance for morale, and in challenging the idea that air power alone could ensure a nation's collapse. In considering the efficacy of the proposed Operation Sea Lion, it is salutary to compare the overwhelming level of maritime and air superiority that the allies deemed necessary to effect the D-Day landings.

Limited Sea Control

Unlike the complex requirements for a major landing, a submarine submerged far from land requires very little in the way of sea control before it launches its land attack missile.

Risk

In warfare risk can be managed but cannot be reduced to simple formulas. Even when maritime warfare took the form of pitched battles at sea between opposing fleets, numerical superiority was no guarantee of success. Despite having twenty-seven ships to Villeneuve's thirty-three, Nelson was confident of success at Trafalgar and declared that he would not be satisfied with taking less than twenty prizes. His vision for the Battle of Trafalgar, given to his commanding officers, his 'Band of Brothers', nine days before the Fleets engaged, recognizes the uncertainties attendant on sea warfare:

> I send you my plan of attack as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position you may be found in.... Something must be left to chance: nothing is sure in a sea fight. Shot will carry away masts and yards of friends, as well as foes. Captains are to look to their lines as their rallying point, but in the event where signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his ship close alongside that of the enemy.

That remains good advice to this day and the victory at Trafalgar makes the point that superiority of numbers can be overcome by experience, judgement, training, and skill

of seamen combined with better technology. A classic example of this was the Battle of Tsushima where Admiral Tojo defeated the Russian Imperial Fleet in 1905.

Blockade

In a global or major war, sea control is usually employed offensively as a means of blockading an opponent's shipping lanes or ports or to enable amphibious forces to make a beachhead on a contested coastline. Blockade can often starve an opponent of resources and war materiel to the point where they are unable to sustain their war effort and collapse as a result, as was close to happening to Japan in 1945. Japan is an island nation but blockade can also have a dramatic impact on a continental nation. During the First World War, Germany was near collapse by 1918. The Allies had steadily tightened the grip of its blockade, instituted four years earlier. Great Britain was initially wary of offending neutral countries, particularly the USA, and conscious of the need to maintain her own markets abroad. But as the full nature of total war became apparent, and particularly with the United States' entry into the war in 1918, the blockade became a stranglehold. By 1918 this was telling, not simply in terms of food shortages, but the ability of Germany to continue sufficient levels of war production.[4] For example, by 1918, a quarter of Krupps' machine tools were at a standstill for want of specialist steel parts.[5] It was the impact of these industrial forces that helped to decide the fate of the German Army.[6] The inability of the Germans to produce any significant number of tanks was a reflection of their inability to expand production any further. Shortage of copper forced the Germans to make greater use of wireless telegraphy with the consequent benefit to Allied intelligence.[7] The fodder shortage affected some 100,000 horses on the western front, which severely restricted the ability to move artillery and shells; civilian rations fell short of a person's average daily needs in every month from July 1916 to the end of the war.[8] The blockade had a direct link to the total collapse of the German state and the revolutionary activities that spontaneously erupted across the nation.

The German U-boat campaign came near to achieving the same impact against Great Britain in 1917 and in the Second World War. Famously, in realizing the huge impact of maritime blockade on an island nation, Winston Churchill wrote: 'the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril'.

Types of Operation

Sea control operations are potentially wide-ranging and include the destruction of enemy naval forces, the suppression of enemy maritime commerce, the protection of vital sea lanes, and the establishment of local military superiority in areas of naval operations.

The variety of sea control tactics is huge. It is possible to describe a spectrum of sea control activity over the last sixty years ranging from heavyweight, essentially deterrent fleets undertaking open-ocean Cold War operations at one end, to the 'Sea Tigers', the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s fleet of waterborne suicide bombers at the other: agile, adaptive, and deadly, but nevertheless very limited in their strategic effect. The key method for establishing sea control is to attack and destroy shipping or to threaten to do so. Ascendancy of the submarine and aircraft carrier as the most effective

means of establishing sea control through direct attack—a distinction that they enjoy to this day—has seen the role of the conventional warship decline in importance since 1939. The destroyer (DD) and frigate (FF) are the smallest units capable of a full (albeit to a limited capability) range of worldwide autonomous action and they are particularly valuable for anti-piracy, anti-drug-smuggling and offshore tapestry tasks. The primary roles of DD/FFs are to enable the offensive capabilities of submarines and carriers by protecting them from attack by others, and giving fire support to amphibious and land forces ashore. Some nations have armed DDs with land-attack cruise missiles, which adds considerably to their utility at the operational and strategic level. Unless a navy is able to deploy one or more fully capable Carrier Battle Groups, its primary tool for sea control will be the submarine in concert with surface units. The submarine can attack shipping with torpedoes and tube-launched anti-ship missiles and lay mines. It can also be deployed defensively to engage hostile submarines.

Sea Denial

Sea denial is a facet of sea control, which very often stands in opposition to it. Sea denial is exercised when one party denies another the ability to control a maritime area, without either wishing or being able to control that area itself. Classic means of achieving sea denial are to lay a minefield or to deploy submarines and use air assets to threaten enemy surface forces. Mines are particularly effective weapons, being simple, cheap, reliable, and persistent. Minefields can deny an opponent the use of ports, shipping channels, and lanes as well as force shipping into 'kill zones' patrolled by submarines and aircraft. Modern mines are difficult to find and remove and can be easily delivered by ships, boats, submarines, and aircraft.

More recently, sea denial has come in the form of shore-based missile systems, which can pose an unacceptable level of risk to surface ships. The C-802 missile attack on Israeli Navy Ship *Hanit* by Hezbollah irregulars in 2006 was an example of attempting to effect sea denial. The ship was not destroyed but the attack led to the loss of sailors' lives and forced an immediate reassessment of adversary capabilities and force protection for inshore waters.

Sea denial and sea control operations are not mutually exclusive. The denial of an opponent's freedom of action is a consequence of effective sea control operations. Sea denial operations may be necessary to achieve sea control elsewhere but the concept is only applicable when full sea control is not exercised by choice or out of necessity.

Theatre of Operations

For maritime forces in war, operations may be conducted from under the Arctic ice, from the open oceans, within narrow seas, in shallow coastal and inshore waters, on rivers, on land, or in air. Putting these principles into practice therefore calls for an understanding

of the nature of all the environments in, over, under, and from which maritime warfare is conducted, as well as a grasp of the particular attributes of maritime forces.

The most striking capability of maritime forces is their impressive mobility. This is often not understood, even by military men of the other services. John Toland in his book on Hitler wrote of him: 'He who was practically landbound was stunned by the shocking mobility of sea power.'[9]

The seas, oceans, and skies above them give maritime forces unique global access, but they are also the most demanding and dangerous natural environment on the planet, where conditions can and often do complicate the war fighter's calculations and frustrate his plans. British Maritime Doctrine[10] makes this clear:

> Flying operations, amphibious landings and sonar performance may be made more difficult by high sea states and extreme high and low temperatures. Skilful seamanship and well-rehearsed tactics and procedures can reduce these effects, as can the acquisition of equipment designed to operate in the demanding maritime environment. Adverse conditions can also be used to advantage; a submarine, for example, can use poor sonar conditions to avoid detection. The mobility of maritime forces may allow them to move to an operating area where conditions are more favourable. An aircraft carrier can, for instance, seek out and exploit a local window in poor visibility to continue flying operations. This may be a particularly significant advantage when opposing shore-based aircraft are weather-bound.

During NATO operations in Bosnia during the 1990s, on many occasions when the Italian airbases were fogbound, it was only carriers that could provide the necessary air cover to our ground forces.

Over two-thirds of the world is covered by water and the distances involved can be staggering, particularly in the oceans. The Pacific Ocean, our largest, covers more than sixty-five million square miles and accounts for over 32 per cent of the earth's surface—an area larger than the planet's combined landmasses. Of these, 85 per cent of nations are directly accessible from the sea and the land-locked remainder are susceptible to influence from the sea; for example, up to 60 per cent of the NATO airpower over Afghanistan came courtesy of aircraft carriers in the early stages of the campaign there.

Maritime forces, free from the requirements of operating from fixed bases and overflight permissions, can move hundreds of miles per day. Their mobility is absolutely central to their military utility in war, a point that can be demonstrated equally by reference to the Korean and 1991 Gulf Wars. In September 1950, three months after the North Korean invasion of the South, the Northern forces had driven the United Nations forces into an area around Pusan in the far south of the peninsula. US Marines, covered by the gunfire of two British and two American cruisers, stormed ashore at the port of Inchon near the South Korean capital of Seoul which was soon recaptured. This surprise amphibious assault struck the Northern forces in the flank, cut their lines of communications and caused their rapid collapse and retreat. In the 1991 Gulf War two US Marine Corps brigades first carried out a demonstration landing in Oman, then remained poised at sea. The effect was to tie down five Iraqi divisions in defence of the Kuwaiti coastline.

There is no doubt that admirals think in terms of oceans, hundreds if not thousands of miles, with constant movement of forces (often five hundred-plus miles a day); loitering, hiding, reappearing, and influencing the fates of many nations at the same time. Consequently they are at home at the strategic level. This fluidity means maritime forces are much less vulnerable to terrorist-type attack and indeed to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. By contrast, the army has to occupy ground, and a move of fifty miles a day, particularly in contact with the enemy, is deemed a great success. Consequently their leaders seem more at home at the operational level. By being tied to fixed bases, the army and the air force are more vulnerable to terrorists, CBRN agents, and attack by targeted battlefield, regional, and strategic rockets or cruise missiles. It interesting to note that when the Argentinians invaded the Falkland Islands, there was an urgent scramble in the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) by the army and air force staffs to get maps that showed the southern hemisphere. The Navy offices had worldwide charts/maps whilst their service counterparts had maps of the Inner German border and parts of Europe.

Jointery and Scaleability

Maritime forces are most effective when they operate as joint assets, able to draw upon the complementary capabilities of air and land forces, appropriately enabled by logistical support, force protection, and good intelligence and surveillance capabilities. This is an inevitable characteristic of operations in support of a maritime strategy that has at its heart the ability to project power onto the land. There are some types of operations that are inevitably confined to naval forces, because the particular capabilities possessed by those forces are to be found nowhere else: naval blockade, escorting commercial shipping, anti-submarine warfare, and so on. Notwithstanding, those operations are conducted in order to establish the sea control necessary to project combat power ashore. The maritime environment demands operations across land, sea, and air, and so a balance of capabilities, drawn together under a unified command and control structure, is optimal for war-fighting. This may find its expression in a single unit, for example a type 45 destroyer which carries embarked marines or special forces, its own helicopter, long-range air radar, area air defence missiles, and shore bombardment capability—or in a Task Force or Group, either tailored for a particular operation or comprising a full range of capabilities (in the British case), including Commando Group amphibious assault and significant special forces capability including helicopter lift, land attack cruise missiles, strike aircraft, control of an up to 400-square-mile area of airspace and significant shore bombardment capability: enough for most eventualities.

The ability to 'scale' maritime forces is equally important. By 'scaleability' I mean the ability to integrate maritime units or Task Groups into a larger force, or release units and groups to conduct other operations in response to the changing tactical, operational, and strategic situation. In the same way, a wide range of (non-combat and) combat

power options is available, whether from a single unit or larger formations, which can also be ratcheted up or down. This not only allows maritime forces to dictate the tempo of operations, but also offers considerable freedom of choice to military commanders in how military forces are to be structured and how combat power is to be used.

Coalition Operations

Scaleability, particularly in the sort of coalition war-fighting we have seen in recent years, depends on the ability to integrate, nationally with land and air forces and, increasingly, multinationally in combined operations. The integration of multinational maritime forces is more straightforward than attempting to integrate land forces and permits operations over a wider area free from the artificial constraints of battlegroup operating areas. But it does bring its own challenges and calls for a degree of de-confliction and coordination. In common with land warfare, issues of language, non-standard operating procedures, and inconsistent rules of engagement will continue to vex the maritime commander unless every opportunity is taken to operate with other maritime forces before war comes. That way, differences can be ironed out or at least understood and accommodated, particularly where forces from outside traditional alliances and security structures are engaged. In the Caribbean, the Joint Interagency Task Force South is a prime example of collaboration between the US, UK, Dutch, French, and Spanish, along with national forces of the many island states within the region, to interdict the drug trade in the area. It has brought together intelligence agencies, air forces, special forces, and Customs to generate a web of international treaties, jurisdictional corridors, and enforcement routes to cover the entire region. Similarly, the UK-led EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA, protecting shipping from piracy in the Somali basin and off the Horn of Africa, is a valuable opportunity to build capacity and trust with maritime forces from many diverse nations beyond Europe and NATO, including most notably the Chinese, who last year undertook an historic out-of-area deployment to the region for counter-piracy operations.

Maritime Flexibility

Maritime forces provide options across the range of combat operations, from the early shaping of the battle space through surveillance and reconnaissance to the delivery of combat power at sea or from the sea—everything from air power and land-attack cruise missiles to boots on the ground. A useful diplomatic tool, they can exert influence and threaten action but then withdraw, unlike ground forces which once committed have no such option. They can also play an important role in supporting the building of the peace that is an essential component of a successful war.

Today's commander will ask himself three things: first, do I have the ability to go where I need to go (whether to attack enemy ships, deliver forces or air power ashore, or protect sea lines of communication while denying them to the enemy)? That is a function of geography and sea control, taking account of the risks posed by an opponent's sea control or sea denial capabilities. Secondly, do I have the wherewithal to protect myself and those units and non-combatants who either rely on me for that protection, or whose protection is part of my mission? Maritime forces at sea are organized to provide layered protection within Task Group or Task Force structures, are resilient to combat damage, and ultimately can exploit maritime manoeuvre to avoid the threat, but force protection is always a key consideration. Thirdly, do I have the capabilities needed to deliver my mission? Maritime forces are inherently flexible, providing a range of combat power options, whether from a single ship or submarine, or as part of a larger force with many complementary war-fighting capabilities. That said, if he is to use his forces as effectively as possible, a commander must bear in mind his role in the larger war plan and understand how his force contribution is intended to contribute to the joint campaign. The capability of the force—too often assessed by inexperienced commentators as a simple recitation of weapons and sensors—can only accurately be gauged by reference to the vital enablers that maintain or enable a force to operate effectively. These include intelligence about enemy plans and capability, logistic resupply of one's own units and—most important—the morale of the men and women under command.

There are two other considerations, which, while they may sound contemporary, are as timeless as the others. Today's commander must understand the roles, abilities, and ways of warfare, not just of his foe, but also of his allies. And he must enjoy and rely upon the confidence of those in his chain of command.

The Future

Challenges

The challenges faced by tomorrow's commander of maritime forces look set to increase in the future. There has been a great deal of thinking and writing about the future strategic environment, along with a tendency to extrapolate future outcomes from identifiable themes. Whatever worldview you prefer, there is a consensus that the end of the Cold War, far from ushering in an era of peace, led to a lengthy period of readjustment to US hegemony: relatively and surprisingly free of pain in some former Soviet bloc vassal states, but otherwise complex and costly in lives and resources, from the Balkans to the Hindu Kush. Conflict has followed along that fault line, and elsewhere, inflamed by the very diverse interests pursued by states, those sponsored by states, and the stateless. If you accept, as most do, that this complex security environment demands cooperative responses, embracing all the levers of national and international power, including joint,

preferably combined military operations, then maritime forces are going to remain fundamental to success.

If the last twenty years are anything to go by, the next twenty will be characterized by unpredictability, rapid change, instability, continued globalization, and increasing global interdependence. Transnational issues, such as terrorism, climate change, demographic shifts, religious and ethnic tensions, and increased competition for resources of all kinds provide the potential for crisis, confrontation, and conflict. The sea is the global highway that allows globalization to work; disrupt that highway and the model ceases to function. It is not just a question of allowing free movement of goods, energy, and people by sea, vitally important as that is. In many respects, competition for land resources will be mirrored by competition for the resources within and beneath the sea. Accentuated by the new access to Arctic waters as a result of the shrinking icecap. The accommodation between the interests of coastal and maritime states that finds its expression in the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) delineation of territorial sea, contiguous zones, and EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones) will increasingly be challenged, along with the freedoms of the high seas and the right of innocent passage.

Coastal states, emboldened by the relative paucity of maritime nations' naval forces to assert their own claims, will increasingly encroach on the freedoms enjoyed by maritime nations as the strategic and economic significance of the sea is realized in the developing global order. Excessive jurisdictional claims by coastal states over fish, mineral resources, and the deep seabed will provoke tensions as resources contract and the technology to exploit them deeper into the ocean and sea bed becomes available. Where maritime boundaries are disputed, or where conflicting claims to sovereign territory arise because of the rights to exploit the waters around that territory, tensions may provoke conflict. Notable examples are the Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the United Kingdom's controversial claim until 1997 that Rockall was an island which could generate extensive fishing rights into the Atlantic. The polar regions have always been hotly contested and recently Russia attempted to establish sovereignty over the Arctic seabed whilst Argentina has been outraged by oil exploration off the Falkland Islands. Such disagreements have the potential to directly involve states, or indirectly affect their interests in a way that may demand maritime force intervention.

War-Fighting

What does all this mean for the future of maritime warfare? Whilst predicting the future is a risky business and we may be certain that the unpredicted will occur, there remain indicators which can inform longer-term planning. Naval planners have no choice but to think strategically, given the lead times for the development and delivery of the equipments and training needed to facilitate effective maritime operations in time of war.

The prospect of large, decisive battles at sea has diminished. Few nations have large, effective fleets and those that do are able to rely on them as much to deter pitched battles at sea as to project power. The US fleet is by far the biggest in the world and the majority of other significant navies are established allies. Although the balance of maritime

power is gradually shifting in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the prospect of large fleet engagements in the medium term remains remote. While maritime forces will continue to exploit the mobility and protection of the seas, the focus of maritime warfare will look away from the oceans towards coastal regions, which brings its own challenges.

Operating at the interface of land, sea. and air requires the coordinated effort of sailors, marines, soldiers, and airmen. Commanders must understand the relationship between all environments, be alive to battle space management and the need to de-conflict complex activity. Freedom of manoeuvre, relatively easy to achieve in a large water-space, becomes constricted and more difficult to guarantee closer in to shore. The evolution of the modern anti-shipping missile and the proliferation of submarines mean that shipping must be defended from hostile missile-firing aircraft, ships, and submarines at greater ranges. The size and weight of carrier-based strike aircraft has increased proportionately and they can be deployed most effectively from the type of very large carriers used by the US Navy and those under development in the Royal Navy. Larger aircraft carriers allow the optimum use of air power, as they are able to generate sorties efficiently, re-role rapidly, and operate free from fixed airbases (susceptible to attack by terrorists in particular) and overflight restrictions. The stand-alone lightweight carrier is not a viable option for operations in contested waters although it can be used to good effect where sea control can be achieved.

In terms of technology, the utility of unmanned vehicles offers exciting and evolving prospects for changes in war-fighting and other military operations. Unmanned Combat Aerial and Surface or Sub-surface Vehicles are already a feature of modern warfare: they offer range, persistence, and strike capabilities relatively cheaply and at low risk to their operators. In the maritime environment, unmanned vehicles are already in use, with many navies countering the mine threat, conducting hydrographic and engineering survey operations and seabed recovery. The deck space on aircraft carriers offers an obvious platform for unmanned aerial variants as part of a tailored air group and the USMC (United States Marine Corps) is already experimenting with unmanned aircraft for logistics lift in the maritime environment. More widely, greater stealth and the ability to operate free from electronic and space-based scrutiny will remain at a premium. The aspiration for longer-range strike options with greater accuracy will continue, while the utility of submarines, both for sea control and denial, will see many more countries entering the market for sub-surface capability.

The era of ships operating solely with their own weapons and sensors is fast disappearing. Contemporary warfare requires the ability to collect information from a variety of off-board sources and onboard sensors and conduct focused analysis to produce the most up-to-date intelligence possible. This is the prerequisite for accurate targeting and the timely application of either:

a. hard (kinetic) power through the delivery of precision weapons (whether your own or delivered by another element of the force); or
b. soft power, influencing the behaviour of others through the range of non-kinetic means, from information operations and cyberwarfare to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These trends are very likely to continue.

Logistic support, based from the sea, already offers benefits in terms of force protection, mobility, and the persistence and sustainability of maritime forces, and the concept is attracting heavy investment in the USA and elsewhere. Again it removes the need for large static bases with all the vulnerabilities inherent in their existence. It is also one of the factors that make maritime forces so valuable in terms of humanitarian operations at a time when it would seem that natural disasters are on the increase.

Coalition Operations

The economic realities of interdependence and the inter-connected nature of international relations tend to suggest that—unless a nation has very powerful maritime forces configured for global reach, sustained presence, force protection, and very capable power projection—maritime forces will be increasingly multinational in nature. The era of coalition operations is already upon us. This trend will continue, at least as far as warfighting is concerned, because the challenges of international security will be global, calling for greater burden-sharing and joined-up international responses. Key enablers will be those that facilitate interoperability with other maritime forces; this may mean greater technological parity, the sharing of doctrine and operating procedures, and, ultimately, a common operational language.

Meanwhile, developments away from war itself may see state interests asserting themselves more strongly with the rapid disintegration of old alliances and the swift, perhaps temporary, formation of new partnerships which have strategic impact. Anything that frees nations from strategic dependence on other states, such as reliance on basing and overflight rights for those engaged in warfare elsewhere, is likely to assume greater importance.

Conclusion

For the future, if a nation has any ambition to use maritime forces for strategic effect, then it will want to ensure that—however large, whatever their capabilities—they are optimized for:

- global reach
- to be self-sustaining
- protecting themselves and others
- effecting sea control
- projecting power onto the land.

Conversely, if a nation has neither the ambition nor the resources to develop maritime forces beyond national defence, then emphasis will be on area-denial and anti-access capabilities, where range of influence is focused on coastal waters.

Whatever change we see in the coming years, be it geostrategic, demographic, national, economic, tactical or technological, the essential object of maritime warfare will not alter. Sea control will be the greatest priority in order to deliver combat power on and over the land and to blockade an enemy whilst ensuring freedom from blockade for oneself.

Notes

1. Gray, 2008: 15.
2. Ibid. 17.
3. Maritime forces should be understood to potentially comprise naval, air, and land forces.
4. Deist, 1996.
5. Offer, 1989: 72.
6. Wilson and Prior, 2001.
7. Black, 2009: 231.
8. Offer, 1989: 30, 60.
9. Toland, 1991.
10. Great Britain Ministry of Defence, British Maritime Doctrine BR 1806. 3rd edition, 2004.

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CHAPTER 30

AIR WARFARE

AIR COMMODORE FRANS OSINGA

Introduction

Several interrelated technological and doctrinal developments over the past two decades have changed the character of air warfare and indeed of the US-led Western way of war in general. It is notably different from the images of air warfare in the total wars of the twentieth century and was central in what has been termed the 'revolution in military affairs' of the 1990s. Recent wars, both conventional and irregular, have demonstrated the increased utility of the resultant new air power capabilities but also the necessity for ensuring proper strategic preconditions for effectuating the potential of post-industrial-age armed forces, of which air power is the cutting edge.

The Heritage: Air Power and Total War

The new style of warfare has been labelled precision age warfare, virtual war, spectator sport warfare, and post-modern war, to laud, to critique but in any case to indicate a sense of novelty and to contrast it with the World Wars and the Cold War.[1] The First World War saw the birth of air power, changing the character of war by adding a third dimension to it, thus expanding the zone of conflict, which allowed direct attack on enemy rear zones, cities, economies, and civilian populations.[2] In the four years of the First World War the now familiar distinct roles of air power were fleshed out: reconnaissance, air defence, air transport, air support, interdiction, and strategic attack.

During the Second World War, it was air power integrated in an overall joint strategy that dictated the conduct of operations in almost all theatres of war, and success was almost unthinkable without air superiority. Success in air warfare proved pivotal for the survival of Britain and for the defence of shipping convoys against German submarines

in the Atlantic, and for the outcome of the land battles in North Africa. Often, the demoralizing effects of air attacks on troops exceeded the real capacity to actually hit tanks and troop formations. Yet the sustained ability to hamper enemy troop movement and disrupt the logistical support system proved essential for the success of the Allied invasion in France and the subsequent march into Germany, and equally for the Russian advance. In the Pacific, air power revolutionized maritime power, demonstrating the vulnerability of ships to massed air attacks and subsequently turning the aircraft carrier into the capital vessel in naval warfare, supplanting the battleship. The American island-hopping strategy to defeat Japan was dominated by the requirement to obtain airbases for fighters, which would support the amphibious attack on the next island, and for strategic bombers, which could strike the Japanese homeland.

The Allied strategic bombing campaigns warrant specific discussion. The morality of the destruction of German (and later Japanese) cities has inspired a debate that continues up to this date, and directly informed the development of the Law of Armed Conflict with its strict principles of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality.[3] The bombing raids must be assessed in the strategic context and conceptualization of war of the time, and in light of theory and strategy development in Europe and the USA on strategic bombing during the *interbellum* that explicitly included targeting of industries and cities for deterrence and coercive purposes. The nature of war was considered total and civilian populations more or less legitimate targets. The crippling shipping blockades of the First World War had served as precedent, as had the bombing raids on cities such as Rotterdam, London, and Coventry. Furthermore, technology did not allow precision bombing, yet aerial bombing offered one of the few options to strike back at Germany in the early stages of the Second World War, thus also sending a welcome political signal to Russia, which was suffering massive losses on the Eastern Front.

Although many effects had not been anticipated by the *interbellum* theorists and Second World War commanders of strategic bomber forces, the strategic impact of the bombing campaigns is beyond doubt. The crippling of the infrastructure resulted in the dispersal and significant loss of efficiencies of German war material production and severely limited Hitler's tank and aircraft production expansion plans.[4] It drove Germany to divert scarce resources—guns, ammunition, aircraft, and two million men—to the defence of the homeland. The beleaguered population was severely affected, with some cities seeing 55–60 per cent of homes destroyed. Worker absenteeism rates of 20–25 per cent were not unusual. Perhaps the most significant effect was the defeat of the Luftwaffe, which suffered a 78 per cent decline in strength.[5] This provided the Allies with air superiority, preventing costly air superiority battles over Normandy, thus freeing up assets to cripple the French transportation network prior to D-Day, and to undermine efforts of the German army after the invasion.

The dropping of the two atomic bombs by B-29s dramatically highlighted how air warfare had changed war and strategy. Air warfare required the unprecedented cooperation of scientists, engineers, and industrialists in order to mass-produce front-line aircraft while simultaneously maintaining a steady pace of innovation in design. The failure to develop and sustain an efficient aircraft industry was to be one of the causes

of the undoing of Germany and Japan. The failure to maintain air control meant catastrophe for a country's cities, its industries and population, and, ultimately, the ability to defend the country. Thus, air power and total war were linked as both causes and consequences of each other.

The Cold War East-West confrontation dominated air power development after the Second World War. while highlighting the limited effects of conventional military capabilities in irregular warfare, as neither the Korean nor the Vietnam War significantly affected air power doctrine or force structures. Air defence was a major priority for NATO air forces whereas tactical missions such close air support and battlefield air interdiction were considered necessary but also ineffective and wasteful in light of the capabilities of modern surface-to-air missiles, as the Yom Kippur War of 1973 had demonstrated. In addition to an attritionist conventional air war over Europe, the threat of mass destruction inflicted upon city centres and military complexes by bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles was to dominate strategy and security policy.

Desert Storm: Air Power in Conventional Wars

Operation Desert Storm, the campaign to liberate Kuwait in winter 1991, was taken to represent a new age of warfare.[6] On the one hand it featured familiar NATO tactical air assets such as AWACS (airborne radar early warning aircraft), specialized aircraft to suppress Iraqi air defence systems (SEAD), air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft, F-16s, F-111 and F-15 fighter bombers. On the other hand, the intensive air offensive of thirty-nine days, including conventional strategic attacks against targets in downtown Baghdad, that preceded the four-day ground campaign, was a break with the common and expected pattern of operations.[7] Two technological icons stood out in creating this image: stealth technology and precision guided munitions (PGMs).

Stealth has been labelled revolutionary with some justification. With a radar reflection surface of a golf ball, the F-117s could operate almost unseen deep into enemy territory from the first moment of the war, sometimes attacking two targets per mission in the Baghdad area, which sported the highest density of air defence systems in the world. In turn, the availability of even a limited number of PGMs also made a dramatic qualitative difference, enabling a new model of conventional warfare, marked by a dramatic rise of intensity, lethality, and efficiency of air attacks.[8] Whereas a typical non-stealth attack package required thirty-eight aircraft to enable eight of those to deliver bombs on three targets, only twenty F-117s were required to simultaneously attack thirty-seven targets successfully in the face of an intense air defence threat. To illustrate, during the whole of 1943 Allied bombers attacked 123 target complexes in Germany whereas during the first twenty-four hours of Desert Storm 148 target complexes were attacked.

With air superiority gained in just a number of days, both technologies, in combination with electronic warfare and drones, implied a new dominance of offence over

defence in air warfare. This was a radical break with the past, when air warfare involved a continuous battle of attrition for air superiority, which could mostly only be obtained and exploited over a limited area and for a brief period of time. With Egypt operating modern Soviet SA-6 systems, the 1973 Yom Kippur War had demonstrated the increasing lethality of air defence systems. The defence had the upper hand. Desert Storm suggested that even non-stealthy aircraft, if equipped with precision munitions *and* precision information, could steer clear of even advanced air defence systems by flying at high altitude while maintaining accuracy of attacks. By rapidly crippling enemy air defence radars and SAM systems and effectively blinding the opponent, a virtual sanctuary in the third dimension was created that could be exploited for various purposes, such as reconnaissance, surveillance, interdiction, close air support (CAS), and strategic attacks.

The increased lethality of air-to-ground attacks suggested another break with experience. Most Western air forces had always considered interdiction and CAS risky missions that required vast numbers of aircraft with only limited chances of achieving significant effects, and hence an inefficient way to employ scarce air assets. Now, in contrast, one fighter could attack several targets in one mission, including dug-in tanks and artillery. In February 1991, air interdiction and CAS strikes destroyed almost two entire Iraqi divisions while they advanced to Al Kafji, after being detected by a JSTARS air-ground surveillance aircraft,[9] which subsequently inspired the Iraqi army to hunker down and continue to suffer mounting punishment, both physical and psychological, from the air. Roads and bridges leading into Kuwait were interdicted, isolating the Iraqi forces. Within the Kuwaiti theatre, coalition air attacks managed to destroy sometimes in excess of 50 per cent of Iraqi armour and artillery equipment and Iraqi ground troops surrendered by the thousands after being pounded by B-52 strikes or leaflets threatening such attacks. The result was a drastic shortening of the time required and the risk involved for ground units to complete the coalition victory.

In addition, Desert Storm saw the rediscovery of conventional strategic attack. Updating the *interbellum* ideas of theorists such as Douhet, Mitchell, and the US Air Corps Tactical School, John Warden, the architect of the strategic part of the air campaign, had recognized that precision, stand-off, and stealth capabilities offered new possibilities for strategic attacks against multiple target categories of a nation-state (military units, leadership, and critical infrastructure). Even if targets were in the vicinity of civilian objects, it was now possible to attack these near simultaneously in order to rapidly degrade the functioning of the entire 'enemy system', as he put it.[10] It was now possible to strike at the heart of a country (the regime) from the first moment of a campaign and cripple the strategic command capabilities before attacking fielded forces.[11]

Finally, Desert Storm suggested that military operations need not necessarily entail massive civilian casualties and the measure of 'collateral damage' to civilian infrastructure seemed to be controllable. In addition, the risk for coalition troops was lower than expected. Approximately 148 coalition military personnel died in combat, a regrettable but also unprecedentedly low number considering the scale of the operation and the pessimistic prewar estimates of 10,000 coalition casualties. The age of

mass warfare—industrial age warfare—that had existed since the First World War was drawing to an end, and a new popular image of modern warfare had been created.

The Balkans: Air Power as a Coercive Instrument

Theory Development

With such a 'mystique', air power, unsurprisingly, became the option of choice for Western politicians in the post-Cold War environment (perhaps pathologically so), where wars of necessity had given way to wars of choice, involving not national survival but limited interests and humanitarian values.[12] In the new, complex, and not entirely well-understood dynamics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions of the early 1990s in the Balkans, with ground forces tied to strict non-aggressive rules of engagement, NATO army commanders and politicians alike turned to air power when a punch was required to deter or coerce political and military leaders of the various ethnic factions. With the strategic attacks on Bagdad fresh in mind, this inspired a debate among Western academics and military planners on the best strategy to coerce an opponent.[13]

Various 'coercive mechanisms' were advocated, such as *decapitation* and *incapacitation* (paralysing the country or its military apparatus by eliminating command nodes or disrupting command processes), *punishment* (increasing the cost of achieving a strategic aim), or *denial* (eliminating the means to carry out the strategy thus decreasing the chances of success). The intensity of attacks was also a topic of debate, with one doctrinal school advocating 'decisive force', massively and continuously applied for maximum political and military shock, while others favoured a gradually increasing intensification so as to provide room for political manoeuvre. Eventually, these targeting rationales, combined with the new ability to strike accurately, were conceptually tied into an overarching concept called 'Effects Based Operations' that became part of US Joint targeting doctrine in 2001 and of the NATO lexicon in 2002. It recognized that forces must be able to produce a variety of desired military and political effects, not merely massive destruction.[14] Few of these insights informed strategic thinking in practice, however.

Deny Flight and Deliberate Force

NATO air operation Deny Flight in the Balkans highlighted the conditional nature of the advantage high technology may offer when not tied to a proper strategy and suitable context. Typical European weather hindered European aircraft that were not widely equipped with PGMs. Lacking a well-established and proven peacekeeping doctrine, Western forces operated under a limited UN mandate, and in a politically constrained

environment, where pinprick air strikes on targets with limited strategic value were unsurprisingly ineffective.

In response to the Srebrenica massacre in summer 1995, the NATO alliance took steps to create proper conditions for the effective use of force. When Operation Deliberate Force started on 30 August 1995 against Bosnian Serb forces, the effect of modern Western air power, in fortuitous simultaneity with a Croat ground offensive, was visible even if only employed in a limited coercive campaign. A total of 293 aircraft flew 3,515 sorties in two weeks to deter Serb aggression. Compared to Desert Storm the percentage of PGMs used was much greater, totalling 98 per cent of US and 28 per cent of non-US ordnance delivered. Serb leadership stood powerless against this air offensive that destroyed the military capabilities it needed for the defence against the Croats. As a result of this relatively low-risk endeavour, all military and political objectives were attained: safe areas were no longer under attack or threatened, heavy weapons had been removed from designated areas, and Sarajevo's airport could once again be opened, as could roads to the city. More importantly, the path to a peace agreement had been secured.

Allied Force

Over Kosovo, between 24 March and 27 June 1999, strategy once again was lacking. During that period, NATO, led by the USA, after a year of fruitless diplomatic efforts, conducted a limited air campaign to halt the continuing human-rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of the Kosovo province by the Serb strongman Slobodan Milosevic. The stunningly limited level of intensity of the first air strikes (only 48 sorties a day, versus 1,300 daily during Desert Storm) did not in any way convey power, a sense of urgency or commitment, violating any guidance that the literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy offered. US commanders had preferred to use Desert Storm-style overwhelming parallel strikes also against targets in Belgrade, and avoid Vietnam-era gradualism. However, such a nearly dogmatic approach was disconnected from the political reality within the fragile NATO coalition, where the need for consensus precluded any such thoughts, despite the fact that Europe was crucially dependent on the wide array of American capabilities, such as numerous tankers, satellites, data-links, Early Warning and SEAD aircraft, required for a modern sustained air campaign of any intensity.

Force escalation only became an accepted option when NATO credibility came to be at stake. Despite deficiencies in strategy, planning, operational concept, and day-to-day command of the operation (that included target selection by three heads of state), Allied Force nevertheless was a turning point.[15] A combination of factors forced Milosevic's hand. This included the shift in Russia's diplomacy away from Serb leadership; the rumour that a ground option would be reconsidered within NATO (although explicitly ruled out by US President Clinton); the increasing intensity of Kosovo Liberation Army activities; NATO perseverance despite setbacks; and the exhaustion of possible

Serb countermoves without marked effects. All of these, however, only came into play after and because of the continued limited air campaign.[16] In the end, NATO achieved its goals, at low losses and costs, especially considering estimates of the number of ground forces that would have been required for a forced entry into Kosovo (in excess of 100,000).

The air campaign lasted seventy-eight days, involved 38,000 combat sorties by 829 strike aircraft, and exploited increased satellite and data-link capabilities, and multiple reconnaissance and surveillance assets. GPS-guided PGMs offered all-weather and night precision navigation and attack capabilities. With PGMs accounting for 40 per cent of the ordnance delivered, the trend of increasing use of precision weapons was continued. By flying at high altitudes and by launching weapons from stand-off ranges, allied casualties were avoided and only two aircraft were downed. To appreciate this accomplishment: two decades earlier in 1972, the US lost sixteen B-52 bombers in just eleven days during the Linebacker II campaign against North Vietnam.[17] Several firsts were noted: a Dutch F-16 downed a Mig-29 at night using the new AMRAAM air-to-air missile; B-2 bombers saw their first offensive actions, flying thirty-two-hour missions and receiving target details over satellite data-link on their way to Europe; and for the first time too, unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Predator, Pioneer, and Hunter made a substantial contribution. Another first was the deployment of Predators equipped with laser target designators. It heralded the transition into the twenty-first century.

Into the Twenty-First Century: Air Power in Irregular Warfare

Discovering Traditional Problems

By 2000 various studies recognized that air power had become the weapon of first resort and a symbol for the new American (and as the USA was mostly in the lead in NATO operations, also by extension Western) way of war, and indeed of US hegemonic power. It stressed high tempo, the offensive, information dominance, precision engagement from stand-off ranges, and risk reduction. It dovetailed with the transformation of US army units that needed to prepare for expeditionary operations; in order to be light and mobile, air support, instead of heavy artillery and armour, was to provide the necessary firepower.[18] Vision still often clashed with reality, though, as the Balkan experience demonstrated.

First, the opponents in the 1990s had been either a small state or one that opted to mass its forces and wait until the inevitable happened. Most targets that were attacked were large and/or static. During the 1990s, air operations centres often lacked timely battle damage assessment, the air tasking cycle was deemed inflexible and long, and information on emerging targets was too slow to reach the air operations centres and strike aircraft. As a result, when the target was mobile and small, or the terrain and flying

weather not so favourable, air power failed mostly in its tasks. Second, and fuelling this problem, adaptive enemies also quickly learned to exploit caves, underground facilities, dispersal of equipment and troops, and the use of decoys, and if necessary, the perverse use of convoys of refugees, negating the asymmetric edge that air power confers upon Western forces.

For instance, in 1991, despite a massive redirection of aircraft to execute the famous Scud Hunt, of the forty-two launches that were spotted (out of eighty-eight Iraqi launches), only eight could be attacked and none of those was successful. The time between target detection and that information arriving at a pilot overhead the target still consumed up to fourteen hours. The Serbs, in turn, moved their outdated SA-3 systems every few hours and were able to fire off 815 SAMs, forcing the NATO planners to dedicate 30 per cent of every wave of attackers to the SEAD mission, making up 58 per cent of all offensive sorties of Operation Allied Force. Moreover, this threat-in-being prevented NATO from employing potent but vulnerable AC-130 gunships and Apache combat helicopters, which could have been very effective against the small Serb infantry groups. In the mountainous terrain of Kosovo Serb troops could hardly be detected and attacked. Adverse weather and smart use of decoys compounded to make target observation and laser designation a daunting task.

In effect, Western air forces were rediscovering the traditional challenges of air power in irregular warfare. British experience in the Malayan Campaign and the US experience in Vietnam indicated that in counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla operations, air power can play a very significant but mostly supporting and 'non-kinetic' role such as air transport, liaison, air mobile operations, Medevac, and reconnaissance (indeed, these are the primary roles of air forces in South America and Africa).[19] Interdiction by high-speed fighters and bombers often were ineffective or irrelevant against opponents that do not depend on a large infrastructure or sustained logistical flow of materiel. In urban environments, the negative side-effects of air attacks involving numerous civilian casualties often outweighed the potential benefits. Close air support, while vital, was always crucially dependent on good, but hard to effectuate, coordination between air and land units in order to target the enemy in time, but equally to de-conflict with own troops and prevent fratricide. To wit, during Desert Storm out of a total of 467 US battle casualties, 'friendly' air-to-ground incidents killed eleven US servicemen and wounded fifteen, a third of the total fratricide casualties.

Operation Enduring Freedom

Operation Enduring Freedom, the American military response to the 9/11 terror attacks by Al Qaeda, indicated distinct progress in that respect. The US was confronted with an enemy trained in guerrilla fighting in mountainous terrain, with an impressive track record against the former Soviet Union and domestic rivals, with no significant infrastructure offering strategic coercive leverage, and within a region non-supportive of US military action. It was neither obvious nor predetermined that the US would come out

victoriously from Operation Enduring Freedom, and with such relatively low costs in terms of destruction and losses.

With only 300–500 Special Forces actually within Afghan territory, uniting and empowering local opposition factions totalling no more than 15,000 men, the USA managed to evict a force of 60,000 Taliban fighters and the regime. It was in essence an air campaign conducted in conjunction with, and supported by, special operations forces and friendly indigenous fighters. It required a relatively limited operation of 100 combat sorties a day, amounting to 38,000 sorties flown. Outside Afghanistan, a US/UK force of approximately 60,000 men supported this operation, dispersed over 267 bases, on thirty locations in fifteen countries. The US lost thirty men.[20] And again, the use of PGMs increased, this time up to 60 per cent, indicating that PGMs had become the norm.

A crucial ingredient was the unprecedented integration of ground-air communications. This was the fruit of various (mostly US) military initiatives to exploit developments in ICT in combination with doctrinal and organizational changes with the prime objectives being to make the battlefield more transparent; to achieve 'information dominance' and create situational awareness at all command levels; to disseminate target information in good time to those who needed it; and to adjust command and control doctrine accordingly. From 1997 onwards these trends were aligned under the banner of the US joint concept of network-centric warfare (NCW), which became one of the key ideas behind the Transformation programme both in the US as well as in NATO. Briefly put, NCW entailed creating a network of sensors, 'shooter platforms', and command nodes through data-links, allowing the rapid dissemination of information towards anyone who may need it, from the highest to the lowest levels, with the aim of reducing response times and increasing the tempo of operations.[21] For air forces the objective was to shorten the 'sensor-to-shooter' time, or the 'kill-chain', enabling time-sensitive targeting, enhancing air-land cooperation in the process.[22]

In combination with data-link-equipped Special Forces in the area, who acted as forward air controllers, these new capabilities allowed the engagement of so-called emerging targets such as small Taliban troop contingents. Midway through the operation, 'flex-targeting' dominated: 80 per cent of sorties took off without specific assigned target. Instead, JSTARS, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Special Forces acted as eyes, spotting pop-up targets and relaying time-sensitive up-to-date accurate target information to shooter platforms inbound or already circling in the vicinity, and handed the aircraft off to the forward air controller. It offered a stunning reaction capability, with response times sometimes down to several minutes, and averaging only twenty minutes. This Afghan model of the combination of air power *supported by* dispersed small units of Special Forces proved a formidable force.[23]

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Iraqi Freedom reaped the benefits of the experience of Enduring Freedom.[24] The flawed Operation Anaconda of March 2002, where the 10th Mountain Division blatantly neglected to involve the USAF in the planning process with US fatalities as a

result, had reaffirmed that close cooperation in planning and execution between air and land units was essential. It resulted in organizational improvements in the cooperation between the US Army and USAF, increased attention to training and equipping tactical air control teams, increasing the number of such teams, and air-land integration at ever lower tactical levels by assigning air liaison officers and joint tactical air controllers to companies, if required even at platoon level. The conventional phase of Iraqi Freedom aimed to capitalize on these developments.

There were only 125,000 forces in Iraq, with only three divisions forming the 'spear' of the attack, whilst Iraqi forces numbered 400,000 including some 100,000 well-trained and -equipped Republican Guard troops. In the south, the US secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put his trust on the NCW concept with precision bombing, a small, fast-moving ground attack force and heavy reliance on Special Operations Forces and air power. Air-ground surveillance systems, unmanned aircraft, and Special Forces located conventional Iraqi forces while a continuous stream of strike aircraft delivered ordnance on the accurate target locations provided to them. In a single week, the coalition destroyed 1,000 tanks and reduced the Republican Guard by 50 per cent. Although US and British ground units saw some intense close combat against Fedayeen fighters, most Iraqi armour and artillery was neutralized before it could deploy against coalition ground forces. Even urban operations saw enhanced effectiveness of air strikes. Intense intelligence preparations had produced detailed maps featuring codes for individual buildings of specific areas in Baghdad that facilitated CAS coordination with ground troops. A time-sensitive-targeting cell responded to emerging information on important targets by re-tasking orbiting fighters or bombers. In various cases it took approximately twelve minutes to destroy a confirmed target; in some cases it was five minutes after detection.

Applying the Operation Enduring Freedom model, in the west and north of Iraq large numbers of SOF teams (Special Operating Forces) operated as part of a closely integrated team with airborne sensors, command nodes, and offensive aircraft to detect and neutralize potential launches of surface-to-surface missiles such as the Scud and to restrict Iraqi freedom of movement on the ground. The legitimacy, political and strategic soundness, neo-conservative ideological undertones, and neglect of post-conflict planning have justifiably been heavily criticized. This should not distract however from some of the stunning military achievements, albeit against once again a very cooperative opponent.

Fighting Terrorists and Insurgents

These new air capabilities also enabled NATO to conduct operations in Afghanistan from 2003 onwards, including COIN operations. Intense air-land integration proved challenging (vast distances, many national caveats on the use of their units, few NATO Air C2 capabilities) as well as essential. Without continued strategic and in-theatre air transport, logistical supply, air mobility, timely Medevac, rapid and precise offensive air

support for troops in contact (which occurred on a daily basis), and air reconnaissance for convoy protection and detection and tracking of enemy movement, operations with light ground forces in such vast, barren, and underdeveloped terrain would be highly vulnerable, ineffective, and sometimes simply unfeasible. Indeed, modern air power has proven far from a peripheral instrument for COIN operations.[25]

One recent development stands out in such operations: the proliferation of the use of UAVs in the surveillance, and increasingly also in the combat role. Literally thousands of small, medium, and large UAVs have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of COIN operations. The advantages are obvious. Small UAVs can be launched, operated, and recovered by deployed surface forces, offering them organic reconnaissance capability. In Afghanistan and Iraq UAVs have provided effective surveillance for detecting—and deterring—the placement of improvised explosive devices. Larger UAVs offer persistent presence over maritime patrol and combat zones, and at strategic distances if required, routinely well beyond that of manned platforms which offsets their usually slow transit speeds (typically between 100 and 200 knots). For adversaries this makes exposure outside buildings or forests a risky activity. Armed UAVs, or a combination of manned fighters and a targeting-pod-equipped UAV have also proven to be able to strike key leaders and small groups of Taliban insurgents (and guerrilla fighters, as the FARC has experienced), and are especially suited for politically delicate missions, such as targeting of Al Qaeda militants in Pakistan and Yemen by the CIA. In fact, the first sortie of Enduring Freedom was an armed Predator UAV operated from an airbase near Las Vegas, 7,000 miles distant.

The Israeli Experience

The IDF's experiences in 2006 demonstrated once again the benefits as well as the conditional nature of technological superiority. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) had been in the forefront of, and reliant upon, air power developments, including the use of UAVs. During much of the 1990s the IDF, in particular the army, had focused on policing operations, losing much of its capacity to wage combined arms warfare.[26] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) meanwhile had honed its skills in targeted killing of key leaders of Hamas and the PLO through the use of data-linked surveillance UAVs, combat helicopters, and fighter aircraft, a concept that it pioneered against Syrian SAM systems in the Bekaa Valley in 1982. This, combined with an aversion to casualties and instability, resulted in a belief shared by civilian and military leaders that air power could offer a low-cost—primarily in terms of casualties—way to retaliate and defeat adversaries such as Hamas and Hezbollah. In the summer of 2006 this model was applied in order to stop the Hezbollah firing of Katyusha rockets against Israeli communities and compel Hezbollah to return two soldiers to Israel whom they had abducted.

In part this low-risk strategy was effective. The IDF, operating primarily through its air assets, is thought to have eliminated about 500 of Hezbollah's most advanced fighters and forced many of the others to evacuate the areas south of the Litani River. The

IAF destroyed about half of the unused longer-range rockets, and much of Lebanon's infrastructure, which was used to resupply Hezbollah. Indeed, as it demonstrated again in Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 and January 2009 against Hamas, by virtue of an established network of multiple UAVs, fighter aircraft, and artillery, the IAF managed to strike targets within minutes and sometimes seconds after a launch had been detected. After the war, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted he had underestimated the degree to which Israel would retaliate, and would probably have been more cautious about the capture of two Israeli soldiers in the first place. To some, the Second Lebanon War was a success in that it subdued Hezbollah for a considerable period, buying Israel time, which is the underlying strategic logic behind the various military operations from which Israel does not expect lasting solutions.

On the other hand, air power was unlikely to be able to produce the desired outcome against a hybrid opponent such as Hezbollah that lacked high-value targets, such as industrial facilities and robust command and control nodes. Instead, Hezbollah's main targets became its leadership, fielded forces, and weapons, hidden among civilians and, moving their offensive capabilities frequently, extremely difficult to target. The IDF attacks inevitably contributed to the tally of 1,100 Lebanese civilian casualties. From stand-off positions, there was no way to distinguish between ununiformed Hezbollah fighters and Lebanese civilians. Mingling with civilians, hiding in mosques or day care centres, was a tactic of dubious moral standing, but the collateral damage it elicited had the advantageous effect of rallying and recruiting sympathizers to its side in the fight against Israel. By showcasing the damage in Lebanon and portraying (indeed by manipulating video material of) the Israeli attacks against civilians as inhumane, Hezbollah was able to generate sympathy for its actions among the Lebanese domestic audience but also internationally. Hezbollah clearly understood the increasing importance of winning the media battle.

Air Power and Post-Modern Ethics

That highlights the paradox that the demonstrated ability to attack with unprecedented precision has raised the bar for future operations, more so than for any other type of offensive force. Desert Storm brought images of cruise missiles flying through the streets of Baghdad. The CNN effect was born and such images have become the expectation, the public and political—ethical—norm and thus the military norm.[27] Targeting errors thus gain instant attention and condemnation. In contrast with the world wars, where the certainty of massive civilian casualties did not inhibit the wholesale bombing of cities, now the risk of unintended 'collateral damage' from air attacks has become highly problematic, even when legitimate targets are struck and civilian casualties are the result of deliberate and unlawful negligence on the part of the defenders, who exploit Western sensitivities. In this they are aided by the proliferation of social media such as camera-equipped cell phones, YouTube, and Twitter.

Risk avoidance has predictably become a paramount concern for military commanders and their political superiors. Nevertheless, and despite the unprecedented media and

hence political and legal scrutiny, it has led to claims that because of enhanced precision and riskless air strikes, Western politicians and ground commanders in close combat with insurgents have been more liberal in resorting to force to achieve their ends than in previous eras, when such aims could only be achieved by risky and costly deployments of ground troops. The increasing automization of war in the form of widespread employment of armed UAVs seems to lend credence to this perspective. The ease of targeting key leaders, while precise, may result in numerous civilian casualties, as has happened with UAV attacks in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Several critics thus claim that modern practices of stand-off warfare deliberately transfer risk onto the civilian population, and away from soldiers, airmen, and Western societies at large.[28]

Conclusion

Despite such countermeasures and criticism, undeniably post-modern air warfare stands in stark contrast to the massive destruction by air attacks in the total wars of the twentieth century. The images of precision strikes in various operations—Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom—and the political preference for the air power instrument have become iconic for the New American Way of War and (as the USA has led most NATO operations), indeed the Western way of war. These operations highlighted the new face of modern air power, featuring new technologies—stealth, improved sensors, UAVs, and precision weapons—combined with new doctrines. Subsequent expectations sometimes exceeded what lack of strategy, inadequate resources, the operational environment, opponent actions, or the constraints of politics allowed. Moreover, the paradoxical nature of strategy predicts that adversaries will know how to adapt to such innovations (and they have) and with the ongoing diffusion of modern technology the asymmetric edge will slowly be blunted. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the history of air power, several related changes have altered the nature of joint operations, amounting to a so-called (and debated) 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA) that has enhanced the versatility of air power in general and its utility in supporting land operations in complex fluid environments such as counterinsurgency in particular.

First, the new ability to quickly achieve air superiority on a theatre-wide scale offers joint commanders a valuable asymmetric 'sanctuary' to be exploited for various purposes, and provides new levels of protection for ground forces, lines of supply, and logistics sites. Second, exploiting air superiority, airborne sensor platforms can provide unprecedented levels of situational awareness to the ground force commander and thus detect, and if necessary prevent, an adversary from massing armoured forces, and delay, disrupt, and destroy follow-on forces. Third, rapid dissemination of accurate target information enhances precision of air strikes and reduces response times, enabling effective engagement of small and mobile targets such as insurgents, thus improving air support. Fourth, these capabilities enable an increased level of intensity of the air offensive, thus allowing a higher operational tempo for the entire campaign. Finally, those

new capabilities provide new options for coercive diplomacy and even enable targeting of individual terrorist leaders.

Importantly, those developments have resulted in a significant reduction of risk for the attacking force's own ground troops as well as for civilians. Indeed, with binding constraints to limit, and with such concern for, human suffering, it has been termed 'humane warfare'.[29] In a sense, the air-power-led RMA has spawned a particular mode of warfare that suits and feeds Western societal changes in norms, expectations, and aspirations towards the use of force, and in the role, meaning, and legitimacy of war in a period when the military threat against their own countries disappeared and militaries seemed mostly busy protecting humanitarian values. Post-modern air power may indeed have become a cultural and normative expression of the Western Way of War.[30]

Notes

1. Gray, 1997; Ignatieff, 2000; McInnes, 2002.
2. This section draws in particular from the excellent studies by John Buckley (1999) and John Olson (2010).
3. For a recent discussion, see Garrett, 1993; Biddle, 2002; and Grayling, 2006.
4. For a very balanced detailed analysis, see Overy, 1981.
5. Buckley, 1999: 166.
6. Keaney and Cohen, 1995: 188. See also Cohen, 1996: 37–54. For a critical perspective on the RMA, see Gray, 2002.
7. Hallion, 1992: 252.
8. Ibid. 205.
9. Titus, 1996: 19.
10. See for instance Warden, 1995.
11. For a balanced assessment of the strategic attacks of the air campaign, see Davis, 1998.
12. Cohen, 1994. See also Farrell, 2002: 286.
13. See for instance Mueller, K., 1998.
14. See for instance Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002.
15. Lambeth, 2000: 181.
16. See, for balanced analysis of the Kosovo operation, Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000; Posen, 2000; and Lambeth, 2001.
17. McInnes, 2002: 92.
18. Pirnie et al., 2005.
19. See Corum and Johnson, 2003.
20. It is estimated that 8,000–12,000 Taliban fighters were killed. Estimated numbers of Afghan civilian casualties vary from 800 to 3,500. See O'Hanlon, 2002: 49.
21. Rumsfeld, 2002: 20–32; for a comprehensive overview of these developments, see for instance Kagan, 2006.
22. For a concise description of the tenets of Transformation, see Farrell, Terriff, and Osinga, 2010: ch. 2. For a thorough overview of the evolution of air command and control, see Kometer, 2007. The concept of NCW is discussed in detail in Alberts et al., 1999. Another influential volume was Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997.
23. For an in-depth analysis, see Lambeth, 2005.

24. For detailed analysis, see Cordesman, 2003; Murray and Scales, 2003; Woodward, 2004; Mahnken and Keaney, 2007).
25. Mueller, 2010. See, for an up-to-date discussion of air power in COIN, Hayward, 2009.
26. This section draws in particular from Krebs, 2009; and from Brun, 2010. For a detailed analysis, see also Arkin, 2007.
27. Thomas, 2001: 162–4.
28. It has been termed risk transfer warfare. For a mildly critical perspective, see Cornish, 2007. For a very critical perspective, see Shaw, 2005.
29. Coker, 2002: 2–5.
30. Thomas, 2001; Coker, 2002; and Farrell, 2005; Mueller, J., 2007.

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CHAPTER 31

TEACHING WAR

COLONEL TON DE MUNNIK

This Handbook does not argue that war is biologically predetermined. More often it is seen as a rational, political instrument to achieve the objectives of a nation, a coalition, or a faction. By others it is considered as a phenomenon inextricably connected to mankind as an end in itself. Van Creveld considers war as 'a highly attractive activity for which no other can provide an adequate substitute' (Van Creveld, 1991: 218). True or not, the broad public interest in the phenomenon of war is proved by an ever increasing number of magazines, documentaries, websites, and interactive games during the last decade. Obviously war has an inherent fascination. At a more intellectual level, the last decade also demonstrates an increasing interest from a growing number of scholars. A huge array of articles, studies, dissertations, etc., is published compared with the limited dimension of publications in the decades of the Cold War. Never before was it possible to study war as a separate object at civilian universities; never before were so many civilian students interested in conflict, its causes and consequences.

In traditional military institutions, like military, air, or naval academies, staff and war colleges, the study of war took a different approach after the loss of the fixed patterns of the Cold War. The uncertainty of missions in fragile or failed states and the requirement to educate officers in a way comparable with civilian counterparts led to the acceptance of an academic approach in the curricula of most military institutions.[1] These developments didn't only affect the content matter of conflict and war but required also a fundamental consideration of the study of war and as a consequence the way conflict and war is taught. The description and interpretation of terms like security studies, war studies, military art and sciences, and military studies have a profound impact on the character of the educational programme, its objects of study, its approaches, and its teaching staff.

This chapter will examine the different approaches to education within the context of military organizations. It is focused on the military conduct of war by its performers, particularly the officer corps. The instruction and training of armed forces will not be addressed, although this is an essential part of the fighting power. This chapter focuses on education as the intellectual, moral, and social instruction to a student as a

formal and prolonged process (*Oxford Concise Dictionary,* 1998) and is limited to the conceptual component of the overarching term 'fighting power' as described in NATO and British doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2008: 2–20). The chapter will provide a conceptual approach to the study of war that is applicable to the education of officers and officer-cadets or midshipmen. It clarifies the choices to be made in the development process of a curriculum.

To that purpose this chapter will first define the object of study in a holistic approach. After that description this chapter summarizes some educational designs that are used by a limited but representative number of nations and military institutions. The variety in design will lead to a conceptual model which helps to make choices in curricula for the professional teaching of war. In the subsequent section a choice will be elaborated, with some 'best practices' in the didactics for the controversial study of military operations. The demand to educate independently thinking officers and to keep the curriculum current and adapted to the professional requirements is described in the next section. Finally, future developments of lifelong learning with its opportunities and limitations will be discussed.

The Study of War

Education as a process of systematic instruction is not by definition an academic process, and war in itself is subject to an intellectual process. According to Clausewitz, war is basically an act of force in which emotions cannot fail to be involved. This simple approach from the Middle Ages is, however, not tenable. Since the Renaissance there has been a clear increase in academic interest in the subject of war. At first this interest was mainly focused on the application of technological innovations in war, but this was soon followed by profound studies of the theoretical foundations of war. Obviously war was considered as a subject that deserved study. Most military institutions struggle with the fundamental question to what extent education for war requires an academic approach and how this should be reflected in the curriculum.

The study of strategy is less controversial. If strategy is defined as the application of military power to achieve political objectives, it provides the bridge between the application of military force and political goals. Many universities offer courses which cover this relationship, either as a pragmatic activity or as 'idle academic pursuit for its own sake' (Brodie, 1973: 76). Those courses are mostly vested in the broader perspective of security studies, international relations, and political science. The academic approach in this field is unquestionable.

Professional education in war is, however, more than strategic studies. It covers also education in the knowledge, insights, understanding, and skills required to perform duties in a very complex environment. This requires a coherent approach to the study of war that involves not only strategic studies, but also technology, behavioural sciences, and the rule of law. All are contributing fields and undisputed as academic

disciplines. But simply mastering these academic fields is not the key to understand the dynamics of war, especially at sea, on the battlefield, or in the air, where the acts of force take place. The battle as such is the classroom in which the professionals wage their war.

The debate in military institutions on the teaching of war was mainly about the question of whether the dynamics of war at sea, in the air, or on the battlefield, i.e. military art and sciences, justified an academic approach. The development of general staffs, military academies. and staff colleges in the nineteenth century is a clear indication of the professionalization of most officer corps. These institutions grew into places where war was studied in all its dimensions, which was indispensable to cope with the drastic transformation as a result of the industrial revolution. Measured against nineteenth-century standards, the study of war in the broadest sense was an academic discipline. And that remained true in the first half of the twentieth century.

In the Cold War era serious doubts were raised as to the academic calibre, not of the contributing fields of science but mainly of the military art and sciences. The term 'art and science' is indicative for the dualistic vision of the dynamics of the battle and the battlefield. Two superpower blocs were opposed to each other and their forces were prepared to deploy against each other at sea, on land, and in the air. Military commanders were limited in their choices in this deployment of fighting power. Most choices were already made at the political and strategic level and the field commanders had narrow margins. This led to an instrumental approach to the application of force. Fixed patterns with a certain degree of routine were more dominant in military thinking than variable factors and flexibility. For a long time this way of thinking controlled military doctrine and as a result education. Military art and sciences were mostly regarded as a non-academic playing field in which instrumentality played first fiddle.

Moreover, the traditional war studies lost terrain in the Cold War era to management sciences. Their preference for a clinical approach to figures, their priority for procedures and production management, and their interest in linear correlations between cause and effect matched very well with the function of deterrence. The complex, multifaceted, and intense dynamics of battle and the need for truly competent professional officers able to deal effectively with such complexity were less relevant. This led to a serious contraction of war studies in the Cold War era within the military institutions.

Looking back, this confinement in the Cold War era is an exception in the line of history. In the world after 1990 military actions are strongly influenced by political and cultural issues, including non-Western cultures. Military actions take place on a 'battle'-field in extraordinarily complex situations, with more influencing factors than ever before. This complex environment not only requires creativity, but also innovating competence in action, related to the available resources, including non-kinetic means. Only officers with an academic level in thinking and working are able to cope with the challenges of current operations.

In spite of this conclusion there is still a tendency within most armed forces to minimize this academic education and to limit education to learning skills and drills and to reduce it to the sheer application of doctrine. This choice, principally based on efficiency,

harbours the danger that officers are fixed on patterns and routine and lack competence in adaptation and flexibility.

If the study of war in its broadest sense is interpreted as an academic discipline, the next question is: What is the object of study? In most civilian institutions which deal with this subject, the object is war as a phenomenon for its own sake. That leads to themes such as the function of war in politics and society, prevention of war, causes and effects and consequences of conflict, and termination of conflict and war. Although relevant, a limitation to these themes is not practical and not sufficient for the professional. The core subject for a professional officer is the application of military force, either kinetic or non-kinetic, because that is his business in war. Strategic studies, international relations, behavioural sciences, technology, and the rule of law are the main contributors to the understanding of the complex environment, but those fields of science don't make it complete, as the dynamics of the battle which are produced by the application of military force are not addressed.

In the standard military vocabulary, strategy and tactics are the terms that cover the application of hard and soft fighting power. Strategy on the higher level, with the scope of fulfilling political objectives, and tactics on the lower levels as the employment of units in combat. So, strategy and tactics direct professional war studies programmes. As mentioned before, the subject of strategy as an academic discipline is undisputed, but that doesn't apply to tactics. The academic approach to tactics will be elaborated later on in this chapter.

The development of knowledge about the application of military force cannot be generated by itself. The connecting fields of behavioural sciences, international relations, technology, and the laws of war shape the conditions under which military force is applied and provides conditional knowledge, but the direct sources of knowledge for the application of military force are military history and operations research. Military history is more than the reconstruction of battles: the objective of military history is not only illustrative, but must particularly be focused on the understanding of battle dynamics and its relation with the political, geographical, economic, and social environment. Military history provides a realistic notion of battle dynamics, however, with people and equipment of yesterday. The situation of operations research is the opposite. Operations research furnishes a clear picture of the development of battles in virtual scenarios with the people and equipment of today and tomorrow. However, it doesn't occur in the real world, but in an artificial environment subject to manipulation to influence the outcome. So, military history and operations research complement each other as a source of knowledge about the application of military means.

The conclusion after this rather broad approach is that war studies is an interdisciplinary study. Education for war is more than just study and the acquisition of expertise. It requires also the utilization of knowledge and insight in changing and complex surroundings and the ability to formulate an original and creative vision on the subject matter. A war study programme cannot be complete without the appropriate generic academic skills, such as historical and qualitative methodology, systematic research including limited use of statistics, communicative skills, computer skills, and the ability to learn 'how to learn' (systematic learning and reflective skills).

Different Designs for Education in War

The number of nations reviewed for this study is almost equalled by the number of different educational designs for the professional study of war. Most Western armed forces have in common the requirement of an academic level of working and thinking for the majority of their officer corps. Almost all west European nations also have in common that they are party to the Declaration of Bologna and that they adapt their lay-out for higher education to the Anglo-Saxon Bachelor/Master (or undergraduate/graduate) model. The final objectives of professional study in war are in general also similar in the initial stage as well as in the staff and war college stage. This education is mainly focused on a certain amount of knowledge and insights, on the ability to apply this, on research and communicative skills, and on the attitude to self-supported learning. In short: good commanders and staff officers. All other aspects in the design for education are different. The track that realizes the final objectives differs from nation to nation, mostly as a consequence of different histories and heritage, which lead to different cultures and approaches in the educational field. The differences are also a consequence of the different views of career patterns. Length of obligation, civilian recognition of diplomas to facilitate an eventual later transfer to civilian life, number and duration of career courses are factors which influence the choice of an educational model.

In the United Kingdom[2] officers are generally recruited from the undergraduates or graduates of civilian colleges and universities. They obtain their degree in a civilian subject, sometimes even civilian study in war, and enter with that diploma the Royal Military Academy, the Britannia Royal Naval College, or the Royal Air Force College. These institutions provide basic officer training with a practical focus. The cognitive part is only addressed as far as necessary to perform the duties of a field grade officer. Since cadets or midshipmen already possess an academic level in working and thinking, they learn to apply this on the tactical and technical level.

Later in their careers British officers attend the Advanced Command and Staff Course, in which a study of war is provided with a focus on the operational level of war. In this course the academic level is guaranteed by the close involvement of academics affiliated to King's College London. As a consequence the course has a strong analytical approach and with some additional effort it leads to a Master's degree.

In Germany[3] potential officers are mostly recruited at secondary school level and they enter the forces with a diploma that gives qualification for university education. The basic officer training is performed in officer-cadet battalions and is followed by courses at an officer school. In this school the courses are focused on the tactical level and have a practical nature. The total education and training time of almost seven years covers four years of university study at one of the armed forces' own universities. During this university stage a Master's degree in a civilian subject identical with studies at civilian universities (like engineering, politics, history, or pedagogy) is achieved. This study, however, has no direct association with the study of war as defined in the previous section. During their career, selected officers get the opportunity to attend the command and general

staff college. This two-year course is focused on the operational and strategic level of war, with an analytical as well as a practical character. It is notable that in Germany within the military institutions no efforts are made to study war at an acknowledged academic level, neither in the initial education, nor in the advanced courses.

In Norway and Sweden the military academies for the initial officer education have acquired a university status. Both institutes offer the study of war at Bachelor's and Master's level. Although their study of war is academically embedded, the courses have a practical character and are focused on the tactical level of war in the initial education. Their advanced courses are focused on the operational level. Both nations have an institutionalized academic programme for the study of war within their military organization.

In Austria (Edelman, 2008: 451) the military academy awards the cadets at the end of their five-year education a Master's degree in 'military leadership', which also involves the conduct of operations at the tactical level of war. This Master's degree is not identical with a university degree but has a more professional focus and a practical bias. Selected officers during their career attend their national defence college for two years, with a focus on all levels of war with an analytical slant and without a formal recognition in the spirit of the Bologna process.

In the Netherlands (De Munnik, 2008: 12) the initial education of up to five years for cadets and midshipmen is strictly divided into two parts in an alternating rhythm: an academic Bachelor's education of three years and a basic officer training of two years in total. The philosophy behind this is that an academic Bachelor's degree provides the cadets and midshipmen with an adequate academic level to perform sufficiently most field and staff officer grades. Only selected posts require a Master's degree. Furthermore an academic Bachelor's degree (Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science) provides the officer with sufficient career prospects, should he leave the forces. The Bachelor's degree courses (in war studies, in military management, or in military technology) have an analytical bias and only the war studies programme focuses on the operational and tactical level of war. Selected officers attend halfway through their career the higher defence course, which provides them with a theoretical foundation in strategic studies and with some practical skill on the operational level of war. The course leads to a non-academic master's qualification.

Almost all reviewed nations are convinced of the inevitability of an academic proportion in the officer education, but the way it is achieved differs. Differences occur in academic calibre, degrees in equivalent civilian studies, the presence of a war studies programme, and the addressed levels of war.

Conceptual Model for Teaching War

As described above, the study of war has an interdisciplinary character. Next to the core subjects, strategy and tactics, and their main contributors, military history and operations research, the academic fields of international relations, behavioural sciences,

technology, and the laws of war stipulate the context and contribute to the understanding of war. The result is a very broad approach with a wide-ranging number of themes, subjects, and issues that can be accommodated under the umbrella of war studies. It is inevitable that choices have to be made when curricula are designed. No professional study has sufficient length to address all aspects of war. The decision on a certain policy and priorities will be determined by the issues like:

- academic or non-academic ambition;
- availability of an academic and professional cadre;
- need to facilitate transfer to civilian life later in the career;
- career patterns, e.g. which assignments occur at what stage of the career;
- position and duration of other career courses.

The summary of different educational designs above offers some of the dimensions along which the choices arise. As always with dimensions, it is not an either-or question, but rather a scale on which the focus of an educational design can be expressed.

The first dimension is the level of war, on which the military institutes take a different viewpoint. It is obvious that initial education (military academies) mostly focuses on the tactical level, mid-career courses (command and staff colleges) on the operational level, and higher defence education (war colleges) on the strategic level. But this conclusion is too simple. According to most theories the study of the tactical level is concentrated on the way combat and battles are fought. It deals with the dynamics on the battlefield, the role of the human being and the technology in relation to the environment. Finally, the employment of units in combat is at stake. The operational level is directed at the coherence of the effects produced by the tactical level. The theatre of war or the mission area is its playing-field and it covers a campaign. The political, social, cultural, and economic context in the area is dominant in the study over the application of military means. The political context, in which military force is applied together with other instruments of power, is the subject of the strategic level. Issues like causes and consequences of conflicts and wars, prevention of conflicts, and management of conflicts are part of this. In the reality of today's operations the separation is anything but rigid. There is an inevitable compression and blurring between the levels of war and their dynamic interrelationship and non-linear interaction (NATO, 2007: 2–20; Ministry of Defence, 2008: 2–7). As a consequence, every study of war must grasp all levels of war, but a study has to put an emphasis on some level depending on the learning objectives.

The second dimension along which educational designs differ is a consequence of the ambition—academic or non-academic, or better: more analytical and conceptual or more practical. The differences in design stem mainly from the question of whether the academic level is achieved within the study of war or within any other subject, not directly affiliated with the study of war. An educational design with academic ambitions and recognition requires an analytical approach and a conceptual approach. This is not provided solely by scholarly texts, but requires the student to undertake sound research, based on rigorous methodology. Learning to think is as important as learning to do for the modern soldier. If this ambition is not available, the education will

take a more practical approach. This is a controversial issue. As the military profession is practical in nature, it is obvious to focus on an instrumental approach. This is simpler, less time-consuming, efficient, and is directly focused on the assignments the young officer has to meet immediately after finishing his education. Van Creveld wrote in the 1990s that 'an early college education, with its heavy emphasis on theoretical work and written skill, can actually be harmful to junior commanders whose job, after all, is to lead men in combat' (van Creveld, 1990: 4).[4] That the world since the 1990s has changed is clearly demonstrated in another book by the same van Creveld. He tries to investigate why counterinsurgency campaigns usually go wrong and argues that 'most ambitious young officers want more (than sitting behind a desk) . . . no paperwork . . . but action and adventure'. And 'it is seldom about intellectual types'. And 'as non-intellectual types those young officers are more often mediocre students with the proclivity to stay superficial and not to gain a more in-depth knowledge' (van Creveld, 2007: 238).

This dimension is a continuum with an analytical approach at one end, in which the application of military force is studied, using the instruments of the political, technological, and behavioural sciences and the rule of law. This approach is related to the different environments, like the individual, social, institutional, or organizational contexts. It is analysis and research and its application that makes the difference with the more practical, single context at the other end of the scale. Central to the analytical end of the continuum is reflection on the practicalities, judgement, and formation of new theories. Central to the practical end of the continuum are actions, procedures, and their improvement. In all educational systems both aspects are touched, but the choice is to what extent.

A third dimension is found in the relative value of military history and operations research brought into the professional study of war. The only tool that generates knowledge and comprehension is the experiences of predecessors. Military institutions have a strong tradition of tracing knowledge of war back in history. But the value of military history is not always unquestioned. Sir Michael Howard once admitted that the past, which he aptly referred to as an 'inexhaustible storehouse of events', could be used to 'prove anything or its contrary' (Echevarria, 2005: 78). In particular, the courses of action in battle demonstrate the reality of combat and this reality displays the unpredictable character of war and the dynamics of battle. Limiting the study of military history to reproduction of past battles could, however, lead to an instrumental duplication of events from the past. Study of military history in this manner leads to the quest for the eternal truth of success on the battlefield. That knowledge has never been found and will not be found either. Military history can demonstrate the interaction between the course of the battle and the factors which influence the outcome, e.g. the social, political, and economic environment and the background of military thinking. Studying in this way, the students learn to understand the complexities and interconnecting factors which occur in combat.

At the other end of the continuum is operational analysis. Breaking with all information from the past, it is possible to reason with logic in a certain scenario. Branches and

sequels can be used in the line of reasoning to accommodate 'what if' scenarios. This operational analysis can be validated by operations research, by which all available data are quantified and are tested at random in a virtual environment. The increasing possibility of digitization enhances these knowledge-generating methods. But it is an illusion to think that all human aspects can be quantified to such an extent that these aspects are a viable representation of human behaviour under stress and in wartime. That means that this method will never be perfect and that the '*coup d'oeil*' of the commander will remain a dominant factor. In the end, the operational analysis method delivers a complement to the historical method. The operational analysis method is hardly exploited in military institutions, which prefer the historical approach. It requires an innovative course in the design of military education for war and an expensive investment in software, but it remains a promising method for the future.

Consideration of these three dimensions and making choices on these continua deliver the basic design for a curriculum of the professional teaching of war. This has to guide all other choices, including in the teaching of the associated fields of science, and leads to a coherent programme.

Study of Military Operations

As outlined in the preceding sections, the academic approach to the tactical (and operational) fields of knowledge was and is not undisputed. The summary of different educational systems makes clear that some nations made a choice to impart the academic level of working and thinking through a curriculum not directly related to the study of war. Other nations use the study of war as a tool to acquire the necessary, academic level. This requires a number of conditions which are not simple to fulfil. This section will elaborate on the academic approach to the operational and tactical level of war.

The tactical level of war is traditionally the subject of military instruction. It is taught by militarily experienced professionals and starts with blocks of theory. That theory encompasses mostly the doctrine which is reflected in doctrinal publications. These publications are the result of an analytical process and describe the military thinking which is applicable at a given time. Although some doctrinal publications address a conceptual foundation, the doctrine of most of the Western armed forces is characterized as a positive theory, as Clausewitz called it. He meant that a positive theory gives guidelines and advices which inevitably will lead to success under the average circumstances. Clausewitz regards a positive theory as unattainable (Clausewitz, 1980: 140) based on moral forces and effects, the living reaction, and the uncertainty of all information. But Jomini looks at it differently. 'The fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations of war have always existed . . . These principles are unchangeable; they are independent of the nature of the arms employed, of times and places' (Jomini, 1865: 252). Most Western doctrinal publications have more a Jominian than a Clausewitzian character.

As a consequence the instruction in tactics is, after acquiring the theory as reflected in doctrinal publications, characterized by map exercises, tactical exercises without troops, or tactical exercises with war game support and focused on learning the skills necessary to apply the doctrine in a virtual scenario. At the end of a learning opportunity a discussion between the participants or an after-action review must make the understanding of the chosen solutions more profound. These discussions concentrate mainly on the strong and weak points of the solutions presented by the students. Finally the officer leading the exercise summarizes the discussion and summarizes by placing the discussion in the context of military doctrine. Sometimes the discussion and the doctrinal principles are compared to a historical example. This learning method has been in use for centuries throughout all armed forces in the education of officers for military operations. It is an effective and efficient method given the learning objective of applying doctrine as a positive theory. It is particularly a method to learn the cognitive skills necessary to perform duties as a commander or a staff officer on a certain level. The learning method for the operational level of war is almost identical in character.

After the Cold War armed forces redefined their doctrines, which has led to fundamental changes. Although started in the 1980s, a main alteration was the introduction of manoeuvre warfare or the manoeuvrist approach. Closely connected as an underpinning of the principle of manoeuvre warfare was the adoption of the philosophy of mission command as a style of leadership that brings the requisite flexibility for exploiting opportunities on the battlefield. Both changes were necessary to finish with the instrumental approach of and the focus on defensive operations in the Cold War. Military thinking in that Cold War era was to a great extent dominated by fixed patterns and routine. As a consequence the fundamental changes after the Cold War required a more conceptual approach, not based on a positive theory but through a broad understanding of all factors influencing the outcome of a battle. Doctrinal publications illustrate this by the statement that 'doctrine is not about what to think, but how to think' and 'Doctrine should foster initiative and creative thinking' (Department of the Army 2008 (FM 3–0), D-1).

These statements should also have implied major changes in the education of and training for war. But this change from an instrumental to a conceptual approach did not result in adjustments of the learning methods for the operational and tactical levels of war. On the contrary, the learning methods remained the same as before, in the expectation that these methods were sufficient for the much more challenging learning objectives.

One engine for change was the Declaration of Bologna. This declaration, with the main purpose of harmonizing higher education in Europe, also gave room for a reconsideration of the curricula of the study of war in some military institutions. Military academies and colleges took the opportunity to bring the study of the operational and tactical level of war under the academic umbrella. This requires a more conceptual approach than is reflected in modern doctrinal publications. Despite the stronger academic requirement for the operational and tactical level, the old learning methods of theory and (map) exercises are not obsolete. These methods are still applicable to learn skills. The

new requirement to understand the dynamics of the battlefield in order to acquire the competences of initiative and creative thinking demands, however, an education on an academic level above the more practical approach of the old learning methods.

The generic academic methodology of defining a problem or a key question, followed by a theory which is tested by an investigation of occurrences, an analysis with deductions on the theory, and a conclusion, can also be applied in military operations. Putting this methodology into practice has the advantage that the students not only acquire knowledge on theories, but also obtain academic skills in research and formation of a nuanced and substantiated judgement.

The operational and tactical levels of war do not lack for theories. In the first place parts of the current doctrine can be considered as a foundational theory, if it is traced back to scientific research. Those parts have in general a conceptual character, are universally applicable, and are supported by broader considerations. Doctrinal theories applicable to this level are for example the manoeuvrist approach with the concept of mission command, the operational framework, the intelligence cycle, the core functions in operations, models for counterinsurgency, and the continuum of operations. Secondly, the underpinning considerations should also be regarded as part of the theory. Only the study of these considerations will lead to an understanding of the value of doctrinal theories and, in consequence, to the insight of when, where, and how these theories are applicable. Never in history has so much been written on military operations as since the 1990s, experiences as well as deducing, integrating, and concluding accounts. Personal accounts, battle reports, after-action reviews provide the basic material for case studies. All conflicts since the 1990s deliver many narratives of different quality. Selection based on the historical methodology is an important part of the study.

Academic courses in military operations consist of theory, case studies, comparison of the outcome of case studies to theory, and as a synthesis, the formation of a differentiated and deliberate judgement about the application of the theory. With this approach students acquire a deep comprehension of available theories, including their possibilities and limitations, a broad understanding of the dynamics of military operations, and as a consequence the ability to think about military operations.

Role of Research

Embedment in scientific research is the most important criterion for any real academic study. Without a profound connection to research, education will be marked by reproduction and a lack of creativity. Research is traditionally established in universities and research agencies, and not in military institutions. Military academies and colleges often lack a research climate, because they have a bias to a practical education which is immediately applicable after graduation. This is reinforced by the military staff and the students, who are impatient with abstract, theoretical formulations. Yet, the inevitability of research in military academies and colleges is twofold. First, relevant research delivers

to education the most recent and differentiated insights. Research is not conducted for its own sake, but to fulfil the requirements of education. Never were there so many research projects and studies on war-related subjects as in the last two decades, in universities as well as in 'think tanks'. Most studies focus, however, on those academic fields which have affiliation with supporting fields of knowledge, like security studies, behavioural studies, and studies on the application of the law of war. Research into military operations and its dynamics is limited. At best it is incorporated in 'lessons learned' programmes of armed forces, but these programmes are concentrated on avoiding the same failures and rarely take a conceptual approach. For that reason, military academies and colleges are most appropriate to accommodate research on military matters. Conditions stimulate in general a research outcome which is actionable and teachable, as a result of a balanced composition of the staff between civilian academics and professional experienced officers.

The second reason for putting research in military academies and colleges is the effect in the classroom. A research attitude of the staff will lead to a posture with the student that stimulates an independent hunt for the 'academic truth', a critical reflection on the results, and a self-reliant formation of a judgement. Without overloading the students with an excessive methodological rigour, they are benefited if they master a methodical way of thinking and working. This is only possible when the staff, including experienced officers, are in a position to engage in practical research on a day-to-day basis.

Academic education is inseparably connected with research. Reliance on studies by universities and research institutes is only partially useful. The dynamics of the battlefield is best studied in military academies and colleges, which also benefits the education of officer-cadets, midshipmen, and career officers. Only relevant research will have the effect that the curriculum is current and adapted to the professional requirements.

Future Developments

The continuous pressure on education and the military academies and colleges to do the same or even more in less time will not end, nor will the future of the security environment make way for a single and simple scenario like in the Cold War era. Both challenges will be present, at least in the next decade. This requires a more ingenious approach to education. The provision of the officer corps with an amount of intellectual luggage and curiosity as to the foundations of their profession leads to the need for continuous learning.

In many military organizations, there is still a culture that learning confined to institutionalized courses is sufficient for any assignment and that the rest of the skills are learned during job performance. This is a faulty approach, because it assumes that the operational environment doesn't change. The unpredictable development of the security environment is an impetus for the inevitability of a permanent learning process during the entire career. But not only change demands this permanent process. It is also the intellectual challenges which make officers suitable for assignments on a higher level.

The availability of digital learning environments contributes broad opportunities. It enables all officer-students to take courses when and where it is convenient to them and lessens the pressure on the educational system. These environments provide a perfect knowledge base and the possibility of developing a degree of understanding. The publicly accessible Joint Electronic Library with its Doctrine Networked Education and Training of the US Armed Forces is a good example of these possibilities.[5] Recent developments in the social media also stimulate the learning process from colleagues. The restricted website companycommand.com is a good example of sharing experiences with past and current company commanders.

However, a digital learning environment also has its limitations. The deeper understanding of the foundations of the military profession is only acquired by extensive discussions between professional companions, experienced and educated colleagues, and subject matter experts. This profundity will never be achieved in a blog environment. In an academic setting, where limited but independent research is a main learning objective, a digital learning environment is no alternative.

Conclusion

As demonstrated in this chapter, the military struggles with the question of how to teach war. The umbrella of the study of war is interpreted in very different ways in civilian society, but as part of professional military education, this study has to focus on the battlefield and its dynamics as core of the subject. To understand the environment and to prevent an instrumental approach, the study of war in military academies and colleges has to be extended to security studies, behavioural sciences, technology, and the laws of war. With integration of academic skills it provides officers with a level of thinking and working competence sufficient for the complex operational environment.

By tradition security studies, behavioural sciences, technology, and the laws of war are academic disciplines accommodated in civilian universities. Military operations on the battlefield, at sea, or in the air are too much treated with an instrumental approach, preventing the creativity and flexibility necessary in the current operational environment. That requires a more academic approach in the traditionally instrumental field of tactics and to a certain degree also in the field of strategy.

In the design of a curriculum for the study of war, choices must be made, because the wide array of the interdisciplinary study of war can never entirely be covered. Based on different national approaches a choice has to be conceptualized, based on ambition, available staff, and career patterns. Future developments, such as continuous learning with the use of digital environments, are part of this.

Finally, the mission is not simply to educate per se, but to create an intellectual footing, on which culture, identity, and principles are shared and thus form the very basis of that all-important future *esprit de corps* (Lindley-French, 2009: 37).

Notes

1. In this chapter the word 'academic' refers to the university level in arts or sciences. As a consequence academic study is related to a research programme and in the curriculum, methodology and research techniques are a main factor in the learning objectives.
2. British Army website, www.army.mod.uk/join/22469.aspx (accessed 10 May 2011).
3. Offizier des Heeres, www.mil.bundeswehr-karriere.de
4. Van Creveld refers this quote to a 1932 Reichswehr study, which argues that the best officer material consisted not of college graduates but of youngsters with no more than a high-school education. An Israeli study in Gal, 1986, arrives at similar conclusions.
5. Joint Electronic Library, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ (accessed 10 May 2011).

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PART VII

TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMY, INDUSTRY, AND WAR

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CHAPTER 32

THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY IN WAR

COLONEL MICHEL GOYA*

In physics, when the movement of the planets does not conform to the theory, it means that invisible forces are in action, and that the theory itself needs to be replaced by another paradigm, in the same way as when an anomaly is revealed in Mercury's orbit, it could only have been resolved by the theory of relativity. The art of war evolves in a similar way, through the certification or invalidation of paradigms. The victory, surprising in its scope, of the Coalition during the First Gulf War in 1991 appears as the certification of seventies-eighties American thought, which was looking for an operational 'quantum leap' brought about by new technologies. Yet, hardly ten years later, the Western forces (including Tsahal[1]) faced difficulties in the Middle East, dealing with non-state organizations such as the Islamic Hezbollah or the Taliban movement. This conflict between a large and powerful army and a small organization is reminiscent of the stunning movements of Mercury. Both seem inexplicable considering the disparity of material might between the respective opponents. According to Sun Tzu's aphorism, a brilliant tactic with no strategic view is often only the sound prior to the defeat. In the case concerned, Americans applied unrealistic initial strategies both in Iraq and Afghanistan, which would partly explain their ineffectiveness. Israel followed the same model in Lebanon in 2006. Although, even if when the purposes are blurry or too ambitious, when a coalition combined more than 900 million inhabitants and more than 80 per cent of the world's military spending, and fails to vanquish tens of thousands of fighters, equipped with AK47 assault rifles (1947!) and RPG-7 rocket-launchers (created in 1961), it does not reflect brilliant tactics. Western armies' key asset, their technological wealth, turns out to represent a handicap at least in certain operational circumstances.

However, despite the blatant deficiencies of Western military tactics, no change has been made. The focus stays on the conventional battlefield. Yet, Western weaknesses are more and more obvious. A change needs to be undertaken: military paradigms need to be revised, and Westerners should start thinking of the limits of technologies in war.

* Written with the support of Olivia de Guerry and Stanislas de Magnienville.

Strategy, Operational System, Practice, and Technology

The Wheel of Strategic Rebirths

According to Levis-Strauss' expression, we need to start by 'taking his eye off the problem'. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, armed forces' employment has been classified into four categories and according to two parameters: firstly, the existence of a political armed foe or not and secondly, whether the population is perceived as the major goal in the conflict or not. A force can focus either on the 'Clausewitzian' duel with another state's army or on non-state armed organizations existing and acting within a people. Both types of conflict qualify as war.[2] In addition, armies also participate in the securitization of regions in crisis, without necessarily having a declared foe (in Kosovo for instance since 1999). They can also play the buffer force between two political actors, and in that case having neither declared enemy, nor real direct action on the people. These two situations, which do not involve a definite enemy, can be encompassed under the designation of stabilization operations.

Reviewing French military history from the Restoration army in 1815 (dedicated to internal securitization) to the Algerian war (conflict with the National Liberation Front), passing through five inter-state encounters, we realize that the four strategic contexts defined previously are indeed relevant. Cyclically, every ten to fifteen years, each of those four contexts appears as the new priority. The period that goes from 1962 to 1991 constitutes an anomaly in relation to its length and its non-violent nature. Yet, the end of the Cold War represents a return to strategic volatility. The 1990s have been typified by stabilization operations, as a buffer force or through securitization. The following decade has brought hesitation between prioritizing protection against mass terrorism and fighting rebel organizations in Afghanistan.

Armed forces' activity is thus 'polarized' by a dominant strategic context. This strategic context represents the 'demand'. National resources that will meet this 'demand' correspond to the 'supply'. National resources are inherently unsteady, especially since the industrial revolution. Until the mid-nineteenth century, a soldier used, during his career, the same weapons with the same devices. Since then, he has been compelled to regularly challenge himself, to be innovative. Armies were from then on subjected to a double tension between a fluctuating strategic demand and a supply in constant evolution.

This instability is difficult to control and to comprehend. The end of the Second World War, for instance, completely redefined French defence policy. However, army headquarters' projects limited themselves to repeating the framework of the Second World War. The Army contemplated a force of twenty-one divisions with fourteen armoured vehicles; the Air Force dreamt of a bomber fleet with millions of fighters, and the Navy considered a 750,000-ton fleet encompassing ten aircraft carriers, fifteen battleships,

a destroyer, and sixty modern submarines. First, those schemes were completely disconnected from France's potential 'supply'. Then, they completely ignored the advent of the nuclear weapon and of the Viet-Minh, the first non-state political organization against which France will wage a war.[3]

This army, stuck between fluctuating supply and demand, is itself a complex system that links, at the core of the data structures (subsystems), soldiers with their equipment. Those men are themselves guided by a particular culture and hence develop particular methods. In that system, called Working Knowledge (Practice), men cannot be dissociated from their equipments. In 1917, when the French discovered the 13 mm German anti-tank gun and put it to the test on some firing ranges, its effectiveness was a shock. Yet, during the war, those guns pierced only two French tanks. The designers had simply omitted to consider the 'human' use of this heavy weapon: despite its might, the gun had strong recoil and required a target that stands still for several seconds at a maximum distance of 100 metres. In the 1990s, the design of the Eryx short-range rocket-launchers appeared to possess the same flaws. Only able to fire to a distance of less than 600 metres (with tanks rushing towards them), their design did not take into account the 'human' factor.

On a global level, thinking of military issues only in technical terms, for example by comparing warring parties' numbers of tanks, does not make much sense either. Egyptian and Syrian armies engaged in the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 possessed 3,400 tanks, of which 700 T-62s were equipped with the most powerful cannons in the world. Their opponent, Tsahal, had only 1,850 tanks. Despite the Arabs' numerical and partly technical superiority, they, on average, lost four times more tanks than Israel during the war.[4] This result can only be explained by comparing the adversaries' entire tactical systems. Only by doing so can we perceive that the tanks' technical advantages and disadvantages were in fact balanced on both sides. Israel had developed structures (platoons as '*pion de manoeuvre*', high intelligence means at brigade level), methods (tank commander placed in the turret to reach objectives faster than inside the tank), and a culture (aggressiveness, decentralization, confidence) entirely directed towards flexibility and the spirit of initiative. The non-technical elements of Israel's Working Knowledge (Practice) allowed them to almost always fire sooner than their opponents. Those assets gave Israel a resounding superiority on the battlefield and changed the course of the war.

Dealing with Uncertainty

Hence, while we usually focus on technical innovations, changes can also develop from other sources. In France, the invention of the divisional system in the eighteenth century, or of the infantry squad in 1917, are very important structural innovations. At the core of this battlegroup, considering that simple sergeants can be entrusted with tactical responsibilities is a cultural innovation. There are also many methodological innovations; for example, at the end of 1917, the artillery sought the enemy's neutralization by firing for a few hours (which allowed them to keep the effect of surprise) rather than seeking its total destruction through several days' bombardments. Each of those

innovations is, in fact, rarely autonomous. Other incremental technical innovations (rapid fire artillery, gas bombshell, ballistic calculation) preceded the concept of artillery neutralization. Similarly, giving responsibilities to simple sergeants followed from the creation of the Chauchat machine-gun and concerns that it should be used optimally. The increase in 'productivity' of Working Knowledge (Practice) resulted from the association of *hardware* and *software*, making it difficulty to distinguish what developed from each of those factors.

The emergence of an innovation in one field sparks off other, secondary changes. When the parachute (technical innovation) appeared, the French claimed that it would promote pilots' cowardice by offering them a way to escape the conflict. It is only in 1916, thanks to the evolution of the equipment, that the French reluctance faded away. They quickly understood the parachute's advantages, such as supplying by air or dropping off saboteurs (method innovation). Parachute units (structural innovation) are conceived as early as 1918, and grow between the two world wars. By retroaction, new fitted structures or methods are conceived. Culturally, the cowards' tool becomes a symbol of courage.

These resulting innovations then trigger themselves new interactions and retroactions. This innovation spiral only ends when all their potentialities are exhausted, faced with a more innovative adversary. After a strenuous childhood, and a dynamic life as an adult, the innovation then slowly fades away. We then speak of an S curve. The machine-gun knew years of gestation (especially in fortress defence) from the wars of 1870 to 1914, before undergoing an unprecedented development from 1914 to 1916, until it completely dominated the battlefield and obstructed operations. Multiple innovations (some of which used the machine-gun in hybridization, on planes and tanks) then had to be developed, in order to overcome the machine-gun's efficiency. The relative importance of the machine-gun then rapidly decreased.

Thus, innovations have their own lives, which are often difficult to predict. During the Second World War, Americans created the tank destroyer, an anti-tank gun mounted on a stretcher, designed to be used against German tanks. In reality, they have never been employed in that way, but were always spread out to directly support infantry in close proximity. To date, only 20 per cent of anti-tank missiles used in the world have been applied against combat carriers (although it was their main function). This does not mean that evolution is subject to chaos, and that we have to relinquish management of it. Yet, we need to take into account the men and women who make use of those concepts and equipment. Indeed, those people have the power to alter those employment doctrines and the equipment itself, which they would probably do if their missions are at stake.

In addition, in such a living organization, men leave, die, are promoted, change function, learn, and forget. The sum of competences, on an individual or collective level, never remains at a standstill. A method that is cultivated by training is always more deeply inlaid physically and mentally while a method that is not used in training declines and is forgotten. Imitating the Soviet engines of the 1960s, French infantry's combat carriers became amphibious, sacrificing their armour for the capacity to cross rivers. However, it then became evident that floating was not enough to cross any watercourse at anytime: a reconnaissance mission

was needed, to determine the best places (quite rare in fact) to enter and come out of the water. In addition, checking the engines was necessary, in order to prevent water from getting into the cracks created by ten years of use. For years, infantry units have been trained to cross watercourses, until it was decided, at the end of the Warsaw Pact, that it was not essential. Without training, this *savoir-faire* was quickly lost. From then on, no infantry troop has been able to cross a watercourse. Yet, we did not completely recover the sacrificed armour.

On the other hand, if each combat unit trained and developed its own *savoir-faire*, the results would prove inconsistent. During the Battle of Verdun in 1916, artillery regiments were separated from the division they belonged to: a regiment could either stay in place or be assigned to another division. It became quickly apparent that since the beginning of the war, divisions had split to such an extent that they were made incompatible; hence, regiments found great difficulties working together. Subsequently, in order to reconcile their differences, it was decided that there should be a permanent effort to harmonize training and *savoir-faire*. However, it was essential to maintain something of their individual characteristics and strengths. If some of their competences are explicit and describable (actions), the great majority are implicit (or tacit),[5] inscribed in gestures and brains. Those hidden patterns constitute the strength of the army. They account for its capacity to quickly resolve the problems posed. Yet, for the army to evolve, it first needs to change its habits. Evolving often means destroying and replacing: this is never easy, and rarely fast.

It was thought that, if the individual divisions were provided with a shared, common experience, they would be reconciled and therefore fuse in an organic, natural fashion. Such was the French Army's philosophy during the Second Empire. This quasi-professional army, on which we could capitalize experience, leap-frogged from one war to another, until the disaster of 1870. Conversely, an internal authority (high command) could manage the process of change by defining a Working Knowledge (Practice) and a doctrine which, to quote Foch, would be a 'common way of seeing things'. This doctrine dictated the changes that were to be made to the forces. From the explicit (doctrine), we then proceed to the implicit (men and women's working knowledge). Yet, we only 'try' to transform routines: changes can also be rejected. If the innovation is nevertheless accepted, which happens in most cases, a phase of appropriation is still needed. This phase can take time, sometimes dozen of years. The first digitization systems to be introduced into US Army units (before the Iraq invasion in 2003) met with serious disagreements in the officers' corps. They found the disadvantages (loss of time, loss of immediate competences) more relevant than the advantages (gain in uncertain efficiency). A similar adaptation, also poorly welcomed, was necessary when riders from the twentieth century were asked to replace their horses with the steam engine. Checking soldiers' level of assimilation of the doctrine and the real level of the Practice is therefore also needed.

After a first cycle of autonomous evolution of working knowledge, where soldiers auto-correct themselves, we find a 'second level' cycle in four steps: Doctrine–Learning–Practice–Ideas/Doctrine–Control, inspired from those described in 1995 by organizational sociologists Nonaka and Takeuchi in their studies of Japanese firms.[6] Then a full operational system is reached, which needs to be made effective. The Prussian system of

the nineteenth century is probably the first effective operational system of the industrial era and it remains, in many respects, a model.

The Prussian Operational System and the Integration of Technical Innovations

After 1815, Prussia, unlike other European powers, kept the terms of its original operational system, set up after the Jena disaster. It was the only nation to maintain conscription laws with two years' compulsory service, followed by the compulsory status of reserve. This was the basis of the rest of their innovations as an army. Their power as an army is only demonstrated after they are mobilized. Hence, mobilization has to be as fast as possible. This necessitates precise movements that must be planned meticulously: humans, horses, munitions, and supplies must be predetermined. The Great General Staff, as first 'technostructure' of a great organization from the industrial era, comes from the Prussian model. From planning mobilization, it rapidly extended its competences to planning war according to an experimental scientific process. Since Prussia stayed out of conflicts from 1816 to 1864, the High Command set up a 'virtual front', a *Kriegspiel*, learning from conflict analysis of previous military exercises to create an effective doctrine. This provided the organizational and intellectual framework to integrate technological innovations, such as the railway. Since 1830, the railway had proved useful in accelerating the mobilization process. Initially, the introduction of the innovation reduced the global efficiency of the practice. In 1836 experiments proved that an army corps moves faster on foot than by rail. Yet, this unpredictable complexity reinforced the High Command's authority.

The Prussian army was also the first to use a rifled barrel. Johann Dreyse achieved unprecedented success with this invention: it was easy to use, with a relatively rapid firing pace, and could be used either kneeling or in the prostrate position. It also had an unrivalled range, radically transforming the art of infantry combat. Once the technical hitches were overcome, such as the cylinder head's airtightness, or the firing pin's flaws, the new weapon was to prove revolutionary. What proved more problematic was overcoming the increased consumption of ammunition of the rifle, and the isolation of men who fire from several positions, leaving them more vulnerable. The Prussians revised such issues and, by simplification of original methods, found their solutions. The cadres' function was redefined, and the initiative was to 'carry' troops forward. It was the Dreyse rifle that spawned the notion of the 'miracle' weapon.

Those mobilized troops, with the German demographic boom of the nineteenth century, left several hundreds of thousands of hard to handle men. The solution was this: to set up a pyramid of permanent staff, whose function was both to prompt mobilization and improve the operational command at brigade level. This human network worked in conjunction with a telegraphic network, helping to coordinate mobilization and railway manoeuvres, before following the armies. The unreliability and inefficiency of the telegraphic network necessitated the establishment of a third management body, a doctrine adapted to both human and telegraphic networks. The telegraphic network was

restricted in its capacities. Due to its slow functioning, orders sent had to be very simple, and limited to general directives. Members' mutual knowledge of the 'technostructure', their common culture, and the definition of automatic procedures guaranteed the common interpretation of the directives. The 'thinking' army does not hesitate to combine the contradictions of centralized mobilization and decentralized management. What should follow is an offensive at a strategic level, and defence in a tactical manner, by way of dispersing, displacement, and group combat.

This scientific evolution was naturally put to the test when Prussia went to war. Every operation was, therefore, analysed meticulously. Through this, Prussia realized that hundreds of canons, made with Krupp steel and highly superior to the Austrians' equivalents, performed poorly at the Battle of Sadowa. The analysis demonstrated that the fault was not in the machinery itself, but with the incompetence of the men using it. The men would use them in the same manner as older bronze models, very close to the enemy (where their bombshells were less efficient than cannonballs), or in reserve at the back (where they were useless). The technology needed to be reconsidered. In three years, the technical weaknesses of Krupp's cannons (resistance and airtightness) were adjusted, and the men trained intensively to use the weapon successfully.

Thereafter, the model was a victim of its own success: the operational system itself largely defined the 'demand' according to the practice, but to the detriment of political imperatives. Nevertheless, it remains the first instance of a modern operational system capable of managing behaviour during the war as well as forward planning: by its understanding of the strategic context, the adaptation. By comparison, modern Western armies seem extremely rigid.

The Ineffectiveness of Western Military Technology in Current Conflicts

A New Strategic Context for Western Armies

Afghanistan, and later Iraq, began in the form of Clausewitzian duels between states' armies; they were won primarily by US armies, and, secondarily, by the British armies. The eradication of the Taliban, and then the Iraqi army, were examples of tactical excellence. This was, for the most part, due to the Americans' technological superiority. However, in reality, their strategy was less than formidable: they failed to eradicate the Al Qaeda threat and to achieve the status of Iraq as the 'model for the Arab world'. The Balkans scheme for the fast war (or the 'war of intervention') followed by a phase of stabilization was perverted. War was not over, but stabilization was already starting. This lead to the disassociation of the efforts, between the essentially American force in pursuit of the 'anti-terrorist' fight and another force, principally composed of US allies, responsible for 'winner's zones' stabilization. In the empty space between these two

armies appeared armed organizations, antibodies secreted by the 'losers': Sunnite Iraqi, Pashtun, and poor Shiites from Baghdad.

Far from their revolutionary origins in the 1960s, these groups are drawn from a traditionalist and reactionary core. With no spirit for conquest, their will to harm gets stronger as their environment is endangered and transformed. Some 'anger pockets'[7] the size of a little town or of a valley can become places of total war. Their shape can differ, from Iraqi Sunnites' unframed networks to Moqtada al-Sadr's Madhi army, differing more by their acceptance of death and the popular support they enjoy, than by their relative arsenals. If those organizations enjoy, in addition, sophisticated armaments, they become particularly formidable. In this respect, Hezbollah looks like a model, which in the space of a few years (after the Israeli troops departed from South Lebanon) has managed to transform its Working Knowledge (Practice) from an underground guerrilla organization to one with a structure combining rocket-launchers (the only offensive tool capable of piercing the Israeli defence border) with a defensive system capable of resisting the enemy's air strike capability (underground networks, decentralization, civilian shield) and even an eventual terrestrial attack (anti-tank rockets' network, Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs).

The appearance of those armed organizations, embedded within the populations, obviously changed the strategic situation. From now on, instead of inter-state war, its anti-terrorist avatar, or stabilization, we face a type of war which brings back very bad memories for the West. In this type of war, it is impossible to completely separate the enemy from the population that provides him resources. As an effect, there is a permanent judgement to make in the use of means, violent or not, in order to avoid contradictory effects. For example, when we ravage villages in order to destroy a rebellious group, or when we provide the population with fertilizer which is then used to produce explosives. Western armies' main weakness in Iraq or Afghanistan lies in the fact that, by repression or loss of competencies, they did not have the working knowledge to make this judgement.

The Temptation of Research and Destruction

Those Western armies, although quite similar, differ in their approach of the enemy. The American military culture is traditionally centred on destruction of the enemy, as recalled by the US Army soldier's 'credo' of 2003 (article 11: 'I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy, the enemies of the United States of America in close combat'). In this type of conflict, with very few battles, it boils down to wiping out all the rebels until exhaustion or, at least, until beheading of the adversary. In addition, to protect their men, US Army tends to use massively technology. At the heart of populations, raised in the culture of war and capable of recruiting amongst millions or even billions of potential fighters, this way of doing things seems quite futile: Each dead rebel becomes a martyr, his survivors' companions become heroes, and his cousins become vindictive. Paradoxically, killing a rebel could result in increasing their numbers. Conversely, when a 250 kg bomb hits the population by mistake, Americans appear as mass murderers.

Thanks to the new information technologies, Americans have also reoriented their Special Forces towards the targeting and subsequent elimination of enemy officers. Yet, this strategy is also problematic: the officers killed or captured are replaced by others, often more radical. It tends therefore to suppress every possibility of negotiation. Neither Saddam Hussein's capture in December 2003, nor Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's death in June 2006, have really altered the strategic context.

Americans have been successful in Iraq on two different occasions, in 2004 and 2007, by retaking control of the situation. Yet, those successes were operative and not strategic, since they did not allow the American intervention's objectives to be reached. In addition, those successes owed much to the Americans' adversaries' mistakes, particularly with Al Qaeda in Iraq, which lost its alliance with the Sunnite armed organizations. This war in the 'American way', conducted by professional soldiers and with sophisticated Cold War equipment, is furthermore extremely expensive. When each fighter-bomber flying hour represents several million Euros, we rapidly end up spending more than $2 billion each week. After eight years at war, those thousand billion dollars taken from the American budget have a great impact on macroeconomic equilibrium. In short, the 'convergence line' of those entangled logics is that of a long, expensive, and inefficient Sisyphean war.

The Temptation to Refuse Fighting

In this type of conflict, as on the Laffer curve, when we focus only on the enemy's destruction, we do not obtain any strategic effect. Yet, inversely, if we exclusively concentrate on population aid, the action is exactly as inefficient. From 2003 to 2008, south Iraq has been occupied by a 'Babel army' with contingents from more than thirty different countries. It was framed by rigorous engagement rules and had too limited strength in comparison with the surrounding population's volume. When the Mahdist Shiite revolt arose in April 2004, all those contingents were paralysed. Only the British, thanks to their experience, were tactically effective but strategically impotent due to their lack of resources. In Afghanistan, the extension of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to south Afghanistan in the summer of 2006 has occasioned a similar crisis. Before enlisting forces in the Helmand province, the British defence minister John Reid declared he hoped no bullet would be fired during the mission's three years. In reality, the zone, supposedly calm, was occupied by a mosaic of lords of war, drug dealers, and rebel groups, in particular neo-Taliban, who had the time to thrive in the absence of a security system and of government. The first soldiers of Her Majesty experienced bloodier combats than in the Falklands in 1982. Canadian and Dutch contingents were also extremely surprised.

Then, ISAF split into two parts: one that refused to consider itself at war, in the north and west of the country, and the other one 'fighting' in the East and South. The latter was mainly composed of American forces and was hardly distinguishable from the American anti-terrorist operation 'Enduring Freedom'. Yet, problematically, this

'fighting ISAF', joined by France in 2008, fought 'economically'. Reasons were political, but in addition, American allies could not afford the war effort anymore. The British, who conducted three wars in Afghanistan on their own from 1838 to 1919, would not have the resources to do the same today. Indeed, from the enemy without war during the Cold War, the European armies gave priority, in the 1990s, to stabilization operations without enemies. As a consequence, they reduced budgetary resources and maintained the inherited equipment programmes, the cost of which (at consistent prices) represented on average three times that of the previous generation. With no certainty in such a strategic context, and with no will to alter their military Working Knowledge (Practice), states like the United Kingdom or France faced important budgetary crises. Others abdicated their defence, entrusting the United States with serious military affairs, and limiting themselves to 'Potemkin operations'.

In short, the Americans, followed by the Europeans, launched a great transformation programme in the 1980s in order to improve their Working Knowledge (Practice) through technology. The Americans continued to subsidize this program even if, in the new strategic context, it was not efficient anymore. The Europeans refused both to finance the programme and to give it up, making up for their military impotence by maintaining opportunities for their industries. Israel, another front-rank military actor, took another path, whose limits appear more and more obvious.

The Temptation of the Technologic Wall[8]

In the 2000s, with the remarkable development of precision and long-range weapons and the erection of the security fence, Israel thought it had found the practice allowing it to control territories such as the Gaza Strip or South Lebanon, without getting bogged down in the core of the restive population. These new means allowed Israel to stay aloof from the risk, withdrawing from occupied zones at the same time as keeping them within reach of air strike or Special Forces raids. Yet, this physical remoteness sparked off a political vacuum occupied by Hamas and Hezbollah. Using their enemy's absence in the field, they created proto-states, controlling the population, and leaving little that could constitute a military objective for an enemy. From then on, refusing to come back to a closer combat, Israel had to hit the population to reach its adversaries. Israel found itself in the same position as the Palestinian organizations. The opponents came to look alike: both shared the belief that the other would give up only by force; both were avoiding the fight and using terrorist devices; and both were accusing the other of cowardice.

When Israel and Hezbollah were again face to face in July 2006, this pseudo-battle's logic was pushed to its climax. With the help of Iran, Hezbollah was endowed with the capacity to hit the civilian population by a double meshing of infantry pressure points and of mobile missile units. This strike capability of on average 15,000 rockets and missiles was in reality not that effective (with the exception of the Zelzal missiles, but their carriers are easy to locate) since it needed more than a hundred projectiles to kill someone. It was therefore little deterrent but sufficient to symbolize resistance to Israel.

Tsahal disposed of an extremely sophisticated air force in matters of air-to-ground action. With this powerful hammer at its disposal, it nevertheless sees no dice. After a quick success (the destruction of the Zelzal launchers) which comforted them in their logic trap, Israeli decision-makers undertook to 'paralyse' the Hezbollah system by a flood of strikes, without intervening on the ground. In the end, per day, Israel launched 5,000 bombs and 250 missiles, guided or cluster bombs, on a 45 km by 25 km rectangle.[9] This represents two times more projectiles than against any Arab armies engaged in the Yom Kippur War. The effects were nevertheless minor on Hezbollah's physical forces (only a dozen launchers destroyed and the same number of militiamen casualties every day) and null on its will to fight. A bombing campaign, already difficult when it aims at bending a state like North Vietnam in 1972 or Serbia in 1999, becomes really risky in the face of a furtive organization. The concept of indirect pressure on the Hezbollah through the Lebanese government had no more success. Yet, despite all the precautions proclaimed, these thousands of strikes fatally hit the civilian population, in a proportion fifty times greater than Hezbollah's rockets. The international legitimacy of Israel's intervention was thus undermined until it became unavoidable to impose a ceasefire. The obstinacy to apply only firepower against a non-state organization bears in itself its own end.

After one week, and to get out of this dead-end, Israeli soldiers finally decided to take more risks. Terrestrial forces were engaged, but based on the model of air raids, supposed to be flexible and rapid. With the first wounded, several missions were cancelled, while others were reoriented towards other objectives far from the field. Several leaders were struck by 'cognitive dissonance', paralysed by the level of violence and a completely unexpected environment. The terrestrial forces, accustomed to small scale actions against Palestinians, and particularly to police missions, were not able to manage long-range coordinated operations. The very centralized command structure, accustomed to manage little operations from the regional headquarters or from Tel Aviv, was soaked by the volume of information transmitted by its ultra-sophisticated communication system. In short, this army, which in 1967 had destroyed three armies in six days, experienced the worst difficulties to gain more than a hundred metres per day in the face of the equivalent of a light infantry division.

While the technical pole is the main engine of the evolution of the Working Knowledge (Practice) in an inter-state conflict situation, it can become its main brake in other strategic contexts. The current crisis of the Western armies suggests to not try to 'heal according to medications already on the shelves',[10] but a radical change to the paradigm in order to readjust the military practice both to the current strategic context and to the resources, significant but changing, of the nation.

It should not be necessary to define the means we should be capable of deploying. It is on the contrary necessary to detect which enemy we should be capable of vanquishing and how to do it, even if it means suppressing some 'white elephants', ruinous for their weak utility in the likely context. It will also be necessary to anticipate the clues to the next strategic cycle and to develop sufficient intellectual and industrial flexibility to change again when the time comes. Technology is only a parameter in the heart of a

military system which can give it great strength but can also weaken it when the enemy or the mission dramatically changes. It is then that the limits of technology clearly appear.

Notes

1. Abbreviation of Tsva Haganah Le-Israel, Israel's army.
2. Sometimes a posteriori, such as 'the events' in Algeria, that became 'war' in 1998 or the confrontation between Israel and the Hezbollah of 2006 that became the 'Second War of Lebanon' the following year.
3. Goya, 2010.
4. See Razoux, 1999.
5. Polanyi, 1958.
6. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995.
7. Appaduri, 2007.
8. Thanks to Joseph Henrotin for permission to reproduce elements of my article, 'Retour sur la guerre ratée d'Israël contre le Hezbollah', which appeared in *Défense et sécurité internationale*, hors série 9, December 2009.
9. Goya, 2008.
10. Raufer, 2008.

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CHAPTER 33

SPACE: A NEW THEATRE OF WAR?

XAVIER PASCO

Throughout the recent history of space activities, the link between space technologies and military activities has been characterized by a profound continuity. This relationship has been structured in successive layers based on historically-marked interest by the military user communities. This evolving and constantly updated relationship has especially developed in the United States, which has become by far the most important military power in space. In this country more than in any other, a particular understanding of the role of space in the national military plans has been demonstrated, allowing military space to keep a high-profile status in terms of political and budgetary support throughout the years. In this respect, analysing the use of space assets for military purposes has become over decades a mainly US-centred exercise. While not the only country involved in using space for military purposes, the long history as well as the dominant size of US space activity makes it an unavoidable reference for each and every spacefaring country.[1] However, first reflecting this close link with the Cold War era, the military uses of space are constantly transforming, leading to new questions and involving the global international balance as this chapter will demonstrate.

'Strategic Space': The First Founding Layer of the Military Use of Space (1957 and Beyond)

In the United States, as in the USSR (now Russia), space activity basically started as ballistic/nuclear arsenals were developing. It is because the USA and the USSR were in competition to get equipped with those armaments between 1945 and 1953 that political

authorities in the two countries perceived the advantage of using space. Consequently, the 1950s and the 1960s built durable foundations for many hardcore military uses of space that have been validated up to the present period. This founding period can legitimately be labelled the 'strategic space' period, considering this strong relationship between nuclear weapons and the first military satellites.

Beyond the common perception of technical similarities between space launchers and ballistic missiles, the connection linking space and nuclear activities has especially derived from the very early perceived need to possess monitoring and possibly targeting capabilities that are both permanent and invulnerable. While aerial capabilities would rapidly prove limited in this field,[2] obtaining satellites with surveillance/early warning, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities was soon to become a priority given the rapid evolution of the offensive weapons. The so-called MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) doctrine would almost give such assets the status of national life-insurance, in the USA but also in the USSR later on, helping space to gain the status of a mutually recognized sanctuary.

This initial approach has had consequences both on the legal context of space uses throughout the world, basically shaping a number of space- and disarmament-related texts and treaties. Keeping the strategic balance as a structuring principle of the relationship between the two superpowers has had a profound impact on the development of national space programmes themselves, more precisely on national perceptions of the key role space can play in political and military strategies. For long this policy has been widely shared in the United States as well as in the USSR due to the very existence of Cold War strategies and to the limited or highly constrained space technologies. Very quickly, using satellites as regular 'data collectors' has been considered as the only mid- to long-term solution for ensuring constant surveillance of the enemy ballistic missile arsenal and for a mutual assessment of the respective national capacities.

In contrast, in this context ruled by the nuclear balance, using satellites in combat operations, while sometimes suggested very early on in books of military theorists,[3] has been discarded on the basis of the existence of clear limitations on space technologies. If this relationship between space and nuclear has supposedly made satellites a way to improve the efficiency of terrestrial and naval nuclear forces, satellites have never been considered as a possible long-term substitute for those. By the same logic, space programmes aiming to 'weaponize' space (i.e. destined to deploy weapons in orbit) have regularly proved unable to attract sufficient attention from military and political authorities. From the political point of view, the global cost (including the political cost) induced by such programmes has always exceeded by far the benefit they could provide.[4] In the context of MAD, political authorities were better off accepting the mutual use of spy satellites allowing a precise count of offensive arsenals rather than run the risk of a renewed confrontation which might have led to reduced observation capabilities, then undermining mutual deterrence. Moreover, the two superpowers were highly confident of the efficiency of their nuclear delivery means as soon as 1960. This assurance helped to discard any complex space programmes, aiming for example to put missiles in orbit.

This historical link has remained the basis for the military space effort in the USA. The continuing development of efficient space techniques for information collection about missiles arsenals and other vectors throughout the world shows it well. In addition, dynamic R&D programmes exist that are related to innovative sensing techniques (such as infrared or hyperspectral sensing for example[5]) supported by the current anti-ballistic 'Missile Defence' project. In this regard, there is certainly some sort of legitimacy in considering space-related R&D financed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) effort as a continuation of this 'space–nuclear' historical link in new research domains. However, most ABM-related researches have led to ground-based interceptors, leaving aside dreams of space-based laser or high-energy beam stations as envisioned by the initial 'Strategic Defense Initiative' (SDI) announced by Ronald Reagan in March 1983. In this respect, plans for future battle stations in orbit have clearly faded during the last decades, refocusing the interest of space applications on strategic and operative-level imagery intelligence (Imint), electronic and communication intelligence (Elint and Comint), missile launch detection, and precise navigation and timing.

Decades later, the same interest in the 'strategic' value of satellites has also emerged in Europe. It is no surprise that the first 'spy' satellite in Europe was put into orbit by France, also a nuclear power. The first mission of the French military observation satellites 'Helios', launched from July 1995 on, has consisted in providing continuous-basis strategic-class pieces of information to the highest military and political authorities. In this sense, this particular effort has always been clearly linked to the management of the national nuclear deterrence force. While also announced to be intended for collecting data and information on different areas of interest, and even if the performance and acquisition capacities of the Helios satellite series have constantly been upgraded in light of evolving intelligence and on-theatre requirements, these capabilities have remained modest in size, essentially justified for providing some strategic and political leverage.[6] This notion of independent access to information of strategic importance has remained at the heart of the French political posture if one judges by the 2008 *Defence and Security* white book, which proposed the creation of a new function labelled 'Knowledge and Anticipation', calling for more efficient *intelligence* tools and making space systems key in this modernization.

Making Space a 'Force Multiplier': A First Adaptation to the Post-Cold War Era (1991 to Date)

For any 'military space'-equipped country, there is little doubt that this initial 'strategic' dimension has gradually contributed to making space applications more widely accepted as an operational tool at the disposal of the intelligence and military apparatus, paving the way for new uses at the theatre level. However, the United States can be considered

as a rather unique case in pursuing the objective of increasing the use of satellites in combat operations.

More operationally-oriented uses of space systems have emerged during the 1990s due to dramatic changes both in the international landscape and in technologies. In the aftermath of a series of conflicts inaugurated in 1991 by the First Gulf War, and further illustrated by the other conflicts in Central Europe, space capabilities have suddenly appeared as a must if one wants to win a conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) war. In particular, innovative space capabilities have rapidly been associated with the use of innovative air strategies by increasing their global efficiency, almost giving birth to a new paradigm in the 'art of war' according to their promoters. This renewed importance given to space in the very conduct of military operations constitutes one aspect of a general adaptation of the military tool to the new strategic conditions that was taking place in the USA at that time. Space has reaped some benefits from the reshaping of the US military apparatus underway at that time, and assimilated as a genuine 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA). Space has quickly appeared as the keystone of the future defence architectures, around which forces and doctrines would have to get organized.

Becoming part and parcel of the 'Battlefield Awareness' concept,[7] satellites were to be used as a 'force multiplier'—a means of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations. Information coming from space allows commanders in distant headquarters to locate on screen, in real time, their forces and those of their opponents, as well as guiding weapons precisely to their targets. Incidentally, this evolution has entailed the idea that soldiers needed to be equipped with sophisticated personal communications devices, and that they would require the transmission of so-called 'value-added information': the ability to mix different forms of information sources, to make the information relevant for the user. Strategists bet on compensating the risk of engaging forces in a badly defined environment with better 'knowledge' and by exerting military action from some distance. The combination of intelligence information (imagery and listening) with positioning and guidance data was to give an inescapable edge to armed forces with access to space technology.

This period has been decisive for many military space programmes as a number of technological advances had to be made in different application domains to adapt the use of space systems to the context of theatre operations. The increased use of satellite-guided munitions and weapons throughout the last decades has provided one of the most dramatic illustrations of this change of perspective, as demonstrated in Table 33.1. In the United States, such space technologies have been perceived, and still are to a certain extent, as augmenting 'strategic control' based on aerial dominance, with the hope of keeping the number of casualties on the ground to a minimum. Source of intense reflections as well as controversial debates among the community of military strategists, those far-reaching technical and organizational changes in the conduct of military operations are yet to come. In particular, the ambition of making space systems a cornerstone of intelligence and military operations has been widely questioned, considering that in the most frequent situations asymmetrical warfare is the rule. In Afghanistan, it has been widely recognized that technology cannot provide all answers against sometimes

Table 33.1. Compared rate of GPS-guided munitions by US forces during recent conflicts

Conflict	Total munitions	% guided munitions	% laser-guided munitions (no satellite support)	% GPS-guided munitions
Iraq 1991	238,000	4.0 (9,500)	4.0	0
Serbia 1999	23,700	32.5 (7,700)	29.5	3 (700)
Afghanistan 2002	22,000	59.0 (13,000)	27.0	32 (>7,000)
Iraq 2003	30,000	66.5 (19,950)	39.5	27 (8,100)

Sources: As compiled and recalculated from Hayes, 2004; and Lewis, 2004.

unsophisticated but most unfortunately efficient explosives or ambushes. Space alone cannot provide the solution when confronted with determined and well-organized insurgent forces or units. In such situations, space systems are used to bring support and information in assoication with a whole range of sensors and intelligence capabilities.

Making Space a 'Strategic Enabler' for Defence and Security: A Second Adaptation to the Post-Cold War Era (1994 to Date)

In the middle of the 1990s, from being a 'force multiplier' space was to become a 'security enabler', as it was often dubbed in a number of official speeches delivered by military authorities, again mainly US. At a time when the US armed forces were to be reformatted to be able to fight two 'major theatre wars' simultaneously, space systems were perceived as forming one of the backbones of the so-called 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA). New 'network-centric' architectures would then be studied with the basic objectives of increasing the omniscience (via a real-time global intelligence), the omnipresence (especially via an improved telecommunication infrastructure virtually allowing better-coordinated military operations), and the omnipotence of the forces (notably via the space-aided long-reach piloted weapons systems).

This global political posture adopted in the USA (as well as in Europe to a certain degree) to the accelerated change in the strategic landscape (and consisting in the introduction of the concept of 'enlarged security' responding to new security threats and challenges) has kept the link between space and defence alive during the 1990s and up to now. The increased use of space observation, telecommunication, and navigation/localization/dating techniques during the military operations in the 1990s has gradually resulted in injecting more and more space technologies at the very heart of the military

and security systems. Of course, the precise guiding of missiles and ammunitions by the GPS system mentioned above comes immediately to mind. But more widely, a priority military objective seems to have been the development of innovative intelligence systems that reflected the difficulty of dealing with new military (or security) 'targets' that are more elusive, mobile, and to put it briefly, less identifiable than Soviet missile silos. In other words, based on experiences gained during the 1990s, the idea of adapting existing space assets that had been developed for decades to monitor the Soviet Union has progressively imposed itself.

In this field, increasing omnipresence has meant capitalizing on the quick technical progress made in the field of sensors, with the project of comprehensive data collection systems destined to improve both early-warning (essentially aimed at missile launch detection and monitoring) and intelligence capabilities. Military Earth-observation satellites have to be capable of both increased resolution (geometric and spectral) and enlarged fields of view. Such systems can also benefit from more efficient 'small' satellites that, despite reduced performance compared to traditional military systems, can usefully complete national resources. All these capabilities are intended to be networked to build a genuine 'space architecture' that can be interconnected with other information tools, air-, sea-, or terrestrial-based. In brief, in the eyes of numerous military strategists in the USA, mastering the information technologies has gradually become a prerequisite if one wants to win wars. In this context, space techniques have quickly become more than a simple 'force multiplier' to represent a real strategic or 'security enabler', as they have become more and more central to the present and future defence and security systems alike.

Symbolically, these security-oriented space applications have somewhat reflected the new political analyses that have been made about the new threats facing the USA before and after 2001 and that can benefit from the ubiquity and from the new tasks enabled by these new collective capabilities. Again, the permanence and the performance offered by enlarged networks of collaborative sensors, possibly military and civilian, could theoretically allow dealing with a large spectrum of missions, ranging from police- and law enforcement-type missions up to a direct use in theatre-level weapons systems and operations in high-intensity conflicts. A legitimate question is whether such a basically improved knowledge of the general 'security' environment can a priori be legitimately presented as providing the USA with strategic and political gains in a world embroiled with more and more elusive threats.

This evolution has translated into several concrete steps with the implicit goal of highlighting the value of the political and industrial investments made during the Cold War. In particular, it can be attested by the well-known efforts made by successive US administrations during the 1990s to promote worldwide Earth Observation or navigation/localization techniques that were previously considered sensitive capabilities and kept at the classified or 'military use only' level. In parallel, the US administrations have actively invested in international space launch ventures, also with the global objective of better organizing a crucial capability in a highly competitive environment.[8]

Obviously, making space systems the cornerstone of defence and security policies would not be without a price. In the short term, it raises the issue of new vulnerabilities possibly created from putting space techniques at the heart of Western military and more largely social systems. In the United States, the perception of this latest 'threat' has been growing over the last decade to the point where it is being hailed as a high defence priority, possibly opening the realm of another complete new era for the military uses of space. In the longer term, it could also endanger the prevailing of collective security in space.

Controlling Space: A New Long-Term Strategic Change For Military Uses of Space?

New interpretations of the importance of 'controlling space' have flourished, considering this new situation. They have openly made this goal highly desirable (even necessary) as space assets have gradually been perceived as becoming assets of 'national vital interest'.[9] Today, reconsideration of the military role of space has started, bringing about international discussions in different fora, notably the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in charge of strategic disarmament.

Up to now, projects aiming to put defensive or armed systems in space had never rallied strong political support, even if proposed several times in the USA since the 1960s and despite a sometimes-strong lobbying effort. The highest political authorities seldom endorsed making space a possible new battlefield as suggested by well-known US Air Force generals in the 1950s. Keeping space safe from any military escalation quickly became a political priority.[10]

These new strategic objectives are now on the verge of being translated into radically new military requirements for space. This new expression of needs currently shapes nascent R&D programmes, as well as consolidating already existing defensive concepts based on telecommunications jamming systems for example.

As seen by most US strategists, the more and more diverse and numerous functions assumed by existing or coming space systems have made those 'a vital national interest', space becoming for the years to come 'a centre of gravity, both economically and militarily'.[11] A new mission for space techniques can then be crafted around the general notion of 'space control', usually compared to the strategy that led the main commercial powers to look for dominance on the seas during the last centuries. A very important directive signed in 1999 by William Cohen, then Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, announced that space must be considered as 'a medium like land, sea and air within which military activities will be conducted to achieve US national security objectives. The ability to access and utilize space is a vital national interest because many of the activities conducted in the medium are critical to US national security and

economic well-being.' In consequence, 'purposeful interference with US space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Command Authorities, the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on our rights.' In particular, it is considered vital that 'an adversary cannot obtain an asymmetric advantage by countering our space capabilities or using space systems or services for hostile purposes.'[12]

In a significant move, this first political announcement was paralleled by the so-called 'Space Control' concept, initiated in the USA by a newly appointed 'Space Architect' and conceived as a comprehensive approach encompassing technical and non-technical measures. From a more technical point of view, the 'Space Control' doctrine has developed on three pillars:

- the development of better space surveillance capabilities, capable of providing a genuine 'space situational awareness', i.e. allowing the detection and monitoring of possible crisis situations in space;
- the enhancement of passive protections aboard military and civilian satellites used for defence and security purposes, as well as increased protection of the entire space information chain;
- last but not least, the development of more offensive capabilities in orbit, allowing 'offensive counterspace operations' if necessary.

'Space control' has quickly appeared as being based on a combination of technical, political, and military measures that shows the growing 'dual' character of space techniques involved in defence and security. In 2010, it can be said that the two first principles have been adopted by the main spacefaring powers. More specifically, in addition to the USA and Russia, the European Union has agreed to pursue a 'Space Situational Awareness' (SSA) programme intended to get an autonomous 'global picture' of orbiting objects. This programme, officially adopted in 2008 by the member states of the European Space Agency, has been politically endorsed by the European Union as being part of its future space plans. First European capabilities to monitor space activities should see the light by 2015.

But the notion of space control is also encompassing more overtly military programmes. Admittedly organized in a more 'offensive'[13] fashion, the control of 'hostile uses' of space (or 'the negation of the uses of space' as frequently referred to in official US documents) has translated into several experimental or R&D-oriented programmes in the field of space-based or ground-based anti-satellite capabilities (from the testing of experimental highly manoeuvrable satellites to the study of lasers capable of 'blinding' Earth Observation satellites, or even to the deployment of powerful jamming satellite communication systems). These efforts have clearly capitalized on the R&D financed from 1984 on in the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Despite downsized ambitions, the 'Missile Defence' programme, as it is known today, has remained one the most efficient providers of technology research in many domains, including for innovative space techniques that can now be envisioned as elements of the space control policy.

Challenges Ahead

Several other spacefaring nations have engaged in similar developments, notably China, which has demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities by using a ground-based interceptor that destroyed an old Chinese meteorological satellite in Low Earth Orbit on 11 January 2007, an event recorded as having produced the highest amount of debris in orbit in space history.[14] In 2010, India also revealed an interest in increasing its R&D effort in this domain.

More generally, more than sixty countries now possess at least one satellite in orbit, thus creating a hugely transformed situation as compared with the one prevailing during the Cold War. In addition, the raw number of satellites as well as the amount of debris has been increasing constantly, quickly leading to new challenges regarding the security and the viability of space assets in the mediumterm due to possible congestion and resulting collisions between space objects.[15] In 2009, a total of 1,300 satellites were active among some 20,000 registered objects, most of them satellites or debris (6,300 out of 20,000 being unidentified). In such a transformed landscape, challenges to the security of space are clearly increasing and can only raise new issues about military strategies in orbit.

The recent orbital intercepts tend to demonstrate the emergence of a new antagonistic situation in space with possible military consequences. Again, the US military authorities have been the first to openly formalize a doctrine related to the actual control of space. It has taken the form of an Air Force doctrinal document entitled 'Counterspace Operations', made public in 2004,[16] that can be considered as a military version of the principle of protection established by the 1999 Department of Defense Directive partially cited above.

In October 2006, the US presidential policy (while largely confirming a posture already stated in the Clinton administration's previous policy document published ten years earlier) adopted rather radical conclusions by declaring that the United States would 'develop capabilities, plans and options to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries'. The document confirmed that 'Freedom of space is as important to the United States as Air power and Sea power.' As a consequence, this political document has appeared as fully endorsing some of the most radical views already expressed two years earlier in the Air Force Counterspace doctrine, by recalling first some basic principles ruling outer space activities, and by providing then the political rationale behind these new 'space control'-related efforts:

> The United States . . . rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space; . . The United States considers space systems to have rights of passage through and operations in space without interference. Consistent with this principle, the United States will view purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights.[17]

This policy was widely hailed as marking a new political era for the military uses of space. It has been perceived as de facto legitimizing the possible use of force in space, including against space objects. This would at least have the 'merit' of providing a 'clearer' delineation of the uncertain notion of 'peaceful uses of space' as stated in the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space, as seen from the United States.

However, published by the Obama presidency in June 2010, a new US policy has largely nuanced these initial statements. Considering the more and more complex and interdependent relationships in space, this new policy has announced the interest of the US administration in more cooperation, calling on

> all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future generations. . . . It is in the shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. The United States considers the sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use of, space vital to its national interest.[18]

From a New Theatre of War to Increased Collective Security Regulations: What Perspectives for the Next Military Space Era?

China can be described as the most 'reactive' spacefaring country in this new context. Beyond the symbolic ASAT test conducted in January 2007, the Chinese authorities have clearly indicated for a few years that they have indeed learned from recent conflicts and insisted on the target-nature of satellites. Many official military speeches have pointed out the relative dependency of the United States on space systems, statements that have obviously fuelled the fear of a 'Space Pearl Harbor' as characterized in 2001 by the Space Commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, soon to become G. W. Bush's Secretary of Defense.[19] Possibly interpreted as a confirmation of these fears, many Chinese authors are often quoted as describing this possible shift in space operations:

> Space fighting is not far off. National security has already exceeded territory waters and airspace and territorial space should be added. The modes of defense will no longer be to fight on our own territory and fight for marine rights and interests. We must also engage in space defense as well as air defense.[20]
>
> Based on the need of national security, and our nation's space development, the planning of space weapon development can be divided into two stages, with the first stage covering from now until 2010 and the second stage from 2010 to 2025. In the first stage we must strive to make our space weapon systems possess support and safeguard capabilities as well as basic space combat capability. . . . They should also have a certain combat capability in space, particularly with regard to defensive capability. In the second stage we should build on the foundation of the first

> stage by further improving the offensive and defensive capability of space weapons systems. In particular the offense capability in space should, if necessary, be capable of destroying or temporarily incapacitating all enemy space vehicles that fly in above our sovereign territory.[21]

Many of these authors insist on the necessity for China to mimic the US approach towards the use of military space systems, and often recognize that the mastering of space assets conveys military superiority in the field of information warfare and precision guided conventional weapons.

Without prejudging the technical and political soundness of such assessments, it is important to put them in perspective with the traditional position of China regarding the necessity to renegotiate the so-called Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to more effectively prohibit the 'Placement of weapons in Outer Space'.[22] This post-Cold War political showdown also explains the very symbolic positions taken on space issues by the main protagonists of this strategic debate, while, for each of them, 'weaponizing' space may appear more and more questionable.

Indeed these last years have witnessed the emergence of wider debates pointing at more serious and immediate perils involving the collective security of space assets. While the US–Chinese relationship has focused on the 'weapons in space' issues, other developments, including the increasing amount of debris in orbit, with possibly lethal effect on satellites, as well as the increasing number of actors capable of accessing and using space, have called for more collective security-oriented debates. It is now widely admitted that the most powerful spacefaring countries will be the first to suffer from possible orbital events, without being capable of clearly attributing their origin, or deciding if they may be intentional or not, for example. The collision between a US and a Russian satellite has perfectly exemplified the reality of such difficulties, putting also an accent on the necessity for those powers to cooperate instead of confronting, even if only for their own national security.[23] Considering the ever-increasing worldwide space activity, mainly distributed on a few operational orbits, there is a growing awareness of the possibly limited nature of space resources for Earth-oriented applications, civilian or military. Competition for orbital slots in the geostationary orbits, for frequency spectrum preferred allocations and for avoiding interference, possible traffic management issues on Low Earth orbits, and of course the increasing amount of debris on those orbits, are examples of an ever more constraining environment that may create increasing security difficulties for national military assets also. Ultimately, the fragile nature of space systems (capable of being destroyed in orbit by debris as small as a few centimetres in size) as well as severely constrained uses due to the laws of celestial physics makes this environment very peculiar and a good candidate for highly disturbing accidents or possible 'asymmetric' actions. From this standpoint, the space environment has remained until now very difficult to control from a national military perspective.

Recognizing theses specificities, this 'collective security'-oriented approach has been actively endorsed and promoted by the European Union through the proposal of an international 'code of conduct' for space activities, capitalizing on ideas proposed by several research institutes or think-tanks.[24] Initially presented by the Ambassador of Italy in

Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament, that proposal was further officialized by the Council of the European Union in 2007 under the German presidency. Since 2008, a first text has been circulated to the main space actors in the context of a 'competing' project of a treaty for the disarmament of space pushed by China and Russia. This project, not yet published, appears today as a useful complement of 'good practices' for space promoted in other UN fora (especially in the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—COPUOS—in Vienna). These parallel moves clearly materialize the security-centred approach to space security-related issues as promoted by the European Union.[25]

More than ever, space security appears at a crossroads today. On the one hand, military space systems will benefit from ever-evolving technologies that will make them more responsive to military needs. Concepts such as 'operationally responsive space' (ORS) intended to make space more effective and flexible for operational use, based on both technical and service improvements, will chart the roadmap of future systems. At the same time, recent years have largely demonstrated the limits of space systems when it comes to tactical uses in asymmetrical warfare. These limits should definitively orient space R&D towards more seamless connectivity and better systems integration in larger military and security information architectures. The main objective would consist in making space systems more adapted to the new 'fog' of war rather than attempting to create new conditions of war by focusing on technology push as sometimes advocated by former RMA proponents.

On the other hand, the future of military space (including the more intensive use of space applications in military operations as described above) will also depend on the balance between space 'weaponization' and the global recognition of a need for more collective security in space. The development of orbital weapons could quickly lead to the opening of a Pandora's box with hardly-controlled consequences for their initiators and for the rest of the world space community. At a time when techno-centred military warfare concepts are being balanced with more human-centred approaches, the debate over making space a new theatre of war will be particularly crucial.

Notes

1. Today, the United States accounts for about 70 per cent of the world's public investments in space, while it accounts for more than 92 per cent of the world's military space investments.
2. The U2 spy plane piloted by Gary Powers would be shot down in 1960 by USSR anti-aircraft defences. In August 1960, the first images transmitted by satellites were on the US President's desk.
3. See, for example, the US Air Force Report on the Ballistic Missiles from Col. Kenneth Gantz, published by Doubleday and Co. in 1958. The preface written by Air Force Generals Schriever and White proves particularly supportive of the view that space battles will be unavoidable.
4. Documents recently made public in the USA support this view. Interestingly, in a memorandum sent to President Gerald Ford in July 1976, at a time when a first Soviet anti-satellite test campaign was coming to an end, Brent Scowcroft, then President's Assistant

for National Security Affairs, explained the relative low US profile on the issue by 'a concern that preparation for satellite interception would be contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the SALT protection of "national technical means"', and mentioned a prevalent 'view that it would not be in our interest to stimulate satellite interception since we are more dependent on intelligence from space sources and would have more to lose'. (Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford, Washington, 24 July 1976, Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 66, NSDM 333) in McAllister, 2009.

5. Allowing a better spectral characterization (i.e. better than only optical) of any observed objects.
6. Very recently, Germany has also developed space-based radar capabilities first and foremost able to provide political and military authorities with an independent source of information.
7. 'Battlefield Awareness . . . is the Edge which gives our forces unfair competitive advantage in any combat they're involved in', as William Perry, Defense Secretary during the Clinton administration, once put it.
8. See Malavialle, Sourbès-Verger, and Pasco, 1999: 39–82.
9. See below.
10. In February 1957, before Sputnik was even launched, the highly respected USAF General Bernard Schriever delivered a famous speech calling for an increase of the US military effort in space, in which he considered that 'in the long haul, our safety as a nation may depend upon our achieving "space superiority". Several decades from now, the important battles may not be sea battles or air battles, but space battles, and we should be spending a certain fraction of our national resources to ensure that we do not lag in obtaining space supremacy.' As noted in the USAF document presenting this speech, 'following this address, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson ordered General Schriever, not to use the word "space" in any of his speeches'. See Gen. Schriever, 'Visionary Speech Turns 50', Schriever Air Force base, updated 13 February 2007, at www.schriever.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123040817 (accessed February 2010).
11. Quoted from an oral intervention by General Donald Cook, then Air Force Command Vice-Commander, at RUSI Conference, 'The Military Utility of Space', London, September 1999.
12. Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, accompanying the Defense Space policy Directive #3100.10, 9 July, 1999: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/310010.htm (accessed February 2009).
13. See below.
14. In February 2008, the United States proceeded with the destruction of one of their own satellites, officially for reasons of possible fall-off-associated risks, and using an SM3 ship-based ABM missile. The low altitude of the targeted satellite allowed minimizing of orbital debris, which are now considered to have been destroyed in the atmosphere.
15. In February 2009, a first collision between a US and a Russian-owned satellite occurred, creating several thousand pieces of debris and leading to a general reassessment of the risks in orbit.
16. *Counterspace Operations*, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–2.1, 2 August 2004: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf (accessed January 2010).
17. See www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/national-space-policy-2006.pdf (accessed February 2010).

18. See National Space Policy of the United States of America, 28 June 2010. See www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6–28–10.pdf (accessed December 2010).
19. See www.dod.gov/pubs/space20010111.html (accessed February 2010).
20. *Liberation Army Daily*, 7 February 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, quoted in Morgan et al., 2008: 73.
21. Li Daguang, 2001: 413–14, quoted in Morgan et al., 2008: 74.
22. To this end, a joint Chinese–Russian draft 'Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects' (PPWT) was officially presented on 12 February 2008 at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. To access the draft text, refer to www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/space/IntOrg/CD/2008/documents/CD_1839.pdf (accessed December 2010).
23. This particular case has illustrated the need for more internationally cooperative space surveillance systems, as no national-based system at the time seemed to have been able to forecast the collision with sufficient precision and certainty.
24. Such as the Stimson Center or the Center for Defense Information (both non-governmental organizations based in Washington, D.C.).
25. On this particular European view, see Pasco, 2009.

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CHAPTER 34

AFFORDING WAR: THE BRITISH CASE

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Introduction

Sun Tzu famously said that money is the sinews of war. Indeed, war is as much a function of affordability as it is strategy, structure, and planning. And, for a balance to be struck between what is needed and what can be afforded, a key and enduring relationship must be established between the tasks armed forces must undertake and the capability and capacities such forces possess. It is a mark of the defence economic challenges faced by all NATO and EU states that in spite of Britain's current difficulties it remains only one of three other NATO European members to spend above the minimum 2 per cent of GDP on defence recommended by the NATO Ten Year Strategic Vision.[1] This chapter explores the key relationship between forces and resources and uses Britain as a case study to consider the affordability of modern armed forces in an age of austerity. The core message is essentially simple: whatever the financial situation a state faces, security and defence of the realm must be afforded.

The Affordability Dilemma

The main linkage in affording war is the relationship between the cost of war and the strategic investment in armed forces.[2] It is a truism that has stood the test of time and yet is extremely hard to judge, particularly during times of relative peace when there are so many other claims on the national exchequer. Demonstrating the value of defence investment in peace—the mantra of Value for Money for example—is indeed akin to

proving a negative: if war does not happen to what extent is it due to defence investment? Since time immemorial British governments have grappled with this question and just about managed to balance strategy and affordability. However, such is the severity of the financial crisis that that linkage could be broken for the first time in perhaps four hundred years.

Between 1979 and 1986 the British defence budget increased in absolute terms due to a range of factors such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Euromissiles crisis. Moreover, in 1982 Britain also fought a short war against Argentina to recover the Falkland Islands. Equally, the then incumbent government under Margaret Thatcher believed that relatively strong British armed forces were a vital tool of British influence. However, over the period 1986 to 2010 the defence budget as a function of gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 5 to 2.1 per cent and yet over the same period the tasks and scope and intensity of operations climbed markedly. In fact, having stripped out historical inflation and allowing for Defence Cost Inflation,[3] the 2010 defence budget is less than half that of 1979 and less than a third that of 1986. At roughly £30bn per annum in cash terms, it is also 25 per cent less than it was in 2000 prior to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, successive British governments over recent times have made a conscious decision to ask a lot more from the British armed forces for a lot less investment.

This 'do more with less' syndrome has been apparent since before the end of the Cold War. Since 1981 there have been five separate defence reviews, all employing various euphemistic titles to cut cost: the New Management Strategy of the late 1980s; the Peace Dividend 1990 and Options for Change incorporated with the 1994 Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study; the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which sought to make sense of the role of the armed forces in the post-Cold War world; and the 2002 SDR New Chapter. Only the SDR tried to consider size and shape of the armed forces in relation to strategic and structural change in the world, but its findings and proposals were then starved of funding year on year thereafter. In effect, the ends were deemed to match the means and Britain effectively chose what threats it could afford.

Between 1979 and 1986 Britain did manage to maintain a performance advantage over potential adversaries that also helped the British to exert significant influence over both allies and adversaries. In the jargon of the day Britain 'punched above its weight', which was achieved mainly by aligning British grand strategy closely with that of the USA. These forces proved reasonably effective during the 1991 Iraq War, as well as during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and Sierra Leone in 2000. However, as the first decade of the twenty-first century has unfolded, the reserve of effectiveness, competency, and prestige of British armed forces has dissipated as the investment, size, and use have become unbalanced, mainly due to following an activist post-9/11 American grand strategy on British resources and mismatched/imbalanced capabilities. This has also represented an unbalancing/unpinning of the US-UK ('special') relationship, in which Britain promised and the USA expected too much. Both sides of the exchange came away feeling let down: trusts were broken—'better always to promise less and deliver more'.

The supporting figures bear this out. Between 1979 and 1992 British defence expenditure remained ahead of defence and historical inflation and saw asymmetric (as opposed to balanced) investment in both the teeth (front-line) and tail (research, procurement, development, education, and logistics). However, by 2000 the military performance advantage was in steep decline and by 2010 it had effectively been exhausted. Consequently, the gap between forces and resources left British armed forces fielding many force structures affordable at 5 per cent of GDP, but no longer affordable at 3.5 per cent, let alone the 2.1 per cent expended in 2010. In effect, the British concentrated on maintaining capability at the expense of scale, and strategic performance was thus sacrificed to maintain operational performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Great Defence Depression

In essence the British armed forces have always had to grapple with inconsistent funding and irregular re-equipping, which, if the gap becomes too great or decisions taken are too far removed from strategic or financial reality, result in spending bulges that inevitably lead to funding gaps over time. Indeed, the British National Audit Office (NAO) estimates that the funding gap in the equipment procurement budget over the next ten years could be as much as £36bn and possibly much higher. In effect, to have kept pace over the 2000–10 period either an additional £12bn needed to be spent each year on defence or the size and tasks of the British armed forces similarly reduced. Today the British armed forces find themselves in the worst of all worlds—with tasks, commitments, and the unit cost of equipment still rising as the budget shrinks and the force wears out.

To rebalance effort with equity the British defence budget would need to be stabilized at the very minimum at around £44bn per annum (at 2008 prices) or approximately 3 per cent of GDP over the period 2010–20. At a time of acute financial stress and given the cuts announced in the October 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) this is not possible. Moreover, even to maintain comparative performance advantage would require a significant rescaling of the British armed forces.

Successive British governments have struggled to give British forces effective and affordable equipment. However, the British appear to have reached the limits of such an approach, especially if effective interoperability with the Americans remains the first principle of British defence policy. This is nothing new. Eisenhower, in his 1960 military industrial complex (MIC) speech, warned 'against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the MIC'. Earlier in the same speech, he called for '[a system] which enables us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle'. Eisenhower understood complexity. The institutions put in place to administer the MIC in the US and the UK did three things: (a) they sought to control expenditure on defence by developing (b) a technological *performance advantage*[4] (more 'bangs' at the expense of less 'boots') and (c) planning acquisition and procurement programmes over generations rather than years. These

institutions were designed to fight a Cold War over decades. They were not designed as responsive and adaptive organizations to deal with 'hot wars'. To regulate expenditure, these planners sought to control the supply side and inevitably, as the unit cost of equipment rose, this posed a fundamental choice and one which continues to affect all countries, including the USA.

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) was essentially misguided because it took the financial crisis as an absolute rather than a phase to be weathered prior to the return to sound strategy. As such it employed language of a great defence depression, similar to that of the Great Depression of the 1930s, that to all intents and purposes destroyed any level of ambition. Indeed, by creating a narrative of effective decline it highlighted the bureaucratic management of decline rather than the political leadership of strategy front and centre in British defence policy. Specifically, the SDSR was based upon existing operational analysis models designed to balance between existing force structures and capabilities and emphasize precision (intervention) over mass (stabilization); not to devise new strategic designs. The SDSR was run by the MoD simply to achieve the 20 per cent salami-cuts required to meet the Comprehensive Spending Review; not to enable strategic thinking. It was not helped by a coalition and factionalized political class that until, literally, the last week could find agreement only in that it neither 'knew' nor 'cared' overmuch about defence—particularly, a defence-industrial complex aligned to the right of the Conservative Party and not the vital coalition 'centre' ground, itself supported by a security establishment that preferred the USA over the EU at a time of structural political disenchantment between Britain and America.

The final SDSR decisions were then given to a newly formed and critically understaffed National Security Council, formed at the five-star level and required also to deliver on national security strategy. In the end, under intense pressure from the Americans, Prime Minister David Cameron intervened to limit the cuts to 8 per cent. However, even that cut had a major impact on British defence strategy. First, the service chiefs were forced to defend their own core capabilities as haggling went down to the final weekend before the announcement, with the result that key joint enablers such as the brand new Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft were erroneously cut. Second, whole swathes of capability were cut well before their end-service dates, such as HMS *Ark Royal*, the fleet flagship, and the entire Harrier force. Third, in terms of deterrence, the removal of MRA and frigates from the UK's order of battle had the unintended consequence of reducing the UK's deterrence posture to, at best, a 'one-and-a-half strike', thus impacting upon the USA's declared 'second strike posture'—a dangerous place to be. Fourth, the 8 per cent cuts failed entirely to address the, by then, systemic failure of the defence budget.

An 8 per cent cut, based upon 2008 defence expenditure and 'historic inflation', represented a reduction of the cash budget by 9 per cent. Set against DCI since 2008, the cut represented a reduction of 11 per cent. Based upon historically high inflation and allowing for marginal increases in defence spending, an 8 per cent cut in 2010 represents a real-terms reduction of almost 20 per cent by 2015. Based simply on DCI and no increases in defence spending, this would represent a cut of almost one-third by 2015. Put simply, on these figures the shortfall needing to be found was at least an additional

£12–£20bn. This became evident in January 2011, as reported in both the Sunday Times (9 January 2011) and Financial Times (20 January 2011), with indications of the need to find 'an additional £18bn and/or £1bn a year'. Within less than three months, the SDSR had completely unravelled but there was no political appetite or MoD expertise by this time to undertake the vital review necessary to put in place the appropriate system-level budgeting mechanisms.

The dilemma is all too clear. British military posture is established across the new strategic stability spectrum: strategic coercion/deterrence, strategic/regional stability, robust peace enforcement in distant places over extended periods, peacekeeping in distant places over time, traditional peacemaking/peacekeeping in and around Europe (including rescue missions), stabilization and reconstruction operations beyond Europe. American military planning necessarily remains focused at the highest end of the spectrum. Therefore, whilst retaining the capability and capacity to support the Americans at the high end (including nuclear deterrence) remains important, the centre of gravity for British force planning tends to be at a lower level of conflict intensity.

There are some short cuts that can be employed to shrink the causes of the gap, forces and resources. However, endemically short on forces and resources, the British are forced to adopt a whole-of-government approach to defence with the armed forces acting as a focal point for the generation of effect across much of the conflict spectrum. Given the standing and performance of Britain's armed forces such an objective is reasonable but it makes the organization of security far more complicated than for the Americans. Given that war is always expensive, emphasis is rightly placed on effective conflict prevention. Defence diplomacy thus is a high priority, designed to export the British way of military security and to increase British military influence by placing military and civilian personnel trained in security and stability operations in key places as advisors.

Thus, the SDSR commitment to a continued global role for the British armed forces sits uncomfortably with the Treasury's demand for a 20 per cent cut throughout the planning cycle from strategy to procurement. Indeed, as the tasks grow exponentially, covering missions the world over as diverse as stabilization and reconstruction; disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation (DDR); security sector reform; counterterrorism and even counter-piracy, there comes a point when neither the force nor its 'kit' can shrink further. In other words, not only are the British armed forces too small for the missions outlined in the SDSR, they are likely to get smaller. Therefore, either more must be spent or less must be done, and given the CSR it would appear to be the latter. Certainly, the price the British will pay will be profound in terms of its projection of influence and thereby power.

The poor state of Britain's traditional preferred instrument of power and influence is a case in point. Current strategic thinking presupposes a Royal Navy with a balanced fleet organized around the two new super-carriers HMS *Queen Elizabeth* and HMS *Prince of Wales*, supported by British commando and helicopter, littoral manoeuvre, carriers, air and submerged protection, as well as offensive nuclear attack submarines and ballistic nuclear missile submarines. However, the Royal Navy's surface fleet has been cut from thirty-two principal surface craft (PSC) to twenty-five, with more ships expected to be cut. Traditionally Britain's global role has always been built around a frigate navy.

Indeed, frigates offer the most flexibility across the greatest range of likely missions. Critically, the Type 45 destroyers and Astute class nuclear hunter-killer submarine programmes have been both cut and delayed. This is financially self-defeating as it leads to the retention of aging ships such as the Type 23 frigates, which need larger crews and thus impose an additional and inefficient cost on the Royal Navy over the interim.

The British Army has already seen its infantry battalions reduced from forty to thirty-six and armoured regiments from six to five with many of those formations undermanned and ill-equipped. It is a failing reinforced by poor spending. Two-hundred and thirty-two Euro-fighter Typhoons, two large, sixty-five-thousand-ton aircraft carriers, and of course the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) need to be justified, built, equipped, and crewed ultimately as a strategic judgement, cost being only one aspect. For Britain therefore the real question concerns that level of expenditure required to ensure the armed forces can undertake missions vital to national security with every reasonable chance of success at a reasonable level of risk. Effective modern armed forces need a percentage investment level in modern equipment of at least 30 per cent of the defence budget to keep up with technological developments. To that end, some basic future-planning assumptions must be gripped if the capability-capacity crunch from which the British armed forces currently suffer is not to become acute:

- Defence cost inflation (DCI) rises year on year at 6–8 per cent.
- Reduced equipment orders and a focus on development rather than production as a function of equipment budget cuts drive unit costs up exponentially, exacerbated by 'featurism'.
- The use of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) is the antithesis of sound procurement planning, undermines the Defence Planning Assumptions, and places upward pressure on DCI.
- Sophisticated weapon systems require ever-increasing up-front investments in defence research and development (R&D), as well as significant investments during the design and development phases.
- The living and working conditions for professional forces increase in line with inflation and market expectations. Professional militaries have to compete for labour in labour markets.
- All modern armed forces face a reduced teeth-to-tail ratio due to the ever-increasing complication of logistics and maintenance.
- Advanced expeditionary operations impose much greater wear and tear on both equipment and people, resulting in the need for revised and accelerated force rotations and materiel replacement.

For the past decade British armed forces have been operating beyond the limits framed by the Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA), the policy framework of the Ministry of Defence within which force planning takes place in order to meet the government's stated objectives for the armed forces. The state of the British armed forces in 2011 thus demonstrates the extent to which a gap has opened up between stated national strategy, the ever-expanding task-list imposed on the armed forces, and the willingness of

government to invest in the armed forces to a level commensurate with the defence roles and missions set. Indeed, the Treasury's grip on expenditure is leading to a counter-strategic posture, effectively splitting foreign and defence policy and preventing anything like a proper national strategy able to generate credible presence and/or strategic effect. As a result the British armed forces are starting to degrade materially and morally.

Today, with sustained operations in Afghanistan, together with other enduring commitments worldwide, the British armed forces are engaged on one enduring major combat and stability operation of 10,000 deployed personnel (and recovering from another) when in fact the force was designed (under the so-called 'harmony guidelines') to undertake only one shorter medium-scale operation, one enduring small-scale operation (of around 2,000 personnel), and one medium-scale operation of limited duration. A capability-capacity crunch is thus becoming daily more apparent in critical areas such as logistics, repair and maintenance, and, of course, people. The people problem is becoming particularly acute with an attrition rate of 10 per cent in infantry battalions in Afghanistan preventing the effective regeneration of the force. The symptoms are all too apparent in the personnel structure with the early promotion of people ill-prepared for the missions they are called upon to undertake.

Certainly, during times of strong economic growth all non-conscript armed forces face difficulties recruiting people and that has been the case for the British Army in particular, with some formations being 10 per cent below strength. The current financial crisis may ease this problem but over the medium to long term recruitment and retention will likely continue to prove problematic. The technical professions, including aircrew, simply do not attract enough quality candidates and retaining technical grades is proving exceptionally difficult given both operational tempo and length of deployments. Indeed, given that some 10 per cent of British armed forces are made up of foreign nationals it could be that the domestic personnel pool is reaching its limit at current levels of employment, although this is unlikely. Rather, the shortfall is more likely to reflect the relatively weak relationship between British armed forces, the society they serve, and the education/technical base from which they recruit. This certainly needs to be fixed as a matter of urgency. Moreover, given the tasks expected of the modern British serviceman and woman, a much more attractive employment and conditions package is likely required if the services are to compete effectively over the medium to long term, which will mean looking at increased reserve employment, a changing/adaptable regular–reserve ratio, and even the use of Private Reserves (the licensing of private security companies, for example).

Balancing Strategy, Capability, and Affordability

Superimposed upon the defence model was an emphasis upon balance as opposed to balancing. In other words, rather than striking a balance between what is needed and what can be afforded and between the tasks armed forces must undertake and the capability

and capacities such forces possess, the emphasis was placed on balancing existing force structures, for example Balance Score Cards. Such 'balance' assumed stability in which the plan, balance, and performance indicators (targets) were right in the first instance and it was simply necessary to trim accordingly—salami-slicing. At the same time, the linking of defence programmes to strategy becomes particularly important to demonstrate affordability ('Value for Money'). Cost alone does not dictate affordability, which is only possible if such expenditure is placed in its proper security policy context. However, the SDSR acts more as a snapshot of the tasks the Government expects the armed force to undertake, rather than a proper vision statement for the future. All governments (not just the British) are faced with three options: increase the defence budget in order to uphold the quality and quantity of the forces; maintain the quality while reducing the numbers; or lower the quality while maintaining the numbers. Since the end of the Cold War British defence ministers have tended to prefer option two. However, all the planning drivers would suggest that even as the cuts bite Britain will need significantly greater numbers of quality forces. How can such forces be afforded?

At the very least a new centre of planning gravity will be required to meet adequately the demands of the emerging security environment with a credible and balanced force. If interoperability and task specialization in NATO and the EU could be relied upon to offset relative British weakness a more specialized approach could be adopted. However, that is patently not the case. All that alliances can be absolutely relied upon for is solidarity and legitimacy (not effectiveness) should a state threat re-emerge to the home base, requiring a reconstitution of NATO collective defence. For all other types of operations support is conditional, using ad hoc coalitions, with Britain at best playing the role of coalition leader or framework nation, a role of course for which Britain would have to properly prepare and invest.

Furthermore, because cuts in defence budgets have gone further and faster in most other NATO and EU countries, interoperability is weakening in the face of acute material underinvestment. Therefore, giving up essential expeditionary capabilities and capacity comes with a dangerous opportunity cost for the British armed forces. First, because such losses are usually irreversible and second, they narrow the tasks that can be undertaken even as the task-list expands. For the British, cutting the defence budget drastically in the face of inherent uncertainties in the security environment means that a level of risk has been accepted by government that is historically high even in terms of the emerging centre powers such as Germany, post the financial and Euro crises.

In that light the fight taking place between the services as real resources shrink in relation to expanded missions is particularly unfortunate. In effect, the impact of land-heavy operations on the defence budget is certainly helping to distort the defence budget for understandable reasons. However, such distortion effectively prevents the generation of an adaptively-balanced force, with the 1:2:1 ratio between the Royal Navy (RN), the Army, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) becoming more or less fixed. As a consequence the services (the RN and RAF in particular) are forced to stretch their long-term investment plans over an ever greater length of time, making procurement and acquisition critically inefficient. An essential question not asked by SDSR is 'what is the size of Armed Forces

for a medium power with a population approaching 70 Million?' Empirical evidence suggests that the Royal Navy, including the Royal Marines, is sub-critical at 30,000 and it needs to be about 50,000; about the same size as the post-SDSR RAF. In which case, the question politicians, the Treasury, and military planners should have been addressing all along is 'how to fit out and sustain a military force of 250,000'. This will require completely different equipment and manning models to those existing today.

Indeed, producing a limited number of assets each year over a lengthy period is far less efficient than larger orders over a shorter timeframe with economies of scale and production. Moreover, the system to be replaced and the system replacing it needs a much shorter in-parallel service time. In other words, we need to increase our production tempo rather than trying to keep existing equipment going longer and longer. Moreover, spinning out programmes tends to generate service-driven priorities which do not necessarily correspond with longer-term political objectives and again places the relationship between defence policy and national strategy at risk. The future carrier programme is a case in point. Even though the Royal Navy is desperately in need of reinvestment, an excessive part of the navy's investment budget between 2010 and 2020 will be absorbed by the costs and associated costs of the carriers, thus creating an acute opportunity cost across the fleet. As the money will have to come from the defence budget the consequence is that there will be little room for any other Royal Navy requirements and as costs inflate (as they will) vital projects for the other services will almost certainly suffer. For example, manpower cuts of 5,000 to the naval service resulting from SDSR will essentially cut the Surface Fleet by a quarter. The message is simple: given Britain's stated ambitions and the money it is willing to invest, the current 'solution' would appear to be the provision of either less and/or inferior equipment than suggested by sound national strategy. Britain is in effect trying to be a pocket superpower on the cheap and history is replete with examples of such folly: the destruction of the 1919 HMS *Hood* by the modern German battleship *Bismarck* in 1941 being but the most obvious case of the folly of sending inferior equipment into harm's way. Such strategic judgements thus need to be made by the British Government as a matter of urgency. Rather, both the SDSR and CSR seem to dodge the strategic for the sake of the financial and in effect transfer risk down the command chain onto the men and women in uniform, and they deserve better.

Matching Means to Ends

The perennial lesson of defence economics is that the best way to afford war is not to engage in it. However, such an option is likely unreasonable given the position of Britain in today's world. The luxury of war avoidance is unlikely to be afforded to Britain during the first half of the twenty-first century. Britain must therefore develop armed forces that can offer a credible deterrent (both conventional and nuclear) across the most likely range of contingencies and act effectively to resolve conflicts successfully when called upon to do so.

Given that framework, to achieve a reasoned and reasonable balance between cost and effect the armed forces will need to be rapidly expandable with access to both personnel and equipment that can rapidly augment the force at the very latest over one defence planning cycle of ten to fifteen years. These must be forces able and capable of war-fighting and stability operations and able to be sent and sustained the world over. In other words, the British armed forces must have the ability to cope with MacMillan's famous 'events' and deal effectively with both the expected and unexpected as part of a new national security effort. Indeed, planning to cope with the unexpected is as important as planning for the expected. Britain thus needs a strategic core force that can act as a credible hub of operations for sustained medium-sized operations with Europeans and other partners, act as a credible partner for strategic operations with the Americans, and be capable of acting in its own right to force entry or resolve short-term crises.

The first step will be to revise the Defence Planning Assumptions to ensure the armed forces can lead with allies and partners two simultaneous enduring medium-scale operations, with a significant complementary civilian capability able to augment purely military efforts, at scale. For the Royal Navy this will mean the sustaining and maintaining of a meaningful carrier and littoral manoeuvre (not simply amphibious) programme (including for destroyers, surface combatants, landing and mine countermeasure vessels), with the scale and capacity to match. This is likely to call for alternative, more commercially aligned systems designed around versatile and adaptive force structures. Principally, such adaptive force structures need to be able to test for success and failure. In simple terms, we need to be able to afford to lose them in order to use them—itself the hallmark of an adaptive, network force structure. This will mean a new focus on production rather than development and on experimentation. As Sir Robert Watson-Watt[5] observed: 'give them third best to go on. The best never comes, and the second best comes too late.' Close cooperation to that end should in parallel be sought with the French and Americans—who both face similar challenges.[6] The Army requires between eighteen and twenty infantry battalions, together with an additional armoured regiment. The most important acquisition for the RAF will be more C-17 strategic lift aircraft with a minimum of eight required, in addition to the planned A-400M aircraft.

This implies at the very least stabilizing defence expenditure and spending better. However, it should be noted that when compared with other sectors of major national expenditure and the defence expenditure of others it pales into insignificance. Since 1997 the British have increased expenditure on health by £45.1bn (147%), on education by £35bn (75%), whilst overseas aid now at 0.7 per cent of GDP (one-third of the defence budget) has increased in real terms by 215 per cent.[7] Defence spending since 1997 has increased only by 11 per cent which is less than historical inflation over the same period. Surely, if cuts are to come they should take place first in areas where such bloated and rapid expenditure by its very nature cannot be efficient. Moreover, when British defence expenditure is compared with that of others over the same period London has been to say the least modest. For example, the US has increased its defence expenditure by 109 per cent, China by 247 per cent, Russia by 67 per cent, and Australia by 56 per cent.

Furthermore, whatever the financial situation it is the security of the citizen in any given security environment that is the Government's first responsibility. Defence expenditure must thus be accorded the priority it deserves, albeit within the framework of a properly conducted security policy review, which the SDSR was not. To that end, the British strategic method should place a new whole-of-government approach at the heart of a national security strategy worthy of the name, based on much greater unity of effort and purpose across government. The welding of such a wide range of ministries and agencies, each with their own implicit doctrines and traditions, will also require a new approach to planning. Thankfully, Britain's long tradition of inclusive defence, force, and operational planning has created the framework for effective strategic security planning at all levels of engagement. Indeed, it is no coincidence that much of the work on new civil–military partnerships (the Comprehensive Approach) is being undertaken by the armed forces. Indeed, realizing a new national security strategy will require far better balance between protection and projection, with synergies sought across four areas—strategy and diplomacy; defence; aid and development; and societal resiliency—all of which draw from an overarching security budget:

Strategy and Diplomacy: A tighter relationship between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Department of Trade and Industry and Department for International Development (DfID) will be essential. First, the FCO needs to become far more adept at exporting the British strategic message by better promoting the strategic stabilization/prevention concept to partners and allies and in so doing build a new diplomatic and political consensus. Second, far greater efforts are needed on the part of British diplomacy to communicate British strategic resolve, as well as openness to new partners. Third, the FCO must play its full diplomatic role by helping to create the security space upon which stabilization and reconstruction relies. Fourth, the UK must develop an integrated strategic communications strategy, connecting across Government, the United Kingdom (including Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, London, the City, and remaining overseas territories, e.g. Falkland Islands/Gibraltar), the economy, and inclusive of the BBC. These are all key to the stabilization and prevention message.

Defence: The Ministry of Defence must refocus on reinforcing strategic diplomacy through credible military effect. That means a defence policy firmly embedded in security policy and driven by it, that maintains sufficient military capability, both nuclear and conventional, to deter, dissuade, and if necessary destroy. Additionally, British armed forces need sufficient capacity to enable the strategic stabilization concept focused on the establishment of a security space (of which the battle space may be but one part) through forced entry and robust stabilization. And, thereafter, be able to properly support/integrate robust civilian elements to reinforce state structures in-theatre through stabilization and reconstruction, defence diplomacy, and security sector reform.

Aid and Development: The Department for International Development (DfID) must be encouraged to overcome the cultural objections too many of its civil servants express to working closely alongside military leadership. Moreover, a national security strategy must make it abundantly clear that British aid and development must and will be employed for national strategic ends. To that end, much greater linkage must take place between British aid and development, trade investment, and legitimate British strategic aims and objectives. The Overseas Development Act (ODA) must either be reformed or scrapped.

Societal Resiliency: The Home Office and Scottish Government must work together to rebuild the cohesion and resiliency of society, whatever future constitutional settlement will be agreed for Scotland. Like it or not, all parts of the United Kingdom are locked together in the national security effort. That will mean in turn the organization of national civil defence agencies and civilian authorities for effective protection of critical infrastructure and effective consequence management and rebuilding of a national British consensus about Britain's role in the world.

Flexible and Adaptive Budgets

The pressures faced by the British are shared by many states in this age of austerity. In essence, governments must balance three often competing dynamics—reduce costs, increase investment in security, and avoid drastic reductions in defence capability. In the British case it is evident that the cut in the defence budget imposed by the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), which represented some 20 per cent, reduced British defence expenditure to an historic low of 1.7 per cent of GDP. Clearly, even a cursory analysis of British interests and the world in which Britain resides makes it all too clear that such a cut can only be justified as a short-term financial fix. In time British defence expenditure will have to increase again, probably to some point between the NATO minimum of 2 per cent and the US 4 per cent. What damage will be done in the interim? Perhaps such a moment must be seen also as an opportunity to reconsider strategy and specifically the relationship between security and defence postures.

For example, the 2008 French Defence White Paper reconsidered the balance between protection and projection to a far greater extent than the British. Civil defence, warning, and planning is being overhauled, with French civil and military cooperation in the management of crises modernized. For the French, societal resiliency is vital in an era of systemic terrorism. To that end Paris is taking steps to make French society far better able to withstand so-called strategic shocks than the British (who are muddling through).

However, even a narrow focus on the British defence budget emphasizes the challenges that lie ahead for all Europeans. For the British to return the defence budget to 3 per cent of GDP over ten years (£52bn per annum at 2008 prices), which will be needed given defence cost inflation (DCI) and if all the worn-out equipment currently in use

is to be recapitalized over a reasonable period, would require the defence budget to grow year on year following the 2010/11 cuts for ten years at 8.7 per cent per annum. Of course, spread over ten years year-on-year growth need not be linear but for the sake of sound and efficient planning a commitment to such overall growth would be required. Indeed, part of the problem faced by the British armed forces over the past ten years (and which is likely to be repeated) reflects the need to replace too much equipment over too short a time, thus creating a tsunami of demand on an ever-smaller equipment budget. Something, sooner or later, will not add up and Britain cannot continue to mortgage its defence future for the defence present.

Therefore, two pivotal questions must be answered by the British and all such states: how to grow the defence budget in a sustainable and adaptable way? How to create an adaptive defence budget that can be managed adaptively? The answers are at first sight simple: spend more or do less. However, would it were that easy. Thankfully, there are ways of finessing the challenge because the key is to maintain essential capital flows and there are several ways to do that. An adaptation budget would focus on achieving a balance between the regular redesign, disposal, and rebuilding of systems and capabilities that to some extent future-proofs the defence budget against defence cost inflation. The basic proposition would see a fixed percentage annually of systems and capabilities being disposed of, matched by a similar fixed percentage being acquired. To see the effective recapitalization of the force over say ten years that percentage would need to be around 7.5 per cent per annum, which would also see more capabilities disposed of at mid-life thus retaining some residual value. Such an approach could be buttressed by seeking to spread the financing costs of big-ticket items, such as aircraft carriers and strategic lift aircraft, across the life cycle through financing arrangements with the private sector.

Affording War: The British Case Study

Of twenty-eight NATO members, sixteen spend less than 1.8 per cent of GDP on defence and a few are spending as little as 1 per cent. The seven 'big spenders' include Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Turkey, countries that frankly spend poorly. Only the US, UK, and France spend reasonably efficiently and effectively and above 1.8 per cent of GDP.[8] Many of the rest are little more than armed pensions. Sound defence economics must be seen by governments as what it is: an insurance policy for which a certain amount of money should be set aside and which must be spent effectively. However, only clear political leadership during times of financial stress prevent the squeezing of defence between the hard rock of multiple missions and the hard place of a structural shortage of funds, personnel, and equipment.

Therefore, in an age of austerity the affordability of modern armed forces and equipment is central to national security. Certainly, in the absence of an existential threat defence spending is today discretionary for most NATO members. Therefore, new ways of financing defence must be sought based on affordable critical capabilities that can be

acquired by more effective spending from within existing defence budgets justified as key elements of a true national security strategy. As recent events are showing, the US is not immune. Cuts of up to 20 per cent to US Defence spending are being demanded each year over the next decade. Allowing for DCI, this could represent up to a 50 per cent cut in 2011 US Defence spending. In other words to 2 per cent GDP by 2021. To continue as is simply untenable. We are about to see a step change in military affairs. An evolution in military affairs (EMA)—where evolution is not iterative. This will inevitably return scale, capacity, composition, and adaptation to the equation. Our very existence will be determined by how we lead this change. A question posed is 'do we have the leaders—the Barnes Wallises, Churchills, Roosevelts, Thatchers, Reagans, Lickerts, Hayeks, Watson-Watts, Orwells, Lloyd-Georges, Nelsons, Weiners, Wellingtons, and Slims—today'? We believe we do. The Liberal enlightenment is not yet over, as Churchill opined: 'some chicken; some neck'.

However, one thing should be understood well. The events of the first decade of the twenty-first century suggest that it could be every bit as complex and dangerous as the twentieth.

Notes

1. The others being France, Greece, and Turkey, with the latter two spending large sums primarily due to tensions between each other.
2. All the figures herein are based on research by Commander Simon Atkinson in three Naval Staff briefing notes of August 2010: 'The Road to Thralldom' (based upon von Hayek's seminal 1944 article, 'The Road to Serfdom'), 'The Course Set Fair', and 'Defence Cost Inflation—System Dynamic or Unit PI?'
3. There is ongoing discussion about Defence Cost Inflation (as introduced by Pugh and Augustine) as to whether it exists as a system (defence)-wide phenomenon or a unit-level intergenerational/unit purchase cost. Increasingly, given the complex nature of the military-industrial complex, it is recognized that DCI (at somewhere between 6 and 8 per cent) needs to be addressed at the system rather than exclusively the unit level.
4. Based on nuclear deterrence and hi-tech forces rather than large standing armies.
5. Inventor of the radar.
6. The US Navy has halved in size since the mid-1980s and is facing a similar crisis to the RN.
7. The BBC has been remarkably reluctant to reveal its actual budget but estimates and releases suggest that the BBC and Overseas Aid (DfID) budgets are both about 0.7% GDP: growing to or at £10bn a year.
8. The German Government will in 2010 cut some €8.3bn from a €31bn defence budget and at present can deploy abroad only around 7,000 of its 250,000 troops: 'At Ease', *The Economist*, 17 July 2010: 27.

CHAPTER 35

INDUSTRY AND WAR

HEINZ SCHULTE

There is truth in the old adage that amateurs analyse battles and experts deliberate on logistics. And logistics is the hinge between industry and war! Industry in its various forms over time has been the companion of war. It was the superiority of arms in sufficient quantities and the invention of revolutionary instruments of war—the chariot, the crossbow, the needle gun, the computer—which made the difference between victory and defeat. At the same time there have always been the tools of 'asymmetrical warfare', like David's sling.

A Brief Historical Excursion

The examples in modern military history of the correlation between industry and war are plentiful. It was Wallenstein during the Thirty Years War who refined the concept of a 'military contractor', so well represented by the Italian 'condottiere' in earlier conflicts.[1] Not only did Wallenstein provide regiments to the Imperial cause but, in addition, he used his estates profitably to (mass-)produce arms and garments for the Catholic side. The early artillery specialists embodied the concept of industry and war acting as part of a single commercial focus by first casting the technologically demanding cannons and then operating them on behalf of the highest bidder.

How could tiny Holland have challenged British dominance at sea? Apart from an entrepreneurial spirit equal to its counterpart across the Channel it was a crafty Dutch invention, an inexpensive cargo vessel, easily built and armed, called the 'fluyt'. This vessel contributed significantly to the rise of the Dutch maritime empire in the seventeenth century. In fact, it became the naval backbone of the Dutch East India Company. The 'fluyt' is a fine example of the symbiosis between technological advance and the conduct of war. It was this kind of technological advantage on which the British Empire rested: the steam ships carried troops across the oceans and railways, and telegraph

wires provided British and Indian troops on the subcontinent with the 'network-centric' tools of their time. The US civil war is often cited as an example of the power of industry tipping the military scales. In terms of overall capability to conduct war, the rural South stood little chance against the industrialized North.

The First World War (WWI) saw the ruthless marshalling of the entire national industrial base for the front line. Names like Vickers and Krupp stood for the mighty defence industries in Europe throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Incidentally, the disappearance of both Vickers and Krupp as leading arms manufactures in the second half of the twentieth century was a harbinger for the paradigmatic transformation of defence technology, away from 'metal bashing'.

It was the Second World War (WWII) that introduced the transformation of industry to supply the goods of war on a scale never seen before. In terms of grand strategy both Germany and Japan had lost once the mighty American industrial base switched to all-out wartime production. And the naval battles in both the Atlantic and the Pacific attest to this inevitability. The fact that the Royal Navy did not lose the Battle of the Atlantic was largely due to two factors: the deciphering of the German naval codes (Enigma) and the fact that US yards were able to turn out Liberty ships faster than the 'grey wolves' could sink them. Thus, the Battle of the Atlantic was not about the classic exchange of naval gunfire but about protecting convoys en route to Britain. It was about safeguarding the industrial supply lines in order to bring the war to the continent of Europe. Grand strategy based on industrial output!

One Japanese summary of why the 'Empire of the Sun' lost the naval war in the Pacific gives us an intriguing insight. The essential argument is that the Japanese, having defeated the Russian Imperial Fleet in the sea battle of Tsushima (1905), 'remained prisoner of the battleship mentality':

> The outmoded doctrine of victory through a main fleet action governed the navy. . . . The outlook of the high command is reminiscent of the Royal Navy's offensive mentality in World War I, which delayed adoption of the convoy system as a response to the German U-boat threat. In that war, however, British naval forces were ultimately successful in protecting sea lanes and denying their use to the enemy despite the lack of a decisive naval battle.[2]

Japanese strategic planners were only too painfully aware that the United States could 'afford' to lose the Battle of Midway. A defeat would have merely delayed the inevitable outcome of the Pacific war. Japan did not enjoy the 'strategic luxury' of having several aircraft carriers sunk, which their naval industry could not replace! In the end, it was industry that won the war.

It should not be forgotten, however, that there are exceptions to the general rule of the supremacy of industrial might in warfare. The asymmetrical wars in Vietnam and most probably in Afghanistan are cases in point. It is not always industrial 'muscle' that reigns supreme. An AK-47 assault rifle and an RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade launcher in determined hands have often put a stop to over-confidence in military high-tech!

The Cold War

The Cold War saw the continued development and increased procurement of modern military tools which had their origins in WWII: radar/sonar, jet aircraft, and missile technology. It became clear pretty soon that America continued to enjoy the upper hand. Household names, especially in the aerospace industry, like Boeing, Douglas, Northrop, and Grumman, rose to the challenge during WWII and are still relevant today. In this sense the Cold War saw the continuation of the importance of harnessing the industrial base to retain the strategic upper hand. The new dimension was nuclear deterrence. And for nuclear deterrence to be credible, new delivery systems, hardened communication techniques, long-range bombers, survivable land-based silos, and nuclear submarines were required. Britain and France could barely afford the substantial fee for membership in this 'nuclear club'.

In the end, however, it was the Soviet Union, a colossus with feet of clay, that could no longer keep up with the United States. The end of the Cold War is to a large extent the result of the victory of the vibrant US industrial base over that of the sclerotic Soviet model. For Moscow, gaining nuclear parity with Washington was a premier strategic objective. Having achieved parity, a freeze on nuclear weapons seemed desirable. In other words, the Soviet Union had become a status quo power. Not so the United States! Nuclear competition with the Soviet Union fired the imagination of designers and engineers: if a limit was put on the number of delivery vehicles, why not increase the number of miniaturized warheads on each delivery vehicle? A new aspect had been added to the 'arms race'. But that was not all! 'Star Wars', the ability to intercept incoming Soviet ballistic missiles, became a mantra of the Reagan Administration with enormous and profitable potential for the defence industry. In essence, 'Star Wars' was the return to the classic warrior with a sword (offensive missiles) and a shield. The technological challenge was not dictated so much by the field of the kinetic impact but rather in terms of timely identification and robust command and control systems based on miniaturization of systems architecture. And the US industrial base rose to this challenge! To sum up, it was the versatility and dynamics of the US industrial base, rather than its size, which triumphed over Soviet-style mass production, inflexibly embedded in five-year-plans.

The relationship between industry and war during the 'Long War', as Philip Bobbitt aptly described the period between August 1914 (the beginning of WWI) and November 1989 (the fall of the Berlin Wall),[3] can be summarized thus: technological innovation as in the case of Germany during WWII (lead in tank technology, invention of the jet engine, early development of missile technology: V1/V2 rocket) is not sufficient if it lacks a broad and robust industrial base. Equally, a broad and robust industrial base, such as that which the Soviet Union enjoyed in the first half of the Cold War, is not adequate if it lacks technological innovation and inspirational input from non-military industry. In the early phase of WWII Great Britain enjoyed technological advantage (radar) as well as a sufficient industrial base. During the 'Battle of Britain' the United Kingdom produced

more fighter aircraft than Germany. In the long term, however, it was the industrial might of the United States that turned the tide. The winning formula for the defining period of the Long War was an amalgam of dynamic technological innovation based on a broad and robust industrial base which was not limited to the military sphere.

Europe

While the US industrial base was able to serve the entire spectrum of military requirements of a superpower acting globally, the Europeans were increasingly forced to focus on 'industrial niches' which grew out of the immediate geographical challenge of the Cold War and finite financial resources. Britain, France, and Germany are all cases in point. Britain and France maintained the notion of 'great power status' based on nuclear deterrence and power projection (e.g. with aircraft carriers) at enormous cost. This was the classic set-up for Great Britain, which saw itself as an indispensable ally of the United States as well as having 'post-imperial commitments' vis-à-vis former colonies. Britain's contribution to the defence of Western Europe, the 'continental commitment', was focused on four army divisions of the British Army of the Rhine. As a result, the British defence industry base produced naval and aerospace systems while maintaining a limited national land systems capability which reflected the relatively small all-volunteer force.

France, on the other hand, had two interests at the same level of national ambition: she was a continental European power as well as having colonial responsibilities. The French army had to 'match' the newly formed West German army, the most numerous land forces in Western Europe. Therefore conscription was maintained until the end of the Long War while the French Foreign Legion traditionally looked after France's overseas interests. The French defence industrial base reflected this strategic status.

It was the French who coined the phrase of an 'industrie de souveraineté' based on the assumption that great power status necessitated a balanced, independent defence industrial base. With respect to nuclear deterrence, independence from the United States became increasingly difficult to maintain. In the 1960s, London accepted the American proposal to arm British submarines with Polaris missiles (tipped with British-designed nuclear warheads). The cooperation between Paris and Washington in the nuclear area was and still is delicate. France insisted, at great cost, that it should develop and produce its own missile and warhead technology. The precise extent of US–French cooperation in this field is still shrouded in secrecy. Both London and Paris maintained independent defence industrial bases at a hefty price in order to uphold the notion of great power status. The time for genuine and deep industrial cooperation in the defence field has not come yet. In other words: it does not (yet) hurt enough financially!

Tight budgets can unleash technological ingenuity! The concept of the Invincible-class aircraft carrier together with the Harrier combat aircraft—capable of vertical take-off

and landing—is a case in point. Britain found it impossible to replace the traditional aircraft carriers for budgetary reasons. On the other hand, Britain's international commitments required naval airborne power projection. Thus the concept of a small carrier with a limited number of unique aircraft—the Harrier was later adopted by the US Marines—was born. It was less versatile than the large US through-deck carriers. Yet, Britain could afford three of them! France, on the other hand kept two classical aircraft carriers operational, regardless of the cost.

An opportunity missed! At the time of writing, the incumbent British Secretary of State for Defence has announced that there will be no Anglo-French cooperation in terms of a future aircraft carrier. Such cooperation would have offered a real chance of genuine European defence integration. The argument goes as follows: Britain could have opted for one national aircraft carrier while a second one would have been jointly built with France. As a result, both Paris and London could have resorted to the 'joint carrier' whenever the 'Charles-de-Gaulle' or the 'Queen Elizabeth' was in dock. A combined Anglo-French carrier force would have raised a host of intriguing questions for the European defence effort. Would the 'non-carrier' navies in Europe have provided the escorts for the carriers? And would there have always been a French or a British flag officer in command?

Cooperation in the field of (naval) power projection could well lead to closer cooperation in other areas. It has been suggested that London and Paris seek a bilateral relationship in the field of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), which will eventually replace manned combat aircraft. Also, the field of protected combat vehicles could see closer synergy across the English Channel. Germany is not automatically included in this bilateral strategy. The defence (industrial) relationship between Paris and London is rather exclusive (see below). For Germany the 'industrie de souveraineté' is not defence but rather the manufacture of automobiles.

Given the cautious post-war development of West Germany and geographical location at the front line vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, the German defence industry has focused on producing the equipment needed to defend the North German plains against massive Soviet armoured forces and to seal the Baltic approaches for the Red Baltic Fleet. West Germany had neither global ambitions nor overseas commitments. The result? The Leopard family of potent main battle tanks and small conventional submarines optimized for littoral warfare.

But the three major European powers have, potentially, a major role yet to play in the process of European defence industrial integration. There are currently two major European projects of fundamental strategic dimension: harnessing the overall European defence effort (which Paris and London drive, as epitomized by the 'St Malo Initiative') and establishing a single European currency. The Euro, already a major international currency, acts as a strategic partner of the US Dollar in terms of addressing the international economic and monetary crisis and also possibly with a view to 'hedging' against future Chinese monetary ambitions; it was initially a Franco-German project. In a sense, the major challenge for Paris, London, and Berlin is to merge these two separate projects into one European grand strategy.

Moscow, the Warsaw Pact, and Selected Customers

The Soviet-era defence industry is a stark reminder of the failure of relying on a one-dimensional industrial effort. True, there were advantages in a single-line, mass-produced defence market for the national requirement, the alliance (the Warsaw Pact), and selected customers (third world client states and increasingly important actors like China and India). Yet, the disadvantages prevailed in the long run. The Soviet defence industry, while being robust and battle-hardened, lacked innovation and readiness to absorb technological progress from other industries (technological 'spin-in'). In other words, the bloated Soviet model missed the dramatic advances in non-military technologies like miniaturization, computerization, and progress in the field of consumer electronics. It became harder and harder, and in the end impossible, to compete with the vibrant US industrial base!

One telling example should suffice: in 1990 the (West) German armed forces 'absorbed' parts of the East German military including the then state-of-the-art MiG 29 combat aircraft. The advanced MiG 29 had been provided by Moscow to reliable allies on the front line. The German Luftwaffe inquired about 'documentation' for the MiG 29, which the East German air force could not provide, because there was none. Asked about the 'operating cost' of flying the aircraft the East Germans could not answer that question, for such a concept did not exist. The operational cost of the MiG 29 was irrelevant and documentation was not needed as the MiG 29 was returned for in-depth maintenance to the Soviet Union. These were fundamental reasons which contributed to the Luftwaffe's decision to retire the MiG 29 as soon as possible. The Soviet concept behind operating the aircraft was alien to a Western perspective.

Let there be no mistake! The Soviet Union had a concept for war in central Europe: attrition! Masses of equipment and soldiers were to overwhelm the Atlantic Alliance. And in that operational scenario the definition of 'through-life-cost' was irrelevant. Thus their technologically limited yet robust industrial base served a single doctrine: the battle of overwhelming attrition. The concept failed, however, the moment the war on the central front did not take place and the United States industrial base was marshalled to win the technological race against the Soviet Union instead.

Since then the Russian defence industry has clearly become more sophisticated in order to satisfy the demands of discerning clients like China and India. Yet Moscow is faced with increased indigenous production in its erstwhile 'home market' (China) and fierce Western competition (India), especially from the United States and Europe. One main task for Moscow must be to shed its image of supplying 'pariah states' like Iran. For the time being the overall Russian industrial base is no match for the developed Western industries. There is neither an electronic consumer industry nor an automobile industry in Russia worth mentioning. The non-military Russian aerospace industry cannot, yet, compete with the likes of Boeing or Airbus. It will be a major undertaking to

instil entrepreneurial innovation, market dynamics, and managerial flexibility into the Russian industrial base. In short, it requires a transformation of the Russian model, in terms of society, government, and industry.

There are four more or less dynamic developing states which see the defence industry as a constituent part of their growth strategy: Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC). Of these four, China and Brazil are in the forefront, with Brazil maturing as a serious competitor in the aerospace industry (especially through the Brazilian aerospace company Embraer).

The most serious challenger in the defence industry sector for Moscow, however, will be China! The Middle Kingdom is clearly eyeing those, mainly third world, export markets which have been dominated by the Soviet Union/Russia hitherto. China is a fine example for our main thesis that a broad and dynamic industrial base, not confined to military goods, is a precondition for the sustainable development of modern defence equipment. Yet this is also a major challenge for the fabric of Chinese society. Increasingly, its industrial base is linked to a vibrant currency. The yuan/renminbi is on the way to becoming a global reserve currency; the Russian rouble is not! And Moscow is aware of the fact that it is being 'overtaken' by Beijing both in terms of monetary clout (China holds roughly $750 billion in US debt) and global political ambition. The last Russian bastion to be defended was the supply of military equipment to those states that would not be served by the United States or Europe. Yet this is also changing.

So far Russia's main defence materiel customers have been China and India. While China is developing an indigenous industry, India is increasingly looking for Western suppliers as well as supporting the build-up of a national industrial base, albeit with mixed results. China is the main supplier of arms to Pakistan, the nuclear rival of India. It is obvious that in the not-too-distant future both China and India will be less reliant on Russian defence equipment. Indeed, China will compete with Russia in the international market before long. China has been accused, not only by Russia, of interpreting the term R&D not as 'research and development' but ruthlessly as 'receive and duplicate'. (The more diplomatic term would be 'reverse engineering'!) While this is probably true for the time being, it is bound to change in the next phase of the intended development cycle. And here lies the risk for the Chinese ambition.

The Market-State and Agents of Change

If it is correct that a symbiosis exists between the advanced state of manufacturing defence equipment and the robust health of a dynamic industrial base, the greatest challenge lies in the maturity of the fabric of the society sustaining such a market model. There will be no advanced defence industry in China without a change of the Chinese

entrepreneurial model! A leading Chinese defence industry analyst made the point that Chinese defence companies need exposure to the financial world:[4]

> This is critical because it allows companies to gain access to different models of development—especially in terms of access to financial resources and risk management models. It is moving from the excessive state-led and centrally planned processes to much more [of] what China defines as Western-style development plans. It enforces corporate acumen and market-led discipline.

Let us return to Philip Bobbitt. His main thesis is that the period of the Long War between nation-states (1914–89), which had been dominated by ideologies like fascism or communism, has been replaced by competition among various advanced 'market-states'. The market-state distinguishes itself by the fact that it draws on the lessons of failure of the nation-state:[5]

> The failure of the Soviet Union to live up to its expectation [providing economic security and public goods to its people], as much as any other cause, contributed to its delegitimation in the eyes of its nation. Very simply, the strategic innovations of the Long War will make it increasingly difficult for the nation-state to fulfil its responsibilities. Three strategic innovations won the Long War: nuclear weapons, international communications, and the technology of rapid mathematical computation. Each has wrought a dramatic change in the military, cultural and economic challenges that face the nation-state. In each of these spheres, the nation-state faces ever increasing difficulty in maintaining the credibility of its claim to provide public goods for the nation.

It is noteworthy that Bobbitt identifies three interrelated areas—military, culture, and economics—which determine the dynamics of the modern market-state. While the nation-state 'mobilized' its citizens for the 'defence of the realm', culminating on the bloody fields of Flanders in WWI, the market-state provides the service of domestic (police) and external security (armed forces) for its discerning citizens. Countries that cannot afford such services are faced with the exodus of well-qualified elites. The defence industry has to adapt to that seismic change: it no longer produces simple hardware (rifles and steel helmets) for mass armies but sophisticated equipment for well-trained, motivated, and indeed well-paid professionals, providing a service for a discerning citizenry.

That, it seems to us, is the real challenge for the symbiosis between industry and war, not the dynamics of further technological breakthroughs. The model of society behind the defence industry is what matters most! During the time of the Maoist regime, China boasted the largest land army in the world. For US strategic planners it was merely a 'target in waiting'. Despite the overwhelming number of bayonets, mainland China was unable to invade 'renegade' Taiwan for lack of amphibious capability and air power. Maybe Taiwan will return peacefully to the motherland by realizing that the economically dynamic Middle Kingdom is a business opportunity rather than a military threat. And in this context the growing defence industry in China, turning out numerous missiles targeted at Taiwan, might be part of an 'act of persuasion' without their ever being deployed in conflict.

The Challenge

Examining future challenges in the context of our main theme of 'industry and war' it is important to note the role of women in society. The contribution—or lack of it—of 50 per cent of a nation's intellectual capability is one determining factor of the state of (defence) industrial advancement. The correlation between general intellectual vibrancy and defence industry output is aptly described by Frank Cappuccio, General Manager of Lockheed Martin's 'Skunk Works', where highly secretive and innovative defence programmes are being managed:

> The biggest challenge is that our industry is not producing dreamers.[6]

And it does not matter whether these dreamers are male or female! The main lesson to be drawn for aspiring global players is that a specific model of society, one that gives equal access to women and encourages independent thinking, is a precondition for a healthy and vibrant (defence) industrial base, especially in the area of 'soft skills' as opposed to mere metal-bashing. It is in the area of 'soft skills' needed for the new battlefield of cyberwar/cybersecurity where even the United States finds it difficult to attract the right kind of experts.[7] This challenge is also confronting the BRIC states with different levels of intensity depending on their predominant ideological foundations (China: adherence to the primacy of the communism system; Russia and India: strong state interference; Brazil: relatively free entrepreneurial spirit). As a result, we should focus on the general state of economic development when identifying future challenges for the defence industry. The Soviet model of isolating the defence industry from the rest of the economic and industrial cycle has clearly failed.

Post-War Development

The development of the defence industrial base since WWII can be summarized as follows. During WWII the United States armed its major allies, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government of China. Yet, equipping the national armed forces remained the paramount task. The emergence of the Cold War led to the need to arm client states on both sides of the political and military divide. In this era 'non-aligned' states like Yugoslavia and truly neutral countries like Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland maintained a defence industry autarky at considerable expense. Genuine export of defence equipment in terms of market competition is a relatively recent development after the end of the Cold War. Singapore stands as a model for a discerning defence customer 'playing the market' skilfully and competitively. Meanwhile India has emerged from the role of loyal customer of Soviet/Russian equipment and is increasingly looking at Western products, mainly from the United States and Britain.

There is a new round of international dynamics. National markets—even in the case of the United States—are too small for a return on investment in sophisticated and thus expensive defence technology. Exports and international cooperation are no longer a welcome 'add-on' to meeting the national requirement. Instead, they have become a precondition for sustained R&D and reduced production costs ('economy of scale'). It comes as no surprise that the traditional defence industry champions—United States, Britain, and France—lead the fray. The annual 'Top 100' of the global defence industry published by the US journal *Defence News* shows for 2009 that of the global top six companies five are American (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon), while BAE Systems (UK) stands at number two.[8] European companies like EADS (predominantly Franco-German), Finmeccanica (Italy), and Thales (France) follow closely. It is noteworthy that not a single company from the BRIC states has—yet—achieved 'Champions League' status! This is bound to change.

The main defence market is still the United States, as a recent study confirms:[9]

> while annual budgets for defence equipment across the EU are about €40 billion combined, the US spends around €165 billion on procurement. And while member-states spend a total of around €8 billion a year on research and development (R&D), Washington spends approximately €55 billion.

The above Top 100 list also shows the various business models adopted by the leading companies. US companies tend to focus on the dominant home market and selected export opportunities. BAE Systems played the card of 'strategic partner' and entered the American market on almost equal terms. This was possible because both London and Washington supported the BAE Systems strategy. However, there is a realization that BAE Systems will not be allowed to grow further substantially in the United States for fear of upsetting the delicate balance among the indigenous top-tier companies. As a result, BAE Systems has consolidated its position in the United States and looks increasingly towards other strategic markets, notably Australia and India.

The EADS model is not based on the Anglo-American 'special relationship', unlike the BAE Systems strategy. However, EADS does see the US market as a strategic one. The fierce competition for a new tanker aircraft for the United States Air Force is a case in point. Airbus stands at the heart of the originally Franco-German aerospace competition against Boeing (and, initially, McDonnell Douglas). The global civil aircraft market was the main target. Defence followed suit. Increasingly, Cassidian (formerly EADS Defence & Security) is winning international markets for security products like border security or maritime surveillance.

A unique model has been pursued successfully by Thales; it is called 'multi-domestique'! Thales does not see itself as a predominantly French company. It wants to be seen as a British company in Britain and as an Australian one in Australia. Accepting this concept not only depends on the business strategy of the company but also on the reception in the host country. And London has accepted Thales' claim to be a British company.

London has set three conditions in order to qualify as a domestic provider of defence and security equipment:

a. Industrial know-how is to be retained and increased in Britain; there will be 'firewalls' requiring sensitive technologies to remain in-country.
b. The company creates and maintains skilled jobs in Britain.
c. The company pays taxes in Britain.

As a result Thales has been accepted as a first-tier British defence company—next to BAE Systems and Rolls Royce.

Are the emerging states ready for such a dynamic business model? Or are they still in the mode of protecting their fledgling (defence) industries against foreign competition? The following American-European business models can serve as examples for the emerging states—especially BIC (BRIC minus Russia)—to adopt:

a. Focus on the domestic defence and homeland security market (mainly US model)
b. Three-legged strategy: defence, security, and civil aviation model (Boeing/EADS)
c. Multi-domestique (Thales).

Obviously, the future will see a dynamic mixture of all three business models. This, however, presupposes decisive political and entrepreneurial leadership, astute commercial decision-making (including an understanding of the international financial markets) and innovative R&D. And all this without immediate state interference. In other words, it requires a modern 'market-state' model. It is in this context that another development has come to the fore: the engagement of sovereign investors in the defence sector.

A New Business Model

Why build up your own defence industry base if you can buy into an already existing one? This is a relatively new development, coupled to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of market-states with relatively liberal economic regimes. A recent briefing paper raised the crucial point:[10]

> A small number of sovereign investors, sometimes originating from countries with non-democratic governments, are buying shares in Europe's aerospace and defence sector. Such investors can provide useful capital. But they could also leak sensitive information or interrupt the supply of military equipment to European armed forces.

The realization of potential risk for the host country sets this option into obvious conflict with the 'multi-domestique' model discussed above, which is based on implicit trust. This dilemma once again highlights the political nature of an 'industrie de souveraineté'. At the same time, the dynamics of the prevailing liberal economic and industrial model

make it increasingly difficult, and expensive, to cocoon the domestic defence industry—even in the United States. As a result, it is not primarily the military hard- and software that stand at the centre of deliberation but the economic and political environment in which defence-related R&D and production takes place. A leading European aerospace and defence industrialist, Dr Tom Enders, who currently heads Airbus, has been credited with a new definition of transatlantic industrial exchange: *cooperatition*, meaning a fluent mix of cooperation and competition at the same time. While two companies cooperate on one (transatlantic) programme they are in fierce competition on another. This requires a sophisticated system of firewalls accepted by all industrial and political players. Again, 'multi-domestique' could be a model for this kind of industrial flexibility.

At the same time it is clear that major defence players like Russia, China, and India are a long way from being invited to join the transatlantic 'Club of Cooperatition'. But this is bound to change the moment aspiring defence industrial players accept the terms. And the BIC market potential is too large to be ignored by major Western companies. It is therefore not reckless to predict that innovative models like 'multi-domestique' or acceptable engagement by sovereign investors will expand beyond the established transatlantic league. A recent example is the failed attempt at cooperation between Abu Dhabi MAR (ADM) and the German naval yard of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). However, this strategic partnership was to be confined to surface vessels and would not have extended to conventional submarines. Berlin would not have given permission at this stage for ADM to engage in submarine activities, still considered a sensitive core German capability.

The essential realization lies in the fact that the time of truly independent national defence industries is coming to an end. And the emerging BIC states are well advised to 'skip' the process of establishing a totally independent defence industry base—a product of the Cold War period—and move directly towards the next phase instead. The dilemma for Europe has been aptly summarized:[11]

> If member-states do not start spending their defence budgets more efficiently, they will be forced to rely increasingly on American firms to provide the most technologically advanced equipment. Some European countries already do. But if this became the case across the EU, Washington would lose a source of healthy competition, making it harder to keep costs down in its own market.

New Kids on the Block

It will not be long before China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Singapore, and South Korea join the traditional array of Western suppliers of defence equipment. They lack neither ambition nor determination; what some of them lack is the appreciation of the dynamics of the market-state in terms of entrepreneurship and the role of financial institutions (stock-quoted companies or innovative financial models like leasing). This will change, in some cases soon (Brazil and Singapore) and in other cases later (China and India). But change it will!

A special case is Israel. In most countries of similar size, the industrial strategy of self-reliance in key areas would be economically unsustainable. Israel's threat perception, however, overrules the argument of budget constraint. While Israel relies on the United States for 'strategic force enablers' like advanced fighter aircraft,[12] the ground forces' equipment is almost exclusively home-produced. Increasingly Israel is entering the international market with UAVs that are combat-proven in the Middle East conflict.

Likely Trends

The trend is clear: metal-bashing in terms of protected vehicles or naval vessels is no longer the prerogative of the West. Sophisticated 'systems-of-systems' architecture—which turns an armoured vehicle or a naval vessel into a complex software-based fighting system—is the new dimension. And the 'new kids on the block' are catching on!

New technologies will dominate the future (virtual?) battlefield and include space technology, the software to dominate cyberspace, laser weapons, autonomous unmanned vehicles (land, air, on water/underwater), and the development of reliable and ample non-fossil fuel for military use. No doubt, the armed forces of the future will be 'green'! Again, this begs the question whether emerging states, having promoted growth at the expense of the environment, appreciate the dynamics of a green agenda for modern military forces.

If you can lease an automobile why not lease a piece of equipment relevant to the armed forces? This does not have to be a combat vehicle or a fighter aircraft in the first place. But a double-hull tanker or a lightly armed vessel for constabulary purposes is a different matter. And again it is Great Britain which takes the innovative lead. The new buzzwords are PPP (public private partnership) and PFI (public finance initiative). For example, the Royal Navy signed an agreement with Vosper Thornycroft for the construction, lease, and support of a number of vessels (River Class), one for Falkland Islands patrol duties.[13] These vessels are manned by the Royal Navy. This development is only the beginning and raises a question about what constitutes the essential 'military core' that cannot be delegated.

Why destroy a bridge physically if you can disrupt the entire flow of traffic by a click of a computer mouse? Cyberwar will be the new and growing dimension of future conflicts. Writing the necessary software codes on a computer screen does not require the wearing of a military uniform. As long as there is conflict there will be an industry to serve the protagonists. And as the face of war changes so do the dynamics of the defence industry.

Notes

1. Howard, 1976: 25.
2. Yokoi, 1986: 499.
3. Bobbitt, 2002.

4. 'Banking and Bombs: The Merging of Giants', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 August 2010. The Chinese state news service Xinhua stated that some governments have complained of Chinese corporations' 'lack of familiarity with the rules of the game' in international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity ('Made in China', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 September 2010).
5. Bobbitt, 2002: 215.
6. 'Suppose I could teleport a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] into the battlefield,' he said. 'I don't have to worry about basing' (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 August 2010).
7. 'The USAF mission to attract cyber warriors is made difficult by the gulf between military culture and freewheeling techies' (*Defense Technology International*, September 2010).
8. *Defense News* (28 June 2010).
9. O'Donnell, 2010a.
10. O'Donnell, 2010b.
11. O'Donnell, 2010a.
12. The reason why Washington supplies state-of-the-art arms to Israel not available to other allies at the same time is probably due to the determination to prevent Israel from going nuclear in a regional conflict.
13. *Jane's Fighting Ships 2009–2010*.

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CHAPTER 36

PROCUREMENT AND WAR

NICK WITNEY

A Difficult Business, Becoming More So

On 21 July 1662, Samuel Pepys paid a visit to the Royal Dockyard at Woolwich. Though remembered by history as a celebrated diarist, Pepys was also a distinguished public servant—Secretary to the Navy Board, a position involving important responsibilities for the support of the fleet. So his visit to Woolwich was professional—to watch the docking of the *Royal James*, one of the finest British warships of the day. Recording events in his diary that evening, Pepys reported:

> We went out and saw the manner and trouble of docking such a ship . . . But, good God! What a deal of company was there from both yards to help to do it, when half the company would have done it as well. But I see it is impossible for the King to have things done as cheap as other men.[1]

Kings have come and gone, but the dilemma remains: how can governments acquire the equipment, goods, and services needed for their armed forces at reasonable price, appropriate quality, and within a reasonable timeframe? Open any newspaper and examples of the continuing difficulties afflicting defence procurement—from the A400M European military transport plane, three years late and some billions of Euros over budget, to the funding sink-hole which the US Littoral Combat Ship project has become—demonstrate how this seemingly straightforward business is actually anything but. In his 2009 independent review of the 'sclerotic acquisition systems' of the UK Ministry of Defence, Bernard Gray reported the questions that procurement for war all too often prompts: ' "How can it be that it takes 20 years to buy a ship, or aircraft, or tank?" "Why does it always seem to cost at least twice what was thought?" Even worse, at the end of the wait, "Why does it never quite seem to do what it was supposed to?" '[2]

Buying for war presents particular complications. In the civilian world, globalization has confirmed the power of competition to secure goods and services with the best

combination of price, quality, and promptitude—as well as to spur technical innovation and constant improvement, so as to meet and even anticipate the needs of consumers. If central planning and state ownership of the means of production were more effective, then the roads of the twenty-first century would be filled not with Fiats and Toyotas, but with Ladas.

Yet, for a number of reasons both good and bad, defence procurement in all societies continues to resemble more closely the communist model. Certainly, the relationship between governments and their supplying defence industries bears only a faint and imperfect resemblance to the normal customer/supplier relationship of Western market economies.

Governments are, after all, the sole domestic customers of the defence industry—and, through their control of defence exports, have a veto over their industries' efforts to find customers elsewhere. Those industries' very freedom to exist is subject to government licence. Often, indeed, governments are their owners, or at least hold a controlling interest. And because warfare is a matter of life and death, for individual combatants and even for the state itself, exceptional levels of assurance are sought. The highest quality of weapons and equipment is specified, often—in pursuit of a possible battle-winning 'technological edge'—beyond what is currently technically feasible. And 'security of supply'—the twin preoccupation with ensuring that new supplies can be readily obtained in an emergency, and with ensuring that a viable technological and industrial supporting infrastructure continues to exist for the long term—is a powerful argument for trying to keep the means of research and production on national territory, if not actually in government hands.

So too often in defence procurement the relationship is between monopsonistic government and monopolistic supplier. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency are often further compromised by the veil of secrecy, justified by reference to national security, which frequently obscures defence purchasing. Add the fact that procurement is undertaken either in times of war when no one is much concerned to count the cost, or in times of peace when it may be many years before the effectiveness or otherwise of the expenditure is put to the test—and the scope for corruption is clear. Milo Minderbinder of Joseph Heller's *Catch 22* was an engaging satire on how easily the logistic and supply systems of belligerents could be diverted to the service of private enterprise. Darlene Druyun, convicted in 2004 for abusing her position in the Pentagon to assist Boeing (her subsequent employer) in a major procurement competition, provided a less amusing real world example.[3]

Nor is the problem confined to individuals. The taint of corruption hangs over many of the largest government-sponsored defence exports.[4] And governments have no hesitation in using defence funds to serve not just military but more broadly economic, or frankly political, ends. Efforts to rationalize defence infrastructure frequently butt up against governments' refusal to close plants or bases at politically inopportune times or places; whilst naval shipbuilding orders often seem dictated as much or more by employment figures and electoral calculations than by military need. As advanced democratic societies work to achieve ever greater transparency and accountability over how governments spend taxpayers' money, defence budgets remain a last repository of the 'pork barrel'.

Small wonder, therefore, that the King still struggles to have things done as cheap as other men. And the evolution of armed conflict in recent years has only made the business more complicated. James II at least had a relatively easy task in assessing what he wanted to buy. His shipbuilding programme—for it was the navy which mattered to him—could be derived from his ambition for the nation; the fleet sizes and expansion efforts of rivals or enemies (Dutch, French, Spaniards); and his calculation of how much money he could extract from the Commons by invoking these hopes and fears. In most of the intervening years, a similar calculus has applied: Dreadnoughts, Spitfires, and nuclear missiles have all been acquired on the logic of the arms race.

The immobility of the Cold War allowed these calculations to be refined to an exquisite degree. The governments of Western forces deployed along the dividing line of Europe could calculate the weight of Warsaw Pact armoured forces deployed opposite their sector, monitor the enemy's technological advances, and model their implications in terms of individual tank engagements. They could thus frame impressively evidence-based 'requirements' for the expansion or upgrading of their own forces—culminating in a precise invoice which could be handed to the Ministry of Finance.

But recent years have seen a dramatic change in the character of modern warfare. The expectation of conventional state-on-state conflict, where the balance of force could be computed by reference to the number and quality of 'platforms' (capital ships, combat aircraft, etc.) has now been replaced by the uncertainties of 'asymmetric warfare', where the threat is posed by the suicide bomber, or the computer virus. The strategic challenge is now less to balance other powers than to combat such Protean opponents as terrorism, or the proliferation of mass-effect weapons, or failed states.[5] The problem thus becomes not just how to supply the needs of armed forces most cost-effectively, but how to define those needs in the first place.

Theory

The problem has not lacked for attention. Where once standing armies used to set their personnel in peacetime to foraging, or painting the parade-ground stones white, they now proliferate staff jobs. Think-tankers and academics are ready, too, with their advice.[6] So, at least in modern Western democracies, a broad consensus is now beginning to emerge on how twenty-first century defence procurement should ideally work.

Planning

In place of the old simplicities of arms-racing, a more sophisticated, deductive process is now prescribed, beginning with the definition of a 'national security strategy'. The US has produced such documents since this was first mandated by Congress in 1986: Russia, France, and even the UK (overcoming that instinctive national distrust of codification

which still leaves it without a written constitution) have in recent years followed suit. Such a document describes, or at least implies, how the nation sees its place in the world; and how it sees the principal threats to its security and prosperity, and the challenges to its ability to play its self-conceived international role.

From this is then derived an account of the roles of the armed forces—what sort of armed forces are needed, to do what sort of things?—and a more precise account of the missions the nation may want them to conduct (ranging from full-scale 'general war' to peacekeeping tasks, or limited interventions). Further judgements are made of the 'scale of effort' the armed forces should be able to sustain, taking account of such factors as the assumed availability of allies, and the need to undertake more than one operation at the same time. Examples of this include the US Kennedy-era 'two and a half wars' doctrine and its subsequent refinements[7]—or the somewhat less plausible decision by twenty-seven European Heads of State and Government in December 2008 that their combined forces should be able to conduct simultaneously two two-year, ten-thousand-strong stabilization operations, two rapid-response operations of battlegroup size, an evacuation operation, and various other lesser interventions besides.[8]

From such assumptions or planning parameters the desired size and shape of armed forces is to be established, interpreted through the intermediate currency of 'capabilities'. Capabilities are a relatively new concept, introduced in the attempt to break with the old mindset that because, say, the nation's current fleet of forty-eight combat aircraft is nearing the end of its life, it must necessarily be sensible to aim to replace it with forty-eight aircraft of a more modern (and expensive) generation.

The capabilities concept is to focus on what is required for 'mission success'. If the government wishes to be sure that it has the ability to lift 200 of its expatriates off an African beach in the midst of a civil war, then it should consider whether it envisages doing that by landing craft or helicopters, and what sort of naval assets that choice implies. It should also consider the communications and reconnaissance demands of such an operation, and how best they could be satisfied. Analysis of different such scenarios, related to a range of missions from the relatively limited (such as civilian evacuations) to major operations of war, should in theory allow the optimum size and shape of a nation's armed forces to be deduced, and much else besides—not just what equipment they should be supplied with, but what sort of logistic and intelligence support they will optimally enjoy, what sort of personnel should be recruited and what sort of training they should undergo, and what sort of home-base infrastructure is required to support them.

On this basis, it is hoped, appropriate equipment and systems requirements can be formulated; their costs estimated and then aggregated across time; the resultant all-up cost of the desired forward equipment programme can be compared with foreseen resources; and, by an iterative dialogue between those sponsoring the equipment needs and those who will have to pay for them, a forward equipment programme can be identified which represents the best balance within the limits of affordability. This dialogue will take place both at the Defence Ministry level, adjudicating between the different demands of equipment and, say, personnel expenditure, and at the Government level, assessing the demands of defence against, say, those of health. Hidden within such an

acquisition programme will, of course, be further trade-offs—between immediate needs and the longer term, between investment in research and development and in final production, and so on.

Warming to their task, the theorists have correctly observed that the costs of defence equipment lie as much or more in sustaining it throughout its life as in its initial purchase—B52 bombers which dropped smart munitions on the Taliban in 2001 were first brought into service in the 1950s. They note that commercial airlines buy their new aircraft by reference as much as anything to their likely operating costs. Accordingly, defence procurement decisions must be further refined to take into account the question of 'whole-life' or 'through-life' costs.[9]

Buying

The technicalities of contracting for defence goods and services have also been subjected to ingenious elaboration. The spread of industry and the growth of private enterprise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to a proliferation of armaments manufacturers, from Krupp in Germany to the Jeep company which supplied so much of the US Army's transport in the Second World War. But, since the end of that war, the trend has been towards contraction, as the increased sophistication of weaponry has raised the bar to new industry entrants, and the spiralling unit costs of ever more complex weapons have reduced order sizes. Especially since the end of the Cold War, mergers and acquisitions have sharply narrowed the number of defence suppliers, making it increasingly difficult to introduce competitive pressures into the business of acquisition.

Thus, for all equipment involving a degree of development or innovation, the norm in recent decades has been to buy on a 'cost-plus' basis—the supplier simply bills the government for what the work is costing him to perform, plus an agreed rate of profit. Such arrangements do little to incentivize him to reduce his costs, accelerate delivery, or even to ensure that the performance of the promised end-product is technically achievable. The failed British attempt to develop the Nimrod Airborne Early Warning aircraft was only one of the catalogue of procurement disasters of the latter half of the twentieth century, in which all the major defence industrial nations are represented.[10]

In response to such fiascos, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have over the last quarter-century made repeated efforts at 'acquisition reform', often involving attempts to incentivize better performance from the contractor, or to transfer the risk of failure to them by establishing a fixed price for the product to be delivered. But, as the British government discovered over the Astute submarine and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft—'Nimrod' seems an ill-starred appellation—a military requirement does not disappear just because the contractor has made a mess of the project.[11] A government may find itself with little option when problems emerge but to renegotiate the contract, allowing the contractor more time, or more money, or both. Such experiences are, however, traumatic for the contractor also—engendering an increased reluctance by industry to do business at all on such demanding terms.

The latest trend is therefore towards 'partnering', a hoped-for middle road between the laxness of cost-plus and the unrealistic rigour of fixed prices. Partnering comes in many variants, including the Private Finance Initiative, whereby the private sector provides a service rather than merely an asset, itself funding the up-front investment capital and then recovering costs and making its profit via government payment for the service, at a rate guaranteed over perhaps twenty years. Thus, if government decides that it needs a new simulator to train its helicopter pilots, it might decide instead to contract with the private sector for the provision of a pilot-training service. Industry will furnish the simulator, and the building to house it, as well as taking responsibility for recruiting the instructors and managing the training programme to achieve contractually specified standards, charging agreed rates for a guaranteed minimum throughput of trainees, and using spare capacity in the system to make money training commercial pilots on the side. It will inevitably cost the private sector more to raise the initial investment capital than it would government; but in a well-structured deal this disadvantage will be more than compensated by the greater efficiency (including exploitation of spare capacity). And there are obvious short-term advantages to cash-strapped governments in not having to find the cost of the simulator up-front—the temptation to 'enjoy now, pay later' stimulates the customer's appetite for such arrangements.

All these different techniques and approaches are attempts to mitigate the underlying dilemma that defence procurement is fundamentally different from procurement in the commercial world, not just because of the incestuous relationship in which customer and supplier inevitably stand to each other, but because of the uncertainties involved in pushing the boundaries of technology—an understandable reflex of the military customer which industry sees no advantage in discouraging.

A final word should be said about international collaboration. As defence budgets fall, unit costs rise, and technical complexity increases, so the logic of two or more nations pooling both their needs and their resources becomes ever more compelling. From the Jaguar fighter-bomber of the 1960s to the Storm Shadow/Scalp EG stand-off missile of the 1990s, examples abound of cooperations which have produced better weapons at lower unit prices than individual nations could have achieved on their own.[12]

Even more examples abound, however, of projects which have collapsed in acrimony or produced equipments only with big cost overruns or huge delays, or both. Collaboration inevitably increases the complexity of procurements already difficult enough on a national basis—and is particularly vulnerable to the risk that national governments and/or industries will seek to distort the most effective distribution of the work in order to secure national advantage. What should be a combination of strengths can too often become a combination of weaknesses, as governments manoeuvre to secure work which their industry has not done before, but would like to learn. Moreover, the problem presented for all national programmes of the stops and starts and changes of mind than can affect long-running procurements is compounded when two or more nations, each with its different national electoral cycle, are involved.

In Europe, OCCAR—the acronym is from the French 'Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement'—was created in 1990 as a multinational

procurement agency, in an only partially successful attempt to provide a layer of insulation between the political temptations of national governments and the actual management of collaborative projects. The European Defence Agency followed in 2004, with a remit amongst other things to incubate new collaborative efforts which might be handed on to OCCAR to manage when they reached the point of contract. Partly reflecting the general downward pressure on defence budgets, the agency's initial successes have been in catalysing relatively modest research and technology collaborations rather than major new equipment programmes. But its day-to-day life is a testament to the tension between the irresistible logic of procurement collaboration and the often immovable reluctance of national defence establishments to accept the disciplines and compromises required in working with others.

Practice

Given this wealth of attention and ingenuity devoted to the theory of modern defence procurement, one might expect that modern practices and outcomes of purchasing for war would represent some sort of apogee of the art. Yet this does not appear to be the case.

As noted above, the foundation of all efficient procurement must be to have a balanced and affordable plan. Given the timelines now common for the gestation of the most complex defence systems—often twenty years or even longer from initiation to the first deliveries—one might expect governments to fix their levels of defence spending some years in advance. Yet the almost universal reluctance to do this leaves, for example, the Italian Defence Ministry regularly scrabbling to collect ad hoc subsidies from other departmental budgets when routine payments for ongoing projects fall due.

The UK is unusual in setting its defence expenditure on a rolling three-year basis—whilst the French are alone in enshrining a six-year financial perspective in law, the *Loi de Programmation*. Yet such a firm financial framework is of use only insofar as it is respected: the French Defence Review initiated by President Sarkozy on his arrival at the Élysée Palace in 2007 rapidly established that the outgoing administration had left behind it commitments to new armaments programmes which exceeded the resources specified in the *Loi* by 40 per cent.[13] Similarly, the Gray Review confirmed that so far did UK MoD procurement engagements run ahead of foreseen revenues that the MoD was in effect trading whilst insolvent (something for which company directors in the commercial world would find themselves disbarred)—he accordingly proposed that the ministry must be regularly subjected to a 'going concern' test.[14]

Both British and French experiences highlight a modern procurement phenomenon now identified as 'the conspiracy of optimism'. It suits both customers (whether the armed forces aspiring to new equipment, or the defence minister anxious to announce the jobs and other economic benefits of a new procurement project), as well of course as the supplying industry, to agree to the sunniest possible financial estimate, in order to establish the project's affordability. Once the political, indeed psychological,

commitment has been made to a new project (and costs have started to be sunk), there will be strong incentives on governments to find ways to persevere with the project even as the actual costs begin to escalate.

In the UK, this process is charted through the annual publication by Parliament's Public Accounts Committee of a Major Projects Report, an analysis of the twenty most costly projects in the Ministry of Defence's procurement portfolio at any one time. Thus the 2008 report noted that the aggregate forecast cost of the project population had increased by over £200m over the previous twelve months, along with a further aggregate slippage of eight years in estimated in-service dates.[15] These latest setbacks brought the total cost escalation of the family of projects since their initial approval to some £3 billion or 12 per cent, and their aggregate slippage in in-service date to a 36 per cent increase in their expected timescales. Smaller projects evidently fared worse: across a large range of programmes, the Gray Review found an average time overrun of 80 per cent and an average cost increase of 40 per cent.

There is, in practice, a close interaction between cost increases and timescales. Excessive optimism can affect the assessment of technical risk as much as of cost—indeed, one can be a function of the other. Even more often, however, it is the cost escalation itself that drives the slippage. Only by deliberately delaying programmes and thus postponing cash requirements can the books be balanced in the current year. This process of pushing unaffordable but committed expenditure into later years has its own term of art—what the British call the 'bow-wave', the French call 'la bosse', or hump. A vicious circle then sets in, typified by the earlier British practice of applying a 'block adjustment' to the aggregate estimated annual cost of the forward equipment procurement programme—when assessing its affordability, a discount of up to 20 per cent would be applied to the total, on the basis that delays would inevitably occur even if the particular programme in which they would happen could not be identified in advance. Thus, year after year investment plans were endorsed which could be afforded only if they were not delivered.

Though delaying projects may relieve short-term financial pressure, it will of course also drive up overall costs by increasing the total of work and effort which will be consumed by a project before it delivers its product. Meanwhile, an increasingly desperate search for ways to make the overall investment programme affordable will resort to the Procrustean tactic of cutting production numbers and eventual fleet sizes—thus compounding the inefficiency by ensuring that the research and development costs are amortized over a shrinking number of delivered units. Worse, such practices ensure that defence procurement is biased towards the needs of the past—the financial envelope is crammed with overrunning legacy projects which may have outlived their usefulness even before completing their gestation, but which ensure that no room can be found for new requirements, no matter how sorely needed.

Only, of course, when countries go to war do the consequences of such mismanagement become evident. When getting the right equipment to forces in the field becomes truly important and truly visible to publics and political opponents, normal procurement systems are simply abandoned. Whether in the USA, UK, or France, actual operations

trigger increasing resort to 'urgent operational requirements' (UORs). In practice, this means cutting through the usual over-elaboration of requirement definition and procurement practice, and buying the best of what is available or can be produced in short order as rapidly as possible. With their armed forces heavily committed first in Iraq and subsequently Afghanistan, the UK Ministry of Defence has, since 2003, spent over £3.6 billion on UORs and generally to good effect.[16] The money has had to come from the central government financial reserve—overcommitted programming had left no margin for manoeuvre in the authorized defence budget.

To some extent, this practice of buying only when the need arises makes sense. It is, for example, clearly more sensible to replenish supplies of everything from missiles to batteries, assuming that industry can deliver quickly, than to aim to hold stocks at a level to meet every conceivable need in perpetuity. But far too often the UOR process demonstrates that not only are defence procurement systems sclerotic and unable to operate at appropriate speed, but that they have also filled modern arsenals with the wrong equipment. To a greater or lesser extent, all the allies engaged in Afghanistan have suffered from shortages of such vital equipment as helicopters, protected vehicles, and body armour.

Why this failure? US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in a seminal article on the need to restore balance in US military capabilities, identifies two main culprits.[17] The first is the tendency of the US defence establishment to prioritize future over current wars. Generals, of course, are typically accused of preparing to fight the last war. But the paradox is only apparent. The future wars for which the US military seek to prepare are only updated versions of those of the past—the symmetric clash of conventional armed forces. All the focus is on ensuring that in ten or twenty years' time US armed forces can expect still to enjoy their current overwhelming technological superiority to any conventional foe. The needs of the actual conflicts of today are overlooked.

The extent of this neglect has been well exposed in a study by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University of just how, for three years between 2004 and 2007, US forces in Iraq were left exposed to mines and roadside bombs by the Pentagon's failure to provide proper 'mine-resistant, ambush-protected' vehicles.[18] The problem was not lack of money or technology—the problem was the refusal of Pentagon generals to accept that such unanticipated requirements were not, in Gates's words, 'exotic distractions or temporary diversions'. 'Why', Gates asks, 'was it necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the capabilities for US troops to fight on-going wars?'

His answer lies in the second culprit he detects—the culture, habits, and behaviours of the US defence establishment. 'Support for conventional modernization programmes is deeply embedded in the Defense Department budget, its bureaucracy, in the defense industry and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is no commensurate institutional support—including in the Pentagon—for the capabilities to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.'[19] Institutional bias is of course cemented in place by vested interest—those of politicians and armaments manufacturers obviously, but also the sectoral interests of the armed forces themselves, committed to preserving their budgets and their force and career structures.

This bias is in no way peculiar to the USA—or indeed to modern times. The French knights who, ignoring the lessons of Crécy and Poitiers, went down to their third successive defeat against the English longbowmen at Agincourt were guilty not so much of stupidity as of a determination not to accept that battles could be fought in ways other than those which conformed with their own codes, preferences, and class interests.[20] Modern armies' attachment to the main battle tank is only an updated version of the warrior's delight in what is still termed 'cavalry'.

The charge sheet is not yet complete. Strangely, in view of the surrounding landscape of procurement disasters, the culture of modern defence acquisition compounds its own problems by consistently reaching for an unattainable perfection. As Gates notes, 'The Department of Defense's conventional modernization programs seek a 99% solution over a period of years'[21]—whereas the US military's real needs today are usually for 75 per cent solutions over a period of months. The quest for perfection leads directly to delays and cost overruns—and is representative of a mindset which values (hoped-for) quality over cost, and cost over time.

For the absence of urgency in normal procurement practices has much to do with a distorted understanding of the needs of public accountability. The greater the public and parliamentary criticism of procurement misadventures, the greater the incentive felt by those operating the systems to defend themselves with a fireproof 'audit trail'—the urge to demonstrate that no contingency was left unaccounted for in the setting of a requirement, and no analysis left undone before final decisions were taken to commit to a programme. In the face of all the evidence, the belief persists in the bureaucratic mind that, if only enough systems analysis and computer modelling is applied, the next project will achieve perfection of execution and performance.

As we have seen, the crude realities of war may be required to shock the culture sufficiently to adopt a different way of doing business. The other pressure that ought to induce realism is the consideration of opportunity cost: if we allow the costs of this particular project to escalate uncontrolled, what is it that we will have to forgo instead? But, again, modern defence establishments seem exceptionally badly equipped to make such trade-offs.

As the Gray Report highlights, 'Equipment plan construction is dominated by a "bottom up" aggregation process, which makes it hard for "top down" strategic guidance to control the balance of investment. Effective forums do not currently exist to allow top down guidance to control the evolution of the equipment programme.'[22] In other words, both the problems revealed by the regular re-costing of the forward equipment programme (unaffordable cost escalations) and the proposed solutions (salami-slice reductions, project deferrals) are put together by relatively junior staffs and served up to top brass to be rubber-stamped. Only in the context of a full defence review do senior figures engage with the programme in a strategic fashion.

The same phenomenon can be observed in the management of individual projects; paradoxically, the more complex the individual procurement, the lower the level to which its management is delegated. The group captain has too wide a spread of responsibility to focus properly on the collaborative missile project which involves intricate

technological, performance, financial, industrial, and diplomatic issues—so it is remitted to the sole charge of the squadron leader. As the military aphorism goes, 'Generals take only general decisions—major decisions are taken by majors.'

Getting it Right

Like everything else to do with the theory and practice of procuring for war in the twenty-first century, the challenge of improving acquisition performance has not lacked for exhaustive dissection and analysis. But, as this survey suggests, the essence of what is needed is conceptually straightforward, however hard to achieve in practice. As Gates emphasizes, the issue is basically one of culture—of changing the institutional mindset in the direction of greater realism, the moderation of excessive ambition, and a heightened sense of urgency.

Realism needs to apply both externally and internally. It must apply to assessment of the future military environment: the benchmark must be the operations which are most likely to have to be undertaken tomorrow, not those which senior military figures would prefer, or those which can be dreamed up by the inventors of worst-case scenarios. And it must apply equally to the management of procurement—what does experience suggest about the actual costs and timescales of new projects, as opposed to what would ideally be achieved if all hopes of a better world were realized?

If the reach of the procurement apparatus is not forever going to exceed its grasp, then ambition must be ruthlessly restrained. Systems must be specified to a level which is 'good enough', not to the outer limits (or beyond) of what might be technically possible in future years. There must be a greater readiness to reuse the already-proven, incorporating technologies matured in the civilian world. And tight control must be exercised over the risks of innovation by investing in technology development independent of specific equipment projects, so that failed experiments can be reworked or abandoned without disrupting the broader programme of armaments modernization, and new projects can draw on a menu of new technologies that have already been substantially de-risked.

And, perhaps most important of all, the urgency that informs the UOR system must be imported into routine procurement, reducing the ambition of new projects as much as is needed to ensure they can be brought to fruition in months and not years, or years rather than decades. A constant battle must be waged against the innate tendency of procurement establishments to over-elaborate process and analysis—a tendency which has demonstrably not only failed to improve delivery of good kit to time and cost, but has actually made things worse. 'Keep it simple' and 'The best is the enemy of the good' should be engraved on the lintels of procurement offices.

At the same time, there must be a clear-eyed recognition of all the vested interests that crowd in to distort effective procurement—those of industry, of politicians, and of the individual armed forces as institutions. The only real defence against such pressures

is a thoroughgoing professionalization of procurement organizations, accompanied by greater individual accountability.

Effecting such culture change in complex organizations is notoriously difficult in the absence of external shock. But in procuring for war the external shock is liable to cost lives. Perhaps, as we proceed through the second decade of the twenty-first century, the conjunction of a high tempo of continuing operations and retrenchment of defence spending following the recent global financial crisis may help to bring about what decades of review and recommendations for reform have so far failed to achieve.

Notes

1. www.pepysdiary.com/archive/1662/07/21 (accessed 25 October 2010).
2. Gray, 2009: 14. Mr Gray has subsequently taken up the challenge of trying to fix what he has criticized by accepting the post of Chief of Defence Materiel in the UK MoD.
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darleen_Druyun (accessed 25 October 2010).
4. For example, British Aerospace's Al Yamamah arms sale to Saudi Arabia: www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae; or the sale of German submarines to Greece: www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5890375,00.html (accessed 12 May 2011).
5. A good analysis of these 'new threats' is contained in the European Security Strategy of 2003, *A Secure Europe in a Better World—the European Security Strategy*, approved by the European Council 12 December 2003: www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed 12 May 2011).
6. See, for example, Kincaid, 2008, which reviews half a century of reports and initiatives directed to this end. The flow of reviews continues, as with the Gray Report (Gray, 2009), or, across the Atlantic, with HASC, 2010.
7. www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF179/sf179.html (accessed 2 November 2010)
8. Brussels European Council 11 and 12 December 2008, Presidency Conclusions, Annex 2: consilium.europa.eu/App/NewsRoom/related.aspx?BID=76&GRP=14566&LANG=1&cmsID=339 (accessed 2 November 2010).
9. See, for example, the conclusions of the French 2008 Defence and Security Review: www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/13.3-Ameliorerlagestionfinanciere.pdf; or the UK MoD's 2010 Strategy for Acquisition Reform: www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/TheDefenceStrategyForAcquisitionReform.htm (accessed 12 May 2011).
10. www.spyflight.co.uk/nim%20aew.htm (accessed 12 May 2011).
11. National Audit Office, 2004. After the three contract renegotiations reported here, the project stumbled on until given its quietus in the UK's Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010.
12. A good review of the pros and cons of European armaments collaboration is provided by Darnis et al., 2007.
13. Tran, 2007.
14. Gray, 2009.
15. National Audit Office, 2008.
16. www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/UrgentOperationalRequirementsuor.htm (accessed 16 November 2010).

17. Gates, 2009.
18. Lamb, Schmidt, and Fitzsimmons, 2009.
19. Gates, 2009.
20. Tuchman, 1979.
21. Gates, 2009.
22. Gray, 2010.

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CHAPTER 37

THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

AMBASSADOR ROBERT G. BELL*

Introduction

'It was the best of times; it was the worst of times.' Charles Dickens' iconic description of the French Revolutionary era could be said to apply, as well, to the contemporary 'military-industrial complex'.[1]

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, defence firms could, in one sense, be said to have never had it so *good*. Defence- and security-oriented companies on both sides of the Atlantic had never been so integrally and comprehensively engaged in *all* aspects of military activity—from research and development (R&D) to procurement to planning to operations—including direct 'in the field' support of weapons and equipment deployed in expeditionary peacekeeping, crisis stability, and *combat* operations.[2] As a senior executive with the world's largest defence services provider, KBR, emphasized: 'We've delivered rocket-proof bunkers in Basra under time, under budget and *under fire*.'[3]

Indeed, according to the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), in September 2009 there were 1.63 contractors working for the US Government in support of its operations in Afghanistan for every US soldier.[4] By comparison, the ratio of troops-to-contractors in the 1991 Gulf War was 50 to 1.[5]

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Judging by governmental policy pronouncements, the transatlantic defence industry may in recent years also never have felt quite as *needed*. At their summit meeting in Bucharest in 2008, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed that 'support of a strong defence technological and industrial base in North America and Europe, through reciprocal and mutual cooperation, is a *strategic objective* of the Allies'.[6] This was the first time in decades that NATO Heads of State had addressed industrial policy at a summit, let alone labelling it a 'strategic objective'.

In his first interview with reporters after being sworn in, the Obama Administration's chief procurement officer for the Pentagon declared that defence firms were 'partners in equipping our forces' and emphasized, 'We're in this together.'[7] Under-Secretary Carter also declared that US industrial base issues were 'completely legitimate because having the best defence industrial and technology base in the world is not a birthright'.[8] For their part, EU Defence Ministers had already approved two years previously a 'Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB)', declaring that a 'strong DTIB in Europe is a fundamental underpinning of the European Security and Defence Policy'.[9]

Moreover, since 2000, defence had been a bull market, due principally to the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. From 2000 to 2008, US Department of Defense (DoD) annual contracting expenditures doubled, from $200 billion to $400 billion.[10] Overall, between 2004 and 2006 alone, US defence spending increased by 18 per cent and among the non-US NATO allies by 13 per cent.[11] Even in the face of the large fiscal indebtedness caused by the global economic crisis, US defence spending continued to increase slightly, although in January 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that despite having identified some $150 billion in DoD and Military Services savings over the next five years, by Fiscal Year 2015 and 2016 US defence spending would necessarily have to level out, since even defence could not be exempted from the government-wide imperative to try to bring the US deficit under control.[12] In Europe, military spending by the twenty-six nations participating in the European Defence Agency (EDA) held steady at just above the €200 billion level in 2006, 2007, and 2008 but began to fall markedly in 2010.[13] For example, the British Strategic Defence and Security Review of October 2010 moved to cut 8 per cent from the defence budget over five years whilst in 2011 an additional *c.* $1.5bn in savings were demanded.

That said, many European defence companies have been able to offset the smaller European defence spend by moving aggressively to acquire US-based defence firms, and hence gain access to the more robust US defence market.[14] Moreover, the values of prime acquisition targets in the defence and security sectors actually increased slightly from 2008 to 2009.[15] Furthermore, the November 2010 Franco-British Defence Treaty moved explicitly to find synergies in both the input and output side of acquisition and procurement, with particular focus on cost-saving synergies through defence-industrial collaboration. Given that Britain and France together represent some 43 per cent of European defence expenditure in 2010 this move is likely to see further consolidations in the European defence and technological industrial base.[16]

Nonetheless, these have also been *perilous* times for the defence industry. In one sense, this observation can be taken literally: at least 1,200 contractors were killed

during the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.[17] In addition, despite the recent trends of greater demand for, greater priority assigned to, and greater resources applied against the defence sector by governments, CEOs have perhaps never seemed so besieged by adverse public attitudes, except perhaps during the 'Merchants of Death' scandals of the post-World War One era.

To cite one very prominent example, in a 2009 speech to US veterans, President Barack Obama called on America to 'fundamentally reform the way our defence establishment does business'. The President continued: 'You've heard the stories: the indefensible no-bid contracts that cost taxpayers billions and make contractors rich; the special interests and their exotic projects that are years behind schedule and billions over budget; the entrenched lobbyists pushing weapons that even our military says it doesn't want. The impulse in Washington to protect jobs back home building things we don't need has a cost that we can't afford. This waste would be unacceptable at any time, but at a time when we're fighting two wars and facing a serious deficit, it's inexcusable. It's an affront to the American people and to our troops. And it's time for it to stop.'[18]

Fuelled by public anger over high-profile stories of contracting waste, fraud, and abuse, especially with 'sole-source' (i.e. non-competitive) contracts in Iraq, and by allegations that private security companies (PSCs) had operated with virtual abandon as paramilitary forces in their own right, Congress in 2008 created a blue-ribbon commission to investigate contracting in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In its Interim Report to Congress, the Commission concluded that a combination of the US Government's 'unprecedented' reliance on contractors and 'a mixture of hasty decisions, lack of planning, day-to-day exigencies, and other factors—especially long-standing problems in staffing and training the federal civilian and military workforces that perform the work, as well as manage and audit contracts—has stressed our system of wartime contracting and generated widespread criticism'.[19] In its 31 August 2011 Final Report, the Commission concludes that $31–60 billion was lost to contract waste and fraud.[20]

On the more 'traditional' equipment manufacturing and production side of defence enterprise, the current picture appears equally black. Under-Secretary Carter in 2009 informed journalists that the Pentagon's largest programmes were, on average, two years behind schedule and in the aggregate during this decade almost $300 billion over budget.[21] Meanwhile, in Europe, EADS/Airbus continues to struggle with what had been billed as Europe's premier multinational military acquisition programme, the A400M air transport aircraft, a plane that at the end of 2009 was nearly four years behind schedule, several tons overweight, and $10 billion over its original budget.[22] In its most recent *Major Projects Report* (2009), the UK National Audit Office examined cost, time, and performance data for fifteen of the largest UK military equipment projects and found that the forecast aggregate costs of the projects had increased by £3.6 billion, compared with the expected costs when the investment decisions were taken, with a total slippage of over two years per project.[23] In October 2010, as the Strategic Defence and Security Review was launched, Prime Minister Cameron underlined the severity of the challenge faced by Britain as he moved to close a $50bn deficit in the UK defence budget. Cameron was succinct in a speech to Parliament on 19 October 2010: 'The last

government got it badly wrong, there is only one thing [worse than] spending money you don't have . . . buying the wrong things with it'.[24]

The British case is indicative. In a withering critique of the UK defence acquisition process, an independent report authored by Bernard Gray in October 2009 concluded that the UK MoD 'has a substantially overheated equipment programme, with too many types of equipment being ordered for too large a range of tasks at too high a specification' and that 'this programme is unaffordable on any likely projection of future budgets'. Gray's review found that the *average* UK defence programme overruns its originally estimated cost by 40 per cent and achieves initial capability five years late.[25] Part of the explanation for this sad state of affairs, said Mr Gray, was a 'symbiotic' relationship between the contractors and the specific armed service that wanted its products.[26] This was demonstrated to no clearer effect than in the procurement of the MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft. Seven years late and having spent some $45bn on the project and with the planes either ready or built, the platform was cut in October 2010.

Allegations of *corruption* have also roiled the US and UK defence industry waters. Criminal convictions involving a former senior USAF procurement official hired by the Boeing Corporation midway through the decade continued until early in 2011 to complicate the Air Force's effort to compete a replacement programme for its fleet of aerial tankers, and arguably served as a catalyst for the unprecedented nature of the strict conflict-of-interest and anti-revolving-door personnel policies instituted by the Obama Administration.[27] In October 2009, the UK Serious Fraud Office referred charges to the Attorney General related to weapons sales by BAE Systems to a number of countries in Europe, Africa, and South America. These charges were separate from similar allegations raised in the case of BAE Systems' £4.3bn sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, a proposed prosecution that the UK Government, under then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, overruled in 2006 on national security grounds. In both cases, BAE Systems reached settlements with the US in 2011.[28]

In response, at least in part, to these controversies, the major aerospace and defence companies in Europe and the United States on 19 November 2009 agreed to new ethics guidelines requiring 'a policy of no tolerance for corruption and addressing conflicts of interest and protections for proprietary information'.[29] On 13 January 2010, ASD and AIA convened the first International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace and Defence Industry (IFBEC) in Berlin, bringing industry representatives together with representatives from NATO, EDA, the OECD, Ministries of Defence, and NGOs.[30]

Assessing the Changing Nature of the Defence Industry

To be sure, issues of 'price gouging', criminality, waste, fraud, and abuse have always been part of the defence industry landscape—just as they have always been part of the landscape of all commercial activity. Given human nature and human fallibility, no

degree of 'self-policing' within any private sector domain—commercial or defence—will ever succeed to the point where strong government regulatory, audit, and oversight enforcement regimes are not required. But there are aspects of the global security environment within which the defence industry must operate today that create *unique* challenges for governmental policies pertaining to the contract management, sustenance of the industrial base, and the oversight and regulation of this industry—challenges that governments have been slow to address.[31]

Until the end of the twentieth century, the main 'business' of the defence business was fairly narrowly focused on manufacturing, or as President Franklin D. Roosevelt called it, serving as 'the Arsenal of Democracy'. For example, during the Second World War, US defence manufacturers produced almost 300,000 military aircraft, with over 40,000 coming from one company alone, North American.[32] Similarly prodigious production statistics were achieved with regard to the manufacture of weapons and hardware for all other military domains during the war—amphibious, naval, and land warfare.

Throughout the Cold War, the principal focus in the United States was again on quantities of equipment fielded. Great debates occurred in the US Congress over the 'bomber gap', the 'missile gap', and, later, the 'megaton gap'. To deter, and if possible defeat, the Soviet Union in an initial conventional phase of battle, the United States and its NATO allies put tremendous emphasis on having the right equipment at the right place at the right time—ready for a lightning war that was expected to be initiated with little or no warning.

Heavily armoured army corps were stacked up, like a wedding cake, along the inter-German border, and backed up by vast quantities of equipment 'pre-positioned and configured in unit sets' (POMCUS), ready to be 'broken out' quickly by the ten divisions the United States had pledged to rush to Europe within the first ten days. Thousands of combat aircraft either stood alert at forward airfields in Europe or were postured to fly to Europe from North America on short notice. Huge allied naval armadas were forward-deployed to try to contain Soviet military power within European waters. Nuclear forces maintained a 'hair-trigger' alert status, and for a decade the Strategic Air Command even kept a percentage of its bombers airborne at all times.

While contractors of course performed support functions during this era, as they have in all wars over the past few centuries, they were a relatively minor footnote in an otherwise predominantly 'high-readiness' military posture. It was clearly understood that once 'the balloon went up,' NATO would fight the Third World War in a highly intense and perhaps catastrophic spasm of violence and destruction with the weapons at hand, and the soldiers, sailors, and airmen in uniform. In this context, the challenge for governments was threefold: (1) to ensure that competition was maintained by encouraging a multiplicity of weapons manufacturers; (2) to regulate this industry by keeping an adequately manned and robust workforce dedicated to the contracting and auditing functions; and, following President Eisenhower's warning, (3) to exercise vigilance to avoid undue collusion between the military establishment and the defence industry.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, defence forces are increasingly less 'defensive' and static in their orientation, and increasingly 'expeditionary' and mobile in their

capabilities. At NATO, this paradigm shift even acquired a motto: 'Out of area, or out of business'. NATO currently directs the military operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean Sea, and supports missions in many other areas outside Europe, including counter-piracy patrols in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. For its part, the European Union has organized over twenty peacekeeping, humanitarian, disaster relief, or crisis stability missions during this decade. While NATO's Article V collective security pledge was revalidated at NATO's Lisbon Summit in November 2010 as a cornerstone of the Alliance's *raison d'être*, few (except perhaps some in Central Europe or the Baltic states) believe that NATO member states might need to defend their nations against an armed attack by a neighbouring country. Indeed, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept states that it does not consider any country to be its adversary.[33]

The significance of this change relates primarily to the eradication of what previously was known as the 'FEBA' (Forward Edge of the Battle Area), in front of which only combatants were expected to operate, and behind which contractors in most cases could work with greater protection. For contractors, as for the troops, supporting military operations is increasingly becoming a case of 'war amongst the people', to use General Sir Rupert Smith's famous characterization.[34] In addition, the very nature of most contemporary conflicts is changing from exclusively military operations to complex civil-military undertakings, in which rule of law, development, humanitarian aid, medical, reconstruction, and other 'soft power' functions need to be brought to bear just as much, if not more than military force if success is to be attained. In these 'civil' areas, too, contractors are inextricably inter-mixed with governmental personnel, and hence inextricably exposed to danger. Given the current levels of violence in Afghanistan, it seems almost quaint now to reflect on the fact that the NATO forces deployed there had, for years, not been principally organized in combat formations, but rather as 'Provincial *Reconstruction* Teams' (PRTs) (emphasis added).

A second fundamental change in the nature of the contemporary global security environment is the *duration* of most of the operations undertaken by alliances and coalitions. The conflict in Afghanistan began in 2002, and that in Iraq in 2003. Both have now lasted longer than the Second World War, though the US combat presence in the latter is planned to cease at the end of 2011, and in the case of Afghanistan, the forty-nine nations participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) agreed at Lisbon to set the goal of transitioning to a lead Afghan security role by the end of 2014. Neither conflict, though, envisions a scenario in the foreseeable future when *no* troops will still be required, as most analysts believe foreign troops will remain engaged in training, and in the case of Afghanistan supporting, local security forces for the indefinite future.

Yet governments have, until quite recently, persisted in treating these conflicts as if they were short-term or temporary 'crises', for which contracting could be handled pursuant to ad hoc or 'urgent operational requirement' (UOR) procedures that short-cut many traditional rules. Indeed, throughout its two terms of office, the Bush Administration funded *all* operations for both Iraq and Afghanistan under 'Emergency Supplemental' legislative procedures.

In the UK, utilization of UOR procedures, which essentially occurred 'off-line' in terms of the MoD's assigned annual budget ceiling, were commonplace, despite considerable push-back from HMG Treasury, which was eager to see cost controls and fiscal discipline maintained. The Gray Review states that this 'may be at least partly excused by the fact that we had not anticipated fighting this kind of campaign in this kind of terrain when we set out plans', while also admonishing that after seven years, 'sooner or later the extraordinary ought to become business as usual'.[35]

To be sure, there were strong arguments for taking these short-cuts and for relying more and more on contracted services and support. As summarized by CRS, there are numerous operational benefits contractors can provide to Ministries of Defence:

> Using contractors to perform non-combat activities augments the total force and can also free up uniformed personnel to perform combat missions. Since contractors can be hired faster than DoD can develop an internal capability, contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical support capabilities when necessary. Contractors also provide expertise in specialized fields that DoD may not possess, such as linguistics. Using contractors can also save DoD money.[36]

As one analyst has observed, the issue should not be whether private contracting is going up or not, it should be whether 'these contracts serve the national interest'.[37]

A third change relates to the dramatic slimming down of governments themselves, in terms of permanent personnel on salary. Since Ronald Reagan famously declared in his Inaugural Address in 1981 that 'Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem', there has been in the US case a substantial out-migration of Federal civilian employees, including a substantial out-migration of governmental personnel who used to conduct contracting and auditing functions vis-à-vis the defence industry. While this has resulted in more aspects of defence 'management' being opened to the private sector, it has also led to less oversight by government.

A fourth major change in the contemporary environment involves the market conditions and market expectations that frame defence firms' business enterprises. In an era dominated by Wall Street expectations concerning quarterly earnings announcements, in which publicly-listed defence firms see their stock prices go up or down based on a relatively small number of investment advisors' assessments as to short-term profitability, and within which corporate executives are held responsible by the shareholders to maximize value and 'grow the stock price', it becomes increasingly challenging for the industry to make business decisions based on long-term investment return considerations. Yet governmental acquisition policies seem in many cases to have still assumed that long-term yardsticks should be applied to defence contracting. A prime example was the high-profile USAF tanker competition in the United States, where *both* possible bidders, Northrop Grumman/EADS and Boeing, voiced objections to DoD's specification that the bids must include an eighteen-year 'fixed price', thereby putting the burden on the winning firm to cover all cost increases over this long, and perhaps unpredictable in terms of market conditions, period.[38]

As noted in a recent White Paper on industrial base issues by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA):

> Corporate strategic decisions on use of resources are made on the basis of profit and loss, with a much shorter time horizon than DoD uses and with alternative uses for resources in mind as well. The government looks at capability requirements 10 to 20 years out, and plans program budgets 5 to 6 years out. Industry, in contrast, makes judgments about keeping capabilities based on revenues and costs for the near term, i.e., on a quarterly or annual basis.[39]

A Necessary Clean-Up

Between the extremes of unconstrained profit-seeking and market-reality-divorced calls for the defence industry to act in 'the public spirit' lies a realistic and pragmatic middle ground of true partnership. As with all such relationships, though, each side must give a little; and each side must be willing to accept compromises. To achieve true partnership in meeting our nations, and our publics' needs and interests, several important reforms should be considered.

First, 'dialogue' must be institutionalized, not occasional or ad hoc. For example, Defence Ministers/Secretaries should regularly and periodically meet with defence industry CEOs, just as then-Secretary of Defense William Perry did at the famous 'Last Supper' in 1993 that informed the subsequent wave of defence industry consolidation in the United States. Trade associations, such as AIA, NDIA, and ASD (the Aerospace and Defence Association of Europe) should have regular access at senior levels of defence decision-making. And formally sanctioned advisory fora, such as the US Defense Science Board, the UK Defence Industries Council, and the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, should meet, at least annually, with the top officials that they presume to advise.

Second, with regard to waste, fraud, and abuse, industry must continue to work harder at policing its own ranks and creating powerful ethical norms within each company to dissuade and deter such misbehaviour. For their part, politicians and government officials should credit industry for what it has already tried to put in place in this respect and what it can yet do to reinforce these initiatives, and avoid, to the extent possible in elected democracies, the temptation to employ rhetoric and sweeping generalizations in characterizing industry's approach as lax or, worse, callous. Governments must appreciate and recognize (as did the US Wartime Contracting Commission in the preface to its interim report), that more than one thousand contractors have died in Iraq and Afghanistan and tens of thousands more have been wounded; hence 'criticisms of the contingency-contract system and suggestions for reform [should] in no way diminish their sacrifices'.[40] For its part, industry must understand that the pendulum swung too far over the last decade towards outsourcing of contract and accounting-related services, and that governments will necessarily endeavour through hiring programmes to redress that balance.

Third, once submitted, governments must give serious attention to the wide range of 'outside' reviews now studying the issue of contractor support to operations, including the US Wartime Contracting Commission and the recently tasked Defense Science Board review to be led by former US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Jacques Gansler. Part of its response must include engagement of industry as a key stakeholder to discuss options that governments are considering for a 'way ahead'. Fundamental to this issue will be discussion with industry over the basic question of which services are 'inherently governmental' and hence should be reserved for performance by government personnel.[41] For example, if governments continue to contract private security companies to provide facility and personnel protection services in high-risk environments, should such PSC contracts continue to be determined based on 'lowest compliant bid' procedures, or do the qualitative demands of this domain instead recommend that 'Best Value' approaches might make more sense in terms of guaranteeing a higher-quality (and hence hopefully more responsible) private workforce?

Fourth, governments are within their rights to insist that 'fixed price' competitions are to be 'preferred'. That said, industry is fully within its rights in pointing out that 'fixed price' does not necessarily advance that nation's defence interests, especially in situations where the underlying military requirements and their relationship to available technology is at first only hazy, at best, meaning that 'technology insertions' or 'spiral developments' may subsequently be required. In these instances, 'cost plus' contracting still strikes the best balance.

Finally, but not least, all parties should appreciate that, as Under Secretary Carter said in speeches after taking office, there is no 'silver bullet' solution to the problems besetting defence acquisition programmes. There is no single 'institutional' reform or reorganization that will magically solve all problems. Rather, the success of ongoing reform efforts will depend most importantly on the skill of the personnel engaged, both in government and industry, their commitment to basic values and principles, and their dedication to ensuring that national interests are truly advanced.

Notes

1. The phrase 'military-industrial complex' was coined by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in the course of his warning in his famous 1961 'Farewell Address' about the undue influence held by the military and industry over governmental decision-making.
2. To cite just one example: at forward operating bases (FOBs) in Afghanistan, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) is installing under a US Army force protection contract an integrated suite of TV, acoustic, radar, and seismic sensors to provide warning of enemy movements several kilometres from the bases. In December 2008, as SAIC was installing this system at an FOB near the Pakistan border, the camera sensors detected Taliban activity nearby. After passing the night in a defensive posture, a combat patrol responded the next day and discovered two Taliban flags that the enemy had, in their haste, left behind. One of these flags was presented to SAIC by the Army in appreciation for its direct 'in the field' role in protecting the base. ('Engineers Quick Work Recognized', *Hunstsville (Alabama) Times*, 30 June 2009.)

3. Interview with Andrew Pringle, President for International Government and Defence, KBR, *Janes' Defence Weekly*, 20 January 2010: 34.
4. Schwartz, 2009: 5. See also *Janes' Defence Weekly*, 4 January 2010: 14.
5. Carstens, Cohen, and Kupcu, 2008: 4.
6. Emphasis added. *Report on Capabilities from the North Atlantic Council to Heads of State and Government*, excerpt quoted in memo (unclassified) to allies' National Armaments Directors Representatives (NADREPs) from the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, April 2008.
7. 'Pentagon's Carter Eyes Closer Industry Ties', *Wall Street Journal*, 1 May 2009.
8. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Ashton Carter, quoted in 'Carter: Protect US Industrial Base', *Defense News*, 7 September, 2009: 1.
9. Press Release, European Defense Agency, 'EU Ministers Pledge Action to Create Integrated and Competitive European Defense Industrial Base', 14 May 2007.
10. Statement of Congressman John F. Tierney, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives, Hearing of the Commission on War Time Contracting, 4 May 2009.
11. IISS, 2008: 443.
12. Pentagon Press Briefing by Secretary Gates, 6 January 2011. As the Obama Administration and Congress wrangled over the US debt ceiling issue in the summer of 2011, though, it became evident that additional reductions in planned defence spending over the next 12 years might need to be as high as $500 billion.
13. EDA, 2009.
14. Forecast International, Inc. 'European Defense Squeezed by Economic Difficulties, Indifference', ASDNews, 17 November 2009 (www.asdnews.com). European firms' defence acquisitions in the United States accounted for more than one-third of all US defence industry acquisitions in 2008: 'European Industry's Drift West Becomes a Stampede', *Jane's Defence Weekly,* 18 March 2009: 23.
15. 'Defence Values Are Defying Gravity', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 December 2009: 19. The largest acquisitions in this sector increased in value from 12.30 times EBITDA to 12.79, according to *Jane's.*
16. Article 1 of the Franco-British Treaty of 2 November 2010 states that cooperation will be designed *inter alia* to: 'Maximise capacity through co-ordinating development, acquisition, deployment and maintenance of a range of capabilities, facilities, equipment, materials and services, to perform missions across the full spectrum of operations' (Taylor, 2010: 9).
17. Carstens, Cohen, and Kupcu 2008: 4.
18. The White House, 2009.
19. CWC, 2009: 4.
20. CWC, 2011: 7.
21. 'DoD Procurement Czar Seeks Early warning on Troubled Programs', *Aerospace and Defense Report*, 4 September 2009.
22. 'Airbus Hopes to Get an Albatross in the Air', *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 2009: 17. On 11 December, though, the programme did achieve an important milestone with the first flight of the aircraft.
23. National Audit Office, 2009: 2.
24. 'Cameron Unveils Defence Cuts', epolitix.com, 19 October 2010: http://www.epolitix.com /latestnews/article-detail/newsarticle/cameron-unveils-defence-cuts/ (accessed 12 May 2011).
25. Gray, 2009: 16.

26. Ibid. 51. That said, Gray found that the UK Industry had a 'strong desire . . . to resolve this set of problems, even at the cost of a significant rationalization of programmes' (ibid. 52).
27. For example, on 20 November, the US Government published a Final Rule that prohibits any Pentagon acquisition official from going to work for any US defence contractor for two years without a specific waiver by DoD ethics authorities.
28. An internal BAE Systems report on ethics authored by Lord Woolf, former Lord Chief Justice for England and Wales, concluded, however, that the company 'did not in the past pay sufficient attention to ethical standards and avoid activities that had the potential to give rise to reputational damage' and 'contributed to the widely-held perception that it was involved in inappropriate behaviour'.
29. 'US, European Industry Groups Adopt Ethics Policy', *Defense News.com*, 20 November 2009. The crafting of these 'Global Principles of Business Ethics for the Aerospace and Defense Industry' was accomplished by the US Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and the Association of European Security and Defence Industries (ASD).
30. ASD/AIA Press Release: 'A Landmark Approach in Addressing Business Ethics', 13 January 2010.
31. This is beginning to change. For a summary of recent OSD, US Army, and Congressional initiatives to bring more accountability and more coherent regulatory approaches to operations support contracting, see Schwartz, 2009: 12–13.
32. 'Who Built the Airplanes', *Air Force Magazine*, October 2009: 36.
33. 'Active Engagement, Modern Defense', Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010: paragraph 16.
34. Smith, 2005.
35. Gray, 2009: 21.
36. Schwartz, 2009: 2.
37. Ben-Art, 2009.
38. 'US Tanker Aircraft Rules Spark Concern in Industry', Reuters.com, 22 October 2009. This article notes that traditionally, 'fixed price' contracts have not extended beyond ten years.
39. AIA, 2009: 7.
40. CWC, 2009: iii.
41. In accordance with US law, 'inherently governmental' services cannot be out-sourced; however, there is broad disagreement within the United States as to how to define this term.

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PART VIII

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION AND WAR

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CHAPTER 38

THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

PAUL CORNISH

Introduction

The interaction between society and its armed forces—otherwise described as 'civil-military relations'—is rich in historical and cultural complexity. But civil-military relations are more than a merger of cultural studies and military history. Since the end of the Cold War and the geopolitical certainties that went with it, for those Western societies involved in the conflicts of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries there has been a political and strategic urgency to the subject. New risks, challenges, and threats to international security call into question many long-held assumptions regarding the role and even the primacy of the armed forces in the protection and security of the state.

Just as there is no standard version either of a society or of armed forces, so there is no common definition of civil-military relations. It is possible, nevertheless, first to describe the main features of the subject and then to outline the ways in which civil-military relations might be challenged in the early twenty-first century. To that purpose this chapter focuses on the case of the United Kingdom. How is the relationship between British society and its armed forces constituted? In what ways, and how severely, is that relationship being put under stress by contemporary political and security challenges? This is not to say that the United Kingdom offers the only or even the best model of modern civil-military relations. But there are several reasons why the UK qualifies as a good case study of the changing relationship between a society and its armed forces. The UK maintains professional (i.e. voluntary, rather than conscript) armed forces across the spectrum of military capability. British armed forces have been operationally committed for most of the twenty-first century in discretionary (and therefore contentious) conflicts:

'wars of choice rather than wars of survival'.[1] Britain's history is that of a country which has sought to involve itself in the world and although only a medium-scale power, the UK remains committed to a global role. The UK is a prominent member of international security organizations and military alliances and accepts the commitments, force structures, and expense which arise from membership of those bodies. Like most other open economies the UK must try to ensure that the structure and capability of its armed forces reflect, but are not unduly undermined by, constraints on public spending which have been tightening since 2008. Each of these reasons points towards another: the UK is widely perceived to suffer from a 'gap' in civil-military relations, a gradual estrangement of post-industrial society from its armed forces and from the willingness to take risk.

The Study of Civil-Military Relations

Why should there be a discrete 'relationship' between society and the armed forces maintained to serve and protect it, and why should we be concerned to study that relationship? In the late 1950s, when the subject was still relatively new, Michael Howard answered these questions when he described the origin of the study of civil-military relations:

> Civil-military relations appeared to those who inaugurated the study of the subject as a problem primarily of politics. How, they inquired, could the generals be kept under control and be prevented from giving too military a flavor to foreign policy or public opinion, from appropriating unnecessarily too large a proportion of the national budget or even, *in extremis*, from taking over the state?[2]

There are some types of society, of course, for which these questions would not arise. An absolutely pacifist society would presumably have little or no interest in refining a relationship with armed forces, and indeed little interest in maintaining armed forces at all. At the other extreme, in a militarist society where the armed forces and society are essentially fused into one political entity, there would be little obvious need to construct a relationship between them. The harder case is a society which is motivated neither by pacifism nor militarism but by liberal democratic values and which maintains armed forces for self-defence and to protect material and other interests. And the case is harder still where liberal democratic societies become engaged in the complex, so-called non-traditional conflicts which have come to dominate security policy and strategy in the early twenty-first century.

If there should be a relationship between society and its own armed forces then how should that relationship be described? By one account, the relationship is a matter of how the two parties 'communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated'. This description is accurate enough, but in its author's own judgement incomplete. Where liberal democratic societies are concerned there must also be a normative dimension to the discussion, summed up in the term 'civilian

control', which in turn is defined as 'the degree to which the military's civilian masters can enforce their authority on the military services'.[3] The requirement for civilian control has its roots in the liberal democratic ideal that there should be a close and constraining relationship between the civil and the military. The liberal model of civilian control makes three core propositions: the first concerning a hierarchy of interest; the second concerning the organization of agencies and actors within the civil-military relationship; and the third concerning the exclusivity of the relationship.

The first proposition is that the military, as professional experts in warfare, should exist to serve the security interests of society and not vice versa: whatever else it might be, and whatever form it might adopt, warfare is essentially a *political* activity. This insight is popularly attributed to Carl von Clausewitz, the early nineteenth century Prussian general: 'war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.... War in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs'.[4]

The second proposition is also attributed to Clausewitz. Clausewitz saw in war a 'remarkable trinity', comprising 'primordial violence, hatred, and enmity', 'the play of chance and probability', and 'subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone'. Clausewitz then developed a second version of the trinity in which violence is the concern of 'the people', chance and probability the concern of 'the commander and his army', and policy the concern of 'the government'.[5] Clausewitz's trinity has provoked trenchant debate. Van Creveld argues that in place of major conventional war between states, the world is witnessing the rise of non-traditional or 'non-trinitarian' armed conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, and on 9/11, in which there is little or no evidence of a formal, finely balanced relationship between people, armies, and governments.[6] Others have leaped to the defence of Clausewitz, arguing that the central components of the trinity can be found in 'all manner of strategic actors, including non-state organisations and even individual people'.[7]

For the purposes of this chapter, what emerges from Clausewitz's account is a model which can indeed serve as a 'touchstone for discourse on the military's strategic position relative to that of other essential elements of Western society'. Mattox argues that 'all three actors in the trinity possess unique and equally valid perspectives'.[8] What Clausewitz advocates in the trinity is, in effect, a sophisticated system of checks and balances where the organized use of armed force is concerned. The trinity makes the different functions distinct and the proper use of armed force then becomes a matter of cooperation between the separated elements of people, army, and government: a 'dynamic relationship'.[9] With such a system, it is easy to see that armed force and war cannot become an end in themselves. By being held 'accountable' to the will of the people and the policy of the government, armies and their commanders, whatever their professional prowess, are nevertheless judged by standards and values over which they can have no control.

The third and final proposition is that the civil-military relationship should be exclusive: an idea usually attributed to Max Weber, the German sociologist who argued in the early twentieth century that 'a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence'.[10] The so-called 'SMLV

thesis'—'state monopoly on legitimate violence'—defines the nature of the relationship between society and its armed forces in several important ways. First, it is only the state (as a defined 'human community') which can call upon the services of armed forces (as providers of 'physical violence'). It follows that no conceivable alternative to the state (such as a political party in opposition, a parastatal corporation of some sort, a commercial enterprise, a religious organization) can enjoy the same rights where armed force is concerned. Second, while there might be any number of organizations and individuals in a society with the capacity to employ 'physical violence', only those with the imprimatur of the state can be considered 'legitimate'. All other forms of physical violence must, in consequence, be presumed to be illegitimate; itself a valuable ordering principle for any society. Armed forces (which could include established military forces, police forces, and perhaps licensed private security companies) therefore enjoy a unique relationship with society as the sole providers of uniquely justifiable modes of physical violence. Finally, there is an implication in the use of the word 'successfully' that the human community's claim to SMLV is more of a norm to be pursued than a state of grace to be assumed. In other words, SMLV requires constant vigilance and frequent adjustment of the exclusive relationship between armed forces and society in order to ensure that civil interests and civil authorities remain primary.

Having established the principle of civilian control over the armed forces there remains one more point of debate: the style and intensity with which civilian control is to be exercised. One particularly well-known analysis of civil-military relations in modern democratic societies was that offered in the 1950s by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington. Writing of the development of military professionalism, Huntington attributed to Clausewitz the 'theoretical rationale for the new profession'. Huntington's model of civil-military relations was rather more straightforward than Clausewitz's trinity, however:

> The military profession exists to serve the state. To render the highest possible service the entire profession and the military force which it leads must be constituted as an effective instrument of state policy. Since political direction only comes from the top, this means that the profession has to be organized into a hierarchy of obedience.[11]

For Huntington, civil-military relations were therefore dyadic rather than trinitarian: the military profession was driven on the one hand by a 'functional imperative' (dealing with threats to the security of the state) and on the other by a 'societal imperative' ('arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society').[12] The two imperatives should not be allowed to merge, however. This central element of Huntington's analysis, variously described as the 'normal' or 'separatist' view of civil-military relations, is summarized in the following claim:

> Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values.[13]

Huntington argued, furthermore, that the separatist approach was good not just for the military profession but for society as a whole: 'a strong, integrated, highly professional officer corps . . . immune to politics and respected for its military character, would be a steadying balance wheel in the conduct of policy'.[14]

Huntington has his critics.[15] Strachan, for example, complains of the United Kingdom's armed forces being 'hoodwinked by [Huntington's] model of civil-military relations' whereby 'they are professional, therefore they are apolitical'.[16] Writing in the early months of 2010, in the midst of controversy over whether Britain's armed forces had become too overtly politicized, Strachan described it as 'absurd and even dangerous to pretend that soldiers do not exercise profound political influence: we need both to recognise that truth and legitimise it'.[17] The main alternative to Huntington is the 'fusionist' argument often attributed to another American, the sociologist Morris Janowitz. As a result of changes in war and warfare Janowitz saw the line between the military and the non-military elements of society as having 'weakened' and become more porous. He wrote of a 'convergence of military and civilian organization' and saw the professional military officer 'subject to civilian control, not only because of the "rule of law" and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values'.[18]

Civil-Military Relations in the United Kingdom

There are two pillars to the evolution of civil-military relations in the United Kingdom: one informal and one formal. The first of these is a largely unwritten set of assumptions about the history and culture of the UK and the place of the armed forces in and around British society. Some writers, for example, have focused upon the maturity of Britain's democratic institutions and the notion that civil supremacy and control of the armed forces is culturally embedded and enduring: an 'unspoken pact between society and the military, possibly originating as far back as Henry VIII's reign'.[19] In some cases what is revealed is a rather complacent belief that any challenge to the civil-military equilibrium would in some respects be 'un-British' and therefore not worthy of serious study. Broadbent, for example, claimed that 'In the United Kingdom, political control over the armed forces was established as a principle some centuries ago and, unusually even for Western Europe, has never been seriously challenged.'[20] Taking Huntington's line, other analysts have settled on military professionalism as the decisive restraint on interventionist tendencies. Harries-Jenkins describes the professional military officer as being 'above all, obedient and loyal to the authority of the state, competent in military expertise, dedicated to using his skill to provide for the security of the state, and politically and morally neutral'.[21] Similarly, Keegan writes of the 'political docility' of the British army, which he sees as 'famously unpolitical', citing the strength of small-unit (i.e. regimental)

cohesion as a factor limiting the development of *esprit d'armée* and consequently of unconstitutional *raison d'armée*.[22] A third explanation for the supposedly apolitical tradition among Britain's armed forces is that the British Army—the service considered most likely to intervene in domestic politics—was for much of recent history simply preoccupied elsewhere.[23]

Since 1945 Britain's armed forces have not intervened in the most direct and overt manner imaginable in the government of the United Kingdom—there have been no *coups d'état*. But not all critics would accept this as evidence of the 'politically neutral', 'apolitical', or 'famously unpolitical' character of Britain's armed forces. Military leaders have often occupied prominent and highly influential positions in society, both while serving in the armed forces and after retirement. In some cases, the most distinguished officers have been awarded life (and even hereditary) peerages, giving them a role in the country's legislature, while others have taken executive or advisory roles in commercial enterprises. Conversely, the image of Britain's armed forces as docile, unthinking ciphers is also wide of the mark, and scarcely qualifies as a convincing explanation for the durability of civilian control over the armed forces in Britain.

Britain's armed forces undertake functions and occupy positions within society which are of the utmost political significance. At one level, and most obviously, the armed forces are charged with providing for the security and defence of national territory and interests; the task of the military, in other words, is nothing less than to *enable* civil society and politics. Armed forces also consume vast amounts of national capital and income in order to cover equipment, personnel, and basing costs; in any developed economy the allocation of scarce fiscal resources is both political and politicized, and the armed forces cannot be immune from such matters. There is also a moral dimension to consider. The armed forces are responsible for recruiting, training, and deploying young men and women on combat operations, thereby exposing them to the risk of injury and death. The duty of care owed by military commanders to those they lead is driven both by military common sense and by more general social mores: no good or wise commander would risk his troops (his most precious resource) unnecessarily; and no liberal society would wish its military leaders to behave in such a way.

Military leaders might have been particularly conscious of the duty of care to their subordinates during the period of compulsory military service in the United Kingdom, when the armed forces were populated less by committed military experts than by 'citizens in uniform', who might reasonably have expected not to be exposed recklessly to the risk of injury or death in an occupation which was not of their choosing. That said, even as recently as the 1960s there were still vestiges in the United Kingdom of the class-based, patrician/deferential society it had once been, and any sense of political/moral obligation might have been unfamiliar to some traditionally-minded military leaders. Equally, there were doubtless many national servicemen who regarded their national service (with its attendant risks) as a duty to society. Since the end of conscription, however, the political/moral obligation has become steadily more apparent in British society's relationship with and control over its armed forces.

For almost half a century Britain's armed forces have been entirely professional and voluntarily recruited. Having made a positive choice to join the armed forces it might be supposed that the professional soldier would regard the risks of military service with more equanimity than his or her conscripted colleagues. Interestingly, however, as the twentieth security progressed Britain's armed forces increased in professionalism as they decreased in size and as they did so the political/moral obligation upon commanders not to expose soldiers to risk needlessly actually became more keenly felt. A professional soldier is no more or less valuable morally than a conscripted soldier. But where a professional soldier is more highly trained (and at greater expense) than his conscript predecessor, and is a member of ever smaller armed forces, so the military commander's 'common sense' mentioned above holds more sway; commanders have better (and militarily more valuable) soldiers, but fewer of them to put at risk. This impulse is joined by social mores which have become steadily more influential. A function of improved communications and of intense media coverage, modern military deployments have at times seen micro-management of operations (and even tactics) from the highest levels of the politico-military command structure, a growing emphasis on force protection and risk aversion in command and decision-making, and a tendency to judge an operation in terms of the number of casualties received—the so-called 'body bag syndrome'.[24]

The conclusion of the Cold War in 1989/90 is widely understood to have brought to an end decades of geopolitical and strategic certainty, and might have had a similarly destabilizing effect on civil-military relations in the United Kingdom. During the 1990s British armed forces were involved in a series of conflicts and operations, of varying intensity. At the same time, absent the consistent and relatively straightforward explanations of the Cold War, it appeared increasingly that the relationship between society and its armed forces was becoming less certain and more complex. It was perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the British Army chose to mark the beginning of the new century with the publication in 2000 of a doctrinal statement which has become known as the Military Covenant. Albeit a very recent arrival to the debate, it is this document which now constitutes the second, formal pillar to the structure of civil-military relations in the United Kingdom. The Military Covenant is brief and straightforward and is reproduced here in full:

> The Military Covenant is the mutual obligation between the Nation, the Army and each individual soldier; an unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility which has sustained the Army throughout its history.
>
> Soldiers will be called upon to make personal sacrifices—including the ultimate sacrifice—in the service of the Nation. In putting the needs of the Nation and the Army before their own, they forgo some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces. In return, British soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as individuals, and that they (and their families) will be sustained and rewarded by commensurate terms and conditions of service.
>
> In the same way the unique nature of military land operations means that the Army differs from all other institutions, and must be sustained and provided for

> accordingly by the Nation. This mutual obligation forms the Military Covenant between the Nation, the Army and each individual soldier; an unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility which has sustained the Army throughout its history.
>
> It has perhaps its greatest manifestation in the annual commemoration of Armistice Day, when the Nation keeps covenant with those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, giving their lives in action.[25]

The Military Covenant, now widely considered common to all three armed services, is best understood as civil control of armed forces by mutual consent, or social contract. The document makes demands on society but does not make threats (at least not overtly); it is not clear, for example, what the armed forces, separately or collectively, would do were the Covenant judged to have been broken. Interestingly, the genius of this document might lie in the fact that it has been political parties, the media, and those outside (or recently retired from) the armed forces who have been most protective of the Covenant and most sensitive to alleged breaches of it. The effect of the Military Covenant is thus that the norm of civil control of the armed forces is now more explicit than it has ever been and has more of the sense of a contract between parties. In other words, for the past decade civil-military relations in the United Kingdom have been more clearly understood to mean not simply prohibitions on the armed forces, but also counterpart obligations on society.

Challenges to Civil-Military Relations

How might the relationship between British society and its armed forces be challenged? Since the civil-military relationship is, at its heart, about the *control* of armed forces by the society which they serve, how might the norm of civil control be brought into question, and possibly even undermined? The challenge is often discussed in terms of a metaphorical civil-military 'gap': the claim that 'the military has become increasingly estranged from the society it serves; that it has abandoned political neutrality for partisan politics; and that it plays an increasingly dominant and illegitimate role in policy-making'.[26] Put another way, as the 'gap' widens so the danger increases that armed forces will move beyond control: shedding their sense of loyalty and duty to society, seeking to reorganize the relationship in their own terms, and finally choosing to intervene in domestic politics in an unconstitutional manner. Alternatively, society could either lose interest in its armed forces and become less vigilant in exercising control, or could lose its understanding of the purpose and capability of the armed forces and seek to make use of them in inappropriate and unsustainable ways.

In the UK experience, if society and armed forces have become less familiar with each other and have steadily drifted apart, a number of explanations could be offered. With

compulsory military service having ended many decades ago most of society has little if any direct experience of, and therefore familiarity with, the armed forces. The same can be said of those occupying leading positions in society—in politics, business, and the law—where military experience is an ever-diminishing commodity. Another plausible explanation concerns the mission of the armed forces. Since the late 1980s / early 1990s the perceived threat of aggression by the Soviet Union, which must at some level have had a unifying effect on society, has been replaced by rather less urgent and convincing commitments to discretionary operations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the controversy surrounding these commitments may have had a directly divisive effect on civil-military relations, with the armed forces seen to be in the service of unpopular and even supposedly illegal political objectives. In Britain, the armed forces have shrunk dramatically in size in recent decades, making them generally less noticeable: an effect exacerbated by the security requirements imposed by thirty years of operations in Northern Ireland. With ever-growing demands for better healthcare, education, and other public services, the competition for scarce economic resources has also resulted in the military being marginalized in the domestic political debate. For many elected politicians, the operating presumption is that most voters would prefer local hospitals and schools to a new warship or another division of troops. Finally, if a civil-military gap has indeed opened up in the United Kingdom then the armed forces might themselves have contributed to it. As society is perceived to have lost interest in the armed forces, and allegedly to have become 'soft' and comfortable, the military have tended increasingly to see themselves as the last redoubt against declining moral, patriotic, and civic values. As Strachan puts it, military men and women 'see civilians as venerating individualism over cohesion, as mentally soft and physically feeble, and as expecting the armed forces to incorporate personnel policies wholly inappropriate to fighting formations'.[27]

Opinion is divided over the seriousness of the civil-military gap in the United Kingdom, and indeed over its very existence. Edmunds and Forster argue that the Military Covenant 'is damaged and must be repaired' and that a new 'civil-military compact' should be drawn up.[28] The converse argument is that the gap does exist but is 'the product of continuity' in the British experience, rather than some regrettable exception to it. The notion that the United Kingdom once enjoyed a golden era in civil-military relations, when there was no civil-military gap, is seen by Strachan as the legacy of an historically brief and politically anomalous period in recent British history, when military service was compulsory. Instead, there should be a 'realistic acceptance' of the civil-military gap as a normal feature of British society.[29] Alternatively, McCartney insists that although the 'moral contract between the British people and their armed forces is undeniably under strain', that contract 'cannot be described as broken'.[30] Each of these arguments is persuasive, but modern political and strategic circumstances might call for a combination of them all.

The civil-military gap should not be allowed to grow so wide as to be unbridgeable; civil society cannot effectively control that with which it is largely unfamiliar. And as the security and defence agenda becomes ever more complex and urgent so it becomes ever

more necessary to ensure both that government hears the advice of its professional military advisors, and that armed forces are able to draw upon the technological and analytical expertise available across society. Without a close and cooperative relationship, a loss of understanding can occur, not least in the responsibility for and development of threat assessments. It has traditionally been supposed that enemy *capabilities* should be the concern of military staffs while enemy *intentions* should be the product of more sophisticated political and diplomatic analysis:

> In estimating the security threats the military man looks at the capabilities of other states rather than at their intentions. Intentions are political in nature, inherently fickle and changeable, and virtually impossible to evaluate and predict. The military man is professionally capable of estimating the fighting strength of another state. But judging its policies is a matter of politics outside his competence.[31]

Huntington argued, furthermore, that it was the duty of 'the military man' to *stress* the dangers to military security and that he should be expected to err on the side of caution and overstate the threat; 'consequently, at times he will see threats to the security of the state where actually no threats exist'.[32] The difficulty with this position is that it suggests a division of responsibility and labour which might prove hard to sustain, particularly for those governments committed to inter-agency and inter-departmental cooperation in security and defence policy under the banner of the 'comprehensive approach'. Huntington's separatist approach is also inconsistent with contemporary thinking about security and strategy, whereby threats and risks will spring from many quarters in many ways, acting against many different sectors and functions of society.

On the other hand, whereas an ever-widening civil-military gap threatens loss of civil control or loss of understanding, then too close a relationship threatens loss of function or worse. In a fundamental and paradoxical way, liberal democratic society and the armed forces it maintains are and should be different and distinct; to close the gap between them would be to seek the fusion of society and its armed forces, rather than the control of the latter by the former. One risk is that civil-military relations might then be over-engineered to the point that society's control of its armed forces becomes so constricting that armed forces become unusable and society effectively becomes self-deterred where the proper use of armed force is concerned. Barnett, for example, rejects the claim that the strategic problem for liberal democratic societies is that an 'asymmetric' adversary can find a myriad ways to attack. Instead, it is Western society which has put itself at an asymmetric disadvantage by insisting upon a range of constraints—operational, organizational, legal, and moral—which adversaries would not feel compelled to observe.[33] The field of conflict is uneven, in other words, and liberal democratic society has chosen to occupy the least advantageous part of the field. Another risk is that too close a relationship might breed contempt and that society might seek to use armed force erratically or inappropriately.

Reports in the UK media show that the norm for civil control of the armed forces can also be challenged during operational deployments. A society which has little

familiarity with its armed forces might have even less understanding of the risks and stresses of armed conflict. Local authorities and even national government might thus find themselves ill-equipped to deal with the demands and expectations of those returning from operations. While it might not be possible, for example, to give special consideration to injured members of the armed forces, to give no consideration whatsoever might appear to lack interest, compassion, and gratitude for the tasks undertaken by the armed forces and the dangers they have faced.[34] Furthermore, Britain's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows how long-simmering debates over strategy, equipment, troop numbers, technology, and force protection can all erupt into large-scale arguments involving government ministers, senior military officers, the media, and the electorate.[35] On occasion, even the families of those deployed on operations have become involved in the national debate, particularly where family members have been killed or injured while serving.[36] In addition, when strategy is uncertain and resources are in short supply, rivalry between the armed services can make it more difficult for civil society both to understand the uses to which armed force can be put and to exercise control over it.[37] Civil-military relations arguably reach their most dysfunctional when, under the stress of operations, military leaders are persuaded to place professional loyalty to the armed forces they command before constitutional loyalty to the government and society they serve, choosing to speak out against the judgements and decisions of the political leadership.[38]

Post-conflict deployments of troops can also, finally, create difficulties and tensions in civil-military relations and in maintaining the norm of civil control. In one study of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities, security sector reform (SSR) is described as the '*sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction'.[39] SSR seeks to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict by focusing on the reorganization and rehabilitation of organized armed forces (whether formal or informal) and other elements of the security sector such as armed police and border guards. Without durable and inclusive SSR, post-conflict stability can be very vulnerable to those with the military capability to wreck the fragile peace. SSR is also an explicitly normative exercise which insists on civilian control of the military and on parliamentary oversight of the security sector. The tasks of SSR are therefore complex and demanding in their own right, but armed forces involved in such activities face additional challenges. As they seek to present an exemplary model of civil-military relations, armed forces might find that the quality of the relationship with their own society and political leadership will come under close and perhaps uncomfortable scrutiny, and that they might be expected to conform to unnecessarily cautious or intrusive standards of behaviour in order to validate the SSR framework being proposed. On a more practical level, armed forces involved in SSR might also face pressure to cease their activities and transfer authority to civilian bodies and non-governmental organizations; a step which would be broadly consistent with the doctrine of civilian control. Yet seasoned armed forces might be reluctant to transfer authority if these bodies and organizations are seen to lack the experience of local politics, the capacity for timely analysis of the security situation, and the ability to protect themselves.

Conclusion

The purpose of civil-military relations is to maintain effective armed forces under effective civilian control. In other words, the goal is to ensure that liberal democratic society can be secure and defended without compromising its essential character. In the early twenty-first century, however, challenges to national security have become more complex and urgent and it has become progressively more difficult to define security narrowly and in the familiar language of civil-military relations. Societies and governments must prepare for a variety of security challenges, including territorial aggression, organized crime, natural disasters, domestic extremism, and misuse of the digital information network. As the security agenda has broadened, so an increasing number of organizations have become closely involved in the provision of security; even, in the case of cybersecurity, with the domestic public regarded as a strategic actor in their own right.

As described in this chapter, established ideas about the relationship between armed forces and society are no longer adequate to the task. A doctrine of strict 'separatism' in civil-military relations lacks the flexibility and responsiveness which the modern security agenda requires. 'Fusion', on the other hand, could be uncharacteristic of liberal democracy and could result either in armed forces being so closely constrained as to be unusable or in their being used convulsively and inappropriately. Rather than rely upon a monochrome distinction between civil and military, national security now requires a framework in which armed forces can contribute to national security in novel ways and in which an array of non-military and non-governmental organizations can be involved. The relationship between society and the armed forces remains important, but is no longer sufficient. What is also required is a national security culture which is responsive and reconfigurable: a political version of 'variable geometry' in which key agencies can be as dynamic, integrated, and flexible as volatile circumstances demand.

Notes

1. McCartney, 2010: 413.
2. Howard, 1960: 36.
3. Hooker, 2003/4: 4.
4. Clausewitz, 1976: 605.
5. Clausewitz, 1976: 89. See Heuser, 2002: 56.
6. Van Creveld, 2002: 9.
7. Stone, 2007: 293.
8. Mattox, 2008: 202, 205.
9. Callum, 2001: 67.
10. Weber, 1919.
11. Huntington, 1957: 31, 73.
12. Ibid. 2.

13. Ibid. 71.
14. Ibid. 464.
15. For a concise discussion of theories of civilian control of the armed forces, see Cohen, 2002, Appendix: 'The Theory of Civilian Control', 225–48.
16. Strachan, 2003: 54.
17. Strachan, 2010.
18. Janowitz, 1971: 15, 418.
19. BBC, 'Ethics Guide: Military Covenant': www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/war/overview/covenant.shtml (accessed 25 March 2010).
20. Broadbent, 1988: 4.
21. Harries-Jenkins, 1990: 121.
22. Keegan, 1987: 2–9. The classical military perspective on these matters is that provided by General Sir John Hackett (1983: 9ff).
23. Howard, 1957: 14; and Bond, 1963.
24. See Cornish, 2006.
25. British Army, *The Military Covenant*: www.army.mod.uk/join/terms/3111.aspx (accessed 25 March 2010).
26. Hooker, 2003/4: 4.
27. Strachan, 2003: 43.
28. Edmunds and Forster, 2007: 82.
29. Strachan, 2003: 44–5.
30. McCartney, 2010: 427.
31. Huntington, 1957: 66.
32. Ibid. 66.
33. Barnett, 2003: 154–6.
34. 'War Hero Last in Line for Council Home', *Sunday Times*, 4 April 2010.
35. See, for example, 'General at War for Army's Future', *Financial Times*, 14 October 2006; 'Front-Line Fighting is Alien to the Law Givers of Westminster', *Daily Telegraph*, 14 June 2007; 'General Blames "Whitehall Amateurs" for Deaths in Afghanistan', *Daily Telegraph*, 10 December 2009; and 'Equipping Our Soldiers is a Matter of Trust, Training and Lives' (Letters), *The Times*, 15 March 2010.
36. See 'Blair Misled Us on Iraq, Say Families', *Daily Telegraph*, 19 December 2009.
37. See, for example, 'Sea Lord Takes Aim at Army Chief', *Daily Telegraph*, 4 June 2009; 'Air Force Chief Hints that the Navy's Carrier Jets are Doomed', *Sunday Telegraph*, 7 June 2009; 'Ships and Jets No Longer the Answer—Army Chief', *The Guardian*, 18 September 2009.
38. 'Generals Must Keep their Noses Out of Politics', *The Times*, 12 March 2010.
39. CSDG, 2003: 13.

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CHAPTER 39

CLEAR, HOLD, AND BUILD: OPERATIONALIZING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH, PAUL CORNISH, AND ANDREW RATHMELL

Introduction

The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept places particular importance on the Comprehensive Approach:

> The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, makes it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.[1]

However, the challenge with moving to a Comprehensive Approach has been to establish sufficient unity of purpose and action across governments and differing cultures and institutions to achieve the synergies and savings such an approach would undoubtedly realize. In 2009 the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) embarked on a programme of experimentation to establish itself as the best-practice leader in this vital strategic and operational domain. In particular, as one of NATO's High Readiness Force (Land) headquarters HQ ARRC attempted to improve flexibility and utility by experimenting with better working practices so as to operate more effectively in the contemporary environment. To that end, the ARRC endeavoured to overcome some of the perceived shortcomings in the development of the Comprehensive Approach. The goal was to achieve unity of purpose in hybrid operations through a development project that was infused with

experience from operations in Afghanistan and other theatres, and driven by the need to establish effective Allied mechanisms to promote better cross-theatre cooperation.

Getting armed forces and civilian specialists to work effectively together is seen by some charged with the conduct of war as sitting at the margins of the business of war. Of course, in so-called 'kinetic', i.e. extremely violent, environments, there is little room for civilians and militaries must go about their business. However, once a space begins to be held the introduction of civilians as early as possible is not just essential, but part of the conflict resolution cycle in which the security space is cleared, stability held and thereafter built through reconstruction and development (clear, hold, and build). The effective operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach is thus central to the future utility of NATO (and the European Union) in crisis management, and in return the Alliance is vital to the effective, legitimate conduct of the Comprehensive Approach if mission success is to be achieved in future hybrid war. However, the experience of NATO forces in Afghanistan suggests the need for a much more systematic approach at the command level is needed to generate and sustain all vital elements and partnerships, with the focus very clearly on the delivery of security, governance, and development in-theatre.

The Comprehensive Approach can be defined as the generation and application of security, governance, and development services, expertise, structures, and resources over time and distance in partnership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments, and partner institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. Therefore, if the Comprehensive Approach is to work as it should, the concepts and doctrine underpinning such a cross-Alliance effort must also be matched by efficient generation and use of required resources, political will, and strategic patience.[2]

Strategy and the Comprehensive Approach

Getting strategy right is of course a prerequisite for the Comprehensive Approach, and the US-led Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) strategy illustrates the challenges amply. Security and stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have historically required a balance between top-down efforts to create a central government, and bottom-up efforts to secure local support. Therefore, if strategy is to gain traction several steps always need to be taken across a coalition if the Comprehensive Approach is to embedded in a sound strategic framework. Critically, partners to such an approach must at the outset agree a clear and minimum definition of success, which, because it is an inherently political process, is also inherently tricky. The focus of effort must always and invariably be aimed at establishing basic but robust instruments of government that reinforce traditional structures, in pursuit of a reasonable level of stability and the prevention of the return of terrorists.[3]

The consistent and sustained application of any strategy is of course critical. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan real strategy came surprisingly late given initial deployments

to protect the seat of the Afghan Government began as early as 2001. Indeed, it was only at the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit that four strategic principles were agreed—a long-term commitment to Afghanistan; Afghan leadership and civil primacy; a comprehensive or whole-of-government approach; and all-important regional engagement.[4] This position was reinforced by the 2009 NATO Summit Declaration on Afghanistan which established some important specifics: the NATO training mission; the provision of more police trainers; support for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the run-up to the elections; and critically the expansion of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) for further expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000. Additionally, it was also agreed to expand the role of the Afghan National Army Trust Fund, enhance cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani governments, strengthen the integrated approach with the UN to better synchronize cross-country civil-military efforts, and support the UN election fund. It should be noted that Afghan helicopters supported the effort to bring aid and succour to the victims of the 2010 Pakistani floods.

Since 2001, the USA and the international community have focused predominantly on top-down security efforts, including the rebuilding of an Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army.[5] But the deteriorating situation and local nature of the insurgency requires time to be given for the enhanced effort to work with local tribes, sub-tribes, and clans to establish order and governance in rural parts of Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan. Indeed, only with a proper sub-national effort will the grand strategic effort implied by the AFPAK Strategy have a reasonable chance of success. That is, after all, the central plank of the people-centric approach to military operations adopted by General McChrystal and General Petraeus. Therefore, for the Comprehensive Approach to work effectively unity of effort and purpose at all levels of the effort is vital, with grand strategy seen as a clever, sustained, and truly multinational effort.

A shared culture is also important. Indeed, central to the successful fulfilment of the Petraeus concept of operations (CONOPS) in Afghanistan is ironically a European-inspired effort to promote creative civil-military effect within well-embedded foundations of legitimate multinationality. Indeed, military parochialism is the very enemy of the Comprehensive Approach, be it the narrowness of many military officers or national parochialism of a coalition leader. In Afghanistan much of the leadership comes from US Central Command (CENTCOM), which has little time for Europeans (including the British, who were seen by said Americans to have quit in Iraq) and even less understanding of or liking for NATO (war by committee). The danger is that the Americans tend to employ European forces in a way that makes them appear less efficient than they actually are (which is saying something). Therefore, at the heart of military effect in complex contingencies is the art and science of command and control in which forces must adapt continually, both conceptually and structurally.

Equally, the essence of military command and control is timeless. It is about getting the right capability to the right place at the right time to deliver the right effect. This means understanding the problem, mission, and constraints; planning, resourcing, directing, and executing ALL forces under command, given who they are and the strengths and weaknesses they bring to the mission. Not only does such effect require clarity of

strategic direction, but at the theatre and tactical level it means getting the operational design right and executing that design. Today, such a plan must also be crafted, shared, and implemented with civilians of all size and shape—the Comprehensive Approach.

The alternative is to sacrifice cooperation for control. In Afghanistan with the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) the Americans effectively created a super-headquarters under which all American and Coalition forces operated (including Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) which was the American national caveat) as well as NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Such a super-headquarters has to look upwards, sideways, and downwards simultaneously across all political and military aspects of the mission. However, if not handled carefully such a headquarters can further undermine support across a coalition. For example, European forces became progressively removed from the control of NATO (whatever the rhetoric) and disaggregated across American commands. In such circumstances, American commanders with little experience of working with Europeans became frustrated. This made it harder for non-American civilians to work the campaign plan.

Therefore, how best to organize and employ all allies and partners across a campaign plan places the design of a campaign at the heart of the Comprehensive Approach. Indeed, critical to strategy in any coalition is the balance to be struck between 'taxation' and 'representation'. Ultimately it is a question of culture and, as Afghanistan has demonstrated, the USA, as coalition leader, needs to constantly consider the problem of the 'other'. Paradoxically, European strategic culture (such as it is) is built on a new joint civil/military venture, from top to bottom. This is in line with demands on the ground but it is also the European way of doing war, which now demands a different approach to command and control at all levels of war. In other words, for many Europeans hybrid conflict is what Europeans do, placing particular emphasis on the importance of putting civilian influence at the heart of operational design given the sensitivities of European leaders and publics.

Therefore, for the Comprehensive Approach to be effectively operationalized five basic elements of strategy must be in place. First, the strategic campaign plan must be constantly and consistently reviewed to exploit new political alignments. A three-phase strategic approach (security, governance and rule-of-law capacity-building, and Afghan civil primacy) is sound so long as it is matched by political commitment in capitals and by a resource and governance effort that can be measured across the region in such a way that it is relevant to the critical ground for such a strategy—the people. In a sense the Comprehensive Approach is utterly dependent on both doctrine (which has tended to emerge from practice) and strategy worthy of the name.

Second, stability in-region must be as important to regional powers as it is to the West. For example in the AFPAK region no Western strategy could or can succeed without a firm understanding of the interests of regional powers. Both China and Russia are concerned about Islamic fundamentalism. Iran is concerned by encirclement and entrapment. Above all, it is vital that both Pakistan and India are convinced to de-link the struggles in southern Afghanistan and Kashmir. Indeed, Pakistani and Indian strategies are still too much at odds with AFPAK to make critical common cause with the West.

Third, successful counterinsurgency efforts ultimately hinge on the competence of local security forces and structures, not international ones. The use of the Comprehensive Approach must ultimately be devoted to building local capacity. One critical need in Afghanistan has been the international partnering gap that has plagued efforts to improve Afghanistan's police and army.[6]

Fourth, institutional ownership is critical to the Comprehensive Approach. In Afghanistan civilian international organizations (IOs) such as the UN and EU have been dangerously resistant to close cooperation with Coalition armed forces. One option to promote such ownership may be to make a virtue out of necessity by picking one area as a 'model' as a means to better harmonize the efforts of the various national and institutional actors. At the very least such a model would need to be reinforced with credible benchmarks that would also help to re-establish control.

Fifth, the concepts and doctrine underpinning such a coalition effort must be matched by the efficient generation and use of required resources, political will, and strategic patience. For NATO this is critical because without an understanding of the fundamentals of operational effectiveness in hybrid conflict, while the Alliance might persist as a political organization, the effective and credible fighting power upon which it is and must be based could well decline to the point where no operational or deterrent role is credible.

Lessons Learned

For all the emphasis on the role of civilians on stabilization and reconstruction missions the Comprehensive Approach remains an essentially military-led effort. The operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach is thus necessarily focused on a four-star theatre commander. Ideally, in the NATO framework a bespoke Comprehensive Approach Command under the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) would ensure that civil-military integration takes place from top to bottom and from the strategic to the tactical level, with the role of strategic headquarters being first to ensure that campaign planning is sound, but above all the assured organization and delivery to theatre of forces and resources.

Critically, operations within the compass of the Comprehensive Approach must from their inception be based on a holistic view of the strategic objectives. This particularly concerns the impact of actions on overall mission success and the need for assessments to be shared by all partners. Influence is the medium through which the Comprehensive Approach is most clearly manifested and the central organizing concept for hybrid operations, with all other elements (campaign planning, targeting policy, and strategic communications) part of a holistic approach to mission management.

For the Comprehensive Approach to work in hybrid operations NATO commanders must be rigorous in their application of a standard model of effective and flexible command and control, able to embrace and reach out to key civilian partners—member

and partner nations, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—supported by deployable forces, such as the NATO High Readiness Forces (HRF), that are able to operate at tactical level as a rotatable planning and command nexus for sustained operations in such domains. In support of such a goal the Comprehensive Approach must be seen from the outset as a whole-of-government issue with structures built accordingly at Alliance and national level with the sustained backing of nations to support the theatre-level effort.

Thus far, experience of the international civil-military effort in Afghanistan has emphasized three weaknesses in the Allied effort: (1) the creation of national stovepipes that undermine the transnational effort and thus weaken cross-theatre cooperation; (2) an inability to measure progress (or otherwise) in the key areas of governance, such as rule of law and development; and (3) an inability to speak with one voice to actors in-region. However, if the goals originally established by General McChrystal and from July 2010 by General Petraeus for ISAF were to be achieved, unity of effort had to comprise far more than the merger of the military counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. The challenge has been be to reach out effectively to include key civilian partners at an early stage in the campaign planning. High-level political fusion has also been self-evidently critical to unity of purpose and effort and ideally would have been achieved through the driving influence of a senior political figure able to act as a consistent interface between the political level and all partners to an operation. However, NATO Senior Civilian Representatives (SCR), with the best will in the world, have lacked political seniority both in Kabul and back in Coalition capitals.

Equally, several important lessons have already been learned from operations in Afghanistan relevant to the Comprehensive Approach. For the Comprehensive Approach to be effective it is critical that campaign planning and command decisions take place at the right level. To that end, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) has proved vital to help marry strategic and theatre-level efforts with subordinate commands fighting the tactical battle. Key have been efforts at civil-military integration from top to bottom and from the strategic to the tactical, supported by a Policy Steering or Action Group (PAG) able to properly reach out to host nations and other key partners in the mission. In other words, the role of strategic headquarters once the campaign plan has been agreed has been to support and enable the theatre commands as part of a partnership between the NATO Command Structure and the High Readiness Force structure.

An integrated civilian planning element (CPE) working within the headquarters provided trusted collaboration and the exploration and implementation of ideas beyond the mandate of a purely military HQ, which demonstrated the utility of embedded civilians so close to command decision-making. Equally, it was also evident that such civilians need to be fully prepared and worked up prior to any deployment. Ideally, exercising the Comprehensive Approach needs civilians to be in the lead, with a strong NATO civilian-led inter-agency team supported by member nations. Such exercises would help to bring about the effective operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach, fostering new relationships between NATO in Brussels, SHAPE in Mons, and member and partner/participating states.

Partnering and collaboration across functional areas and domains is essential and should, where appropriate, be replicated across all levels of the NATO structure, particularly the High Readiness Forces (HRFs). Such partnership needs to take place at the corps level through the incorporation of the civilian planning element. In November 2009 Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 09 included civilian professionals provided by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the UK's interdepartmental Stabilisation Unit (SU) and Department for International Development (DfID), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the US Department of State. Importantly for the effectiveness of the civilians, collaborative planning began seven months prior to the exercise with key areas of function and competence established early.

Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 09 also demonstrated the extent to which success was dependent on trust between civilian and military personnel. For example, even at a national level the willingness of British departments of state to deploy a civilian planning element to current operations in Afghanistan is compromised by the inherent institutional difficulties caused by getting different institutions to work together and the dangers and risks inherent in a complex contemporary operation, even within the framework of a single nation. The challenges posed by the Comprehensive Approach are magnified by the construction of NATO's institutions; the lack of any bespoke, dedicated architecture, particularly at higher levels of the command chain; the need for consensus; and the lack of any dedicated shared doctrine (ways of doing business) and understanding of best practice across the Alliance. In other words, such partnerships take time to construct and cement.

The Comprehensive Approach effectively operationalizes unity of purpose through unity of effort implicit in the campaign planning by translating medium- to long-term stabilization objectives into a range of critical partnerships between civilian and military actors as part of a shared roadmap. Unfortunately, examples abound of NATO military headquarters attempting to coordinate unity of effort in an environment where unity of purpose is not much in evidence. In the first instance, coordinating the efforts of NATO, the United Nations (UN), and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the preliminary stages of a deployment is vital if unity of purpose is to be meaningful. Particularly important for unity of purpose is early agreement over a UN Security Council Resolution to provide the political legitimacy upon which any such security, stability, and development operation must rest. Such unity could be fostered through the early establishment of an in-country Policy Steering Group (PSG) co-chaired by the UN International Coordinator and the leader of the host nation, with membership of the group extended to key actors and institutions in-country.

Strategic communication connects all activities and actors across all theatres with host nations and home nations. If unity of purpose is to be achieved, the Comprehensive Approach must have a unified message, ideally one that is aligned with that of the wider international community and communicable to ally and adversary alike and which offers a cogent 'story' to publics at home and in-theatre. A coherent strategy to deliver such a narrative and to maintain consistency is also vital. In certain important respects,

a compelling narrative is the foundation upon which the Comprehensive Approach is established and a fundamental element in effective campaign planning. Clear political leadership and buy-in from the civilian stakeholders early in the planning is therefore essential to avoid a gap between political and military activity. This is particularly important for maintaining campaign momentum, because inevitably different military and civilian actors, IOs, and NGOs require different narratives and have different decision-making cycles. Effective strategic communication thus creates an information domain within which all actors can operate in partnership. For this reason, influence must be at the heart of all activity, both physically and conceptually, attempting to match narratives with actions with the specific objective of adopting an approach that is the least 'kinetic', i.e. lethal, that is possible and consistent with problem resolution and the need for the headquarters to assure the fighting power of the force.

Mechanisms must be in place early to systematically provide resources for collaboration between the major actors engaged in-theatre and to influence and exploit all opportunities. The military are usually possessed of the planning capacity, whilst the civilian actors who constitute the international community (e.g. member nations, UN, and EU) tend to operate more effectively over time and have more mechanisms in place for the systematic application of funding of all-important political reconciliation, reconstruction, and development.

All NATO headquarters suffer shortcomings in facilitating civil support and its limited role as an enabler. Rarely, and normally only if the security situation prevents civil involvement, will military forces seek to involve themselves in reconstruction and development projects and humanitarian assistance.[7] To help better inform such judgements, military headquarters need to establish early a civil support branch comprised of military (reservists) and civilian subject matter experts (SMEs) to advise on the appropriate level and nature of military involvement. Such a structure should cover several areas critical to gaining the rapid support of host publics, such as essential services (water, power, sewage, etc.), governance and rule of law, and economic development. This external expertise should also inform a better understanding of the funding dynamics in-theatre and where to best influence donors and project leaders.

The Comprehensive Approach: Getting the Basics Right

The 2006 review of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) resulted in a political compromise. Regrettably this tended to undermine much of the development work being done on the Comprehensive Approach. The 2010 Strategic Concept took a slightly bolder step but sadly it was decided not to properly resource the NATO Response Force (NRF), most critically the land force elements which are best placed to work up an Alliance-wide Comprehensive Approach.

In 2009–10 the NATO Response Force underwent a review which resulted in the decision to extend the standby period from six to twelve months. This provided more time and resources to train for the kind of complex commitments the Comprehensive Approach is designed to support. However, the political commitment of many NATO governments to support such efforts demonstrates a critical problem for the Comprehensive Approach—political will. Today, even given the reform of the NATO command structure announced in the Strategic Concept, with the use of the so-called Flags to Posts (F2P) process (jobs fixed to member nations) the staffs of deployable headquarters are only likely ever to be used in a piecemeal fashion as individual augmenters, again undermining any hope of a systematic approach to building NATO headquarters able to act as hubs for the Comprehensive Approach in a sustained and systematic manner. Such inefficiencies in the method of employment threaten the continued support and resourcing of three-star corps headquarters by their framework nations, if NATO's overarching strategic headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, will not/cannot employ them in a coherent manner. At the very least, NATO must make the ad hoc less ad hoc by establishing a sustained and coherent link with coherent functional expertise, both military and non-military. Indeed, vital is the need to ensure not only that employment of such forces are in keeping with their design and levels of training, but that effective command and control is reinforced systematically by the civilian knowledge and expertise communities vital to mission success.

Therefore, far more work needs to be done to promote truly credible and effective combined, joint, and comprehensive (CJC) (civil-military) command and control. To that end, several adjustments to modus operandi would need to be made, not least rendering the entire NATO command structure less bureaucratic and top-heavy. What is needed as a minimum (and *ad interim*) requirement for the effective operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach is a deployable command with a credible level of joint expertise to effectively manage maritime and air assets. Even if key actions take place on the ground, lessons from both Iraq and Afghanistan make it abundantly clear that maritime and air components are and will remain key enablers.

Ideally, integrated 'fly-forward' packages would be drawn from the staffs of Brunssum and Naples. The implication, therefore, of a systematic approach to the concentration and rationalization of NATO's command effort would be that some commands would be scrapped, most likely the headquarters at either Heidelberg or Madrid, which would be surplus to requirement. However, if the nations continue to block structural solutions for political reasons, the need for some form of hybrid solution will persist, and with it the very tendency to resort to quick fixes that makes NATO on occasion appear far weaker and more inefficient than is actually the case.

This is a major failing for the Alliance. Indeed, given the constraints on Brunssum, Naples, and the deployable commands, this structural failing is becoming steadily more pronounced and forcing one nation (the United States) to fill in the gaps, which does not augur well for the future. Hopefully, the ISAF Joint Command in Afghanistan will offer the way forward but to do so and to provide all-important legitimacy for the Comprehensive Approach such a headquarters must (a) be genuinely multinational in

ethos, structure, and practice, and (b) not seek to command all elements, i.e. to simultaneously look up, out, and down.

The effective operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach raises another set of questions, in particular the equitable sharing of cost. For example, is it right that only one member nation should finance the commitment to provide a theatre-level headquarters, with all that entails over a period of time? Can a headquarters that rotates every nine to twelve months be effective at managing a €1bn fuel management programme for a command such as ISAF, or the €200m infrastructure programme that is spent annually in Afghanistan? This is a particular problem if there is in effect very little chance of a seamless handover of function from headquarters to headquarters. Therefore, to be truly effective in the stabilization and reconstruction game, the Alliance needs to examine where best campaigns, tasks, and personnel should be generated, organized, and commanded. In other words, to achieve maximum effect in a large, complex space over time and distance with limited resources (the very purpose of the Comprehensive Approach) would likely take truly radical reform of the NATO command structure, which the 2010 Strategic Concept clearly dodged, not to mention a new set of relationships with key partners vital to mission success. At the very least SHAPE needs to take the lead in determining how practices and standard operating procedures (SOPs) should be harmonized.

In the end, what the Alliance needs is a smaller number of effective deployable headquarters that can rotate seamlessly without any loss of institutional memory or operational momentum. Such headquarters will need a set of command and control (C2) standards that enable forces to plug-and-play and which can be easily augmented as and when required. Surely, that is not beyond the ability of the Alliance? A more agile command and control construct, with clearly defined (and constrained) roles for Naples and Brunssum, would demonstrably add value to the overall effort by shifting the centre of gravity onto the deployed headquarters with all necessary support funnelled to them and in particular the commander in the field. Ideally, Brunssum should be the supporting command for HQ ISAF, with responsibility for pre-deployment training, deployment of forces, long-term resource planning, etc., with HQ ISAF reporting directly to SHAPE. Without such reform, the tendency of nations to retreat back into national stovepipes during deployments will persist, and all the effort invested in both a transnational Comprehensive Approach (worthy of the name) and multinational formations designed to generate cost-effective strategic, theatre, and tactical effect will wither.

Clear, Hold, and Build?

The operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach is central to the future development of the Alliance and its modernization. However, current attempts by the Alliance to create a multinational, multidisciplinary hub will need 'transformation' to take place that goes significantly further than recent timid efforts. The simple fact is that if Europeans

(and Canadians) are to close the gap between a world that increasingly buffets them, the implicit and explicit security task-list that emerges from such events, and the limited forces and resources available to European (and Canadian) leaders then new creative solution must be sought as a matter of urgency. The Comprehensive Approach must be front and centre of such an effort. Certainly, the Comprehensive Approach could vitally foster closer NATO–EU relations because the method implicit in the Comprehensive Approach is central to the emerging European strategic culture, for all its many failings.[8] Put simply, if the basic geometry of the challenge in relation to force and resource is not addressed, sooner or later the armed forces of a NATO member or a NATO intervention will fail and possibly catastrophically. Therefore, these issues move beyond the merely military-technical into the decidedly political.

NATO is of course the sum of its nations' ambitions. At present there is a growing gap between aspirations, the Strategic Concept, and the willingness of nations to meet commitments given the pressing need for nations to rediscover the strategic patience that hybrid operations invariably require. In an age of austerity defence has become all too discretionary. Sadly, reality is rarely discretionary. Therefore, given that the public finances of most NATO nations are under severe pressure, investment in quality personnel would offer a cost-effective opportunity to enhance Alliance effect. If the Alliance could embrace such a level of ambition then the transformational would become the credibly operational and the Comprehensive Approach would be realized in full. Clear, hold, and build? Maybe.

Notes

1. NATO, 2010: 21, Article 19.
2. The United States Institute for Peace and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute reinforce the central need for unity of effort and purpose at the heart of the Comprehensive Approach. In addition to the early establishment of a shared strategic framework for action that also highlights the importance of six fundamentals: interdependence, in which 'everything is connected to everything else'; cooperation, whereby a shared strategic vision enables different actors to work cooperatively towards the same goal; priorities given to resolving the sources of conflict and promoting stability, implementation of a political settlement, and provision of services that meet basic needs; nesting, whereby short-term objectives are nested in longer-term goals; flexibility of sequencing and timing dependent on context; and, finally, the early and agreed establishment of metrics which translate into measurable outcomes (USIP, 2009: 5-30–5-32).
3. Michael R. Frunzl identifies six 'critical tactical imperatives' in Afghanistan: preventing collateral damage; focusing of development funds on critical areas; ensuring persistent force presence in remote areas; committing early to the long-term development of a literate and broadly educated population; respect for Islam; and a marked reduction in corruption at local and provincial levels. See Frunzl, 2010: 362–74.
4. The Bucharest Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, states: 'This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: a firm and shared

long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan.' See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 13 May 2011).

5. Connable and Libicki make an interesting point about counterinsurgency end-games and stress the stakes. 'In the vast majority of internal conflicts, the incumbent prevails, and typically does so in a decisive way. Insurgent victories are rarer, and, when they do occur, they frequently contribute to shifts in the tectonic plates of international politics' (Connable and Libicki, 2010: 212).
6. US Army Field Manual 3–24 emphasizes the point: 'While traditional aspects of campaign design as expressed in joint and Service doctrine remain relevant, they are not adequate for a discussion of the broader design construct for a COIN environment. Inherent in this construct is the tension created by understanding that military capabilities provide only one component of an overall approach to a COIN campaign. Design of a COIN campaign must be viewed holistically. Only a comprehensive approach employing all relevant design components, including the other instruments of national power, is likely to reach the desired end state' (US Army/US Marine Corps, 2006: 96).
7. The establishment of basic security is vital to the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Approach, preferably in conjunction with local authorities. This weakness was all too apparent in the early days of US-led operations in Iraq. Dobbins et al. noted the consequences of disarming the Iraqi Army and Police: 'Bremer [Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority or CPA] made an early decision to retain the Iraqi Police but to build an entirely new army from scratch. Neither approach produced positive results. The new Iraqi Army eventually became a relatively competent and reliable force, but it took several years. The police force, which had not been disbanded, was even slower to develop; it became, indeed, a serious source of insecurity . . . This experience indicates that the CPA's critical failure lay not so much in retaining police or in disbanding the army . . . but rather in failing to reform and rebuild either of these forces in a timely fashion' (Dobbins et al., 2009: xxi).
8. NATO–EU relations are one of the most contentious areas of the Comprehensive Approach. *The CSDP Handbook* places the relationship in a positive light by stating that 'Between the two organisations, a regular dialogue takes place in non-decision making meetings at various levels, in particular between the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and between the two Military Committees. To prevent unnecessary duplication and to ensure overall coherence, the two organizations meet also in the EU–NATO Capability Group to exchange information on capability development processes.' However, in reality EU–NATO relations tend to reflect the hard reality of the Comprehensive Approach, which tends to work in the field but not at the strategic levels. See ESDC, 2010: 83.

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CHAPTER 40

BUILDING A MULTILATERAL CIVILIAN SURGE

HANS BINNENDIJK
AND JACQUELINE CARPENTER

Introduction

The United States and NATO entered the previous decade fully prepared to win the last war, but ill-equipped for the conflicts that would soon unfold. US reconstruction and stabilization capacity was all but non-existent, having been allowed to wither in the aftermath of Vietnam. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent major shifts in the nature of operations for both military and civilian government agencies. It was not until the middle of the decade that the United States recognized and began to meet the challenge at hand. The US military took the first steps to change force structure and doctrine. Civilian agencies eventually followed suit but their capacity still lags far behind the military. A 'civilian surge' began in 2009 when President Barack Obama announced a policy to substantially increase the number of US civilians on the ground in Afghanistan to 'advance security, opportunity, and justice—not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces'. The United States has taken steps to correct the imbalance between the growth of military and civilian capabilities for complex operations over the last decade.[1] NATO must also embrace this change and develop the resources required so that its military and civilian efforts have a unitary approach that begins with initial planning long before operations are undertaken.

The United States and the Alliance agree that a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, post-conflict stabilization, and, ultimately, reconstruction is key to successful execution of complex operations. A truly comprehensive approach draws on the full array of military and civilian and national and international resources, applying them robustly across all phases of a conflict to bring the stricken populace to a state of security, basic services, and legitimate governance as rapidly as possible.[2] Yet the political, military,

and economic resources essential to success are rarely committed and integrated in this well-accepted and broadly prescribed approach.[3] While the United States has established policies and written doctrine to address the demands of such future conflicts, it struggles to turn these decisions into actionable operational concepts and genuine capabilities. This is even truer of NATO, and the Alliance has much further to go to realize its own Comprehensive Approach initiative.[4] Civilians must be involved in all phases of the response, beginning with pre-conflict planning, through to a desired end state with relative peace. To do so will require the development of greater civilian planning capacity and robust expeditionary civilian capabilities at national and international levels.

Integration Efforts in the United States

At the top levels of the US government it is accepted policy that civilian agencies will play a pivotal role in future conflicts. The Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are augmenting their abilities to assist in the development or restoration of governance. Military means are no longer sufficient for winning wars. With increasing frequency, these diplomatic and economic elements of national power are necessary for achieving the strategic objectives for which the nation went to war.

Military Efforts to Empower Civilians

The political goals of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the absence of DoS capacity at the outset of those conflicts obliged the Department of Defense (DoD), albeit reluctantly, to fill the civilian capability gap with military resources and personnel, and with private contractors. The learn-as-we-go nature of this effort generated controversy in Washington over the lack of alternative solutions. The dearth of civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization and the need to rapidly surge the number of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan required the military to look to contractors as a force multiplier. The number of contractors soared, at one point even reaching a one-to-one ratio of contractors to US military personnel in Iraq.[5] The heavy reliance on contractors also led to the loss of significant institutional knowledge and in-house expertise throughout the US government. It further raised concern of some host governments; for example, in Afghanistan, President Karzai ultimately prohibited the use of security contractors in Afghanistan. In the future, DoD and State must be able to maintain a suitable balance of in-house and outsourced expertise and a cadre of skilled contract managers, so they can exercise appropriate oversight.

Accepting the demands of its changing mission, the DoD took steps to balance its capabilities for the requirements of today's conflicts. In 2005, Department of Defense

Directive 3000.05 declared that stability operations are a core US military mission, to be accorded priority comparable to major combat operations.[6] As a result, the US Army shifted tens of thousands of its occupational specialties. The Army also developed new joint operational concepts, and field manuals were written on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. FM 3–0 *Operations*, FM 3–07 *Stability Operations*, and FM 3–24 *Counterinsurgency* all refocus military efforts on the stability operations mission and have major implications for military force training and planning. The shifting of capabilities and strategies is not limited to the US Army. Joint Publication 3–07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War* and the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept are also being updated to reflect the requirements of today's conflicts. The most recent Maritime Strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, built on the requirements of reconstruction and stabilization missions and declares that 'preventing wars is as important as winning wars'.

In addition to official shifts in strategy, military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have created a large cadre of officers and enlisted personnel with the skill sets required for complex operations. Today, all regional combatant commands have developed small inter-agency civilian cohorts, usually called Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, to provide inter-agency advice to their military staffs, primarily during planning. Under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the military began to encourage the development of an enhanced civilian capability. 'The civilian component of what we're doing is critical to success for our country,' Secretary Gates told US soldiers in Kirkuk, Iraq, in early December 2009, echoing his often-expressed concern that US civilian agencies do not have the resources necessary to meet their mission requirements.[7] Acknowledging that civilian agencies are chronically underfunded for these demands, Secretary Gates transferred DoD funding for reconstruction and stabilization missions. In an effort to bring clarity to the debate over roles and mission in reconstruction and stabilization, in December 2009 Secretary Gates proposed giving the State Department shared authority for programmes that have a clear connection to security, placing traditional defence, foreign, and development policy back under the purview and authorities of their traditional agencies. This new structure would allocate up to $2 billion in additional funding for nation-building activities, including security capacity-building, stabilization, and conflict prevention.[8] Under this proposal, joint civil-military field teams would develop operational plans, which both the Chief of Mission and the Combatant Commander would then endorse before any action is taken. Both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense would give final approval.

Civilian Agency Efforts

In addition to the Department of Defense, the Department of State and US Congress have begun to take steps to counterbalance what some have called the 'militarization' of foreign policy. For much of the past decade the civilian agencies lacked the capacity and resources necessary to transition societies from conflict into stability. Only recently has

this begun to improve. The first requirement was a culture change within the civilian agencies forcing 'diplomats and aid providers [to] let go of the notion that they can sit safely on the sidelines of conflict until the smoke clears'.[9]

The paucity of civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization, and its necessity for future US international efforts, was identified in the 1990s, when the Clinton Administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, 'Managing Complex Contingency Operations'. The Clinton administration intended for PDD 56 to achieve unity of effort among US Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations through specific management practices and planning processes. PDD 71, 'Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations', conveyed a similar message, citing, in particular, the lack of civilian personnel to aid the host nation in establishing appropriate security forces and implementing political and economic programmes. However, executive branch attention to civilian capacity waned until December 2005, when National Security Presidential Directive 44 designated the State Department as the lead for reconstruction and stabilization activities involving coordination with all relevant US government departments and agencies. While State was the lead on paper, it did not have the capabilities or resources to translate policy to the operational level. Officials have only recently emphasized the need for development of capacity at the State Department. Strengthened recognition of the requirement for inter-agency collaboration in complex operations could come through Congressional authorization of the multi-agency reconstruction funding suggested by Secretary Gates in 2009. This type of effort, however, is still in a nascent phase within the Departments of Defense and State and the US Agency for International Development.

At the State Department, the introduction of the Lugar-Biden bill in 2004, leading to the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), was an important first step to organize and develop civilian capacity for complex operations. The State Department was in need of adequate planning mechanisms for reconstruction and stabilization operations, efficient inter-agency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required.[10] Unfortunately, this new office was 'underfunded, understaffed and unappreciated within the State Department'.[11] When the Lugar-Biden bill became law in 2008, it gave the State Department more resources to begin to meet the need for civilian capacity. Working with a small staff, compared to the substantial manpower of the military, 'S/CRS has taken steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop a rapid-response crisis management "surge" capability, to improve interagency and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help the Regional Bureaus of the State Department develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.'[12] In an effort to build operational capabilities, S/CRS created a civilian 'surge' capability for use in stabilization and reconstruction operations requiring a quick response. The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) consists of an active standing civilian capacity that is trained and rapidly deployable to austere environments (the CRC-A) and a standby corps of US government civilian agency employees who are trained and able to deploy on an as-needed basis. As of this

writing, the CRC-A has approximately 100 members and the Standby component has 810 members.[13]

Not far from Foggy Bottom, USAID—established in 1961 under the Foreign Assistance Act to lead the US development effort—is also in need of a surge in its capacity to meet the demands of complex operations. At one time, USAID possessed the institution-building skills needed in the vulnerable countries we are assisting today. However many of those skills were lost in the downsizing of the USAID Foreign Service since the 1970s, as personnel fell from about 12,000 to fewer than 2,000 today.

USAID is taking steps to regain some of its former capacity. Shortly after the establishment of S/CRS, USAID created the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to improve its coordination with DOD in Washington and at the combatant commands. Around the same time, USAID also began to implement the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF), a standardized diagnostic tool used to gather information from local inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in a unit's area of operation.[14] However, the creation of new offices and tools for conflict assessment is not sufficient. What USAID needs is greater capacity to return the agency to its former capabilities. One such vehicle is the Development Leadership Initiative, which aims to double the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers by 2012.[15] This effort should continue in order to provide USAID with the capacity to support the increasing demands of stabilization and reconstruction missions. It is also crucial that these new Foreign Service Officers embrace the expeditionary and operational mindset present in the OMA or S/CRS and understand the culture and requirements of complex operations.

Stability operations publications from the National Defense University and elsewhere identify and categorize the missions and tasks involved in complex operations. This information provides policy-makers insights that enable them to determine the mix of civilian skills needed to conduct these operations in the future. Most of the sixty tasks—associated with six mission categories: restore and maintain security, promote effective governance, conduct reconstruction, sustain economic development, support reconciliation, and foster social change—would be best done by civilians, with the military in a supporting role.[16] In addition to USAID, DoS, and DoD, many of the skills required for success in complex operations are found in the US domestic agencies—the departments of Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Energy, Interior, Health and Human Services, and Education. These agencies do not contribute significant resources to complex operations missions, often to the detriment of those missions. This deficiency is not necessarily due to a lack of desire but because of a lack of legislative mandate, resources, and personnel. The absence of a legal basis in US Code to support complex operations overseas amounts to a formidable disincentive to participation and needs to be rectified by the Congress in order to utilize the capabilities and reachback found in the domestic agencies. A comprehensive approach must focus on capabilities and capacity, not who the civilians are or what department employs them. Agencies must be given the statutory mandate and incentives to support these missions. Within the United States, S/CRS and the CRC are making great strides in this area, but more must be done to recruit and train a cadre of complex operations professionals.

Alliance Capabilities

As in the United States, NATO leadership understands that the reconstruction and stabilization missions being conducted today are the new norm and that civilian skills noted here are needed to be successful. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said, 'the military is necessary—but it is not sufficient'.[17] The Alliance is adapting, but the changes are not easy and the process requires shifting priorities and resources, both physical and financial, and requires both time and skill to move from a design phase into a genuine operational change. NATO also recognizes that the international coordination and collaboration necessary in complex operations are often late to arrive and fall short of the necessary focus on close, constant cooperation. Instead of being driven by predetermined strategic partnerships, these efforts are typically ad hoc and piecemeal.

Current Efforts

Over the past decade, NATO has been pursuing European and transatlantic security objectives through a more integrated approach. At recent summits, including Riga in 2006, Bucharest in 2008, and Strasbourg-Kiehl in 2009, the Alliance acknowledged that Afghanistan is its greatest challenge and emphasized a necessary focus on strengthening regional partnerships with the EU and other entities to achieve security. NATO already has the greatest military capability of any multinational organization in the world. The Alliance has had a mission in Kosovo since 1999 and a mission in Afghanistan since 2004. NATO's first and only other major land force deployment, to maintain a peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, lasted from 1996 to 2005. These long-running missions underscore the critical need for greater cooperation and partnership among the agencies providing security and those trying to achieve development.[18]

NATO's current and future military operations would be enhanced by complementary civilian capacities that can rapidly deploy to conflict areas. To solidify cooperation and increase this capacity, NATO should endeavour to work more closely with key civilian institutions—including the European Union, United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, among others. A lesson learned from recent and current reconstruction and stabilization missions is that early mistakes are difficult to undo. However, as a multinational organization dependent on member contributions, NATO has limitations when it comes to civilian capacity. To date, any NATO civilian capabilities have focused on logistical support to military operations. NATO does not intend to develop a large civilian capacity. However, as stated by the NATO leadership, the Alliance should develop a small civilian capability that is not reliant on any other institution. A NATO component of roughly 250 member-nation civilian employees with varying areas of expertise would be able to deploy to a combat zone or austere

environment within forty-eight hours. As a military organization, NATO needs trained civilians who can enhance its ability to work with civilian partners. The NATO 2020 report calls on NATO to integrate the identification of civilian capabilities into the Defence Planning Process. The group also recommends that NATO ask its member states to identify civilian specialists who could support missions requiring rapid deployment.[19] NATO is beginning to utilize the COMPASS database as a means for tracking member nations' civilian experts with the skills required for stability operations. The development of a rapidly deployable civilian capability could help to avoid mistakes and could be critical to the success of NATO missions. This requirement should be supported and resourced by all member nations.

Within its headquarters structure, options for NATO include organizing civilian resources using the model of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and Civil Emergency Planning Directorate to coordinate national non-military contributions.[20] Other experts have also recommended that NATO develop a theatre command under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to operationalize the Comprehensive Approach and ensure full civil-military integration.[21] NATO currently facilitates the conduct of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) operations through training and exercises for interaction with civilians in a conflict environment, including local authorities and representatives of other governmental and non-governmental civilian agencies. One such vehicle, the CIMIC Center of Excellence (COE), provides training for operational teams and planners working on CIMIC-related missions and developing CIMIC doctrine.[22] The CIMIC COE did not have the resources to support operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan but has been getting more attention from Allied Command Transformation (ACT). As with its military support, NATO is dependent on civilian contributions from its member nations.

NATO member states have a substantial reservoir of untapped civilian capabilities. As NATO's primary regional partner, the EU offers civilian capacity and capabilities in the areas of governance, infrastructure reconstruction, and civil-sector development, including customs and border matters, policing and judicial systems, institution and facilities development, and resourcing commercial enterprise. While these are promising for the future, the EU's current contributions are primarily in the economic and social sectors. The EU has deployed eleven civilian special representatives to specific crisis areas, such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, the African Great Lakes Region, and Kosovo, among others, to coordinate EU military, rule of law, and civilian aid programmes. The special representatives report directly to the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Council. However, the EU's competencies for civilian crisis response fill a much wider portfolio and include programmes for humanitarian aid, assistance to displaced persons, civil protection, democracy building, rule of law, human rights protection, food aid and security, reconstruction, and mine action.

Notably, Denmark has also initiated various efforts to increase civilian capacity. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and the Defence Command Denmark have laid the groundwork for an inter-ministerial working group tasked

with the goal of developing a corps of personnel with stabilization and reconstruction expertise. The working group will make recommendations on how to strengthen civilian capacities by addressing issues of recruitment, incentive structures for civilian experts, vacancy schemes, training, and protection. The stabilization and reconstruction initiative will expand the existing International Humanitarian Service (IHS) reserve corps. Additionally, Denmark is looking to establish a lessons-learned hub, to ensure that best practices are developed and fed into the planning of future stabilization missions.[23] The UK has similarly made efforts to strengthen its stabilization and reconstruction capacities. In 2003 the government called on civil departments to contribute to military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit was instituted, similar to the US CRC, which was later replaced by the Stabilization Unit. This unit has sixty members and a standby reserve of 1,000 qualified civilians who are willing to deploy overseas, 200 of whom are current civil servants within the Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UK is increasing its efforts to broaden that base to other civilian departments. A unique feature of the UK is that the main funding source for reconstruction and conflict prevention operations comes from a tri-departmental funding pool. This mechanism forces greater inter-agency collaboration and prioritization. From a multilateral standpoint, both the UN and EU have undertaken efforts to develop civilian capacity for complex operations. NATO must draw upon these efforts and other member-nation resources, including those of the USA, to strengthen its own capabilities.

The Comprehensive Approach

In an effort to repair and prevent the types of disconnects evident in NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, Denmark detailed a concept called 'Concerted Planning and Action'. The Danes observed that NATO's responses in both operations had been initiated without early and effective civil-military coordination, and did not incorporate lessons learned in previous operations. The result was a waste of effort, resources, and, ultimately, lives, while organizations sorted out tasks and relationships in the midst of a crisis rather than beforehand, in the so-called zero or shaping phase of crisis response. This topic evolved into what is today the Comprehensive Approach and was added to NATO's agenda in 2006. The premise behind this approach is to apply all elements of power with sufficient resources early in a crisis (or post-conflict situation) in order to greatly reduce the social, economic, and physical damage to the society under stress, and hasten the return to peace at lower cost to all concerned—the protagonists as well as the international community.[24]

The original aim of a comprehensive approach was not to develop new NATO capabilities, but to strengthen the capabilities in civil emergency planning that the Alliance had maintained throughout the Cold War and in the years since. The approach emphasized cooperation with other international organizations, initially at the strategic level and ultimately at the operational level.[25] In November 2006 at the Riga summit, NATO

endorsed the Comprehensive Approach as its concept for conflict management and response. NATO leaders directed that an Action Plan be developed for how the Alliance would incorporate the Comprehensive Approach internally and in its relations with other organizations, most notably the UN and EU. The Action Plan was endorsed in April 2008 at Bucharest. Since that time, NATO staffs have been implementing efforts to improve NATO's crisis management and relevant planning procedures, improve practical cooperation with the UN and other organizations, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors, and enhance NATO's military support to stabilization and reconstruction operations throughout all phases of conflicts.[26]

The most difficult obstacle to realizing the Comprehensive Approach results from Turkey and Cyprus vetoing cooperation between the EU and NATO. In NATO, Turkey vetoes sharing information with the EU because of the membership of Cyprus. The situation is reversed in EU votes, with Cyprus vetoing collaboration with NATO because of Turkish membership. This precludes the deepening of NATO–EU relations and leads to serious operational challenges. As a first step towards a solution, both countries might agree to a moratorium on vetoes on issues related to Afghanistan to avoid limiting future actions and fully implement coordination and integrated planning. The success of the Comprehensive Approach initiative depends on NATO and EU leaders giving full support to the effort. However, the EU and NATO have yet to develop a documented process for pre-crisis planning and crisis response coordination, in spite of their well-established, side-by-side operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The void in an agreed NATO–EU cooperation mechanism is a gaping hole in achieving strong partnerships among the major international organizations available for crisis response.

The time required to develop a true comprehensive approach should not deter the Alliance from pursuing one. The earlier the transition begins, the sooner the international community and the affected nations will benefit from a coordinated, comprehensive international approach to conflict and crisis resolution. NATO has begun working with key partners and allies, including Belgium, France, and the United States, to devise a more effective implementation plan and to frame what a NATO civilian capability will look like. This process should include conducting an extensive survey of its membership to determine what level of civilian capacity each nation is willing to provide. With participation by over ten countries, NATO's 2009 'Arrcade Fusion' exercise explored how an international civilian capability can be applied to integrate both planning and operations. The exercise went beyond civil-military coordination and fostered thinking on new ways of integrated assessment, planning, execution, and monitoring between all key civilian actors and the military as part of a comprehensive approach.[27] What has been done to date is moving NATO in the right direction, but the pace of reform must increase. Given the demands of complex operations, much more can and should be done by the United States, NATO, and international partners to realize a true comprehensive approach. Moreover, the successful adoption of the Comprehensive Approach is vital to the future utility of NATO as an actor in military operations.

Current US and NATO Field Operations

The Provincial Reconstruction Team

At present, inter-agency provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are the most prominent manifestation of integrated civil-military operations in the field. Civilian capacity was harnessed, with limited success, for the current PRT effort and the German effort (now under the direction of the EU) to train police in Afghanistan.[28] In 2002, the United States developed the PRT concept, which became operational in 2003, when the first PRT was established in the Afghan province of Paktia. The PRT model was first implemented in Iraq in November 2005 as a joint Department of Defense and Department of State mission. Up to 2009 there were thirty-four PRTs in Afghanistan under NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) member or US command, and another twenty-three in Iraq under US command.

PRTs combine military and civilian personnel from various departments and agencies, operating and coordinating on a daily basis with their colleagues and the military, and represent a dynamic means of civil-military collaboration for reconstruction and stabilization. The general focus of the PRT is to improve stability in a given province and set the foundation for long-term development by traditional means, not unlike the response to a natural disaster. However, in disaster response situations, the military is generally the first entity on the ground, making way for civilian and international response. There are distinct differences between PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, with many lessons to be learned from the experiences in each country. In Iraq, PRTs are civilian-led under the authority of the State Department and primarily staffed by civilians from various government agencies, with small numbers of uniformed military. Embedded PRTs (ePRTS), reporting to the United States Force-Iraq Commanding General, were created in 2007 to work alongside and with the protection of brigade combat teams and advise and assist brigades, while assisting with new military objectives. In this way, PRTs also tie into military strategy for counterinsurgency and stability operations.[29]

Afghan PRTs are intended to be 'a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate the most unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the capabilities brought by its diplomacy, defence, and development components'.[30] In Afghanistan, PRTs operate under the protection of NATO, ISAF, and the United States. US-run PRTs are staffed largely by military personnel though the civilian-military balance varies depending on the regional security situation.

PRT Challenges

While there are differences of opinion on PRT effectiveness, many experts in and out of government believe they have had a positive impact on security and governance in both Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are not a perfect solution but they advance the goals

of reconstruction and stabilization missions and provide an operational-level means for inter-agency cooperation for reconstruction and stabilization missions. PRT effectiveness is augmented by the message they convey to the host nation as a civilian face in a combat zone. In many provinces, they have succeeded in building relationships with local leaders and in strengthening the central government at the provincial level.

Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that PRTs must be guided by centralized, coordinated direction from a civilian leader. In 2007, the US Embassy in Iraq created the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), to oversee PRT activities. There has been a clear benefit to having an ambassador-level leader solely focused on coordinating PRT missions and personnel. With a central authority, it is easier to implement common approaches and training standards that can be applied across PRTs. In Afghanistan, the US Embassy created the Interagency Provincial Affairs Office (IPAO), to oversee PRT activities in that country. While remaining flexible to adapt to unique local circumstances, PRTs need greater organizational structure. In their present state, PRTs are haphazard, developed independently of each other, and have varied organizational structures that are largely guided by national direction rather than coordinated mandates from an in-country civilian entity.

In addition to requiring central coordination, PRTs are dependent on the protection of the military. As the international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan reduce the number of combat troops, there is likely to be a concurrent reduction in the number of PRTs. This will create the appearance that the civilians are leaving at the very time that they are most needed. The future success of the PRT model for civil-military operations in reconstruction and stabilization, therefore, is dependent on NATO and the United States developing a transition plan to enable PRTs to function with reduced military support, not just in terms of security but also in the areas of logistics, communication, transportation, food, and other requirements.

The Way Forward

Transformation begins with a change in understanding of what is needed. The United States is gradually shifting its mindset towards planning and resourcing for complex operations. Owing to increased inter-agency cooperation and Congressional support, the United States has been able to develop several new capabilities to aid in this effort. New laws allow the Department of Defense to shift resources to the State Department for urgent stabilization missions and to more quickly train and equip partners when the need arises. More strategic processes are also beginning to take root. At the State Department, S/CRS continues to build on the civilian capacity for reconstruction and stabilization, training new members of the Civilian Response Corps and enhancing civilian capabilities. The Department of Defense is implementing roadmaps for irregular warfare, strategic communications, and building partnership capacity. Within NATO, there is a renewed sense of urgency to implement the Comprehensive Approach. The new NATO Strategic Concept, unveiled at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, goes

beyond planning and calls for greater capacity to employ civilians for future contingencies. NATO is partnering with the United States and other allies to devise an operational plan that will produce real results in terms of civilian manpower and skills. However, these efforts must reach beyond the United States and even NATO to include strategic coordination with regional multinational organizations and non-standard partners, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, and NGOs. NGOs are often on the ground many years before international intervention and remain there after military actions, if any, are concluded. With approximately 44,000 NGOs operating in relatively peaceful environments, it is critical that the United States and NATO endeavour to build appropriate relationships with NGOs through early and regular communication.

Conclusions

The conflicts of today provide important lessons for the operations we will conduct tomorrow. The United States and NATO alike must continue to prepare for the complex operations we will face in the future by looking at the lessons learned through recent experience. Both entities must have the right tools to meet these challenges. Today, we see a dangerous gap between rhetoric and capacity. The United States and NATO must accelerate efforts to build the capacity of civilian agencies by creating new authorities and policies and providing additional resources, education, and training to develop a cadre of professionals that can meet the challenges of reconstruction and stabilization missions. Increasing civilian capacity will also require changing existing inter-agency structures and giving more clearly defined roles and missions to the DoD, DoS, and USAID. Military forces should understand the multidimensionality of conflict and both acknowledge and welcome the critical role of civilians. DoS personnel with a strong understanding of reconstruction and stabilization operations should provide the leadership to shape the US policy that will be implemented by the Civilian Response Corps in the short term, and USAID in the long term. USAID should double its operational personnel so that it can meet the demands of both development and reconstruction activities. DoD will augment these efforts and coordinate with its inter-agency counterparts as it assists partner nations with increasing the capacity of their own militaries. US domestic agencies should also be given statutory mandates and small budget increases to support reconstruction and stabilization missions, just as many of them now have for domestic disaster responses. The combination of these efforts will better prepare the United States to conduct the next complex contingency operation in a troubled nation, failed state, or humanitarian crisis. Within NATO, an empowered civilian corps would bring a greater degree of success to future NATO efforts so that the challenges caused by entering Afghanistan unprepared are not repeated. By addressing the vetoes of Turkey and Cyprus within NATO and the EU respectively NATO can harness the civilian capacities of its member nations for complex operations.

The United States and NATO may not be ready for drastic reform measures today, but these efforts represent necessary short- and medium-term steps towards comprehensive

inter-agency reform. Just as it took the US military twenty years to fully realize the benefits of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation,[31] it will take time and a significant culture change for the United States and NATO to fully embrace the processes and structures needed for effective responses to complex operations. With sufficient leadership and vision, such efforts can provide a solid foundation for more sweeping changes to foreign and security assistance that will give the Alliance more tools for integrating its efforts to meet the challenges posed by both new and old threats.

Notes

1. The definition of complex operations has changed over time—sometimes including combat, sometimes excluding it, sometimes encompassing disaster relief, sometimes not, and usually focusing only on missions overseas. The Center for Complex Operations states that 'stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare [are] collectively called "complex operations" '.
2. Barry, 2009: 273.
3. Schnaubelt, 2009: 37.
4. At the summit in Riga, Latvia, on 29 November 2006, NATO leaders endorsed the concept of a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution 'involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments' and tasked their permanent representatives to develop a plan to implement the concept in 2007. See NATO's Riga Summit Declaration, Paragraph 10, available at www.nato.int (accessed 13 May 2011).
5. CBO, 2008: 13.
6. In Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 'Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations', 'stability operations' is defined as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
7. Robert Gates, Memo to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 15 December 2009.
8. Secretary Gates' proposal builds on the involvement of civilians in the planning phase that began under Sections 1206 and 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.
9. Schear and Curtin, 2009: 94.
10. Serafino, 2009.
11. NDU, 2009: 3.
12. Serafino, 2009.
13. For additional information, see: www.state.gov/s/crs/civilianresponsecorps/index.htm (accessed 13 May 2011).
14. USAID, 'Our Work: Technical Conflict Assessment Framework': www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_ConfLAssessFrmwrk_May_05.pdf
15. USAID Development Leadership Initiative: www.usaid.gov/careers/dli.html (accessed 13 May 2011).
16. Drawn from the efforts of Christel Fonzo-Eberhard, Richard L. Kugler, and Dr R. Scott Moore. See also NDU, 2009: 16.

17. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, remarks at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), Brussels, 8 October 2010.
18. Barry, 2009: 282.
19. NATO, 2010: 36.
20. NATO, 2006: 301–2.
21. Lindley-French, 2010.
22. NATO, 2003.
23. Denmark's New Framework for Implementing the Comprehensive Approach, 2010: www.civcap.info/recruitment/national/denmark/ihb/printable-version-denmarks-new-framework.html (accessed 18 September 2011).
24. NDU, 2009: 274.
25. NDU, 2009: 278.
26. NDU, 2009: 279.
27. Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 09: www.arrc.nato.int/alliedrapidreactioncorps/page2378 12236. aspx (accessed 21 September 2011).
28. NDU, 2009: 282.
29. 'The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition': www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB828.pdf (accessed 13 May 2011).
30. ISAF, 2006: 39.
31. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the primary military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and promoted, if not necessitated the development of jointness in the officer corps through joint education and inter-service rotational assignments. Today, this idea of jointness is often discussed as necessary in a broader, "whole-of-government" context to include civilian agency personnel assigned to expeditionary missions.

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PART IX

WAR AND SOCIETY

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CHAPTER 41

DEMOGRAPHY AND WARFARE

PROFESSOR RADHA KUMAR

For the early theorists of warfare, its relation to demography was a simple one. Do not seek to conquer larger or more populous states, counselled the fourth-century BC strategic analyst to the Mauryan Empire, Kautilya, for it will beggar the exchequer and they will defeat you (*Arthashastra*). Going by numbers alone, the North was more likely to win the US Civil War than the South, because they had a 21 million population against the South's 9 million (Winter, 2010); of course, this would imply similar levels of skill and technology.

While it is a truism to say numbers count, the question is how much? Does demography have as strong a causal relation to warfare as it does, say, to health or voting? Conversely, does warfare have as strong a link to demography as it does to regime type or major political transition? Can population data help predict the probability and triggers of conflict? And is there a stronger link between demography and warfare when it comes to certain types of conflict—such as ethnic and/or resource wars?

This chapter argues that the relationship between demography and warfare is a complex one, and causal connections cannot be easily drawn. Having said this, causality is easier shown in certain types of conflict (such as ethnic wars) than in others (such as resource wars).

Causes and Consequences

The impact of war on population can be extreme. War can decimate native or weaker communities, such as the Indian tribes in North America and the Aborigines in Australia, or the genocide of Jews by the Nazis. Even when entire communities are not at the receiving end, wars often create population imbalances that impede any return to stability, and may in fact sow the seeds for another cycle of conflict. Indeed, the more protracted the conflict is, the more likely it is to create dangerous population imbalances. Endemic conflicts in post-colonial Africa have played havoc with the populations

of the Congo and sub-Saharan countries, where a lethal mix of poverty, displacement, and shifts in the age of the population, due to war and its attendants famine and disease, have prolonged conflict indefinitely.

Though the consequences of war for population are relatively well known, the causal links between demography and war are less well researched. Theorists have pointed out that demography *can* provide a cause of conflict—for example, imperial Britain deepened public subscription to the normative values of democracy at home by exporting its 'undesirables' to the colonies, in particular, North America, Australia, and New Zealand; in all three, expanding settler families with growing land requirements engaged in a series of territorial wars, most numerous in North America, which resulted in a comprehensive shrinking of the native populations (Winter, 2010).[1] Conversely, it can also be noted that the most populous countries rarely initiate wars (witness India and China), nor indeed do the least populous countries. This generalization too is hedged with qualifications; for example, when a sex ratio is heavily skewed in favour of men, then the probability of conflict is likely to increase in the most and least populous countries.

A brief survey indicates that interest in demography as a cause of warfare has sharpened and dimmed in response to both technological innovation and, more broadly, normative changes in international relations (Mearsheimer, 2001). The first event to focus attention on causal connections was, according to analysts of military history, the mass army that was unleashed by the French Revolution, at a time when European monarchs deployed small professional armies (Posen, 1993). If the French Revolution brought a recognition that population was strategically useful in the consolidation of a state's military power, the Industrial Revolution that followed both strengthened and countered this trend. Mass transport through the railroad and steamship made it possible to deploy and maintain mass armies, but armaments, especially automatic weapons and heavy artillery, made it equally possible to destroy soldiers en masse.

Advances in military technology steadily decreased the salience of demography for warfare. By the Second World War the armoured vehicle and bomber aircraft had reduced dependence on field troops. Henceforth, it appeared, the military-strategic value of populations would lie chiefly in the provision of logistical support and, most importantly, defence of the homeland (Toft, 2005).

The Cold War that followed in the aftermath of the Second World War appeared to reduce the significance of even these factors—weapons of mass destruction vitiated the defensive potential of a population by exponentially increasing the threat of civilian destruction. When it appeared that the arms race was a more important factor in the dissolution of Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact bloc than ideology, it was seen as definitive evidence that warfare has a greater impact on demography than demography on warfare.

The end of the Cold War, however, shifted the spotlight back to demography. The rise of intra-state wars in the 1990s, epitomized by the disintegration of Yugoslavia through four years of gruelling conflict, made civilian populations rather than state systems the target. In the Yugoslav wars—as well as the genocide in Rwanda during the same period—demographic calculations became a primary cause and trigger of wars, with ethnic groups fighting to consolidate territorial controls through the forcible expulsion

of rival ethnic groups and/or minorities ('ethnic cleansing'). Ethnic conflicts also broke out in the former USSR republics, but on a lower scale and focused chiefly on their Russian and/or Russian-speaking minorities, who were fairly small in numbers.

The high toll that the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts took of civilian populations overturned the prevailing view (until the 1980s) that ethnic conflicts were essentially low-intensity in nature and therefore could be contained. Both were high-intensity conflicts that occurred in conditions in which the state could not hold (Yugoslavia) or had failed (Rwanda), and in both the struggle for power took the form of ethnic, and in the case of Yugoslavia communal, war.

As increasing attention was paid to ethnic and communal conflicts, it became clear that populations could be more easily mobilized for war around issues of identity than around issues of scarce resources. Within the strategic community policy analysts worried that the post-Cold War period might be an era of 'tribal' or 'primeval' wars (Kaplan, 1993); but researchers found that ethnic demography acquired salience as a cause or trigger of conflict chiefly in regions where ethnicity, history, and politics intersected. The bulk of these regions were former European colonies.

Then came the 9/11 attacks, which brought a subset of ethnic demography into sharp focus, the analysis of population by religious affiliation. After 9/11 ethnic and religious demography overlapped as cause and trigger of conflict, with the latter often threatening to subsume the former, especially in relation to Islam. Though the famous thesis of a 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) was advanced several years before the 9/11 attacks, it now became an axis of debate. Huntington's subsequent volume, examining the demography of the USA, further elaborated the thesis that ethnic demography and national values were deeply intertwined (Huntington, 2004). A slew of argument followed on the ethnic and communal demography of conflict, some of which also examined the demography of minorities in conflict.

Resource Scarcity, Competition, and Conflict

Two events in the early twenty-first century added new issues to the debate on demography and warfare. The world financial crisis brought salience to the issue of whether countries with aging populations were more vulnerable to crises and/or instability than others, an argument which was tied at one end to parallel debates about whether the USa and Europe were declining as great powers, and at the other end to the Huntington thesis that religious identity, ethnicity, and values are causally linked and thus ethnic demography and security are also causally linked. There is little demographic evidence to prove the thesis, however—and, more contentiously, little to disprove it (Longman, 2004; Teitelbaum and Winter, 2004).

Secondly, the climate change negotiations and the failure to reach a satisfying agreement at Copenhagen in 2009, amidst growing predictions that environment and

resource scarcities were potential causes of war, especially in the poorer and more unstable countries, revived an old debate on whether numbers alone can have so strong an impact as causing war. An important finding was the distinction between conflict and war—while demographic growth in a situation of resource scarcity can cause conflict, it rarely causes wars (Goldstone, 2002).

Is there a causal connection between resource scarcity and war? If the celebrated nineteenth-century population theorist, Thomas Malthus, is to be believed, there is, but his answer turns the question on its head. Malthus suggested that warfare served as a useful means of population control; war, he argued, was a necessary evil—without it, population growth would overrun food production and lead to mass starvation. His theory was debated in its own time: falling birth rates were more often linked to military decline than rising birth rates to war; for example, in the late nineteenth century French patriots blamed France's low fertility rates (as against the rate in 'demographically dynamic' Germany) for their crushing defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, while the British army's inability to deal with a small number of Boer farmers in South Africa in the early 1900s led analysts to voice fears of population decline in the United Kingdom (Teitelbaum and Winter, 2004).

Moreover, though the threat of resource scarcity in the face of growing population needs has been periodically voiced, with many pinpointing water shortages as a source of future wars—sharing of the Indus, Euphrates, Danube, and Brahmaputra rivers have been the subject of long-running inter-state disputes—demographers have showed that resource conflicts have rarely caused wars. Empirically, the trend has been to resolve disputes over resource-sharing through negotiations leading to peace agreements such as international treaties (Goldstone, 2002), for example the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan has endured for a half-century and recently ended a long-running dispute over India's building of dams in Jammu and Kashmir.

Demographers who have looked at specific population categories in relation to war find that the scarcity–conflict connection is most probable when land and urbanization are involved. In the 'greed and grievance' model (Collier, 2000), for example, an expanding agrarian population can get into conflict with large landowners who have exclusive use of adjacent land. Goldstone points out that

> Throughout history, confrontations over land between growing populations of peasants and large landholders have prompted rural rebellions… Conflict of this sort has arisen most recently in Chiapas in Mexico but is typical of peasant/landlord relations throughout history, appearing in the French Revolution of 1789, the German Revolution of 1848, the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of 1949. (Goldstone, 2002)

Similar conflicts have also broken out in India, over industrialization and the appropriation of rural lands for manufacturing plants and/or mines.

Secondly, rapid urban growth can also heighten risk of conflict, especially when it is not accompanied by compensatory rates of economic growth. In 2002, a study of political crises in sub-Saharan Africa from 1955 to 1995 by the State Failure Task Force sponsored by the US State Department 'found that, other things equal, the risk of political crisis

nearly *doubled* in countries with above-average levels of urbanization but below-average levels of GDP/capita' (Esty et al., [1995] 1998)

'Blood and Belonging'

From the available literature, it appears that there is a closer correlation between ethnicity and warfare than there is between resource scarcity and warfare. Under specific conditions, such as periods of major political transition, accompanied by nationalist revival, ethnic demography can indicate the broad likelihood or not of an outbreak of conflict. It can also help predict the course that an ethnic war will take, both in terms of its movement and in terms of its potential scale. Key variables are the size and degree of political mobilization of ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies, and their relation to land. The more numerically similar the rival ethnic groups are, the higher the likelihood that the conflict will be intense, if it breaks out. Similarly, if ethnic polarization is tied to land, and especially if this involves demographic resettlement, attempts at ethnic expulsion are highly probable.

A comparative analysis indicates that ethnic wars generally occur in regions with a prior history of religious, racial, or cultural polarization, as well as of demographic engineering, that is, the resettlement of populations to serve a political or security purpose. Yugoslavia, for example, had undergone both. It underwent demographic engineering through the settlement of Serbians along the Croatia–Bosnia border; and it underwent ethnic polarization during the Second World War, with Croatians, Bosnian Muslims, and Serbians allying with different sides and focusing mainly on butchering each other.

Tito attempted to deal with the polarization and settlement problems by creating a form of ethnic power-sharing for post-war Yugoslavia that balanced central and federal relations between the Yugoslav republics (which were constituted on the basis of ethnic identity), along with autonomous status for minority territories within the republics. The arrangement fell apart when he died without leaving a successor. In the ensuing transition, ethnic nationalism swept the republics, filling the vacuum created by Tito's death. Ethnic nationalism was at its most intense in those republics that had a prior history of polarization and demographic engineering; its language and symbols explicitly invoked the past histories of conflict (Woodward, 1995). In these conditions, the ethnic demography of Yugoslavia, especially the stranded minorities that lived in enclaves within republics or straddled the borderlands between republics, made it inevitable that conflict over independence or secession would take an ethnic and/or communal turn, leading to major civilian deaths.

Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a numerically similar population of Muslims (44 per cent), Serbians (37 per cent) and Croatians (15 per cent, but with cross-border support from Croatia much larger), with Muslims concentrated in cities and Serbians in the countryside. It is little wonder that the war was most intense here (Kumar, 2000).

The same points apply to a host of other ethnic conflicts. Demographic engineering was cruelly used by Stalin to consolidate the USSR under communist rule; this was one factor in the anti-Russian conflicts that took place in a number of former SSRs after

the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Mandelbaum, 2000). Alongside massive population transfers Stalin also fudged census data as part of his 'Sovietization' policy, merging several minorities into Georgians, and concealing the census when it revealed the extent of losses suffered by the famine caused by collectivization (Clem, 1986; Toft, 2005). Similarly, the government-encouraged migration of Han Chinese into Tibet and the Uighur region of Xinjiang has led to violent revolts in both regions, with Tibetans and Uighurs feeling that their identities and territories are being eroded. It should be noted that in all three of these cases demographic change through resettlement in minority territories—or colonized nations—occurred under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, and was perceived by the minorities/colonized as a strategy of suppression.

Comparable episodes of ethnic violence were seen in two prior epochs of great transition—the period following the First World War and the end of empire following the Second World War—with the difference that in these periods unwanted minorities were successfully forced out, especially those groups that had migrated under empire and who were considered 'imperial minorities'. In the aftermath of both world wars, decolonization was accompanied by the expulsion of ethnic minorities—immediately after the First World War, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, and Bulgarians were forced out of each other's countries; soon after, over a million people were 'exchanged' under the League of Nations-brokered peace agreement between Greece and Turkey, whose conflict then turned to Cyprus, with its mixed population of Greeks and Turks.

After the Second World War, the second phase of decolonization was accompanied by another round of intense ethnic conflict, which was at its worst in those areas where the colonial powers employed a strategy of divide and quit, so named because they strived to satisfy ethnic aspirations (which in many cases they had earlier created through policies of divide and rule) before departing. Around fifteen million people crossed over during the violent partition of India and creation of Pakistan; the two countries have gone to war three times since. The Israeli division of Palestine widened rather than curtailed the theatre of conflict—several Arab–Israeli wars have followed, Palestinian territories have been progressively encroached, and communal violence has become endemic. The policies of demographic engineering that Israel continues to follow ensure that conflict will continue, in the form of periodic insurgencies and constant counterinsurgency (Abu-Lughod, 1986).

Though ethnic partitions appear to result in wars more often than not (Kumar, 1997), ethnic power-sharing agreements—generally considered to be the solutions to end ethnic conflict—also frequently break down, violently. Historians argue that the roots of the Lebanese civil war lie in the manipulated census of 1956, which was largely discredited for having excluded a large number of Muslims (Deeb, 1980). Since the French had left a power-sharing agreement in place when they withdrew from Lebanon, under which political posts were distributed among different religious groups proportional to their population, the Maronite Christians, in charge of the census, feared a loss of power and fudged the results (Toft, 2005). The Ta'if agreement that ended the civil war with a reworked ethnic power-sharing formula kept Lebanon in a precarious balance for over ten years, but it broke down when the agreement was altered to reduce the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, amidst riots following the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister in 2005.

It is not just politically motivated ethno-demographic change that causes conflict. It seems that any large-scale shift in the ethnic demography of a region can do so. Bantu migrations into southern Africa led to wars throughout the continent; Bangladeshi migration into the state of Assam in India, which was primarily economic, has overtaken the original population numerically and fuelled a civil conflict that has lasted over twenty years. Sadly, even demographic change through refugee returns can bring about a new cycle of violence, as happened in Rwanda and Burundi when refugee Hutus and Tutsis returned to their countries.

The 'Youth Bulge'

Demographers argue that there is another key variable that can indicate likelihood of conflict, and that is age. Though aging populations do not make countries vulnerable to conflict, the asymmetric growth of a youthful population can make a country more prone to violence than others. How far is this true, and under what conditions?

Data from the Middle East has led some strategic analysts to argue that societies that have a large population of young adults, especially male, are more vulnerable to unrest than others that do not have this imbalance. Such unrest can either take internal forms (civil war) or external ones (terrorism), depending on the political and economic conditions within the country and in its environment (Fuller, 2003). Unappealingly termed the 'youth bulge', the most vulnerable countries are those with an unusually high young male population (18–25): the likelihood of conflict increases dramatically if the proportion is 35 per cent or above of the total. The list includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq. (India is left off Fuller's list, though it too has a young adult population that is around 45 per cent.)

Arguments like these leave as much unexplained as they explain. With age data as with ethnic data, it is not numbers alone that lead to conflict but numbers in combination with other factors. A large youth population becomes a problem when the economy is not capable of responding to its requirements through the creation of jobs and the expansion of prevailing infrastructure. Such a mismatch can result in violence, especially if the economy is stagnating, but the violence is more likely to consist of crime than of war—unless a prior or current political grievance exists. Thus, for example, the educated unemployed in the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka joined the armed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, but only after the constitutional Tamil political parties had failed to wrest any concessions from the Sri Lankan government; the same phenomenon can be found in innumerable self-determination or secession movements, from Africa to America to Southern Europe to Asia. But the accent is on grievance, with the demographic factor playing second fiddle.

In fact, it is when you have a highly educated as well as large youth bulge, which the existing system cannot adapt to, that the probability of conflict grows. Education raises aspirations and opens a world of new ideas and possibilities; when avenues for their

fulfilment are found to be closed in real life, political unrest ensues. More often than not, the outcome is revolution—whether in seventeenth-century England or eighteenth-century France, nineteenth-century Japan or modern Iran, not to mention the Soviet Union, one common factor in the revolutions each underwent was a surge in the educated youth bulge in conditions where the economy and polity were controlled by a relatively small group of relatively autocratic elites, whose interests lay in maintaining a closed and hierarchical society (Goldstone, 2002).

When it comes to armed conflict, however, the educated and unemployed sector of the youth bulge might become the leaders or autodidacts of militant movements, but the majority of the foot soldiers are most often semi-literate or uneducated. This is especially the case in primarily agricultural societies and/or those with a large poverty-line population, such as Afghanistan, Guatemala, Nepal, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, to mention but a few. Where conflict has been protracted and the demographic impact of war has been to create a youth bulge, the forcible conscription—by youth—of child soldiers is also fairly common. The combination can be an especially brutal one, as the corrosive conflicts in Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Rwanda show.

Demographic data indicates that conflicts will be more intense, in terms of total deaths, in countries with a large youth bulge (Mesquida and Weiner, 1999). The probability of a higher ratio of deaths in a conflict is especially strong in a weak state and/or a state in transition from one political regime to another, which also has a youth bulge (Urdal, 2001, cited by Goldstone, 2002).

In the aftermath of 9/11, a considerable amount of policy research has focused on the potential threat of youth bulges in countries where there is sympathy for Islamic nationalism. The evidence, however, indicates that the impact of a youth bulge is primarily local and national, and rarely transnational. In other words, the 9/11 attackers might well have been young even had there been no youth bulges in their countries. In countries where the Al Qaeda movement has spread *and* there is a youth bulge, on the other hand, the spread of violence can be rapid and transnational, as has been seen in Pakistan from 2007 on.

As against this, the largely peaceful overthrow of the Mubarak government in Egypt by public protests in February 2011 indicates that in countries with a disproportionately young population, unemployment and relative poverty, the youth bulge can be a factor in peaceful change rather than violent conflict.

Asymmetric Warfare and 'Winning Hearts and Minds'

The fact that some countries have overwhelming military superiority—the USA, for example, could win most wars within months if not weeks—combined with the 9/11 attacks and the experience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has increasingly focused policy attention on non-conventional and transnational conflicts. These types

of warfare reveal significant connections to demography, because they tend to rely on popular support from their communities of origin or cause. In asymmetric warfare, demography can be a game-changer.

Even prior to 9/11, the Algerian and Vietnam wars had demonstrated that popular support plays a disproportionate role in asymmetric warfare because it can help defeat superior firepower. But those were wars to oust a colonial or imperial power, albeit the former was tired and the latter increasingly reluctant. By contrast, most contemporary examples of asymmetric warfare consist of civil wars in which the weaker party or non-state actor does not have the power to defeat the conventional military superiority of the state, but does have the power to escalate the costs by targeting civilians in terrorist attacks, a point that 9/11 brought brutally home, but was also made by the Chechen, London, Madrid, Bali, Mumbai, and associated attacks. The majority of these types of terrorist tactics do not have to rely on popular support at the local level, because of their secret and cellular nature, though they generally have a local guide or contact. They do, however, require Diaspora and transnational support (most often from affiliates) to provide them with funds, and rely on illegal cross-border arms and criminal networks for weapons and logistics.

While armed groups rarely defeat state actors, it is also the case that conventional warfare rarely defeats insurgencies or even terrorist groups that have a political aim with a constituency, such as Al Qaeda. The latter can be partly dealt with through painful multilateral action to dry up sources of recruitment and support, but the former requires a political strategy first and foremost. Unless a political resolution is forthcoming, the most that can be achieved is to contain the insurgency within manageable limits. What is considered manageable varies from country to country depending on population size (China and India, with very large populations, are able to absorb a higher degree of conflict but can also expect to have to *face* a higher degree of conflict, given the complex problems of administering a vast population). It also varies according to the degree of development (the populations of wealthier countries per capita expect to live in greater security, therefore they require a higher degree of conflict management than the populations of poorer countries), and regime type (developing democracies can tolerate a greater degree of conflict than authoritarian regimes).

Nevertheless, most countries use counterinsurgency methods to manage large or growing conflicts (i.e. those which cause more than 1,000 deaths). Counterinsurgency almost always relies on a substantial number of troops, or 'boots on the ground', because the exercise of securing territory and lives demands a large physical presence (a rule-of-thumb calculation is that counterinsurgency troops' size should be at least three times larger than those required to fight a war; the numbers will of course depend on size of area, terrain, and population). Though strategic analysts often counsel 'smart' methods to reduce troop requirements, such as extensive and improved intelligence,[2] the two functions are different. Intelligence is helpful for offensive actions, such as drone attacks, while boots on the ground is essentially defensive—its aim is to prevent insurgency from overcoming the daily life of the population.

The distinction becomes critical when it comes to public support. Drone attacks are certain to cause public resentment even if their rate of civilian casualties is low—

no one likes a bomb in their neighbourhood—but troops' presence can, under the best conditions, provide the reassurance of a security guarantee. While the reassurance factor depends to a large extent on whether the troops have been welcomed by the local population or not, it also depends on the way they behave and the nature of their interaction with the local population.

In asymmetric warfare, these latter two points are key to success or failure. If the troops were not welcomed, then one of their first tasks has to be to win hearts and minds, because without substantive local support counterinsurgency is unlikely to succeed. The Afghanistan experience from 2006–7, of rising insurgency in its Pashtun areas and cross-border support from the frontier regions of Pakistan, despite six years of the Bush administration-directed 'war on terror' and NATO peace-building efforts, made the point painfully clear. In fact, recognition of the problem led to a change in policy by the Obama administration in 2009–10 (McChrystal, 2009). The policy laid out in the McChrystal Report introduced the defensive approach to counterinsurgency (boots on the ground), but was impeded by a shortfall in troops.

When troops are welcomed in, the task is slightly easier but still entails retaining hearts and minds. In both, a knowledge of the local demography helps to craft programmes that will consolidate or expand public support—for example, the provision of pregnancy, delivery, and post-natal care in areas with high infant mortality rates, schooling as well as adult literacy programmes in areas of high illiteracy, employment schemes that ensure that all ethnic and sectoral groups get a fair share, and so on, will all help establish the credibility of troops, and mitigate the catch, which is that counterinsurgency requires a large number of troops but the larger the troops' presence the greater the likelihood of local resentment.

The Responsibility to Protect

Finally, few others have been as sanguine as Malthus about the impact of warfare on demography. The demographic consequences of war are not merely that they might curb population growth but that weaker groups may be devastated.

Looking at the connection between demography and warfare from the human security position, we find that population considerations have been a primary factor in the creation of codes of conduct for warfare. The Geneva conventions began with the principle that soldiers were entitled to medical aid on the battlefield and moved on to define global codes of conduct to provide immunity for non-combatants, such as medical workers, from attack in the battlefield. After the Second World War, the UN negotiated a number of international treaties and protocols for the protection of civilians in war, including proscribing the conscription of child soldiers and the use of human shields, and also set up agencies such as the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). When the Cold War ended and conflict broke out in the Balkans and the former SSRs, the UNHCR's mandate expanded to include the protection of civilians

in the field, such as refugees and internally displaced persons, but also, more broadly, threatened groups or minorities.

The Bosnian war led to the creation of the office of the UN Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), whose reports gave rise to the concept of 'safe havens', beleaguered enclaves that international peacekeepers would protect because they would not otherwise survive. The safe havens concept was undermined by lack of an international consensus on the numbers of troops that would be required—three of the five safe havens established in Bosnia fell because they were thinly guarded—and on whether the peacekeepers could use force to repel attackers. In wrangles over the latter, the genocide of 6,000 Muslims in Srebrenica took place under the hapless eyes of a handful of Dutch peacekeepers.

Concerted pressure by the UNCHR also led to the setting up of the Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, located in The Hague, to prosecute crimes against humanity and genocide in the Croatian, Bosnian, Kosovo, and Rwandan conflicts. Rape was declared a war crime for the first time, bringing a new demographic into codes for civilian protection.

Paradoxically, demographic factors were also key to preventing military victory by the strongest party. The failure of safe havens in Bosnia gave rise to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, for an internationally-mandated force to intervene militarily in a country that was allowing its citizens to be massacred (Haass, 1999). It was under this doctrine that the NATO air attacks on Serbia to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo were launched in March 1999. The issue was intensely debated in the UN, amidst fears that the doctrine could be used to undermine the sovereignty of member states and the sanctity of borders. It could not be used for the Iraq invasion, and was only partially applied in Darfur. In the case of Afghanistan, on the other hand, Al Qaeda's violation of the principle of civilian immunity elicited near-unanimous support for the USA to attack under Chapter VII or the right to self-defence (the Bush administration decided to conduct its war without the codes that a UN mandate would impose).

Despite the lack of consensus on humanitarian intervention, it was in part complemented by a more recent and as yet emerging doctrine, the responsibility to protect. Careful lobbying led the 2005 UN World Summit to adopt this principle. In the UN Secretary-General's report on the responsibility to protect (UN Secretary-General, 2009: 8–9), three pillars were identified for action on the principle: first, the responsibilities of the concerned state; second, international assistance and capacity-building; and third, a timely and decisive response.

The report was quick to stress that the doctrine 'is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary . . . it seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it' (UN Secretary-General, 2009: 7–8). With concern for threatened population groups and/or mass crimes at its core, emerging mechanisms for the responsibility to protect appear to include:

- Early warning facility for data collection and intelligence at the UN, under the Secretary-General's Special Advisors on Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect;

- Prevention through capacity development of the concerned state;
- Peer review mechanisms, global and/or regional;
- Deterrence of irresponsive leaders/actors through the International Criminal Court (ICC);
- Military intervention, if all else fails.

The conditions under which military intervention can be sanctioned are still interpreted differently, with countries such as India and China agreeing to its application only to the gravest of mass crimes, such as genocide, and is exercised solely under a UN mandate.

It is also now accepted that military actions will benefit from having peace-building operations built in, but it is not clear what the balance between military and civil components should be. In the same way as anthropologists are being attached to peace-building cum military missions, demographers could prove to be significant additions. In Bosnia the UNHCR mapped the ethnic demography of refugees and refugee movements to improve their early warning and protection capabilities; the same tools would prove even more useful for the new focus on prevention of genocide and responsibility to protect.

Conclusion

From this brief survey, it can be concluded that the impact of warfare on demography is undeniably strong, and it becomes stronger in situations of pervasive poverty or ethnic and/or religious polarization, and especially so if the conflict is protracted or has recurrent cycles.

Conversely, however, the impact of demography on warfare varies according to the type of conflict and the economic conditions it takes place in. The impact is most evident in situations of ethnic or religious civil wars, when one population group is targeted by others, leading to mass crimes and even genocide. Age and sex composition can also influence the outbreak of conflict, with age playing a more significant role, as seen for example by the youth bulge demographics.

Interestingly, while contested resources do lead to conflict, they rarely lead to war. Perhaps because resource issues are tangible, whereas ethnic or religious identity issues can often be intangible, resource conflicts are more often resolvable through negotiation or arbitration than ethnic conflicts. One exception to this rule is oil, on which wars were fought during the twentieth century.

However, demographic considerations have played a growing role in determining codes of conduct in warfare during the twentieth century, focused on civilian protection. Since the end of the Cold War, increasing international attention on vulnerable or beleaguered populations has given rise to the significant doctrines of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. This has led to far-reaching changes in military missions, such as including civilian components to deal with issues of human

rights and transitional justice, and an emphasis on winning hearts and minds (in which demographic data can play a central role in policy formulation).

Notes

1. Admittedly the New World diseases that the settlers brought were an even bigger killer than wars were, but the impact of non-traditional threats is beyond the scope of this chapter.
2. Its other function is that of community policing, which is not in the purview of this chapter.

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CHAPTER 42

COMMUNICATING WAR: THE GAMEKEEPER'S PERSPECTIVE

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Wars were once the preserve of states and elites. Britain declared war on Germany in August 1914 without a parliamentary debate or resolution of approval. The Empire followed suit purely by the declarations of the Viceroy of India or the Governors General of the British Dominions. The public mood might be initially enthusiastic, as in August 1914, or more grimly determined and resigned, as in September 1939; but by and large populations were prepared to follow the lead provided by their governments. This is not to say that those governments did not have to come up with a narrative to justify the mass mobilization of their citizens behind the war effort. 'Hang the Kaiser' in Britain had its equivalent in 'La Revanche' in France or the widespread sense among German stormtroopers that 'Gott ist mit uns'. Propaganda also played its role in giving the belligerents a sense of their own moral superiority. British newspapers in World War One were full of stories of raped nuns, the burning of libraries, and corpse factories. Britain had its Ministry of Information in both world wars and France its 'Ministère de la Parole', to quote Maurice Barrès. As the wars dragged on, and as the home fronts were prone to defeatism, governments used these centralized information machines to filter out bad news and put a more positive spin on potential good news. A public narrative that ennobled one's own side, and demonized the enemy—while overselling the benefits ('war to end all wars', 'a land fit for heroes') that victory would bring was not exclusive to Josef Goebbels. Although to a lesser extent than totalitarian states, democracies too have long known that, however just the cause, wars do not sell themselves. Yet it would also be fair

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author alone and do not represent an official position of NATO.

to say that in most of the wars fought by the major powers in the twentieth century, public opinion was largely 'on side'. Governments were for the most part taken at their word and publics believed what they were told. In an age of total war, where national survival seemed at stake, public opinion was either enthused by initial victories (Germany in May/June 1940) or made defiant at the thought of the catastrophic consequences that defeat would certainly entail.

The wars which have followed the end of the Cold War post-1989 seem to follow a different pattern. Experts have defined them as 'wars of choice' rather than 'wars of necessity'.[1] National survival has not been at stake. Indeed military campaigns have been launched either for humanitarian reasons (to stop ethnic cleansing or gross human rights violations) or to pre-empt possible future threats (Iraq) or to punish violators of international norms such as terrorists (Afghanistan). Sometimes all three reasons have been conflated according to the public mood or the most convincing rationale available. Given the superiority of Western military technology and the asymmetry between the belligerents (NATO versus Milosevic; USA versus Saddam Hussein and the Taliban) military victories have come faster and easier than ever before. Yet public support has become paradoxically more fragile and volatile. Even the most justified military campaigns have required more and more hard sell or what has become known as 'strategic communications'. No contemporary government war effort is today complete without its Media Operations Centre with dozens of specialists working on the Events Grid, the Master Messages, Scripts, or Rebuttals along the lines of a political election campaign. No daily news cycle goes by without its crop of news briefings, backgrounders, or embedded press tours ably directed by spokesmen and 'spin doctors' frequently drawn from the advertising or PR industries when not from the media itself. Military commanders are almost condemned to become overnight media stars without needing to engage in the deliberate effort at self-promotion that a Montgomery or a Patton made in the Second World War. No military operational plan is delivered to policy-makers these days without its strategic communications annex; and more than a few generals have complained—seriously or otherwise—that they spend as much time in the TV studio or on the speech circuit as they do in their forward headquarters.

Long Wars: Short Attention Spans

Students of modern warfare have been at pains to offer reasons why seemingly well justified conflicts fought largely by professional armies, and most of them in international coalitions, do not sell themselves; and indeed often work to the political disadvantage of the politicians who launch them (as the final years in office of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair clearly demonstrate). One obvious factor is that short, sharp military interventions have given way to interminable nation-building exercises, where Western notions of democracy have had trouble imposing themselves on intractable local

cultures, whatever the initial legitimacy of the military operation in the public mind. The constant media reporting of rigged elections, corrupt local officials, hostile populations, and tribalist politics tends sooner or later to create a sense of 'mission impossible'. Governments may rightly complain that the media is only interested in kinetic operations according to the well-known dictum: 'if it bleeds it leads'. They frequently accuse the media of neglecting success stories such as rebuilt schools or newly drilled wells. The reality, however, is that tangible progress often is hard to find in places such as Iraq or Afghanistan. A local project here or there is not evidence that the situation overall in these countries is improving and the continuation of major fighting will obviously slow down or even prevent reconstruction while inducing the local population to sit on the fence.

To maintain public patience governments are forced to promise their electorates firm withdrawal dates, which frequently only serve to undermine local trust and morale, thereby complicating democratic institution-building further. Certainly a nation deciding to withdraw risks alienating its allies in multinational coalitions; but not to withdraw as promised can provoke an internal political crisis as the Netherlands experienced with its ISAF deployment in Afghanistan in February 2010. In short, government strategic communications are not easy when a message of steadfast commitment to Iraqis or Afghans has to be balanced by a message of 'light at the end of the tunnel' to domestic public opinion. If governments believe that it is strategically acceptable to leave a conflict zone prematurely, was it right or necessary to be there in the first place? The different time zones of long-term nation-building and short-term public patience have elevated strategic communications into the art of slowing down the inevitable erosion of popular support for military operations in the hope that governments can use this time to at least achieve a durable security gain justifying the human and economic cost.

Another factor behind the fragility of public opinion is the end of 'war without tears'.[2] The 1990s were the golden age of military intervention. In Bosnia and Kosovo the difficulty for the NATO Allies was summoning the political will to launch a military operation against the belligerent believed to be the most culpable. Once that operation was launched it achieved rapid and almost absolute success with no casualties on the NATO side. Military action seemed to have become by dint of Western technological superiority not only a highly efficient but also relatively cost-free device to resolve political disputes or humanitarian crises. As insurgents have inevitably learned to adapt to Western technology and war-fighting strategies and identified their Achilles heel (see for instance the deadly effectiveness of improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan), casualty rates among intervening forces have soared. ISAF lost 700 soldiers in 2010 alone. Undoubtedly some countries find it easier than others to sustain battlefield casualties. For others Afghanistan has witnessed the first serious fighting since the Second World War or Korea.

At one level casualties should not be a prohibitive factor, even if they will inevitably be sensitive for governments in a democracy. After all, we are talking about professional soldiers in conflicts which are justified by reference to real external threats (terrorism or weapons of mass destruction). It is not that sacrifice is no longer accepted by the citizens

but rather that it has to be seen as unavoidable. When the media demonstrate that fatalities are the result of inadequate body armour, unprotected Snatch Land Rovers, or badly maintained Nimrod aircraft, it is a different story. A culture of litigation has entered the armed forces as it has many other branches of society. Families of soldiers killed through alleged negligence have taken the Ministry of Defence to court in both Britain and France. At the same time, hostility to government spin and war narratives is not preventing public opinion from identifying emotionally with the heroism of servicemen and women and the armed forces more generally. In Britain declining support for Afghanistan has also witnessed large crowds gathering in silence in the Wiltshire village of Wootton Bassett as the coffins have returned home for burial from Kandahar.

Contrary to what we have seen in previous conflicts (particularly the two world wars) there is today the risk of a serious split between governments, which decide on interventions, and the armed forces, which have to implement them. Military commanders themselves are inevitably tempted to exploit this split to criticize governments for underresourcing the armed forces and not increasing defence budgets, especially when they are engaged in major wars. This was particularly true of the long-running feud between Chief of the Defence Staff Sir Richard Dannatt and Prime Minister Gordon Brown in the waning days of the UK Labour government. In an age when the photograph of every British dead soldier in Afghanistan is shown on prime-time television, the rationale for the intervention is all too frequently overshadowed by the political debate regarding the treatment and financing of the armed forces. What is attractive to the media is that this debate has fractured the traditional all-party consensus on national military operations. It is not government confronting street protestors, as during the Vietnam years or on the streets of London prior to the Iraq conflict, but more the spectacle of the establishment and security elites arguing among themselves. It is less about the justification for the conflict than the way it is fought.

Kosovo: A Turning Point in Media Operations

Although the 'war without tears' of the 1990s has disappeared, probably for good, in the barren landscapes of Helmand and Uruzgan, it has left another legacy that impacts on popular perceptions of modern conflicts. This is the widespread view that a noble objective must also have above-average military execution. NATO's experience in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was an early pointer in this respect.

NATO engaged in Kosovo convinced that it was acting in a noble cause: to stop ethnic cleansing in this former Yugoslav province. The Allies expected the media to grant them some latitude over the inevitable mistakes and 'collateral damage' incurred from bombing from 15,000 feet. The opposite happened. NATO's alleged just cause and the superiority of its combined military forces induced the media to hold the Alliance to

much higher standards than the Serb army and paramilitaries carrying out their 'sweep operations' on the ground. The Djackovica tractor convoy incident or the four cruise missiles striking the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade caused NATO serious embarrassment, even making it look incompetent at times. The media hardly expect a military operation to be flawless, but what damaged NATO's reputation was not so much the 'collateral damage' itself but rather the trouble NATO spokesmen had in explaining both what had happened, and why. A drip-feed of information caused mainly by delays in military investigations and damage assessment looked all too easily to the media to be a deliberate cover-up or stonewalling.

Kosovo was very much the Alliance's media baptism of fire. With the help of well-known communications specialists, such as Alastair Campbell, the Head of Communications in the UK Prime Minister's office, NATO eventually turned the situation around.[3] A Media Operations Centre was established, information exchange between the major Alliance capitals and NATO Headquarters improved, and NATO soon learned to volunteer the bad news to the media before the media itself found out about it, thereby making negative stories considerably less newsworthy. An Alliance that seemed to be on the back foot for much of the air campaign, having trouble explaining its mistakes while not being able to offer many pictures of destroyed Serb tanks or artillery to put its own story across, ultimately gained the initiative. Information management was centralized at NATO HQ, thereby stopping the flow of uncoordinated and sometimes contradictory stories from capitals, and news briefings were moved up from the afternoons to the mornings so that NATO, rather than Belgrade, could set the news agenda for the day ahead. Journalists lost no time in complaining that NATO was now more strictly disciplined and 'on message', giving them less opportunity to probe and exploit rifts, but for the Allies the lesson that winning the media war was as important, if not indeed the prerequisite for winning the war itself, had been well and truly learned.

One clear reason for NATO's uneven strategic communications performance during the Kosovo campaign was the skill shown by the Serbs in exploiting NATO's mistakes through its own national medias. Whereas NATO did not have access to the Serb media to put its case directly to the Serb population, Milosevic's spokesmen had unfettered access to the international media to challenge the Alliance's assertions at every stage. As the NATO Spokesman at the time, I was struck by the BBC's concern for strict impartiality whereby its outlets would often only interview me if a representative of the other side was immediately on hand to present the alternative viewpoint. Moreover the Serbs' access to the ground battle areas in Kosovo meant that the RST Serb TV was quickly on the scene to film evidence of NATO's 'collateral damage' and broadcast it over the airwaves before NATO had had a chance to establish the facts up and down its own military command chains. This is a phenomenon which Nik Gowing of the BBC has famously described as the 'tyranny of real time'. To some degree, NATO had made itself vulnerable to precisely this kind of information warfare by appearing too self-confident at the beginning and by using too many video clips of supposedly technologically perfect bomb drops on Serb 'military targets'. The TV pictures of 'collateral damage' showed the rather different reality from the ground perspective and the human as opposed to the

purely physical cost. The media—and through the media, public opinion—had the sense of having been misled, deliberately or otherwise.

It is therefore hardly surprising that images of bomb drops virtually disappeared from TV screens during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, except where they could be captured by news organizations on the ground as with the US 'Shock and Awe' bombardment of Baghdad in 2003. Military organizations now offer no pictures and only scant details of battle damage, especially of the 'collateral' kind. They have realized that the price of transparency is ever more intrusive and critical media scrutiny. The US Secretary for Defense at the time of the Iraq war in 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, used his first campaign press conference to play up the likely casualty rate and 'collateral damage' in Iraq in order to mitigate the impact of military misadventure which had so hampered NATO in its Kosovo campaign. When the worst did not happen, the Pentagon received plaudits.

The fact that governments' media organizations and military establishments are becoming better at managing 'collateral damage' does not mean that opposing forces and insurgent groups are less keen to exploit it, when the opportunity arises. Modern conflicts are almost invariably fought by alliances and coalitions whose members have different military cultures, different interpretations of what they are doing, and different levels of public acceptance of civilian casualties. The NATO air strike against tanker trucks captured by insurgents at Kunduz, Afghanistan, on 4 September 2009 is a case in point. The air strike was carried out by US aircraft but ordered by the local German commander, who feared the tankers could be used as suicide bombs against his base. When it rapidly emerged that over 140 civilians had been killed in the strike, the political and media fall-out from this incident, particularly the accusations that the government had not given the full story, led to the resignation of the former Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence, and a senior Defence Ministry official. This was an example of bad media management: giving the facts before knowing the facts and then trying to make public the truth by drip-feed once it had become known; but it would not have had such a massive public and political impact had it not been for a sense of loss of innocence. Up to that moment, German public opinion had been given a narrative of Afghanistan as a peacekeeping and development mission in an essentially benign environment, where soldiers were in support of civilian reconstruction teams. The sudden realization that German soldiers were engaged in a real war and subject to the same real-time decisions under combat pressure as other NATO contingents was not something that German politicians had prepared public opinion to comprehend, let alone accept.

The role of the media, and particularly television, is to dramatize the immediate and reduce news as far as possible to the microcosm of human interest stories that a mass public can empathize with. The same civilian casualties that can pressure governments to intervene when committed by an external agent drive governments towards the exit door when committed by one's own side. Even though the military and civilian casualties in modern conflicts are relatively low by twentieth-century standards (and research suggests that they are on a continuous downward trend[4]), the degree of force required to prevail in current counterinsurgency operations is still greater than what public opinion

is generally ready to accept. This is because the narrative of modern conflict increasingly focuses on selling the low costs of military operations or their non-military aspects, such as development aid, rather than the necessity of their strategic objectives. At the time of Britain's first deployment in Afghanistan in 2003, the then British Defence Minister, John Reid, famously declared that he hoped that the forces would depart 'without firing a single shot'. Governments frequently complain about the media treatment of their 'Just War interventions' but they are often themselves responsible for defining the unrealistic objectives to which the media then hold them to account.

The Role of Leadership

In response to evaporating public support, governments have a tendency to re-emphasize their moral case, rebrand their long-term strategies, and push the focus of their strategic communications higher up the political command chain. As Tony Blair demonstrated during the Kosovo air campaign, it is easier for a political leader to rally support for a military intervention if he is seen to back it from the very beginning. Despite the public distaste for the Iraq war in 2003, it is difficult to believe that the House of Commons would have endorsed British participation alongside the United States without Blair's from-the-front leadership. Conviction is in itself convincing. In an age of public confusion as to whether 'wars of conscience' are really 'wars of interest', and vice versa, the role of political leadership becomes ever more crucial. It will not work on the traditional pacifists, nor on sections of the more highbrow sceptical press; but it will definitely influence the floating voters and the popular press, where the battleground for the 'hearts and minds' is normally situated. Even the most just of just wars becomes increasingly unpopular over time. The role of government strategic communications is essentially to delay the erosion of public support for as long as possible while strategic results can be dictated on the ground. Conflicts are justified backwards, in retrospect, rather than forwards, and in anticipation. The key challenge for strategic communications is to keep public disquiet latent and diffuse. As soon as it boils over into mass demonstrations and direct action, political elites fragment and governments have to weigh the costs of soldiering on against the costs of mounting social unrest.

All the aforementioned factors have increased the desire of interventionist governments to control the media space, both at home and on the battlefield. For many years the returning coffins of US GIs from Iraq could not be filmed upon arrival at Dover air force base. Respect for the victims went hand in hand with the desire for secrecy. Locally supported regimes experience the same temptations. In 2010 President Karzai of Afghanistan announced a new media law to prevent both Afghan and international media from filming ongoing conflicts. Although presented as a device for preventing leakage of real-time operational information, of potential use to the Taliban, this proposed law also aimed clearly to keep unsavoury, morale-damaging images off Afghan and international TV screens.

Embedding journalists in military units has, nonetheless, become the biggest growth industry in media operations in the twenty-first century. As counterinsurgency (COIN) has taken over from classical Blue Helmet peacekeeping operations, and virtually all Western military forces now train and expect to fight against better organized and more determined adversaries, the dangers to journalists and TV crews have increased. The London-based International Journalists Safety Institute estimates that nearly 100 journalists were killed in 2010 (and 139 in 2009)—some by accident but many deliberately. Confronted by these dangers, and mounting insurance costs, many newspaper editors and TV producers have been happy to accept Pentagon and Defence Ministry invitations to embed their reporters in combat units. Frustrated by increasingly sanitized and after the fact news briefings at remote media centres, journalists have frequently jumped at the chance to be at the front, close to the 'bang bang'. It also gives them immediate access to commanders and soldiers in addition to dramatic footage, while enjoying a certain degree of military protection in exchange for adhering to certain rules relating to operational secrecy. On balance, however, and following the experience in Iraq, embedding seems to be a much better deal for governments than for the media.

Iraq displayed a multitude of 'embeds' in a multitude of locations. US TV anchors found it hard to decide which reporter was closest to the centre of gravity and zapped themselves from one hurried stand-up to another in a confusing array of impressionistic reports that gave the viewer very little sense of what was actually happening. Meanwhile groups of armchair strategists and pundits back in the studio (normally retired military commanders with assumed access to decision-makers) did their best to speculate, with reputation often substituting for real knowledge. The result has been to give governments a major edge over the media in the control of news and the setting of the agenda. Would an embedded reporter report critically on the behaviour or tactics of a military unit on which he or she relies for protection? Is there not the danger of a 'Stockholm syndrome' in which the reporter, often dressed in military battle fatigues, identifies too much with the troops? As the example of the former Reagan Administration official turned journalist, Oliver North, working for Fox News during the Iraq war demonstrates, 'they are going in' all too frequently becomes 'we are going in'.

Fed by government video clips and official commentary, the media can all too easily become a simple purveyor of patriotic material and abandon its role as analyst, questioner, and interpreter. The collective media *mea culpa* in the US after the excesses of the Iraq war,[5] and the all too facile acceptance by the media of the WMD thesis of the British government, have hopefully been a useful corrective to this trend. Afghanistan has revealed a media more focused on evaluating the true situation on the ground and considerably more sceptical of the Karzai government and the successes of 'win, hold, and build' than would have been the case just a few years ago. But such has been the predominance of government-led media operations since Iraq, with their press tours, exclusives, and round-the-clock briefings to keep the media fully occupied, that it will take a minor revolution to put the fourth estate back on top.

Using One's Own Media

An additional reason for this view is based on the communications revolution of the past fifteen years. Just as the media no longer require large crews of cameramen, sound engineers, and producers to collect their pictures (a hand-held video camera with a satellite uplink will suffice), so governments have also realized that they can create their own media. NATO today has its own internet-based TV station and its own video teams scouring Afghanistan for positive pictures—either to feed to the regular media or for direct consumption by web-surfers. NATO TV has also used NATO officials functioning as TV 'presenters' conducting interviews with ISAF commanders. This has led the German weekly magazine, *Der Spiegel*, to speak of 'Propaganda TV', a claim that may be somewhat unfair when we consider that NATO's internal management will not allow NATO TV to propagate lies or disinformation, even if NATO TV is obviously keen to put a positive spin on events.

Still, it is crossing a red line if official information disguises itself as independent media by adopting the language, techniques, and nomenclature of real journalists. This was certainly the case when the Bush Administration, shortly after the initiation of the Iraq conflict in 2003, set up a new Office of Strategic Assessment in the Pentagon to merge traditional public information (directed at one's own population) with psychological operations (psy-ops) directed at the enemy. Although Churchill famously claimed that 'in war truth must be protected by a dense thicket of lies' the modern age of multimedia fed by satellite and cable makes it technically impossible for governments to retain their old monopoly of the news within tightly controlled national boundaries. All media is now global. When an obscure US pastor in Florida threatened to burn a Koran in September 2010 the story was immediately on the internet and the international media, leading to riots outside NATO bases in Afghanistan within hours. Moreover, a US media feeling itself deceived by false stories regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to 2003 is now all the more vigilant in resisting further attempts by government to suborn it in the name of patriotism or in exchange for privileged access to key decision-makers. The much more critical media reporting on Afghanistan compared to Iraq not only reflects the greater difficulty of this mission and its fewer resources but also a sense of atonement for the media cheerleading in Iraq. As with the stories of 'corpse factories', believed by the British press in the First World War, but discounted sceptically in the Second World War, one war pays the price of another.

But if the Western media is now mounting a fightback to regain its traditional role as the fourth estate whose articles, to paraphrase Napoleon, are 'worth a thousand bayonets', it seems clear that governments will not easily surrender the upper hand they have consolidated. In this they are being helped by the rapid decline of newspaper circulations—hit by falling advertising revenue—the decreased viewerships for the traditional networks, and the move to direct, unmediated information via internet, email, and mobile phones. It was, after all, candidate Barack Obama who sent his messages to his

supporters via SMS and campaigned for financial donations on the internet—leaving the traditional media on the sidelines. In modern conflicts, this new activism by government is also directed at defining and controlling the information environment in those countries where foreign troops have intervened. Already in the Balkans in the 1990s NATO seized four transmitters of the Bosnian Serb SRT to impose a restructuring of its editorial board, while the Office of the High Representative established its own national radio and TV stations (Radio Fern and TV-IN), using former Western journalists to spearhead local media reform programmes. To the extent that the unreformed local media were broadcasting lies and hate messages (the most notorious example being the Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda), takeovers by the international community would appear fully justified.[6] Nonetheless, the *New York Times* took NATO to task over the sequestered SRT transmitters due to what it saw as a 'denial of free speech' and promoting democracy through undemocratic methods.

This raises the question as to whether intervening forces would not be better advised to use their resources to set up a pluralist local media—in which all opinions can be expressed, even those critical of the intervening forces—than in running their own military broadcasts in a way that stifles local political debate. Helping to shape the local media environment through ensuring laws that protect freedom of information, preventing governments from victimizing journalists who blow the whistle on state corruption,[7] ensuring the technical means for multiple media outlets to operate cheaply (bandwidth, broadband, etc.), and creating an economic and financial basis for a free media to operate without fear of punitive and capricious tax demands from a hostile local authority: these are all steps by the international community in places such as the Balkans or Afghanistan which can do more in the long term to consolidate democracy and the rule of law than handing out free wind-up transistors tied to one single international forces radio station. International forces will understandably be more focused on their own public messaging, on psy-ops campaigns to discredit the enemy, and also on nurturing their own image vis-à-vis the local population, especially when it comes to selling their success stories and mitigating local frustrations and criticism. Yet, as no international intervention is designed to last forever, and the international forces have to leave sooner or later, investment in developing local media capacity offers the best chance that some semblance of democracy and human rights will remain afterwards. An international military which allows itself to be—fairly—criticized by local media and engages with it openly is also less likely to be viewed as an arrogant occupation force.

At the time of writing, it would appear that Western military establishments have understood that they need to prevail in the battle for the hearts and minds of both their own publics and local populations in peace support operations, through superior tactics and professionalism rather than appeals, to patriotism and the moral high ground. The Media Operations Centre is now a universal feature of all Western interventions. Hundreds of professional communications specialists work round the clock on the planning grid of daily activities to keep the media busy, on scripts, rebuttals, the master messages of the day, and on briefings, press conferences, and press tours. The aim of all this is to have a constant flow of facts, information, and stories to keep the media

firmly pinned to 'our' news agenda rather than that of the adversary. 'Feed the beast' and 'occupy the space' have become the key principles of modern news management. No operation is launched without its accompanying strategic communications plan. The military now take media operations much more seriously and organize extensive pre-deployment media training for commanding officers. Former journalists have made a successful second career for themselves by providing this training. Gone are the days of the gifted amateur. The current NATO/ISAF spokesman in Kabul is a two-star US Rear Admiral presiding over an operation that now runs into the millions of dollars with its own consultancies and research teams to monitor the local media and generate stories for placement. Information and psy-ops review conferences, daily conference calls, and media strategy groups are now a regular part of the NATO agenda.

Social Media: It Works Both Ways

All this activity cannot ultimately guarantee success. The same social media that make it easier for governments and the military to communicate their own messages directly also give a big advantage to adversaries and insurgents. Internet chat rooms, blogs, and Twitter are ideal for the expression of opinions and the simple messages or dramatic videos on which insurgency campaigns depend. They are not so good for communicating the complicated reasoned narratives for sophisticated audiences on which Western governments have been reared. The way in which modern media such as YouTube or Twitter can give a veneer of truth and fashionable attractiveness to even the most irrational ideas has led one UK military officer to exclaim: 'we are being defeated by people who do not have to fire a shot'.[8] One media expert has also described the Internet as a 'labyrinth of ghettoes'[9] in which individuals look for that 'reality' which will confirm their own prejudices and beliefs.

Nonetheless, given the rapid growth of the social media (12 million Afghans today text via their mobile phones) there is no choice but to engage. Rather than communicate a message and expect it to be received and absorbed as intended, governments must be prepared to hold dialogues in the social media and to build trust and credibility over time rather than expect an immediate result. This requires transparency. Deconstructing the adversary's ideology or propaganda must take as large a place as presenting one's own positions. The aim is not to make local populations simply aware of the intervening force's messages but to have them understand them. This means that strategic communications have to be embedded in the broader military campaign and not try to embellish it or to be only a form of damage limitation in response to bad news. Ensuring consistency of message with the local government (which often blames the foreigners for all that is going wrong—and vice versa) is also key to success.

At the same time, multinational peace support or counterinsurgency operations generate their own tensions and problems. Delays in explaining 'collateral damage' still occur and showing successes at the tactical level does not always convey an impression

of long-term success at the strategic level. In any coalition it is always tempting to blame the efforts (or lack thereof) of others for inevitable delays and setbacks. Nations claim the successes for themselves but tend to blame the coalition (NATO in Afghanistan for instance) for the failures. Media reporting remains largely focused on the national effort ('our boys'), which can be a source of frustration for the other coalition partners, who feel that their efforts and sacrifices are not given due recognition. Yet when all of this is said, governments and the military have learned the lessons of Vietnam and are now no longer relying on a friendly or complicit media to act as their intermediary in winning the battle for the hearts and minds. If the job of strategic communications is to be done successfully, military commanders have to do it themselves; and by being visible in all media—local and international; new and traditional—simultaneously.

Traditional Journalistic Values are Still Essential

How is the independent media to react to this push by governments for media dominance? The most natural reaction would be to counter official spin with contrary spin along the lines of: 'the more positive you portray the situation, the more negative we will play it'. This, however, is unlikely to serve the public interest as both sides will inevitably accuse each other of unfair treatment and push spin to even greater lengths to compensate. A better way for the media would be to adapt to more slick and professional media operations, whether in capitals or in the field, by developing more expertise of their own about foreign conflicts. In an age of shoestring media reporting, of declining budgets and a public reference for domestic 'news you can use', this will not be easy. But in-depth reporting, objective and balanced, by informed journalists is in the long run a much better way of keeping spin-focused government and military media operations in check while giving public opinion a much better basis to decide whether operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan are meeting their objectives and serving the public interest. It is not a bad thing that governments have resolved to improve their media operations, and journalists themselves are the first beneficiaries of faster, more accurate and complete information about military operations, but honesty will always be the key to credibility and trust.

Yet if the media are not able to challenge the conventional wisdom and smooth-tongued spokesmen with equal expertise of their own, those government media operations will sooner or later relapse into complacency and the natural tendency of bureaucracies to be secretive and 'economical with the truth'. How not just to gather and disseminate information but to interpret for the public what it means? How to distinguish between the important and the secondary in the age of the data overload? How to judge military operations by their intrinsic strategic value as well as by their actual results? How to be objective without being systematically negative and to win

the military's trust and confidence without becoming an embedded and docile camp follower of military operations? These are indeed heavy challenges for the media in the age of Rupert Smith's 'war among the peoples'; but the international community's ability to sustain public support for interventions short of national defence in the twenty-first century depends on the media rising to this challenge. An erstwhile Élysée correspondent of the French satirical weekly, *Le Canard Enchainé*, was awarded the Légion d'Honneur by de Gaulle and promptly sacked. Expressing astonishment to the editor he was told: 'you should never have deserved this!' It remains a good motto for war correspondents and Élysée correspondents alike.

Notes

1. A distinction originally made by Brian Beedham of *The Economist* in the early 1990s.
2. Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies, Kings College London in a presentation to a NATO conference, Brussels, 7 July 2009.
3. In a well-reported speech given in London shortly after the Kosovo operation, Alastair Campbell expressed the popular NATO view that journalists had treated NATO harshly and unfairly while giving the Serbs virtually a free pass. He also asserted that the imperfection of means have to be judged according to the nobility of objectives. Campbell's frustration reflected three obvious truths of modern conflicts. The media report on the side that they have most access to—easy in the case of the daily press briefings in Brussels, London, and Washington, but more difficult in the case of Belgrade.

   Secondly, the media feel a duty of balance and will try to give the opposing side access to air time if they have spokesmen or sympathizers who can be deployed and are sufficiently telegenic. Governments clearly see these opposing spokesmen as mere propagandists who should be ignored by the media because their message is false or less valid. The two classic examples in modern times are the 'Taliban Ambassador' in Peshawar, who dominated breakfast news in the early stages of the Afghan conflict, and the Iraqi spokesman, 'Comical Ali', who denied repeatedly that US forces were in Iraq in 2003 even as US tanks could be seen by TV viewers entering Baghdad. What they lacked in information value they made up in colour. Governments have been tempted to try to censor these media-savvy opponents in the same way that Condoleezza Rice once declared that US TV should ban Al Qaeda tapes or Margaret Thatcher insisted that IRA leader, Gerry Adams, could only be heard via an actor. The public, of course, is not so easily duped and the extremism or irrationality of an opponent's message can in fact be a propaganda boost for Western governments.

   The third truth is that for the media means inevitably corrupt ends. If a military campaign is going badly the media do not only question its feasibility but indeed its very *raison d'être* and legitimacy. In an industry that extrapolates its long-term prognosis from the daily crisis or the here and now, this is simply a fact of life.
4. See for instance conflict data published periodically by the University of British Columbia.
5. This led to the firing of a celebrated *New York Times* reporter, Judith Miller, and a formal apology by the newspaper to its readers for having allowed its editorial and journalistic standards to lapse over Iraq.
6. The most controversial example in recent times of an international force attacking a local media outlet in an attempt to stop its (mis)use by an adversary was the NATO strike against

the Serb TV building in Belgrade in April 1999. Sixteen local staff were killed in an attack that was conducted with no public warning (controversy continues to this day whether a private warning was given but ignored by the Milosovic regime). This attack reveals the dangers, but also the futility, of attacking the adversary's media. The international press, which frequently used the Serb TV facilities, was immediately up in arms that it too could be considered as a 'legitimate military target' by NATO or that any media, even propagandistic, could be treated in the same way.

In the event, the NATO strike did not succeed in incapacitating Serb TV broadcasts for more than twenty-four hours while generating massive negative publicity for an Alliance which had previously hinted that local media was 'off limits' to military strikes, and which had not announced or justified any subsequent change of policy. Ultimately Serb TV was more incapacitated by being disconnected from Eutelsat by the Paris-based consortium than through military action. Moreover, the decision by the Eutelsat consortium had a greater air of legitimacy than NATO's action without incurring to boot any civilian casualties. The Belgrade example argues for legal and technical rather than military solutions in dealing with the problems of 'hate media'. The military with their technical gadgetry will be tempted to try jamming and the US even possesses an airborne capacity (referred to as 'Commando Solo') which can purportedly morph US images onto local networks by infiltrating their signals. Yet once an international force has to deal with opposition media through this type of direct military action it is almost an admission that its own strategic communications are failing to reach local audiences and that its opponent is being more successful, even with far more primitive means, such as pre-recorded video tapes. As the late Richard Holbrooke famously said of Osama bin Laden after the September 11 attacks: 'How is it that the most advanced communications society in the world is being outwitted by a man in a cave?'

7. NATO intervened in Kabul in 2009 to oblige the government of Hamid Karzai to rescind the death warrant against an Afghan journalist.
8. Debate on the media and conflict organized by Cityforum, London, 15 September 2010.
9. Ibid.

CHAPTER 43

COMMUNICATING WAR: THE POACHER'S PERSPECTIVE

CAROLINE WYATT

The Role of the Media in War Over the Ages

A British government worries about the impact of rising British casualties from a war in a faraway land. Public support is in precipitous decline on the home front. A national newspaper launches an appeal for private charity to help wounded soldiers. Politicians and some military leaders are aghast that journalists on the front lines are revealing a shortage of vital equipment, so pressure is put on editors to remove their war correspondents. They are, the government claims, betraying operational secrets and impeding the war effort.

Not Afghanistan in the twenty-first century, but the war in the Crimea from 1854 to 1856. The vivid reports sent from the front lines by Irishman William Howard Russell, war correspondent for *The Times*, and Edwin Lawrence Godkin for the *London Daily News* put both the army and the British government on the defensive by revealing decisive failures of strategy, leadership, and common sense.

From the Crimea to the present day, relatively little has changed in what journalists seek to report from the front lines, even if much has evolved in the way we do it, and how much the media matters in shaping public opinion in Western democracies, as well as in how the military relates to and utilizes journalists.

William Howard Russell could not have imagined the technology that would be used in the future to speed frontline despatches from the wars to editors and audiences across the globe. But the pressures on correspondents to 'take sides' and support 'our boys' (and girls, these days), to be more patriotic, or put a 'positive spin' on the war have not changed, even if video-cameras, satellite dishes, and mobile phones have resulted in far greater time-pressures.

William Howard Russell was, as his epitaph puts it, 'the first and greatest' war correspondent—or as he wrote, the 'miserable parent of a luckless tribe'. In ancient times, military commanders used their own historians to record their victories, ensuring that they wrote the first draft of history. But from the Crimea onwards, that power was ceded to journalists.

Until 1854, most newspaper editors had either filched their news of wars abroad from foreign newspapers, or hired army officers to write despatches from the front. But the soldier as correspondent was less likely to report the unvarnished truth (should such a thing exist), and saw himself foremost as a soldier, rather than a correspondent answerable to his editor and his readers.

The Crimea not only foreshadowed the dilemmas of modern war reporting in the daily battle of wits between correspondents and the military or the government of the day, but also the battles correspondents fought against the privations and dangers of war itself, be those the fateful decisions of where to report from, or even where to sleep. William Russell, like many of his descendants, often found it hard to persuade the bean-counters back in London that his burgeoning expenses for food, drink, and other sundries really were vital.

His anguished questions to his editor are also still matters which trouble the consciences of some war correspondents today. Should he report the lack of equipment amongst the soldiers, bad planning by their commanders, and the needless deaths resulting from the lack of medical care in the Crimea? Or would his reports put his own side's forces in more peril?

Or was he being a better correspondent and a better friend to British forces and his nation in the long-term by telling his readers the harsh realities of the war as he witnessed them?

Russell was lucky to have a supportive editor, John Delane, who advised him: 'Continue, as you have done, to tell the truth and as much of it as you can, and leave such comment as may be dangerous to us, who are out of danger.'[1] That separation between reportage and editorials persists to this day.

Russell achieved fame and fortune, still motivations for many foreign or war correspondents, few of whom are immune to the thrill of war in the early stages of their career, even as they seek to highlight its costs and make clear its painful realities. In turn, war correspondents are still sometimes perceived as glamorous creatures, as they don flak jackets and helmet, and fly to the next trouble spot. Conflict provides some of the most vivid and powerful stories of humanity pushed to extremes, of individual or collective acts of great courage, as well as murkier deeds. The war correspondent can only hope to shine a brief light into some of the darkest corners of the earth, even if he or she can rarely illuminate much for long, as attention flickers away to another, newer story elsewhere.

War reporting remains a professional challenge for journalists through the ages, and an endless source of raw material. War tells us stories about ourselves as a nation, and our place in the world. Our conduct of war—and how it is reported—can define our vision of ourselves as a country, or undermine and destroy that vision. All reasons why

those who fight wars are so keen to keep the chroniclers of conflict and the public onside, whether by use of propaganda, public relations, or media operations. War also creates a voracious demand for fresh information. It is good for circulation, as well as journalists' careers. War sells newspapers, and it sends audience figures for TV, radio, and news websites soaring, at least in the early stages before audience fatigue sets in, as it invariably does if a war lasts 'too long'.

It was a fictional character who perhaps best summed up British newspapers' attitude to war reporting: the fearsome proprietor of the *Daily Beast*, Lord Copper, in *Scoop*, Evelyn Waugh's satire on Fleet Street first published in 1938. Nature columnist William Boot becomes the unlikely correspondent sent to cover a 'small but promising' war. Lord Copper despatches him with this instruction:

> Remember that the patriots are in the right and are going to win. The Beast stands by them four-square. But they must win quickly. The British public has no interest in a war which drags on indecisively. A few sharp victories, some conspicuous acts of personal bravery on the patriot side, and a colourful entry into the capital. That is *The Beast* policy for the war.[2]

That remains exactly the sort of coverage that politicians and armies are keen to encourage from journalists and editors today. Each conflict has thrown up fresh attempts by the armed forces and officialdom to co-opt journalists. And what is most remarkable is how often journalists have been willing to be taken inside the tent by the military, in exchange for access and information or simply to gain the chance to write the first draft of history.

The Job of the Media in War

Albert Camus once wrote that journalists are 'historians of the moment'. So the job of the media in war should be simple to describe. Surely it is to report the news, what the journalist sees and hears, as impartially and objectively as possible, and to bear witness by describing war's impact on those who fight it and the civilians affected by it? If only it were that simple.

'When I was young, I believed in the perfectibility of man, and in progress, and thought of journalism as a guiding light,' wrote war correspondent Martha Gellhorn, in 1959 in *The Face of War*.[3] She began writing about war as a pacifist, but was turned by the conflicts she witnessed into an anti-fascist. This is how she describes her beliefs when she began her career:

> If people were told the truth, if dishonor and injustice were clearly shown to them, they would at once demand the saving action, punishment of wrong-doers, and care for the innocent. How people were to accomplish these reforms, I did not know. That was their job. A journalist's job was to bring news, to be the eyes for their conscience…

In later years, her disillusionment was profound, despite the enduring power of her words from the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, Vietnam, and a host of other conflicts.

> I belonged to a Federation of Cassandras, my colleagues the foreign correspondents, whom I met at every disaster. They had been reporting the rise of Fascism, its horrors and its sure menace, for years. If anyone listened to them, no one acted on their warnings. . . . For all the good our articles did, they might have been written in invisible ink, printed on leaves and loosed to the wind.[4]

Martha Gellhorn's accounts also make clear that Clausewitz's 'fog of war' swirls no less thick in our centuries than it did in William Howard Russell's day. Yet many amongst the luckless tribe believe that despite the fog, all they can do is try to report what they see as best they can, although some have chosen or been forced to take sides—whether out of necessity, ambition, patriotism, pragmatism, ideology, or fear.

And however hard we may try to be objective, journalists cannot help but report from a certain perspective, influenced by our experiences, nationality, age, sex, political or religious beliefs, and—not least—what our editors want us to report. Impartiality, too, can be selective, as the BBC's attitude demonstrated during the Second World War, a war of national survival.

Many modern war correspondents define themselves as observers, reporting what they see and hear on the front line. Yet the job is always more complex. They must select the information to convey, and assess what it means in a wider context, often one of the toughest challenges for a reporter whose eyewitness account from a vantage-point on one sandy hillside offers at best a limited view. And all correspondents must work out how to interpret what they see—not always easy when one's own nation is doing the fighting.

'The principles of reporting are put to a severe test when your nation goes to war,' writes war correspondent Kate Adie of the BBC.

> To whom are you true? To the principles of abstract truth, or to those running the war machine; to a frightened or perhaps belligerent population, to the decisions of the elected representatives in a democracy, to the young men and women who have agreed to put their lives at risk on the frontline? Or are you true to a wider principle of reasoning and questioning, asking why they must face this risk?

The very nature of war, she believes, 'confuses the role of the journalist.'[5] But she concludes:

> I was there to witness, to repeat what I heard, to observe the circumstances, note the detail and confirm what is going on with accuracy, honesty and precision.[6]

The BBC's Middle East Editor, Jeremy Bowen, has also covered conflicts for decades. He admits to some unease over the level of intrusion into people's lives by journalists and their cameras in search of news.

> There's only one real justification for it, and that's being a witness. The reporting I used to do around the world in trouble spots is letting people know what's happening in the world. It's a fundamental human right, I think. . . . The job is to get to the

> truth and find out what is happening. Once you depart from being impartial, from being a journalist people can trust, you become a polemicist.[7]

Yet some war correspondents believe impartiality is bunk and that it is a reporter's duty to spell out clearly good and evil, right and wrong. Another BBC war correspondent, Martin Bell, called for the 'journalism of attachment' after his experiences in the Balkans, arguing for the journalism 'that cares, as well as knows'—a style of reporting which would not 'stand neutrally between good or evil, right or wrong, the victim and the oppressor'.[8]

Bell's television pieces from Bosnia remain some of the most powerful ever broadcast from a war-zone, as much for their sparse voice-over as for the starkness of their imagery. At the massacre in Ahmici, a single burned skeletal hand filled the screen, representing all the other dead men, women, and children whose images editors in London thought too gruesome to show.

Martin Bell's call proved controversial, even though many Western journalists reporting from Bosnia and later on from Kosovo did tend to take sides. That was not down to pressure from the military, but came from journalists themselves, many of whom became increasingly emotionally involved in the war the longer they spent enmeshed in it.

Even the pursuit of objectivity brings its own problems. The late James Cameron thought that objectivity 'in some circumstances is both meaningless and impossible'. He argued that it was of less importance than the truth, and that 'the reporter whose technique was informed by no opinion lacked a very serious dimension'.[9] Yet the wish for journalists to become propagandists or cheerleaders for a government or the Armed Forces has been a common theme in almost all wars. It triumphed in many of the years that followed William Howard Russell's factual but passionate reporting rooted in his own observations.

Whom to Believe?

'The first casualty when war comes is truth,' said the American Senator Hiram Johnson in 1917, words taken by the journalist Phillip Knightley for his book on the history of war reporting, *The First Casualty*.[10] From the Boer War to the present day, each side has sought to persuade the public of the rightness of its cause. Britain gained an early reputation as a world leader in propaganda and censorship, cemented during the Great War, a conflict on an unparalleled scale which many believe would have been impossible to wage in an era of modern news-gathering.

As the mass slaughter in the trenches unfolded from 1914 to 1918, western journalists joined in the attempts to keep from the general public the true horrors of the western front. Some correspondents and their papers even became enthusiastic propagandists, helping portray the Germans as beasts. The British newspapers in 1914 reported German officers throwing Belgian babies into the air, and catching them on the end of their bayonets. It was not true. The correspondents of the First World War knew more than

most about the realities on the front, but in the main they stayed silent as Britain created a propaganda machine so successful that Goebbels later took it as his model for the Second World War.[11] If war correspondents' job is to bear witness, they failed abysmally, with the realities of the war recounted far more potently in soldiers' letters home, or in the poetry and books by those who fought in the 'war to end all wars'. Rudyard Kipling, whose only son John died in that war, later wrote bitterly on behalf of his son's lost generation:

> If they should ask you why we died,
> Tell them that our fathers lied.

By the time official war correspondents in the Second World War were given their uniforms, the propaganda machine was rather subtler, although it was clear then, too, that Western journalists were expected to be 'patriots with pens'.[12] During the early years of the Second World War, radio came into its own as both a conduit for propaganda (BBC broadcasts into Occupied Europe) and for what was seen at the time as relatively truthful reporting, although the level of state control and censorship only became clear to the public later on. Sympathetic American journalists such as Ed Murrow almost left the country because of the censorship being applied, though the UK propaganda effort to win over America and bring it into the war against Germany ultimately worked.

Under Winston Churchill, a leader who had himself been both soldier and war correspondent, the government became adept at using journalists for propaganda purposes, turning many into cheerleaders, trusted by the military because they either went along with Allied censorship or censored themselves. Their talents and the new technology were harnessed by generals and politicians, who came to see information as a crucial weapon of war to be exploited against the enemy, as well as their own citizens and international opinion.

That doesn't mean the broadcasts of the Second World War were always untruthful, but all showed their own side in the best light possible, as broadcasters and newspaper reporters were embedded with their own forces and became a vital part of the war effort. The vivid reportage in the broadcasts of Frank Gillard, Richard Dimbleby, and others for the BBC War Reporting Unit helped make the corporation's reputation. The BBC and some others emerged from the war with their reputation enhanced, despite the censorship that had gone on, perhaps because it was clear that the war had to be won, whatever it took.

For the media after the Second World War, the expectation remained that correspondents would stay 'onside'. In Korea, correspondents were again given military rank and uniform. By Vietnam, the military expected journalists to be as partisan as they had been in both the world wars and Korea. And most began the conflict on their government's side in what became known as the first 'television war', which brought some of the horrors of the fighting directly into the living rooms of the US public.

When the war in Vietnam was lost, the instinct was to shoot the messenger, even though what ultimately lost the war was not just US public opinion revolting against the coffins coming home, but perhaps also a loss of faith in the war by many within the Washington elite and the military themselves. However, the top brass and politicians in

the West took away a very different lesson: that an unrestrained media had lost them a war they should have won. It was clear to both that the media were a powerful tool which had to be contained at all costs.

The Limits of Enquiry

> There is nothing worse than finding yourself alone in somebody else's country, during somebody else's war.[13]

Many of the most recent conflicts of our times have not been other people's but our own: wars in which the military have been determined to avoid the 'Vietnam effect' by bringing journalists into the fold by embedding us, feeding us, and housing us, relying on the fact that a sort of Stockholm Syndrome will take hold, and that we will cease biting the hand that feeds us. Vehement arguments about the rights and wrongs of embedding persist, but journalists and the military sign up well aware of the benefits and disadvantages. Close proximity brings with it a certain bond, not least because many correspondents and crews share some of the qualities of the military men and women they embed with, including a taste for testing oneself to the limits and the calculated taking of risks. Operational security may be endangered by the presence of journalists, but we remain a crucial weapon for any modern-day commander in the real and the virtual battle space.

The war in the Falklands between Britain and Argentina over an obscure set of islands in the South Atlantic in 1982 was a unique case of modern embedding. It was a war in which journalists were almost entirely dependent upon the military for access to the conflict, with a small group of correspondents sailing with the Royal Navy to the Falklands. Despite initial tensions, the late Brian Hanrahan of the BBC described this embed as an effective means of managing the coverage:

> It is a kind of pact with the devil. Inside the military machine you get much greater access, but in return you give them the opportunity to limit what you can report. It is a devil's bargain that you strike and hope you can make the best of it. In theory they had absolute control, but in practice it wasn't enforced very strongly at all.[14]

His memorable phrase about watching British Harrier jets leaving and returning safely came thanks to the strictures of the military censors. 'I counted them all out, and I counted them all back' was a clever ruse to get around reporting restrictions, so that he could say all the jets had returned, even if he was not allowed to give numbers.

For Hanrahan, the Falklands marked a turning point in the military management of the media, as the realization dawned that 'the press are a part of the public debate and part of democracy—and are needed for these military ventures. We have evolved from a position where people thought it was odd and wrong that things should be reported to one where it is accepted that reporting is a part of war.'

The lessons of the Falklands were taken up enthusiastically in Washington and London for the First Gulf War in 1991, and accepted by editors as the corollary for access to troops

and commanders. That became the first 'live TV' war: a sanitized high-tech war against a demonized dictator in the form of Saddam Hussein. He, too, saw the uses of journalists and invited them to cover the war from Baghdad. Amongst the BBC contingent was its World Affairs Editor John Simpson, as well as war correspondents Jeremy Bowen and Allan Little. Their reporting from behind enemy lines led to their employer being dubbed the 'Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation', when BBC correspondents reported Iraqi civilian casualties from the Allies' 'precision' bombing. Allan Little remembers: 'Once we started working there, we soon had to ask ourselves a searching question: is there a conflict between my responsibility as a journalist, and my obligations as a British citizen?' Asked constantly by his sceptical colleagues back at home exactly whose word he was taking that hundreds of civilians had died in that bombing, Allan writes:

> the purest and most decent of the journalism that we do is eye-witness journalism. So I went to the morgue and counted the bodies one by one. I got to three hundred and eleven before giving up. Did that reporting damage the war effort? I don't think so. I am, almost always, on the side of the public knowing, verifiably, reliably, what has happened. It is in the end the only defence against myth-making.[15]

Looking back, it is hard to see how their employers could have been called unpatriotic, when those sent to the front line to embed with the troops were in full military camouflage kit—visually almost indistinguishable from the soldiers, except in their possession of cameras and microphones.

Little was reported from the front that would have caused public opinion at home too much pause. And even the journalists reporting from the other front at their hotels in the Gulf were clear which side they were on. Only a few challenged the system by questioning overtly the value of the daily televised military briefings. The reporting of the First Gulf War was dominated by television, with the Pentagon offering 24-hour news channels such as CNN images of surgical strikes and bombs so clever they could turn corners. The 'Pentavision' that resulted made some wonder uncomfortably about the limits of journalistic inquiry, and the eagerness with which many channels censored themselves.

By 2003, the scene was set for round two: the invasion of Iraq itself, as reporters prepared, once again, to embed or to report from Baghdad to offer the 'other side' of the story, while more than a thousand prepared to hunker down amid the privations of the four- and five-star hotels of Kuwait. By November 2002, the BBC was already clear—although rather less colourful than Lord Copper—about how the war should be reported. More than 300 staff were deployed in the field, with some forty embedded with American and British forces, who were given the BBC's guidelines for the war, written by Stephen Whittle, Controller Editorial Policy:

> Our audiences should have confidence that they are being told the truth. They also look to the BBC to help them make sense of those events by providing impartial analysis and by offering on our programmes a range of views and opinions, including the voices of those who oppose the war in Britain and elsewhere . . . Reporters and correspondents in the battle areas will often be reporting what they have not

> themselves seen. That should be made evident . . . Beware of speculation, and overstated claims from all sides. Context is essential.[16]

We did our best, in the fog of war which followed, to report fairly from our sandpit view of the war as embedded correspondents in the British forward transmission unit attached to the UK military HQ in Iraq, but much of what actually happened eluded us until the day Basra fell or 'was liberated' (an argument over language which raged almost daily) and we finally disembedded. Our information was partial in every sense, and we could only leave our base when our military minders allowed us to.

Our colleagues embedded with the frontline fighting units did rather better, but the only journalists with some overview of how the war was progressing were based in Doha, where daily Allied briefings were held. Reporters were once again fed a diet of almost bloodless military triumph.

The debate over the Iraq War still rages too intensely to make a judgement on whether journalism or self-censorship and military management of the media triumphed. The BBC's own internal report concluded that many lessons could be learned on both sides. But the military's determination to stay in charge of their battlefield and use the media as a weapon of war will not go away. Only a few souls dare brave the battlefields of today's 'war on terror' independently. In Iraq, many of them paid a high price.

Kidnapping is another occupational hazard today, with independent inquiry increasingly bounded by the targeting of the media. The pressures of 'health and safety' are also starting to limit where the mainstream media go, despite a new generation of intrepid freelance journalists and camera-people without whom the most dangerous wars would go almost unreported. These days, the blue flak jacket with its 'press' marking is more a liability than a protection, with many journalists preferring to blend in with soldiers for safety.

Reporting on totalitarian regimes such as North Korea or Burma offers its own challenges, leading—more often than not—to an absence of coverage. Access is difficult, and once there, journalists may be imprisoned. Often, the highest-risk reporting from places such as Iran is done by local journalists, although the internet and social networking sites are starting to challenge how much information can be controlled by a state.

The other limit to journalistic enquiry is what Jeremy Bowen calls the 'boredom factor'. Sometimes, wars just don't get on air if they drag on too long, or do not interest the editors who select from a vast daily menu of news from around a troubled globe.

> TV is bad at giving context… We'd start a story throughout the war in Bosnia or wherever, and it became clear you needed blood to get on. After a while, you needed quite a lot of blood to get on.[17]

James Cameron, reflecting on his reporting of the atom bomb tests on Bikini Atoll in 1947, despaired in 1967 of the worth of his trade.

> One had tried. One had travelled 22,000 miles, one had stewed and steamed, one had fought for the words against the clock. But one was only a reporter, not a historian; one had suffered awhile from the occupational delusion of importance. At home, nobody gave a damn.[18]

The Evolving Relationship Between the Media and the Military in War

'Out of my way, you drunken swabs!' was Lord Kitchener's attitude to journalists in 1897. Other commanders over the ages have seen journalists as the enemy—and only rarely as a trusted friend. The majority today have an ambivalent, though rather more enlightened, attitude. Like us or loathe us, journalists are an essential part of information warfare. And the relationship between the media and the military in war is like any other, dependent on trust, built between individuals rather than institutions, even if leavened by a healthy dose of mutual suspicion.

Max Hastings, in his book *Going to the Wars* says:

> However much they dislike the media, commanders of western armies have been obliged to acknowledge that soldiers in modern war want to know that their efforts and sacrifices are being reported at home. They need journalists to tell their story.[19]

Hastings was clear that part of his job when his country was involved in a war was to be on the side of the nation's soldiers, sailors, and airmen. His views may not tally with those who believe that authority is there to be questioned by journalists at all times, but expert journalists such as Hastings, Robert Fox, or Anthony Loyd have not been uncritical friends to the military.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, the relationship between the British military and the media on the ground was often harmonious, even if Jamie Shea and others at NATO headquarters felt themselves frequently under attack when things went wrong. The UNPROFOR guidelines for British soldiers in Bosnia showed a move from censorship to subtler PR, as an aide-memoire revealed:

> the media are not hostile; handled well, they will promote the unit's image; poorly treated, the opposite applies; they will report on us as they see us; things unsaid are rarely regretted.

In Kosovo, NATO worried about its narrative being thrown off course by events, but to most journalists there, and audiences back at home, the message came across loud and clear: Western forces were intervening following insistent calls for 'something to be done', so the media could hardly complain when it was. How much effect the call that 'something must be done' has is debatable. In his studies of the media's influence in shaping public policy, the BBC's Nik Gowing concluded that governments are rarely railroaded by the media into doing anything they didn't want to do.

More recently, in Afghanistan, British and American forces have seen some of the most 'positive' reporting of their Armed Forces in decades, even if the mission itself is not popular. Embedding with British or American units was virtually the only way to report from Helmand in 2010, even though a few courageous freelancers risked unilateral trips. Flying a 1,000 kg satellite dish into hostile areas is hardly ideal, leaving broadcasters more dependent than newspapers on the military for cooperation.

However, the 'war on terror' has created its own dilemmas for journalists and the military alike. The fight against the Taliban or Al Qaeda is taking place as much on the internet and in the living rooms of democracies as it is in the deserts and valleys of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Military commanders are well aware that the media is a force that can be harnessed for or against them, and that the perception of victory or defeat may be more enduring and persuasive than the reality. Yet for war reporters, it is rarely clear how much we shape public perception, and to what degree public perception shapes us, our stories, and the prevailing narrative of a war.

The Future Role of the Media in War

Every war has seen the use of new technology—from the telegraph, telex, photographs wired from the front, to colour images in Vietnam, or today's helmet cameras able to capture battlefield action. Thanks to the latest technology, journalists can send back live news from almost any battlefield—even if that comes with its own distinct disadvantages. As many correspondents have complained, 'roof-top journalism', or being tied to a satellite dish for endless live broadcasts, means you know little of what is happening around you, and may spend much of a conflict being told through your earpiece by Washington or London what is happening where you are.

But perhaps the biggest change in recent years is the handing of some of the power the traditional media has gained on the battlefield back to the military themselves. Participants in wars now wield their own cameras, and can post their own images and thoughts onto websites, albeit rarely without censorship. Soldiers are once again telling their own stories and helping shape the narrative. Public affairs officers (in NATO and the US) and media ops officials (UK) are also using ever more sophisticated methods to reach audiences and the public directly, without the mediation of journalists: uploading videos and images and messages onto social networking sites or their own official websites to influence public opinion.

Yet there is still a place for the traditional media. The military's increasingly sophisticated attempts to manage news, 'control' the narrative, and win hearts and minds amongst journalists and editors—and via them, the public back at home, whose support is crucial for any democracy sending its forces to war—show that far from being superseded, the war correspondent is still an essential part of fighting today's complex battles, whether state-on-state warfare or wars among the people. Editors are invited on 'fact-finding' tours to war zones with senior military officials, especially if their newspaper's line is seen as less than helpful. The dangers of the modern battlefield, without a clear front line, also mean that journalists rely more than they would like on military footage, while editors are often seduced by 'Pentavision'.

Is the traditional war reporter redundant? Not yet—but our unquestioned primacy is being challenged. And not only challenged by the military themselves, but by our own editors and the accountants. News is not cheap, especially when it has to be beamed

in from faraway places. If the prerequisite for making war is money, money, and more money, those covering war face the same need.

In one sense, the foreign correspondent was saved by 9/11, responsible for a renewed interest in what many feared was a dying trade, that of the foreign correspondent as expert, knowledgeable in the history, culture, and language of hard-to-reach places in the world. It was a trade that had come under threat amidst a tide of an increasing obsession with (much cheaper) lifestyle, celebrity, and entertainment pieces, and reliance on news wires or local media footage beamed into every international newsroom. Afghanistan and other twenty-first-century conflicts have proved that there is still a need for correspondents willing to put themselves on the front lines and bear witness. The work of our era's luckless tribe will long be needed when a nation goes to war.

Will the internet, websites such as Wiki-leaks and 24-hour news ultimately make fighting a war impossible for Western democracies, as some believe? It seems unlikely, although it does make it harder, and means that the military's and the government's case for that war will be tested again and again, sometimes hourly, and perhaps to destruction.

The wars of the future may also be harder to cover. Cyberwars, in which hackers act as proxies on behalf of their nation, will be hard to televise because they yield few images—and one of their first targets may be the media seeking to report the story and the means with which the story is reported. Citizen journalists and bloggers, the 'user-generated content' so beloved of our editors today, may impinge on what was once the territory of the professional. Yet we still need to know who is behind the blogs or the images, and whether they can be trusted.

As audiences fragment, and television merges with the web, will the mass media still be mass? Nobody knows. And will the military need the media more than we need them? I doubt it, although that balance will see-saw back and forth, as it has done through the ages.

The shock today is not how different wars and the battle of wits between those who fight them and those who report them are to the Crimea, but how similar. However high-tech the weaponry now, a soldier from the Second World War might well feel a visceral leap of sympathy for his comrades in the war in Afghanistan in the twenty-first century, where dusty, dirty, exhausted men with guns fight their adversary day after day after day, gaining only inches at a time. The main difference is that those on the home front can keep up with events on the front line in real time, through a variety of voices, although which side is winning may remain open to interpretation until victory or a graceful withdrawal is declared, and even beyond.

And the media may help change the course of wars, but wars also change the journalists who cover them, a little like those who fight them. Few of those who report and communicate wars remain entirely unscathed, and few see much glory in them after the first heady rush of excitement is gone—though journalists will continue to report on war as long as it exists, in whatever shape or form. There is unlikely ever to be a shortage of wars on which to report.

In 1959, Martha Gellhorn wrote:

> War, when it has any purpose, is an operation which removes, at a specific time, a specific cancer. The cancer reappears in different shapes, in different parts of the human race; we have learned no preventative medicine for the body of the nations. We fall back, again and again, on nearly fatal surgery. But the human race has always survived the operation and lived.[20]

Notes

1. Knightley, 2000: 11.
2. Waugh, 1988: 42.
3. Gellhorn, 1998: 373.
4. Ibid. 373–4.
5. Adie, 1998: 44.
6. Ibid. 46.
7. Jeremy Bowen, Rolls Royce lecture at Cardiff University, 2002.
8. Bell, 1998: 16.
9. Cameron, 1967: 72.
10. Knightley, 2000.
11. Ibid. 86.
12. Moorcroft, 1999.
13. Kapuściński, 2006.
14. Brian Hanrahan, interview with the author, January 2010.
15. Allan Little, Mountbatten Lecture, Edinburgh, 17 February 2010.
16. Internal BBC document.
17. Jeremy Bowen, interview with the author, November 2009.
18. Cameron, 1967: 67.
19. Hastings, 2000.
20. Gellhorn, 1998: 376.

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PART X

DOES WAR HAVE A FUTURE?

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CHAPTER 44

DOES WAR HAVE A FUTURE?

MICHAEL CLARKE

War on the Fault Lines

War exists at the fault lines of any international system. Whether wars are fought in an attempt to break a system, to change it or uphold it; whether wars are defined as big or small, cataclysmic or limited, just or unjust, the very term 'war' is used to describe a conflict that is, by definition, exceptional. 'Wars' are declared in many political circumstances: wars on illiteracy, on drugs, or terrorism, or even on a foreign power. Always, the concept is used to imply an exceptional response to a problem that cannot be regarded as tolerable as it stands. A problem is made into a 'security' problem precisely because it is exceptional; it prevents a society from being otherwise normal and unexceptional.[1]

All political systems have within them the potential for substantial disagreements and many conflicts—some of them violent. International systems are distinguished by the fact that there is comparatively little to prevent disagreements turning into violent conflict if they cannot be contained by those themselves who disagree. And the war on the fault lines principle applies. Significant international conflicts that are regarded as wars tell us something about systemic strains at any given time. Civil wars may indicate governmental or state weakness, regional wars suggest the possibility of political power being violently redistributed, or defended; global wars suggest wholesale systemic change. Wars declared against the forces of disorder—terrorists, pirates, international criminals, traffickers, illegal loggers—suggest a system that is empowering different private groups to the point where their activities have a systemic political effect.

This is not an analysis of the causes of war. There are no universal causes—still less a single cause—of conflict. The 'greed or grievance' interpretation does not get us very far when actual conflicts are studied carefully.[2] All wars are unique in their own way. But warfare of some kind has been intrinsically involved in every international system the world has known. And the characteristics and patterns of conflict naturally derive from the system of which they are a part.

The intuitive concept of 'war' is therefore alive and well in the contemporary international system. The twenty-first century has been defined in many different ways. It is certainly 'post-Cold War' in its changing distribution of political power; it is 'post-international' in its growth of genuinely global phenomena that are so much more than merely the interactions between nations; and it is 'post-modern' in its toleration of ideas and beliefs that owe less and less to the eighteenth-century enlightenment and European concepts of rationalism.[3]

Within this system a spectrum of political, and politicized, violence can be observed: from criminal violence that has increasingly politicized effects, as in Columbia, Mexico, Afghanistan, southern Italy, the Balkans, or Somalia; to terrorist violence and insurgency in pursuit of myriad political aims, as in Pakistan and India, in regions of China, Indonesia, Sudan, the Great Lakes, Nigeria, Liberia, Russia, Central Asia, the West Bank, Turkey, or Iraq; to more conventional wars of intervention, as in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, or wars between states, as between Russia and Georgia in 2008. The possibility of future wars between even the biggest states in the international system, as between, say, the United States and China, is still a prospect for Washington and Beijing that defence planners, at least, feel obliged to take seriously. Across this wide spectrum of contemporary conflict, from criminality and politicized violence to major inter-state conflicts, 'wars' have been declared by numerous belligerents; and given the human impact all such violence has on populations, on economic well-being, and on the perception of international order, we cannot assume that such declarations of war are merely rhetorical.

From a statistical point of view, the twenty-first century looks to be developing into a safer environment for any given human being on the planet than was the case in the previous century. Cataclysmic and total wars were responsible for at least 110 million deaths up to 1945. A maximum of twenty-five million people have been killed in wars since then, of which perhaps six million have died in the last twenty years; and that over a period since 1945 when world population has more than doubled from fewer than three to over six billion people.[4] But if the statistics suggest that war is no longer quite the scourge it was, the indications are that violent international disorder certainly is. If citizens of the world are objectively safer in the present era, most of them do not seem to feel it. The human perception of international insecurity is evidently increasing.

Defining and assessing modern wars is therefore not straightforward. If wars are constantly being perceived within the wide spectrum of international political violence that now exists, then trying to understand the phenomenon leads us necessarily to ask other questions and to reflect on the way the international system has been evolving and about which types of violence mankind now chooses to regard as exceptional, abnormal, or dangerous.

Is State-on-State War Over?

Traditional war between states is certainly not over in the present era. There are numerous examples of it taking place: at least seven since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Statistics of warfare always have to be handled with great care. Cases are often ambiguous,

the absolute number of cases is low (so reducing them to statistics can be meaningless), and the high absolute numbers of casualties, monetary costs, and long-term consequences are difficult to measure and are entirely dependent on the assumptions made about them. Nevertheless, some broad statistics of major armed conflict offer an initial perspective on the orders of magnitude involved and the relationship between violence, internationalized violence, and inter-state (that is, state-on-state) warfare.

Table 44.1 lists thirty-seven cases of significant international armed conflict since 1991. In that time there have been twenty-nine unambiguous cases of serious internal armed conflict throughout the world. At least twelve of those cases have become 'internationalized' as happened in the breaking up of Yugoslavia, or in the conflicts in Sierra Leone or Darfur, where other states, or coalitions, chose to become involved for a range of humanitarian and realpolitik reasons. Some of these cases where an internal conflict has been internationalized have been regarded in the popular mind as 'wars' in the sense that we speak about the 'war in Bosnia' of 1991–5, or the 'war in Iraq' after the intervention in 2003. The internationalization of internal conflicts tends to elevate them, at least in the imagination, to the status of 'international wars'. Nevertheless, over the same period there have been at least eight cases of traditional state-on-state wars that have generally conformed to the traditional generic definition of a 'war'.

There have been at least four times as many civil conflicts as international wars.[5] The number of states involved in armed conflicts is at its highest level since 1945, paradoxically, because active peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention operations are greater than ever before in essentially internal conflicts.[6] The casualties caused by them, even when measured conservatively, are almost one and a half million people over less than twenty years; whereas the casualties caused by traditional state-on-state wars in that period are only just over 200,000 (the more precise numbers representing 16 per cent of the total). Civilian battle deaths are orders of magnitude greater than military ones in most of these cases.[7] This is also confirmed by the average duration of armed conflicts. Since 1945 civil wars have lasted, on average, five years each; ethnic wars for closer to ten—over three times the duration of those classed as inter-state wars. The great majority of essentially internal armed conflicts occur in Africa and Asia, and more than three-quarters of them involve at least one state classified as 'weak' or 'failing'.[8]

Moreover, the eight cases of traditional state-on-state war are all distinctive in other ways. In two cases the US organized and led coalitions of forces against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, in 1991 and 2003, stating that the motives on both occasions were to force him to comply with international law. In three other cases, the conflicts were short tussles between intrinsically weak states, albeit that one of them was Nigeria. In a sixth case, Russia invaded Georgia for a matter of weeks in 2008 in an episode that was part of long-running tensions between Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union. In a seventh case a short war between India and Pakistan—the 'Kargil War' of 1999—lasted less than ten weeks and may have resulted in a maximum of 1,500 casualties. These wars were all short: the casualties low, the objectives limited, and not generally of global strategic significance, as would have been the case throughout the first sixty years of the twentieth century.

Table 44.1 Cases of significant international armed conflict since 1991

Significant internal conflicts	Internationalized conflicts	Number of casualties	Inter-state conflicts	Number of casualties
1991			**1991**	
Sierra Leone[a]	since 2000	100,000	Iraq—Kuwait +	29,000
Yugoslavia		11,500	International	
Algeria	since 2004	100,000	coalition	
Angola[b]		2,000		
Niger		240		
Rwanda[c]		31/800,000		
Azerbaijan	since 1991	10–20,000		
Somalia		95,000		
1992				
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	44,800		
Croatia	1992	6,700		
Georgia		2,500–3,000		
Tajikistan	in 1993	30,000		
Senegal		1,260		
1993				
Azerbaijan		83		
Congo	since 1997	11,900		
1994			**1994**	
Chechnya[d]		46,500/83,500	Cameroon –	200
Yemen		1,500	Nigeria	
Burundi		15,500		
1995				
Ethiopia		4,800		
Niger		100 approx.		
1996				
Central African Republic	since 1996	1,600		
1998			**1998**	
Kosovo	in 1999	1,000–2,000	Eritrea—Ethiopia	50,000
Guinea Bissau	since 1998	3,000		
1999			**1999**	
Uzbekistan (1999 and 2004)	in 2000	303	India—Pakistan	1,000
2000				
Macedonia		122		
2001				
Afghanistan	in 2001	17,000 (until 2008)		
2002				
Cote d'Ivoire		1,200		
2003			**2003**	
Darfur	since 2004	5,300	Iraq—US-led coalition	137,400

Significant internal conflicts	Internationalized conflicts	Number of casualties	Inter-state conflicts	Number of casualties
2004				
Nigeria		75,000		
			2006	
			Israel–Lebanon	1,280
			2008	
			Djibouti–Eritrea	around 50
			Russia–Georgia	621
Total		**1,342,408**		**219,551**

[a] Ongoing in 1991.
[b] Ongoing in 1991.
[c] 31,000 actual battle deaths are estimated throughout the Rwandan war; 800,000 is the accepted figure for the genocide of 1994.
[d] 46,500 were estimated as battle deaths in 1994–5; 83,500 in 1999–2007.

Sources: For typology of conflicts, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4–2009, 1946–2008, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (www.ucdp.uu.se), Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. For number of casualties and battle-related deaths, The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset 1946–2008 v.3, Documentation of Coding Decisions; Dataset by Bethany Lacina, Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, September 2009.

This is part of a longer-term development that goes back over half a century. The underlying historical trend in the incidence of intra-state, as opposed to inter-state, wars is revealed in Figure 44.1. This is reinforced if we consider the changing strategic significance of those inter-state wars that have taken place since 1945.

The trend towards inter-state wars that are not strategically significant could be seen strengthening after about 1960, even in the midst of the Cold War. The Korean War in the early 1950s was long, expensive, and had a considerable strategic effect on all the participants; as did the Vietnam War of the 1960s and early 1970s. The first two of the three Arab–Israeli wars in 1948 and then 1956 were short but strategically significant; as were two of the four Indo-Pakistan wars, in 1947 and 1971. By then, however, the strategic significance of inter-state wars was in decline. The third Arab–Israeli war in 1973 and the second and fourth Indo-Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1999 made little difference regionally or globally, by comparison. There were short wars between China and India in 1962 and then China and Vietnam in 1979—all among significant and important states. But these wars, albeit costing tens of thousands of lives, were little more than coercive incursions to reinforce a point that Beijing was determined to make. The Falklands War of 1982 was short, sharp, and mattered greatly to the participants, but had no wider strategic significance. The same was true of Israel's 1982 war with Lebanon. The most destructive war of the 1980s—the Iraq–Iran war that cost the lives of some 800,000 troops—changed very little in the Middle East and was more about the mutual vulnerabilities of the leaderships in Baghdad and Tehran than any structural fault line in the region.



Figure 44.1 Intra- and inter-state conflicts of high intensity 1945 to 2009

Source: Conflict Barometer 2009, 16th Annual Conflict Analysis, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg

The key difference lies not, therefore, in the incidence of inter-state war but rather its broader international significance. Whether considering the latter part of the twentieth century or the particular cases of the post-Cold War era, it is evident that inter-state war still occurs regularly in the modern international system. The incidence of it remains significant, even if it now constitutes only a minority of cases. There is no reason to believe that this will change in the foreseeable future.

More significant is the fact that less and less does inter-state war appear to have a determining effect on the international system as a whole. Compared to the classic wars of the international system that emerged from the politics of Europe in the seventeenth century, contemporary inter-state wars have a minor or negligible effect on global or even regional distributions of power. Something has fundamentally changed, at least in the present era.

The inter-state wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were major struggles for—sometimes global—dominance. The first genuinely global war (1756–63), the American war of independence, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and the nineteenth-century colonial wars, all determined a prevailing balance of power and set the scene for cataclysmic warfare in the twentieth century that fundamentally determined the shape of the international system: its winners and losers, its unfortunates and ignored.[9] And the prospect of the ultimate cataclysmic, and possibly nuclear, war between superpower blocks of states had the effect of freezing the basic shape of the system for half a century after 1945.[10]

This is the international system we inherited after the Cold War, but it has already changed greatly and may soon bear even less relationship to any of the conflicts of the twentieth century. In our new international environment inter-state warfare is not, so far, playing a determining or structural role. Rather, it has recently appeared to be more an expression of weakness, of frustration, of demonstration and resolve; at best, an exercise in the preservation of a regional or international status quo.

What Does War Represent to the Powerful?

The powerful states in the world nevertheless spend vast resources on military preparations for conflict and war. They have a number of rationales for doing so. There are perhaps eight or nine genuinely powerful military states in the world, maybe another eighteen or so states that should be regarded as militarily competent, or significant; not so great a number of players but between them spending around one trillion dollars a year on military preparations.[11]

In a disordered world the powerful live with an existential threat of war that may be remote but which affects them in a number of more immediate ways. It is remote in that the prospect of war directly between the powerful states themselves is now hard to imagine. The ruinous costs of major wars, the shrivelled political advantage they would be likely to give the victor, the sheer unpredictability of the consequences, all indicate that war directly between them is highly unlikely.[12] As many critics have pointed out, this situation may not hold forever, and ruinous wars between other states are still quite plausible.[13] Then, too, the development of what Michael Mandelbaum has called a movement towards 'warlessness' among the powerful is 'something distinctly western and relatively new'.[14] Such 'warlessness' is easier to adopt among Western powers who have triumphed in the international system. Western values, however, may not endure so well in the 'Asian century' that is dawning. If most analysts agree that the prospects of war between the powerful are currently remote and welcome this trend, there is less certainty that it should be regarded as somehow irreversible.

Whether or not the current situation continues, the existential threat of war among the powerful affects them in a number of more immediate ways. Powerful states use their military machines in many other situations. They sometimes choose to intervene in the internal politics of other states for their own purposes; they sometimes become directly involved in ongoing internal conflicts; they offer military support at a distance to some participants in conflict; and they train, equip, teach, and nurture other militaries as an extension of their national diplomacy. Their demonstrated war-fighting potential is intrinsic to their ability to do this. Whether or not powerful states expect to fight a war, their forces frequently find themselves 'war-fighting' at an operational level in situations well short of a major war in the classical sense. Table 44.2 lists twenty-two significant

Table 44.2 Major military interventions since 1991

1990–1	Kuwait	Allied operation
1992–2003	Iraq	Air enforcement operations
1992–5	Somalia	US-led intervention
1992–5	Bosnia	UN/NATO operations
1989	Panama	US intervention
1994	Rwanda	French operation
1994	Haiti	US intervention
1994–5	Chechnya[a]	Russian domestic operation
1995–2010	Bosnia	NATO-led operation
1997	Albania	Italian-led operation
1999–2010	Kosovo	NATO operation
1999–2001	East Timor	Australian-led operation
1999–2007	Chechnya[a]	Russian domestic operation
2000–1	Sierra Leone	UK-led operations
2001	Macedonia	NATO operations
2001	Solomon Islands	Australian operation
2001–11	Afghanistan	International coalition
2002	Cote d'Ivoire	French operation
2003–11	Iraq	US-led operation
2005–11	Darfur	African Union/UN operations
2008	Georgia	Russian unilateral operation
2011	Libya	NATO-led operation

[a]Russian operations in Chechnya are not strictly 'foreign interventions' but in all relevant military respects have had to operate as if they were.

Source: Author's own data.

military operations in twenty years, which have involved the United States at least eleven times, Russia three times, European countries such as the UK, France, and Italy up to ten times and Australia five times.

When powerful states become involved in interventions such as these they inevitably risk unpredictable consequences.[15] Wars of intervention run the risk that they may become proxy wars against other powerful states. Since the Cold War this has not so far occurred in any significant way, though it was common enough in East Asia, South Asia, and Africa during the last century. The possibility that limited military operations may escalate to major conflict against powerful opponents is an attendant risk in a number of recent interventions; not least in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Georgia in the Table 2 list.

The existential prospect of major war also hovers over such operations insofar as they contribute to a sense of deterrence that the powerful would like to establish in relation to others who might try to challenge them militarily. The concept of 'deterrence' was applied overwhelmingly to an essentially bipolar nuclear balance between the world's powerful states during the last century, but in the present system that notion of nuclear deterrence has become far more complex, and is being set within a broader context of deterrence that embraces all military capacity. If nuclear deterrence applied to the (now) remote

prospects of total war between the powerful states, 'conventional deterrence' is all too relevant in current military interventions.[16] The ability of sophisticated armed forces to prevail in some meaningful way when they are engaged is regarded as crucial to the ability of the powerful states to defend their interests and to deter future military challenges.

The costs to major countries of doing this are not trivial. The Vietnam war cost the United States around $686 billion (in 2008 prices). It has already spent more than that in Iraq since 2003—over $724 billion by the end of 2010 (in 2009 prices), and over $300 billion in Afghanistan since 2001 (in 2009 prices). The United Kingdom spent around $1.5 billion (in 1983 prices) in winning the Falklands war, at least $1 billion in Bosnia and Kosovo, almost $10 billion in Iraq since 2003, and over $7 billion in Afghanistan since 2001.[17] Powerful states find it very difficult to countenance military failure and are prepared to spend a great deal of money to avoid it, even in situations that are less than vital to their national interests. Military credibility goes beyond a sense of national pride. Maintaining it is regarded as an essential investment in a secure future: a general, existential deterrent to any would-be aggressor and an instrument of unspoken persuasion and influence that backs up the diplomacy of the powerful.

Conventional deterrence is also an expression of the technological excellence of the militarily powerful. But this is a double-edged weapon for them. On the one hand, the technological superiority of a small number of states and their collective defence industrial base has prompted them to pursue what has been generally labelled a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA).[18] This revolution, if such it is, promises new generations of integrated knowledge and computing, robotics, precision weapons, and command and control technologies, such that the possessors of all this could expect decisive and relatively safe military victories against any type of opponent.

In the past, the multiple, heavily armoured military formations of the powerful states, with their extensive command structures and logistics chains were regarded as essential to the fighting of major conventional wars. These forces were frequently used for other than major military operations, but were regarded as suboptimal when they were. The technologies of the twentieth century were adapted for the fighting of total wars and the powerful states built their expectations of conflict, and their force structures, around them. But the technologies of the RMA offer the promise that powerful states will not have to choose between force structures that are built either for war or else for lesser operations. The RMA encourages powerful states to believe in the arrival of a kind of military omnipotence: in a military instrument that can be used decisively, and in a discriminating manner, anywhere in the world and against anyone. Certainly, the technological differences in how the United States fought the 1991 war against Iraq as opposed to that in 2003, or the way coalition forces in Afghanistan conducted operations in 2005 as opposed to 2010, are dramatic to say the least. There is no doubt that the high-tech war-fighting capabilities of the powerful states are undergoing a step change that sets them apart from most other forces and tempts national leaders to use them in more situations than would ever have been the case in the recent past.

On the other hand, the same technologies that have helped create the RMA have also undermined its effects by helping facilitate the growth of asymmetric warfare.

Opponents of the major powers use the communications revolution to make themselves more operationally agile, to create their own strategic communications machinery operating globally, and to attack the powerful states in other ways, though cyberattack, hostage-taking, and terrorism.[19] Nor is this merely the response of the weak sub-state group against the strong military machine. Asymmetric approaches to conflict are available to all in the present international system. China appears intent on competing with US military superiority in East Asia not by matching its military hardware but by negating its effects. For over a decade China's military spending has increased annually by at least 10 per cent, but its priorities have been focused on hardware and on strategies that would blind and frustrate US advantages in command and control and dramatically raise the political price of any US military action against China's interests.[20] Chinese thinking seems to concentrate on outflanking US military superiority as the best way of competing with it. In the Middle East, Iran tries to pursue a similar policy—creating defensive military systems, a nuclear capability, and political levers that will hold US pressure at bay for the coming decade; attempting to negate US military superiority while declaring brazenly that it is competing with it. Within the region, one of Iran's client groups, the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon, used high-tech communications systems in the war of 2006 to run a successful negation strategy against Israeli military incursions.

For the powerful, and their allies, therefore, war in the present era is not a declared state of belligerence but a level of organized violence in which they engage, or for which they plan. They do not generally anticipate fighting war, but they nevertheless engage in frequent military operations. Some of their military involvements over the last twenty years have been at very low technical levels; some have been peacekeeping and stabilization operations, often where war-fighting techniques have been necessary. And some have been specialist wars of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, or expeditionary intervention. Though some of these operations have been very expensive, none of them has involved a significant degree of national mobilization or threatened the existence of the powerful themselves. And of the list of twenty-two military interventions in Table 2, more than half of them can be regarded as a success for the powerful states, perhaps seven were indecisive, and three were unambiguous failures.

What Does War Represent in the Global System?

It is evident that war is not serving as an enforcement mechanism in the present global system. Powerful states compete with each other in essentially non-military ways. They may have used their militaries a lot against others but they have not so committed themselves as to make 'extraordinary' efforts to prevail. They have modulated their commitments up and down as political expedience has directed. And though some of their interventions may be regarded as serving the interests of world order, others palpably have not.

If warfare represents anything in the present era it is the choice of which conflicts and problems are 'securitized' to the extent that they are regarded as wars.[21] The conflict in Somalia from 1992 was strategically significant and has proved to be consequential since, but international intervention in 1993 was a failure and there was no appetite to do more than leave the territory to its own devices. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was effectively ignored, save for a highly controversial French incursion into the midst of the killing. The conflict in southern Sudan has almost no wider strategic significance even to Africa, let alone in the world as a whole. But the human misery caused by the Darfur crisis from 2003 elevated it to the level of a war and provoked the deployment of 7,000 African Union peacekeeping troops into the territory, who were of limited operational effect in such a huge territory. Such examples can be repeated throughout East and West Africa, the Middle East, and in many parts of South and East Asia.

The world is disordered, as has been the case throughout history; but the militarily powerful no longer impose on it any particular pattern. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the imperial policies of the powerful created a pattern of securitization behaviour that shaped the politics of large swathes of the rest of the world. In the twentieth century their wars had the effect of securitizing those regional conflicts that mattered to them. In the twenty-first century their motives for securitizing one conflict over another—ignoring one and elevating another into an intervention, or even a war—are volatile and ambiguous. It is impossible to calculate whether this represents merely an interregnum between eras when the military politics of the powerful dominated the rest of the world, and will do so again; or whether this shifting mosaic of conflict and intervention will be the norm for the foreseeable future.

Certainly, for the immediate future it is apparent that there is no over-riding ideology that would create a more general regional or global war out of such disorder. This is not one of the fault lines in the present international system. Ingenious attempts are periodically made to create a scenario for a 'Third World War' which point, plausibly enough, to the ways in which regional conflicts could all get worse, perhaps simultaneously. Such accounts are never able to tell a convincing story that would genuinely link them together.[22] Both world wars, and the Cold War, were a series of different regional conflicts united by the ideologies and survival instincts of the major protagonists. Such conditions no longer apply. Francis Fukuyama's thesis at the end of the Cold War, that Western ideology—market-based liberal capitalism—had not so much triumphed in the twentieth century as become a simple fact of life, still appears to be essentially correct.[23] Though there is a wellspring of alienation around the world at this prevailing condition, and a deliberate attempt on the part of China and Russia to escape the logic of it, not to mention an internal crisis of confidence in the system as a result of the global economic crisis that began in 2008, the fact remains that nothing has so far emerged to replace it.

It may be that the post-modern world is ripe for a new globalist ideology that would put liberal market capitalism on the defensive and provide the intellectual cement that would securitize other conflicts into a series of major wars for power and survival. One belief system that aspires to this is the jihadist notion of the recreated caliphate on a global scale. As expressed in the original Al Qaeda fatwa of 1998, and reinforced

in numerous related pronouncements since, the global caliphate would require a genuine world revolution: overthrowing apostate governments throughout the Islamic world, destroying the state of Israel, ejecting all Western influence from North Africa to the Pacific, and then working to convert non-Muslims to spread the influence of the caliphate indefinitely.[24] This aspiration, however, is held only by a small minority of individuals in high-profile terrorist groups who try to mobilize alienated youth throughout the Muslim world. It is not openly espoused or supported by any states in the system, or for that matter any relevant organizations or private groups. If any significant states were to espouse it, the global caliphate might represent a different challenge that would create new motives for conflict; but there are currently no signs of that happening.

Other candidates for a global ideology that could securitize disparate conflicts in the future might be the 'haves' and 'have-nots' resulting from extreme environmental stress. If global warming and environmental degradation put some rich societies in the same boat as poor ones, as the alienated 'have-nots' in a global environmental crisis, it is not impossible to imagine the growth of ideologies that would codify the resentment of the deprived peoples of the world, articulated by the stronger societies who found themselves so deprived. This scenario, too, is plausible but, so far, a mere abstraction.[25] The fact remains that Fukuyama's 'end of history' was describing the end of an international fault line in the previous system and it shows no sign of reappearing.

Where then are the fault lines of the present system, as illuminated by war and conflict? The most obvious is the ongoing tension between the institution of the state on the one side and the forces of the global market, the communications revolution, and human mobility on the other: a 'strategic revolution' in its own right in the view of some authors.[26] Under these constant pressures, the state remains a very significant institution in world politics, but it is no longer the determining institution—the essential building-block—of the global order. Almost fifty states in the world have been defined across five different indexes as 'weak' or 'failing' in some significant degree.[27] There is comparatively little they themselves can do to prevent conflict breaking out within their borders or spilling over from neighbouring territories. The more stable and the stronger states either cannot do much to prevent this, or else have small interest in trying to, since the global market, the communications revolution, and human mobility put the stakes of the powerful in preserving their security and prosperity into a different game altogether.

The global market, on the other hand, is ubiquitous, even if China, Russia, and a number of autocratic regimes reject the liberal capitalist logic of it. The empowerment which the market, communications, and mobility give to individuals and groups is, in historical terms, spectacular. In the current system, motivations for civil conflicts are rarely purely economic, but a conflict normally provokes a powerful micro-economy around it. The costs of an insurgency have to be met with money derived from other sources such as narcotics, minerals, diamonds, or foreign financing; an international division of labour rapidly establishes itself around a conflict so that most actors have compelling economic motives for continuing it; and the incentives for them to switch back to 'normality' have to be considerable and driven from states or institutions well outside the conflict economy. The world is normally not sufficiently interested in most

conflicts to do this.[28] At a systemic level, the global market punishes areas of instability simply by ignoring them. In a knowledge-based and financially-driven global market, there are few genuine choke-points to world trade, even in relation to the energy industry. The global market can certainly be inconvenienced by war and conflict, but it is sufficiently flexible no longer to be held hostage to it.[29] In 1991, Saddam Hussein attempted to hold the northern waters of the Gulf hostage against his ultimate defeat, and to create an environmental catastrophe by firing the oil wells in Kuwait as his forces were defeated. He did all he could to carry out these threats in a highly volatile part of the world, but his actions did not disturb the price of oil and had minimal effect, for all the black plumes of smoke above Kuwait, on the environment.

Another great fault line revealed by the pattern of warfare is the wide dispersion of power in world politics, which accounts for the fact that there is so little to stop local conflicts and wars from occurring or escalating. This dispersion of power not only applies to the actors in world politics, where it is increasingly possible to negate military superiority by asymmetric means. It also applies to the sources and instruments of contemporary political power. The complexity of modern systems for the delivery of human services in all societies, from public utilities, to food, education, health, or culture, makes it difficult for any single government or organization to do more than influence the process. International sanctions against aggressive leaders are notoriously hard to make effective, even if there is an international consensus in the United Nations to make them so. By the same token, the political benefits of even successful military campaigns require complex coalitions of public and private institutions to become tangible. Sheer complexity reduces the political horizons of even the most powerful governments. The wide distribution of political power in the current system is not a symptom of some sort of democracy of power or an equality of strength; it points to a lack of clear political authority in the system, an increasing lack of consensual legitimacy, and a sense of uncertainty and transition.

Current patterns of war and conflict are both cause and effect of such structural fault lines in the international system. There has never been a definitive answer to the universal question of what causes wars to occur.[30] But there are some reasonably specific answers to the particular questions of why they are, or are not, prevented in any particular historical context. The way a system reacts to the resort to violence in the expressions of power or the settling of disputes will be different from era to era and from system to system. The globalized system of the twenty-first century is in rapid transition and shows a degree of chaos and violence that is not statistically so great, but is conceptually challenging because we are not clear what it presages. War is certainly not over. It takes different and changing forms precisely because it reflects all this.

Notes

1. The best expression of this idea comes from the 'Copenhagen School': see Buzan, 1997; Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998.
2. See, for example, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, 2009.

3. See Cooper, 2000 and 2003.
4. Kaldor, 2006: ch. 2; Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2009: 20.
5. This perspective is confirmed by summaries of other similar quantitative analyses. See Blattman and Miguel, 2009.
6. Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr, 2008.
7. Lacina, Russett, and Gleditsch, 2006.
8. Centre for Systemic Peace, *Global Conflict Trends and War List 1946–2008* (www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm); Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr, 2008.
9. See Bobbitt, 2002: Mead, 2007.
10. Gaddis, 2007.
11. See, SIPRI, 2010: ch. 5. The militarily 'powerful' may be regarded as the US, China, India, Russia and, at most, four members of European NATO. The militarily 'competent' might be regarded as states such as Israel, Pakistan, Australia, Japan, Turkey, Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, Egypt, and perhaps ten other members of NATO. It is difficult to imagine this list as much more than twenty or so in present circumstances.
12. Mandelbaum, 1998–9.
13. See Gray, 2005 and 2006.
14. See Mandelbaum, 1999: 150; 2002: 121–8.
15. See Dobbins et al., 2005a, 2005b, 2009.
16. Gerson, 2009; Cain, 2010.
17. On US figures, see Belasco, 2009; National Priorities Project, 2009. On UK figures, see Hartley, 2002. The UK estimates for Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are all now in 2009 prices. Comparative cost figures for military conflicts over a period have to be treated with caution, but are illustrative of different orders of magnitude.
18. The 'revolution in military affairs' is now a much-derided term; see Freedman, 1998. Nevertheless, it provides a shorthand for the step change that has taken place in high-tech military technologies.
19. Thornton, 2007.
20. See Leonard, 2008: 104–9; Holslag, 2010.
21. See Roberts and Zaum, 2008.
22. See, for example, Pearson, 1999. The best is still probably Hackett, 1982.
23. Fukuyama, 1992. A counterblast is offered by Kagan, 2008.
24. Torres, Jordan, and Horsborgh, 2006; Steger, 2009.
25. Paehlke, 1989: 273–8.
26. See Freedman, 2006; Brown, 2009, esp. 235–49.
27. Wyler, 2008: 27–33.
28. Smith, 2009: 80.
29. Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007: 515–24. See also the illuminating facts on the relationship between state and commerce in Shaxson, 2011.
30. The best tilt at the universal question remains, Waltz, 1959.

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CONCLUSIONS: THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH AND YVES BOYER

Introduction

War is unpredictable, as are its consequences. However, it is the job of militaries to prepare for and if necessary fight and win future wars, whatever the uncertainties. Equally, the very fact that war and its consequences are unpredictable remains one of the few great constants in international relations. Therefore, history suggests that the armed forces of the great liberal democracies, whilst of course aware of the political and strategic context of their mission and the societies they serve, must ultimately be permitted to focus on one uncompromising but critical requirement—to win.

Furthermore, because armed forces are, have always been, and will likely always be the last resort of the state and its possible recourse to violence as a tool of policy, it is also critical that the very nature of unpredictability and the dangers it portends are at least understood by those who lead and those who command. Unpredictability has of course many dimensions but essentially there are two upon which leaders and commanders must focus and which must drive the act of war in state policy: when war will take place and what form it will take.

The Unpredictability of War

For all the moderating influence of international institutions the world of the twenty-first century would be recognizable to a seventeenth-century thinker such as Thomas Hobbes. In spite of globalization, the international community, such as it exists, remains

essentially anarchic, comprised of strong states, weak states, sub-state and trans-state actors. Whilst the concept of the nation-state did not formally emerge until after the Thirty Years War of 1618–48, Hobbes would have understood that today's actors exist in a 'state of nature', calculating each other's interests, pursuing their own interests, and assessing daily where progress might be contemplated and where failure and defeat might be suffered.

Naturally, the political, diplomatic, and bureaucratic practices of over three centuries have created conventions and norms for state behaviour such that in regions such as Europe and North America conventional war is today unthinkable. However, it has only been unthinkable these twenty years past and for much of the rest of the world, for which growth, decline, and instability are daily challenges, no such comforting assumptions can be made. Indeed, in spite of efforts to paint the contemporary world as 'post-modern', i.e. one in which the state and its interactions are a thing of the past, it is surprising how resilient the state as a focal point for identity has proven. If they were really as weak a concept as some would have it then the struggle for leadership evidenced across the Middle East and beyond would not generate the mixture of hope and fear that concerns Israel and much of Europe.

Wars will happen. And it is likely that most of those wars for the foreseeable future will enjoy the prefix 'limited'. However, whilst one should not be too dictated to by the lessons of history (one can be doomed to repeat history as much by over-reliance as ignorance), this century is shaping up to be more like the late nineteenth than the twentieth, certainly in terms of the shape of the international system, its relatively instable multipolarity, and the unexpectedly rapid shift of the distribution of power amongst states. No longer can unequivocal world leadership be said to reside in the hands of a few Western capitals. For example, in February 2011 China overtook Japan to become the world's second largest economy and could surpass that of the United States within twenty years or so. Clearly, these events, pushed as they are by the tide of globalization, will by their very nature impact on geopolitics and strategy.

The comforting assumption of many Western states as recently as a decade ago that the task of grand strategy was to make the world better by transforming it in some way in their image has changed in the post-9/11 world with remarkable and frightening speed. If nothing else, Al Qaeda and the thus-far failed attempts of the West to deal with Islamism, far from demonstrating hegemonic dominance, have rather demonstrated the West's inability to shape the global *polis*. This has certainly encouraged the more extreme autocracies, such as Iran and North Korea, to seek 'security' through the means of catastrophic war, but it has also suggested to emerging powers that neither reliance upon nor opposition to American leadership will provide the assured consequences—both positive and negative—many once assumed.

Furthermore, with many states no longer compelled by or with a compelling belief in Western liberal democracy, the return of autocracies means that the very concept of legitimacy is changing. Democracies are of course legitimized by the ability of the people to replace under-performing leaderships, whilst in today's sophisticated autocracies and oligarchies it is economic growth that provides 'legitimacy'. Taken together

with the precipitous retreat from power and status of many Western states in the wake of the systemic financial crisis, it is likely that the world is entering into a period of hyper-competition leavened by the weakening of state identities driven by globalization.

It is comfortingly current to suggest that at least such competition is no longer about the nature and governance of the international system itself. The ideological confrontation between Soviet Russia and liberal America is, one is told, a thing of the past. However, in this globalized world the self-evident preparations for war that arms procurement reveals suggest a world breaking down into identifiable blocs, far less strident but not dissimilar to those prior to the First World War. This is reinforced by the very nature of the systemic struggle between the state and the anti-state which has its epicentre in the Middle East, in which the opponents have very different *Weltanschauungen*, based on diverse philosophical and religious values, further increasing the already enormous unpredictability of war.

The bottom-line is this: what might appear as a relatively stable international system is also beginning to show signs of a potentially rapid descent into instability as nationalism, energy competition, burgeoning and spreading advanced military technology, and state instability suggest that systemic war, whilst unlikely, could well happen far more quickly than many have hitherto thought. Today the possibility of a war between peoples must begin to be seriously considered, not just war amongst the people.

Unpredictability in the Nature and Expression of War

The new systemic uncertainty and the unpredictability of war are compounded by unpredictability in the very nature of war. If the consequences of political, social, and economic dynamics are uncertain, so is the consequence of rapidly developing technology, particularly military technology.

Technology has substantially modified the way wars occur, the way they are launched and fought, not least because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is rapidly reducing the options and ability of great powers to confront middling and smaller powers. Indeed, with potential and/or real access to nuclear weapons the possibility of strategic equalization through technology has not been lost on the likes of Tehran and Pyongyang, even though they both may have exaggerated the extent of American weakness, given the nature of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the simple fact remains that in the business of war the technology factor and its capacity to drive rapid change in the correlation of opposing forces and resources is a massive factor in the emerging concepts and doctrines of modern warfare. As with all the great technological breakthroughs intended to end war for all time, in fact technology adds an additional layer of complexity in what is already a hideously complex set of political, military, and technological considerations.

Has technology made war more or less likely? Whilst during the Cold War the answer was hopefully the latter today it is not all clear, with many new actors gaining access to weapons technology they could only have dreamed of in the not so distant past. And yet, America's advanced technology, whilst useful, has often proved decidedly ineffective against insurgents in Afghanistan often armed with little more than the ubiquitous Kalashnikov. What can be said with some certainty is that today a new unpredictability parameter has been introduced into the complex equation on war that could compel as much as deter war and which only serves to thicken the fog of war through which Clausewitz so famously peered in 1832.

The unpredictability of war and in the nature of war is further reinforced by unpredictability in the very expression of war. The combination of high-tech means and capabilities and processes, reinforced and strengthened by 'cultural-historical' components, makes it very difficult indeed to predict what form future war will take or indeed how it will be expressed. The possible strategic, geographical, military, technical, not to say social permutations and combinations are almost beyond imagination, particularly for those charged with defending open societies in which societal resilience is low and for which the balance between protection and power projection may be being steadily eroded by a mixture of political myopia and financial distress. War could at one and the same time be global, regional, and/or local, flaring and dying down rapidly. It could involve high-tech forces in long, low-intensity struggles or low-tech forces in sudden technology-rich attacks. It could take place simultaneously within state borders and between states and in time it could be both conventional and nuclear. It is hardly reassuring.

Coping with Unpredictability

The unpredictability of war, with the many strategy and policy uncertainties it engenders, is itself a reflection of the blurred distinction between risk and threat. Such blurring makes it very hard for policy-makers to agree a main effort or indeed shape for future armed forces. It is a dilemma further compounded by the merging of military and criminal threat through the great strategic multiplier that is cyberspace.

The twinning of unpredictability with uncertainty explains much of the effort in the West to establish new classifications of war and its many forms—classical war versus atomic war; high-intensity war versus hybrid war; asymmetric war versus humanitarian interventionism—and the role of armed forces therein, etc. In the end such efforts may prove to be, in large part, both circumstantial and peripheral. Indeed, they could essentially miss the point if they drive leaders to recognize only as much threat as they can afford.

The rationale of such efforts on the face of it appears relatively sound: providing political and military leaderships with immediate political, military, industrial, and bureaucratic tools for critical decision-making processes. This, after all, was the appar-

ent motivation behind, for example, the 2008 French Livre Blanc, the 2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the UK's 2010 National Security Strategy (UKNSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). In fact much of the strategic 'consideration' and the bureaucratic process they entailed were driven almost exclusively by short-term budgetary necessities. Consequently, much of the 'strategy' was in fact the politically correct, financial flavour of the month. Consequently, such reviews can all too easily contribute to false security offering elusive 'certainties' and reassurance to hard-pressed leaders confronted with the many unknowns of the current age and increasingly uncertain and insecure publics. Sadly, as has been all too often demonstrated in the past, when real certainty comes knocking the pretence is revealed for what it is and disaster ensues.

What can also be said with some certainty is that the unpredictability of war does not and must not cloud or erase past assumptions about war and how wars should be fought. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz remain essentially correct—if one is going to fight a war, fight it to win and to win it quickly. This basic constant in the teaching of war has as direct a consequence for today's military as it did for ancient China or post-Napoleonic Europe.

Armed forces should concentrate on training and preparing for successful military operations. Hard though it is for political leaders, the more armed forces concentrate on this core mission (*ils s'instruisent pour vaincre*) the more they should be protected and left unaffected by the excess and contingent stakes of political and bureaucratic debates about defence. The failure of past strategic reviews and their findings are examples of what happens when armed forces are forced to take a position in such a debate. Why? War has its own undeniable and dangerous logic. When the cards are on the table, at the point of contact with danger, history is all too eloquent in showing that by then it is too late to remedy past errors. It is therefore precisely (if admittedly naively) that the central argument herein is that the unpredictable character of war must demand a rigorous separation of the military from the many 'ancillary' contingencies that any budget-led process necessarily creates. This is not to argue that armed forces should be immune from economic and financial realities but that first and foremost defence reviews should be strategy-led, not budget-led.

This distinction between the strategic and the budgetary is of course easier for autocratic, undemocratic societies to realize, at least over the short to medium term. In democratic countries it is possible to achieve such distinction only if innovative means of planning and budgeting are sought over the longer term. Such an approach avoids the shaping of core military competencies by immediate and more conjectural imperatives. Such a dramatic reappraisal of roles and costs could be achieved quite quickly, contrary to the apparent inclination of many Western states today. If armed forces must do everything, everywhere, all the time, they very rapidly cease to be armed forces.

In a period of scarce financial resources and growing disinterest about military affairs amongst large sections of society, the military itself may be advised to focus on its core competence. At the strategic level, military leaders must of course reach out to the politi-

cal and civil society. Moreover, civil-military relations will require new forms of contact. However, armed forces are not armed social workers and soldiers are not policemen, and the proliferation of tasks and roles evident in the recent past is in danger of producing people who are poor social workers, poor policemen, and poor soldiers. At the very least the officer corps in particular needs to refocus on their professional art, which is to fight and win wars. Only then will they be able to make the case to politicians to justify their cost, for only then will they be able to speak with one voice as to their purpose and role. As the French writer Alfred de Vigny once wrote, it is both the '*grandeurs et servitudes militaires*' of the officer corps.

Then war might be just a little less unpredictable.

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